JUDGMENT : R.K. Dash, J. - The Petitioner by filing the present application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has prayed for quashing of the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Sambalpur, passed in Civil Revision No. 12/5 of 1995/ 96 (Annexure-5) whereby he set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jharsuguda, dismissing the execution proceeding. 2. For better appreciation of the case, a few facts may be stated thus: The opposite party No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the landlord") filed a petition u/s 7(2)(i) and (iii) of the Orissa House-Rent Control Act (for short, the Act') against the present Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the tenant') for eviction from the house situated at Jharsuguda alleging, inter alia, that the tenant wilfully defaulted to pay the rent and that without his prior permission, either oral or written, constructed a cow-shed and thereby materially impaired the value and utility of the tenanted house. The tenant refuted the allegations of the landlord and contested the proceeding. 3. During trial both parties led evidence in support of their respective cases and after close of hearing the learned House Rent Controller (for short, Controller") heard the arguments. In the meanwhile, both parties filed a petition for compromise. Annexure-1. in terms whereof the Controller disposed of the case. The terms of compromise which formed part of the order reads as under: (i) That, the opposite party (meaning thereby the tenant) will pay to the applicant (meaning thereby the landlord) an amount of Rs. 880/ - (Rupees Eight Hundred and Eighty) towards the arrears of house rent as claimed in the H.R. petition within the first week of April. 1988. (ii) That, both the parties have agreed to fix the monthly rent of the case house at the rate of Rs. 120/ - (Rupees one hundred and twenty) which is to be effect from 1.4.1988 and the said rent is exclusive of electric charges. (iii) That, the opp. party agreed to vacate the case house premises on or before 31.3.91 (31st March. 1991) and in case the o.p. fails to vacate the case house, within the said period, the applicant is at liberty to evict the o.p. through proper process of law. (iii) That, the opp. party agreed to vacate the case house premises on or before 31.3.91 (31st March. 1991) and in case the o.p. fails to vacate the case house, within the said period, the applicant is at liberty to evict the o.p. through proper process of law. (Emphasis supplied) Since the tenant did not vacate the house as per the terms of the compromise, the landlord levied execution, before the Civil Judge (Junior Division). Jharsuguda (Previously designated as Munsif). On being noticed, the tenant filed a petition u/s 47. CPC challenging the maintainability of the execution proceeding on the following grounds: (a) That the order of the Controller is not executable in law and (b) That in view of compromise, a fresh tenancy was created in favour of the tenant and therefore, without there being a fresh order of eviction, the tenant cannot be evicted from the house in question. 5. Learned executing Court upon hearing the parties, came to hold that there being no order passed by the Controller directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises, the order under Annexure-2 passed in terms of the compromise cannot be termed as a decree. Further, it also took the view that since the rent of the tenanted premises was enhanced as agreed to between the parties, a fresh tenancy was created and therefore, the compromise being non est. the execution proceeding was not maintainable in law. In the premises, the Court declined the compromise decree and consequently dismissed the execution proceeding. The said order came to be challenged by the landlord in revision and the learned Additional District Judge upon hearing the parties, set aside the order of the executing Court and held that the order of the Controller under Annexure-2 being a decree is executable u/s 15 of the Act and having so held, he allowed the revision. Hence, the present writ application. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the tenant assailing the order of the revisional Court raised the following contentions: (1) That, thee being no specific direction by the Controller to the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises, the impugned order Annexure-2 is inexecutable. (2) That, as provided u/s 7 of the Act. the Controller was competent to pass an order of eviction on one or more grounds enumerated, therein. (2) That, as provided u/s 7 of the Act. the Controller was competent to pass an order of eviction on one or more grounds enumerated, therein. but in the present case, the Controller without applying his mind as to whether the grounds for eviction existed or not, disposed of the case on the basis of compromise and hence the impugned order even if is held to be a decree, is a nullity. In support of such submission he relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another, and Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal, . (3) That, pursuant to the compromise, the rent of the tenanted premises having been enhanced, a new tenancy was created in favour of the landlord and, therefore without there being a fresh order for eviction, the impugned order cannot be put to execution. 7. From narration of facts, it stands admitted that both parties agreed that the tenant would vacate the premises on or before 31.3.1991 and if he fails to do so within the said stipulated period, the landlord would be at liberty to evict him through process of law. The said term of agreement formed part of the decree, as is evident from the order, Annexure-2. Since the tenant on his own volition agreed to lease the tenanted premises, no specific order, in Our opinion was necessary to be passed by the learned Controller directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession thereof. 8. So far next contention is concerned, it may be reiterated that the landlord sought for eviction of the tenant on the grounds, namely, that the tenant defaulted in paying the rent and secondly, he without the consent of the landlord constructed a cowshed which materially impaired the value or utility of the house in question. It would appear from the evidence of the tenant as well as the compromise petition that he admitted to be in arrears of rent as claimed by the landlord. In view of such admission, the learned Controller was satisfied that one of the grounds for eviction, as pleaded by the landlord, existed. It would appear from the evidence of the tenant as well as the compromise petition that he admitted to be in arrears of rent as claimed by the landlord. In view of such admission, the learned Controller was satisfied that one of the grounds for eviction, as pleaded by the landlord, existed. As regards the second ground for eviction, the learned Controller on scrutiny of the evidence came to hold that the cow-shed has been constructed by the tenant on both sides of the tenanted premises without landlord's consent, which has caused obstruction to the normal flow of light and air. Taking all the above aspects into consideration as also the terms of compromise, he passed the impugned order. Annexure-2. The legal position as enumerated in the aforesaid two decisions in Ferozi Lal (supra) and Smt. Kaushalya Devi (supra) that the Court cannot pass a decree in terms of compromise without satisfying itself that the ground for eviction existed, is well settled. In the aforesaid two cases the Court passed decree in terms of compromise without making further probe as to whether grounds for eviction existed or not. In the premises, their Lordships held that the decree for eviction being a nullity, could not be executed. The present case, however, stands altogether on a different footing. It may be reiterated that the tenant in unequivocal terms admitted both in his evidence as well as in the compromise petition that he was in arrears of rent, and he did not take steps to tender the same to the landlord or to deposit it in Court and this factual position as admitted by the tenant, was taken not of by the learned Controller while passing the impugned order. The facts in Maguni Chandra Dwibedi Vs. Sardar Gurbachan Singh Dugal upon which reliance was placed by the tenant are distinguishable. That was a proceeding u/s 10 of the Act where compromise was effected between the parties that the tenant would temporarily vacate the house and give delivery of possession to the landlord with an understanding that after the new house was constructed for being used as a shop room, the same would be let out to him. The compromise was accordingly accepted and the case was disposed of in terms thereof. Later on, the landlord though constructed new house, but did not let out to the tenant. The compromise was accordingly accepted and the case was disposed of in terms thereof. Later on, the landlord though constructed new house, but did not let out to the tenant. This led the tenant to levy execution. In this factual backdrop, the Court held that the order passed on the basis of compromise being not a decree is inexecutable u/s 15 of the Act. 9. Coming to the third submission of the learned Counsel for the tenant that in view of the enhancement of rent in terms of compromise a new tenancy was created, it may be sated that by mutual agreement the tenancy was determined from a particular date and simultaneously, both landlord and tenant agreed for enhancement of rent which shall remain effective till the date of eviction. Since determination of tenancy and enhancement of rent by mutual agreement are altogether two different things, the contention of the tenant that in view of enhancement of rent a fresh tenancy was created, cannot be accepted. 10. Having given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, we are of the view that the order passed by the learned Additional District Jude under Annexure-5 is unassailable. In the result the writ application is dismissed being not admitted. P.C. Naik, J. 11. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed