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1997 DIGILAW 279 (KER)

Sudhakaran Pillai v. Kadija Beevi

1997-07-28

K.A.ABDUL GAFOOR

body1997
Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. The petitioner is one among the legal representatives of the tenant in a proceeding under the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. The proceeding was initiated by the 1st respondent alleging grounds under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the said Act. The tenanted building is owned by respondent Nos.1 to 3. It was originally owned by respondents 1 and 2 and one Jubbah, who later transferred it to the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent later on transferred it to the 3rd respondent. Ext. P1 is the lease deed. It is an admitted case that "the 1 st respondent was authorised to receive rent from the tenant" as averred in paragraph 3 of the original petition. As per the definition of the 'landlord' as contained in S.2(3) of the said Act, landlord includes a person who is receiving or entitled to receive the rent. S.11(2) enables the 'landlord' to apply to the Rent Control Court to evict the tenant on the specified grounds. Therefore, the 1st respondent, who is a statutory landlord applied to the Rent Control Court for eviction on the ground mentioned above. That was allowed as per Ext. P2. The tenant challenged the order of the Rent Controller in an appeal. During its pendency, the tenant died and the legal representatives of the tenant including the petitioner herein got themselves impleaded in the appeal. But, the appeal later failed. The revision preferred by the tenants was allowed holding that the rent control petition was not maintainable in so far as the two landladies other than the 1 st respondent were not parties to the rent control petition. The 1st respondent challenged the revisional order in O.P. 6292/87. This Court allowed the original petition setting aside the revisional order, as per Ext. P4 judgment, holding that one of the co-owners could have maintained a petition for eviction of a tenant, under the said Act. A Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court also was dismissed. 2. As thus, the eviction order became final, the 1st respondent moved E.P. 113/ 91 before the Munsiff Court, Kollam seeking order to put her the building in possession, executing the order of the rent controller. The petitioner filed LA. 3976/92 in R.C.P. 65/80 seeking to vacate the order of eviction passed under S.11(2)(b) on the ground that arrears of rent had already been paid. The petitioner filed LA. 3976/92 in R.C.P. 65/80 seeking to vacate the order of eviction passed under S.11(2)(b) on the ground that arrears of rent had already been paid. He also filed E, A. 260/91 in the execution petition seeking to pass an order holding that Ext. P2 order of eviction is is not executable as subsequent to Ext. P4 judgment of this Court confirming eviction order, "respondent Nos. 2 and 3 leased out their respective portions of the premises to the petitioner after obtaining possession of the same from the other legal representatives of the tenant". Thus, the petitioner contended that there was a fresh lease in his favour by respondents 2 and 3, two among the co-owners and therefore, Ext. P2 order is not executable. He also contended that by reason of that subsequent act "the purpose for which eviction was sought for under S.11(3) of the Act has become redundant and as such eviction order under S.11(3) of the Act is also not executable." E.P.No.113/91 and E. A. 260/ 91 were disposed of by Ext. P14 common order. It was held that as the arrears of rent was not deposited within 30 days from the date of Ext. P13 order of eviction, the eviction ordered under S.11(2)(b) was still subsisting. Delivery of the entire building was also ordered in Ext. P14. Thereupon, the petitioner filed R.C.R.P.1/96. That also was dismissed as per Ext. P15. It is in the above circumstances, the petitioner has approached this court challenging Exts. P14 & P15. 4. The petitioner contends that the 1st respondent was only acting as an agent of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in obtaining the order for eviction, and she can execute the eviction order only if she is authorised to do so by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is further submitted that as there is a fresh lease by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in favour of the petitioner subsequent to the order of eviction, it amounted to an implied revocation of the authority given to the 1st respondent and therefore, delivery ordered is illegal. It is also contended that the tenanted premises was the subject matter of the new lease and when the lessee accepts the new lease, it ipso facto terminates the old lease, and in such circumstances the 1 st respondent is not entitled to get the delivery of the entire premises. It is also contended that the tenanted premises was the subject matter of the new lease and when the lessee accepts the new lease, it ipso facto terminates the old lease, and in such circumstances the 1 st respondent is not entitled to get the delivery of the entire premises. It is also contended that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 or the predecessor in interest of the 3rd respondent were not parties to the eviction proceedings and therefore, eviction order passed without their juncture cannot affect the rights of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the matter of letting out their interest in the building. 5. Thus, the point is whether Ext. P2 can any longer be executed in the light of the alleged subsequent lease in favour of the petitioner by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and in the light of surrender of possession by the legal representatives of the original tenant to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 6. It is an admitted case that Ext. P1 is the lease deed. It authorises the 1st respondent to collect the rent. Therefore, as per the statutory definition the 1st respondent is the landlady and she is entitled to maintain a petition for eviction of the tenant. In the light of Ext. P4 judgment of this court, the tenant or his legal representatives including the petitioner cannot any longer contend that an eviction order without the juncture of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 who had authorised the 1st respondent to collect rent, is bad. The arrangement or authorisation between respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and the 1st respondent is a matter between them, and the petitioner cannot get or acquire any right out of the arrangement or authorisation or its revocation. As per the definition of 'landlord', the 1 st respondent is the landlady entitled to maintain an eviction petition and that fructified as per Ext. P2, finally confirmed in Ext. P4 and later by the Supreme Court. Therefore, if there was any surrender by the legal representatives of the original tenant as claimed by the petitioner, that should have been to the 1st respondent and not respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Without a surrender a fresh lease is impossible. There was no valid surrender in terms of Ext. P2 order of the Rent Controller to the 'landlord' who had obtained that order. 2 and 3. Without a surrender a fresh lease is impossible. There was no valid surrender in terms of Ext. P2 order of the Rent Controller to the 'landlord' who had obtained that order. Therefore, the case of surrender and consequent fresh lease in favour of the petitioner alleged to be given by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, cannot be accepted. Therefore, Ext. P2 is an executable order. 7. Even if the alleged fresh lease from respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is said to be valid, even then, the excitability of Ext. P2 order of the Rent Controller will not lose. In Narayani Amma v. Govindan Nambi (1994 (2) KLT 485 (DB), this Court had considered a case where few of the judgment debtors had obtained the right from some of the joint decree holders. It was held that, "Having fought the litigation for a considerably long period of about 26 years by now, we are of the view that it will not be proper to deny the revision petitioners their right to get possession of the property along with the other decree holders." Almost a similar case came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Rajesteari & Ors. v. S. P. Palaniappan and Ors. (1984 (2) MLJ 62). In that case, the landlord filed a petition to evict the tenant on the ground of sub letting, conversion of building to other form and committing of waste. During the pendency of the proceedings, the landlord died and the legal representatives came on record. During the pendency, the tenants purchased 11/60 shares of the tenanted premises from one among the legal representatives of the original landlord. The tenants therefore, contended that by virtue of this purchase they had become co-owners and hence they were not liable to be evicted from the premises. It was held that, "the petition for eviction which was filed in the year 1975 will not be rendered nugatory on the acquisition of a share, two years later on (23rd October, 1977), by the tenant from one of the co-sharers of the landlord". It was also held that, "in the absence of tenant's acquiring the entire interest of the landlord, they cannot non suit the landlord's application for eviction on that ground alone". It was also held that, "in the absence of tenant's acquiring the entire interest of the landlord, they cannot non suit the landlord's application for eviction on that ground alone". Thus, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held, in a case the tenant getting ownership over the tenanted premises from one among the co-owners that the eviction petition was still maintainable. Therefore, in the case of a fresh lease by some co-owners, the position cannot be different. On the basis of that principle also, it cannot be said that Ext. P2 order cannot be executed. In a situation where eviction petition is maintainable, certainly an order of eviction shall be executed. 8. The 2nd respondent and the predecessor in interest of the 3rd respondent had given authorisation to the 1st respondent to evict the tenant, and the Court has passed an order in Ext. P2. When that has become final and is sought to be executed, the 2nd and 3rd respondents cannot, alleging that they had withdrawn authorisation, create a fresh lease unless the lease as per Ext. P1 is terminated and without the consent of the 1 st respondent. Admittedly by the petitioner, there is no consent from the 1 st respondent for the fresh lease. There was no termination of the first lease as per Ext. P1. So, long as that lease continues, there cannot be a fresh lease in favour of the petitioner. On that ground also, the petitioner cannot contend that he had become a fresh lessee and therefore Ext. P2 cannot be executed. 9. Moreover, the executing court cannot go behind the decree. There is no dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the Court which passed Ext. P2 order. Unless the landlord in Ext. P2 proceedings for eviction, namely the 1st respondent, puts the building in possession of another, the tenant cannot contend that the bonafide need under S.11(3), for which eviction was ordered does not exist. When S.11(3) ground existed, it does not matter whether S.11(2) ground was lost or not subsequently. So, I find no reason to interfere with Exts. P13 and P14.O.P. fails and it is dismissed.