J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) A Centre for Social Justice, petitioner herein, has knocked the doors of Court for legal justice questioning the order of respondent Ahmedabad municipal Corporation authority rejecting a representation exercising powers under s. 132 (1) (b) and thereby refusing the exemption from the liability of payment of property tax by invoking the aids of the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Precisely the controversy placed in focus in the petition is whether the petitioner could claim the benefit of the provisions of exemption from payment of property tax invoking the help of provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) of the Bombay provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (b. P. M. C. Act ). ( 2 ) IN order to examine and appreciate the aforesaid short but substantial controversy requiring and involving the interpretation and the application of provisions of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act, need narration of skeleton projection of facts relevant and material for the said purpose. ( 3 ) PETITIONER is a Public Charitable Trust registered under the provisions of bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, on 30th December 1985, which runs a centre for social justice (Janvikas Trust ). The petitioner Trust, which is a project of Public charitable Trust, is occupying rented premises which are forming a part of "neelkamal" Building, Third Floor on Ashram Road, Ahmedabad, as a tenant since 1-10-1995. ( 4 ) THE petitioner Trust has inter alia contended that the use and occupation of the building hired by it is for public charitable purposes. The income derived by the Trust is utilised in promoting the public purposes. In short the contention of the petitioner is that the utilisation of the funds of the Trust and the use and occupation of the premises are for the public purposes. The liability for the payment of property tax is on the part of the petitioner Trust in relation to the use and occupation of the rented premises by virtue of a lease as mentioned above. The petitioner Trust is paying rent of Rs. 10,000. 00 per month to the owner of the premises and has accepted the contractual liability for payment of taxes including the property tax. The facts thus far stated are no longer in controversy. The petitioner Trust is paying rent of Rs. 10,000. 00 per month to the owner of the premises and has accepted the contractual liability for payment of taxes including the property tax. The facts thus far stated are no longer in controversy. ( 5 ) THE question which requires our examination and adjudication is whether in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts the claim of the petitioner Trust for the benefit of the statutory provision of S. 132 (1) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act is acceptable or not. The respondent authority rejected the claim while disposing of the representation of the petitioner Trust by passing an order dated 3-2-1997. It may be mentioned that the representation came to be made by the petitioner Trust to the respondent authority pursuant to the direction contained in the order of this Court recorded in Special civil Application No. 6377 of 1996 on 17-10-1996. That is how the petitioner Trust again being dissatisfied and aggrieved by the order of the respondent authority rejecting the representation for claiming the exemption from the payment of property tax under the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act, has rushed to this court invoking the aids of the extraordinary prerogative, plenary, discretionary, equitable, and Constitutional power enshrined in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Could the petitioner Trust be said to be qualified or eligible for claiming an exemption from payment of property tax under S. 132 (1) (b), and whether such a claim could be examined and adjudicated in a writ jurisdiction, are the questions to be answered in the aforesaid factual scenario. ( 6 ) IT is a settled proposition of law that ordinarily Courts will be at loath to exercise its extraordinary Constitutional powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution when alternative, efficacious, statutory remedies are provided and again more so when it involves question of investigation of facts. It is in this context the preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent authority requires appreciation and adjudication. ( 7 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the writ power under Art. 226 is very wide notwithstanding that the parameters for the exercise of such Constitutional power of wide amlpitude must be borne in mind. It is in this context the preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent authority requires appreciation and adjudication. ( 7 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the writ power under Art. 226 is very wide notwithstanding that the parameters for the exercise of such Constitutional power of wide amlpitude must be borne in mind. One of the parameters is that ordinarily Court should not entertain a petition involving factual disputes or where other efficacious, alternative remedies are available. There is no dispute about the fact that looking to the scheme of the provisions of B. P. M. C. Act statutory remedy is permissible and available to the petitioner Trust against the impugned order of the respondent authority and the questions which are agitated before us could be examined, we may hasten to add that vires of provisions of S. 132 are not under challenge in this petition. The liability for the payment of property tax in terms of the provisions of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act which is placed in the main focus in this petition could be agitated before the statutory functionary or the authority. This aspect is not, therefore, rightly questioned. However, in support of the maintainability and competence of the petition under consideration the submission is advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner Trust is that in the earlier round of litigation in the form of writ petition, this Court has entertained the petition directly and has passed directions pursuant to which the representation came to be made by the petitioner Trust to the respondent authority and consequently when it came to be decided adversely against the petitioner and the petitioner, subsequently has challenged the same. It was, therefore, contended that earlier contention about the maintainability was raised and despite such contention this Court issued directions and pursuant to which the representation came to be made by the petitioner against the respondent authority which came to be rejected and which is directly under challenge. In support of this contention, it was further urged that since the question of interpretation of the provisions of Sec. 132 (1) (b), vis-a-vis S. 132 (2) (b), the Court may exercise the extraordinary remedy provided in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention, it was further urged that since the question of interpretation of the provisions of Sec. 132 (1) (b), vis-a-vis S. 132 (2) (b), the Court may exercise the extraordinary remedy provided in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 8 ) IN order to appreciate and adjudicate upon this rival version with regard to the competence and the maintainability of the petition, it may be stated that it is a settled proposition of law that the invocation of extraordinary, equitable, plenary, discretionary, Constitutional powers under Art. 226 is not a matter of right. Thus it is discretionary. The parameters and the fetters affecting the powers of the Court for entertainment of the petitions under Art. 226 are extensively examined and elaborately expounded in catena of judicial pronouncements. Therefore, it is needless to reiterate those settled propositions and aspects relatable to use and exercise of powers of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) THE underlined purpose and desideratum of the provisions of Art. 226 is not to supplant, implant or transplant the existing provisions of law but they are designed only as supplementary and complimentary in nature. Therefore, ordinarily writ Courts should not entertain petitions under Art. 226 when there is non-exhaustion of the existing statutory available remedies. It may also be mentioned that even the supplementary and complimentary nature of exercise of provisions of Art. 226 though they are very wide in its amplitude, are to be used and exercised in recognised areas and situations. ( 10 ) IN the light of the aforesaid settled propositions of law and the admitted fact that available statutory remedies are not exhausted, we could direct for a funeral or burial of the petition at the inception but for the fact that there are certain special aspects and peculiar circumstances obtainable from the record which prompt us to not to strike the technical nail on the head and convert the petition into a coffin. There are, therefore, certain peculiar facts and special circumstances, some of them could be highlighted as follows : 1. On the same subject-matter between the same parties earlier writ petition under art. 226 being Special Civil Application No. 6377 of 1996 came to be entertained by this Court (Coram : S. M. Soni and Y. B. Bhatt, JJ.) and directions were issued on 17th october 1996. 2. On the same subject-matter between the same parties earlier writ petition under art. 226 being Special Civil Application No. 6377 of 1996 came to be entertained by this Court (Coram : S. M. Soni and Y. B. Bhatt, JJ.) and directions were issued on 17th october 1996. 2. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions the representation followed at the instance of the petitioner Trust to the respondent authority and the Corporation rejected the representation claiming the exemption from payment of property tax by passing its order dated 3-2-1997. 3. The question of interpretation and applicability of the statutory provisions incorporated in S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act is involved. 4. We are addressed by both the sides at a greater length if not marathon. ( 11 ) IN view of the peculiar facts and special circumstances, we are tempted and attracted to not to reject the petition at the threshold on technical ground but to examine the merits involving the applicability of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act which obviously could not be treated as a precedent for aforesaid special reasons cumulatively. ( 12 ) LEARNED Advocate appearing for the petitioner Trust has questioned the impugned decision of the Corporation, mainly, on the following premises : 1. That it suffers from non-application of mind. 2. That it is tainted with the vice of incorrect interpretation of S. 132. 3. That the impugned decision is not only unjust and unfair but it is illegal and running contrary to the case law relied on before the authority of the Corporation. The aforesaid contentions are controverted and countenanced by the learned counsel, Mr. Tanna while appearing for the respondent. ( 13 ) NEXT, obviously, it will lead us to examine and appreciate the provisions of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act. It would be, therefore, appropriate and expedient at this juncture to refer the provisions which read as under :"132. Tanna while appearing for the respondent. ( 13 ) NEXT, obviously, it will lead us to examine and appreciate the provisions of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act. It would be, therefore, appropriate and expedient at this juncture to refer the provisions which read as under :"132. (1) The general tax shall be levied in respect of all buildings and lands in the city, the rateable value of which exceeds six hundred rupees except - (a) buildings and lands solely used for purposes connected with the disposal of the dead; (b) buildings and lands or portions thereof solely occupied and used for public worship or for a public charitable purposes; (c) buildings and lands vesting in the Government used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for purposes of trade or profit or vesting in the Corporation, in respect of which the said tax, if levied, would under the provisions hereinafter contained be primarily leviable from the Government or the Corporation, respectively. (2) The following buildings and lands or portions thereof shall not be deemed to be solely occupied and used for public worship or for a public charitable purpose within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-S. (1) namely :- (a) buildings or lands or portions thereof in which any trade or business is carried on; and (b) buildings or lands or portions thereof in respect of which rent is derived whether such rent is or is not applied solely to religious or charitable purposes. (3) Where any portion of any building or land is exempt from the general tax by reason of its being solely occupied and used for public worship or for a public charitable purpose, such portion shall be deemed to be a separate property for the purpose of municipal taxation. Relying on the aforesaid provision the Corporation has rendered impugned decision holding that the petitioner who is a Trust and a lessee is not entitled to the benefit of the exemption contemplated by the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act. The contention of the petitioner Trust propounded through its Advocate is that the interpretation of the Corporation is not only unjust, unfair, incorrect, but is illegal. This submission is resisted by the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation. The contention of the petitioner Trust propounded through its Advocate is that the interpretation of the Corporation is not only unjust, unfair, incorrect, but is illegal. This submission is resisted by the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation. ( 14 ) IN support of the aforesaid contention, it has been contended that the corporation has, seriously, erred in holding that the premises covered by Sec. 132 (2) (b) are only such premises which are owned by a party or a Public Charitable trust. It is in this context, the reliance is placed on two decisions, reference to which shall be made, hereinafter, at an appropriate stage. ( 15 ) IN order to effectively adjudicate upon the aforesaid controversy and to appreciate the applicability and the interpretation of the provisions of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act, it would be necessary and incumbent to have a close look into the object and the whole frame and scheme of the taxation mechanism prescribed in the B. P. M. C. Act and other relevant definitional provisions. ( 16 ) CHAPTER XI of the B. P. M. C. Act provides the machinery and the mechanism for levying of municipal taxes by the Corporation. S. 127 (1) (a) of Chapter XI empowers the Corporation to impose property taxes. S. 128 prescribes the manner of recovering municipal taxes including property taxes. S. 129 provides for the manner and mode of levy and recovery of municipal taxes. It also prescribes that for the purpose of sub-S. (1) of S. 127 of the B. P. M. C. Act property taxes shall be on lands and buildings in the city of Ahmedabad. Needless to state that the emphasis is on expression levy of property taxes on lands and buildings. So the primary concern exhibited in the statutory scheme is the levy of property taxes on lands and buildings. So, it becomes a primary object. It could also further be seen from the other provisions of the same Chapter that the primary liability for the payment of taxes including the property taxes is on the person using and occupying the premises. The expression "premises" is also defined. The incidental provisions with regard to the rate and other aspects provided in S. 129 (a), 129 (b) S. 130, and S. 131 are not very relevant and material for the purpose of question placed in focus in this petition. The expression "premises" is also defined. The incidental provisions with regard to the rate and other aspects provided in S. 129 (a), 129 (b) S. 130, and S. 131 are not very relevant and material for the purpose of question placed in focus in this petition. Therefore, we do not propose to divulge meticulously and minutely on those provisions. ( 17 ) THE important provision which requires our appreciation and consideration is incorporated in S. 132. It could very well be seen from the plain perusal of Sec. 132 that the general tax is leviable in respect of buildings and lands in the city, the retable value of which exceeds 600/- rupees. However, there are some exemptions in respect of lands and buildings, the rateable value of which exceeds 600/- rupees and such exemptions are provided in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-S. (1) of Sec. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act. Insofar as clause (a) is concerned, it relates to the buildings and lands used for the purpose connected with the disposal of the dead to which we are not concerned. Likewise, clause (c) also is not attracted as it only pertains to an exemption of lands and buildings vested in the Government and used solely for public purposes. The important provision, to which we are vitally concerned at this juncture, is in clause (b ). ( 18 ) CLAUSE (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132 in clear terms provides that an exemption could be claimed in respect of buildings and lands or portion thereof which are solely occupied and used for public worship for public charitable purposes. It could, therefore, very well be appreciated from the aforesaid scheme that primarily the liabiliy of all payment of property taxes is in respect of buildings and lands and secondly in the whole juxtaposition and while making a conjoint reading of the entire S. 132 in the statutory frame of Chapter XI of the b. P. M. C. Act, it can safely be concluded that buildings and lands when used for public worship or for a public charitable purpose unlike personal occupation or use and in absence of an element of profit making or a case where buildings and lands are used for getting monetary or otherwise benefit like self-occupation, the incident of levy of property tax is attracted. The general exemption is in respect of buildings and lands and the rateable value of which does not exceed 600/- rupees, whereas in clauses (a), (b) and (c), exemptions are provided on fulfilment of certain conditions. Exemption could be claimed under clause (b) if the buildings and lands or portion thereof even if they are occupied and/or utilised only for public purpose or for public charitable purposes. The conditions incorporated in clause (b) must co-exist so as to be eligible for exemption from payment of property tax. After having given our anxious thoughts, we are of the opinion that the same benefit incorporated in clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132 is not available to the petitioner Trust who is a lessee and who has ex-contractu accepted liability for payment of taxes. This aspect even at the cost of repetition we would like to reiterate that is no longer in controversy. In other words, the liability for payment of tax in respect of buildings which is primarily on the owner under the provisions of law is shifted by the owner and accepted voluntarily by a contract of lease by the petitioner Trust along with the liability of making payment of 10,000/- rupees per month towards rental for the lease of the premises. In other words, it may be stated that it becomes clear that primary, statutory liability for payment of property tax on the part of the owner is shifted to the petitioner Trust who is a tenant and who has voluntarily accepted it. ( 19 ) IT may also be mentioned that there is no dispute that the person primarily liable to statutory payment of property taxes in relation to the premises in question is not doing or using even rental part of the income for any such purposes mentioned in Clause (b ). He has been receiving 10,000/- rupees per mensum and the liability of payment of property taxes is voluntarily recognised and accepted under the terms of lease by the petitioner Trust who is a tenant. In other words, the acceptance of liability for payment of property tax originally and primarily on the part of owner when accepted by the tenant obviously would be relieving the owner from the liability and therefore, obviously any resultant effect would become a consideration for the use and occupation of the premises in question. In other words, the acceptance of liability for payment of property tax originally and primarily on the part of owner when accepted by the tenant obviously would be relieving the owner from the liability and therefore, obviously any resultant effect would become a consideration for the use and occupation of the premises in question. Therefore, on both the counts the petitioner Trust howsoever good activities under the banner of Centre for Social justice may be doing or howsoever high it may be in terms of its activities in the social, paralegal and even in legal fields, it cannot be above the law. On the contrary, we are fully satisfied that the impugned decision of the Corporation rejecting the claim of the petitioner Trust - tenant for exemption from the payment of property tax exercising powers under S. 132 is fully justified. ( 20 ) IT is in this context it would be appropriate and expedient to refer the material and relevant definitional provisions incorporated in first Chapter. In S. 2 (41), the legislature has defined the expression occupier. We are highlighting this in view of the fact that the expression employed in the provisions of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act is occupier and this expression is sought to be used for to reinforce the claim made in the petition challenging payment of property tax. "2. (41) "occupier" includes - (a) any person who for the time being is paying or is liable to pay to the owner the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building in respect of which such rent is paid or is payable, (b) an owner living in or otherwise using his land or building, (c) a rent free tenant, (d) a licensee in occupation of any land or building, and (e) any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building;" . ( 21 ) AGAIN as it was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondent authority by learned Counsel, Mr. Tanna, the definition of property tax provided in S. 2 (49 ). It defines property tax as tax on buildings and lands in the city. It is, therefore, clear that primarily property taxes are leviable in relation to buildings and lands situated in the city. Tanna, the definition of property tax provided in S. 2 (49 ). It defines property tax as tax on buildings and lands in the city. It is, therefore, clear that primarily property taxes are leviable in relation to buildings and lands situated in the city. Again it would be interesting to refer the definitional provision pertaining to primary liability for the payment of taxes. While reading the aforesaid definitional provisions in the light of the provisions incorporated in Chapter-XI, it becomes crystal clear that the benefit of claiming exemption from the payment of property taxes cannot be claimed by an occupier who is a tenant who pays rent in relation to the buildings to its owner. It is, therefore, clear that the building or land even in case of self-occupied situation is liable to property tax. The said exemption could be claimed by the occupier who is not receiving any benefit in terms of money or in terms of user of the premises and the premises which are used for public worship or for that purpose or for public charitable purposes only. The whole scheme, therefore, is indicative of this aspect that when there is an element of profit, may be in nature of rental, or otherwise which is obtainable and available to the owner, then in that case the actual occupier who is a tenant whether a Trust, whether it is the premises used for public worship or for public charitable purposes is not to be seen. What is to be placed on mental radar is the use and occupation of the premises for the public worship or for public charitable purposes by an occupier which means the owner of the property. This proposition which we enunciated is further reinforced by the provisions of S. 132 (2 ). ( 22 ) IT could very well be visualised from the provisions of sub-S. (2) of Sec. 132 and which has to be read in juxtaposition with the provisions of S. 132 (1), that certain buildings and lands shall not be deemed to be solely occupied and used for the public worship or for public charitable purpose within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132. Clause (a) provides that buildings and lands or portions thereof in which trade or business is carried on, to which we are not concerned in this petition. Clause (a) provides that buildings and lands or portions thereof in which trade or business is carried on, to which we are not concerned in this petition. Reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioner Trust on the provisions of clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132. Placing strong reliance, it has been vehemently contended that the petitioner Trust is eligible and qualified to claim the exemption under S. 132 (1) (b ). After having considered the entire provisions of S. 132 and the frame and the scheme for levy of property taxes incorporated in Chapter XI of the B. P. M. C Act, we are extremely unable to agree with and uphold the said contention propounded by the learned Advocate for the petitioner Trust. On the contrary, in our opinion, clause (b) strengthens the interpretation which we are inclined to accept that the buildings or lands or even part thereof in respect of which rent is obtained. Not only that, whether such rent is or is not applied solely to religious purposes or charitable purposes would not be covered by the legislative scheme and the provisions of clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132. So, it is not the correct interpretation propounded on behalf of the petitioner Trust. Apart from that even bearing in mind the celebrated canons of interpretation of statutes in the jurisprudential aspect the purpose and the object of the Act has to be advanced by harmonious interpretation. The interpretation which is canvassed before us in this petition, if accepted, would not only frustrate the entire provisions and statutory authority of levying property taxes in relation to the provisions of B. P. M. C. Act, but it would in all probability create a paralytic impact on the whole scheme and the mechanism. ( 23 ) ON behalf of the petitioner Trust the reliance is placed on a decision of the apex Court in Christian Children Fund Inc. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and ors. , [ 1994 (4) SCC 337 ]. After having dispassionately examined this case law, we are of the opinion that the learned Advocate for the petitioner is unable to make any slice of profit out of it in view of the factual scenario of the case on hand and the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) read with S. 132 (2) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act. ( 24 ) IN the aforesaid case, there was no dispute about the fact that the appellant organisation was a charitable organisation and that the purpose for which appellant body was established for running a charitable Body and therefore, it was one within the meaning of S. 115 (4) (a) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. However, the only ground on which the appellant was denied the exemption was that the premises in question were being used by the appellant for its office, which according to the Municipal authorities and the High Court as well could not be said to be used for charitable purpose. Such a view was rejected by the Apex Court while allowing the appeal. ( 25 ) IT was, therefore, held by the Apex Court that the premises required by an organisation for its administrative office are an essential and integral part of its charitable activities. Sometimes the administrative office of such organisation may be located where the charitable activity or activities are carried on and sometimes it is located away from such place depending upon the availability of the premises and convenience. So long as the premises in which the administrative office of the charitable organisation is carried on are exclusively used and occupied by its office, the premises would be one covered by the exemption provided under the said provision of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. It was also further held that to hold otherwise, like that, that would be the premises where actual charitable activity is not carried on alone and is not qualified for the exemption, is to be irrational. It is in this context, the appeal came to be allowed quashing the view taken by the authority and accepted by the High Court. In our opinion, the facts are different and so far as the present case is concerned, the lessor of the premises has let to the petitioner Trust upon a consideration of an amount of Rs. 10,000. 00 a month and the petitioner Trust having accepted the liability of making payment of taxes in relation to the hired premises by virtue of the lease deed between the parties. Apart from that the provisions of S. 132 (2) (b) make it abundantly clear and we are told that similar provisions are not there in Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. 00 a month and the petitioner Trust having accepted the liability of making payment of taxes in relation to the hired premises by virtue of the lease deed between the parties. Apart from that the provisions of S. 132 (2) (b) make it abundantly clear and we are told that similar provisions are not there in Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. Therefore, from any point of view the decision of the Apex Court relied on by the petitioner Trust is of no avail in the peculiar facts and different provisions of law. ( 26 ) STRONG reliance is also placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner Trust on a decision of Bombay High Court in Balkrishna Dharamdas Vora v. The Poona municipal Corporation, [65 BLR 119]. Placing reliance on the aforesaid Division bench decision, it was, vehemently, contended that the ratio propounded in the said decision is, squarely, covered and attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. ( 27 ) IT is true in said case the applicability and interpretation of the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) and S. 132 (2) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act have been discussed. It is held, where a Municipality imposes a tax under the Bombay Provincial Municipal corporations Act, 1949, the Civil Court can entertain a suit challenging the legality of the imposition of the tax or the liability of an assessee to pay the tax. But in this case, same question is not involved. What is important in this matter is the question which we may refer. ( 28 ) IT is held in the said Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court that under S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act, if property is not directly applied for worship or for charitable purpose but only its income, that is, the property is indirectly applied for such public purpose, it will fall within clause (b) of sub-S. (2) of S. 132 and will be liable to general tax. The question in each case that must be considered is whether the lands or the buildings are directly applied for worship or for charitable purpose so as to be exempted from tax under S. 132 (1) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act. The question in each case that must be considered is whether the lands or the buildings are directly applied for worship or for charitable purpose so as to be exempted from tax under S. 132 (1) (b) of the B. P. M. C. Act. ( 29 ) THE very important and relevant discussion is made in the said decision in last but one and last paragraphs of the judgment. It was a matter, wherein, the suit was filed challenging the applicability and interpretation of the provisions of Sec. 132 (1) (b) and also S. 132 (2) (b ). After, comprehensively, comprehending and analysing the conclusions in the aforesaid two paragraphs, we are of the opinion that the observations and the views expressed in the said decision are not at all applicable and attracted to the facts of the present case. ( 30 ) THE real dispute was centered round sub-clause (b) of sub-S. (2) and the question in that case was whether the properties fell within the category of those for which "rent is derived, whether such rent is or is not applied solely to religious or charitable purposes". The intention of the Legislature is to distinguish between two kinds of properties even though it might appear that the properties are being applied to charitable purposes. Clause (b) of sub-S. (1) exempts buildings or lands which are solely occupied and used for the purpose, and an exception is created to that clause by sub-clause (b) of sub-S. (2) in cases where rent is recovered but which rent is used for the purposes of some charitable purpose, the difference being that in the first case the land or building is directly applied for a charitable purpose or for worship, while in the second case the property is indirectly applied for the worship or charitable purpose. The emphasis in said decision is on the direct applicability of the user for the purpose of worship or charity. It is highlighted also by giving examples. ( 31 ) IN order to further examine the illustration given in the said decision in penultimate para would also be expedient to be considered. It is stated that the proposition laid down can very well be compared and the Court examined the question in case of a temple which is used for public worship and for housing the deity. ( 31 ) IN order to further examine the illustration given in the said decision in penultimate para would also be expedient to be considered. It is stated that the proposition laid down can very well be compared and the Court examined the question in case of a temple which is used for public worship and for housing the deity. The temple is clearly used directly for the public purposes. Supposing, however, that some shops are attached to the temple which are given to shopkeepers who pay rent and such rent is applied for the uses of the temple. The shops, in such a case, the income of which is used for the religious purpose, would fall in clause (b) of sub-S. (2) and would be liable to tax. But if instead of the premises being shops, if they are Dharamshala rooms where visitors are given shelter without any charges, or such nominal charges as are necessary for the upkeep of the buildings, then they would fall with clause (b) of sub-S. (1) and would not be liable to tax. To take another case, suppose an educational institution has got some property under its control which is being rented and the income derived from the rents is utilised for its purposes. In this case again, the property is not directly applied for the public purpose but only its income, that is, the property is indirectly applied to the public purpose, and therefore, it is held it will fall within clause (b) of sub-S. (2 ). The question, therefore, in each case that must be considered is whether the lands or the buildings are directly applied for worship or for charitable purpose. ( 32 ) IT becomes crystal clear from the proposition laid down in the said decision of the Bombay High Court that if the income is derived in any form rental or otherwise by the owner or the lessor or the person who has right to let irrespective of the fact whether lessee or the occupier is engaged in discharging activities relating to worship or charitable ones, the case would be covered by the provisions of clause (b) of sub-S. (2) of S. 132. What is the essence of the provisions is that if the land or building which is put on use has no monetary gain; has no element of profit; has no commercial intention; and if the premises are used and enjoyed for the purpose of worship or for charitable activities, the general exemption provision incorporated in sub-clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132 is attracted. This is not precisely, the position emerging and obtaining in the case on hand. ( 33 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the owner or lessor is receiving an amount of Rs. 10,000. 00 per month by way of rent from the petitioner-Trust. The primary liability for payment of property taxes or others is undoubtedly on the lessor. Thus, statutory obligation cast upon the owner or the lessor, is contractually shifted on the lessee or the tenant as per the lease deed between the parties. In the present case, there is an element of profit. There is a commercial and monetary gain. The premises are put to use and income is derived. It is nobodys case that even the rental income obtainable by the lessor or the owner is being utilised for the purpose of worship or even for charitable activities. Apart from that even in view of the clear provisions of Clause (b) of sub-S. (2) of s. 132, it becomes explicitly manifest that the income derived out of the user of the premises whether fully or partly is utilised for the worship purpose or for the charitable purpose would not make case any better and it will not be possible for claiming the exemption contemplated by the provisions of Clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132. ( 34 ) IT could very well be examined and visualised from the provisions of Sec. 132 (1) (b), the buildings and lands or portions, thereof, solely, occupied and used for the public purpose or for a charitable purpose can be exempted from the payment of general tax. After having given our anxious thoughts to the provisions of Sec. 132 (1) (b), vis-a-vis, the provisions of S. 132 (2) (b) and the aforesaid decisions on which strong reliance is placed, in our explicit opinion that this is a case which is not covered by the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) but is covered by the provisions of s. 132 (2) (b ). Apart from that also the owner lessor or the person who has a right to let, namely, the respondent in the present case, has not claimed any exemption. The exemption which is claimed for the subsequent year for the assessment period is made by the petitioner-lessee. The right accrued and enshrined in the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) is not available to a lessee who is paying rent to the lessor who has accepted the statutory liability of payment of taxes of the lessor by virtue of a contract. It may also be mentioned that the petitioner Trust had not applied for exemption even for the period during which the property tax has been assessed. Therefore, the petitioner Trust, from any point of view, is not entitled to be assisted by the Constitutional remedy under Art. 226 for the simple reason that it has not been able to prove to be qualified and entitled for claiming the statutory benefit of the provisions of clause (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act. Therefore, the claim made by the petitioner Trust for exemption from the payment of property taxes is neither legal nor valid. Consequently, the petition is required to be rejected. A last submission no doubt was made for being rejected at the threshold. It was contended that the intention of the parties while entering into the lease transaction must be taken into account as it was clear that the property tax could not be levied on the lessee. Firstly, we have not been able to clearly discern the proposition canvassed. Secondly, assuming that the proposition is advanced for the purpose of getting exemption under S. 132 (1) (b) on the ground that the petitioner- trust is doing charitable activities and is running an organisation, a Centre for Social justice for public purposes, the intention should be inferred that the liability for the payment of tax was not on the part of the petitioner lessee. This submission is neither legal nor logical nor acceptable. Not only that, it runs counter to the proposition articulated in clear terms in the lease. It is not in dispute that the petitioner lessee has undertaken and has assured the lessor to pay taxes over and above the payment of rent to the tune of Rs. 10,000. This submission is neither legal nor logical nor acceptable. Not only that, it runs counter to the proposition articulated in clear terms in the lease. It is not in dispute that the petitioner lessee has undertaken and has assured the lessor to pay taxes over and above the payment of rent to the tune of Rs. 10,000. 00 per month in respect of the occupation and use of the premises in question. The liability primarily is on the part of the lessor in terms of the provisions of S. 139 of the B. P. M. C. Act. This statutory liability is shifted on the lessee with its wanton acceptance. Had the petitioner Trust not accepted the liability for payment of taxes in respect of the user and the occupation of the premises in question, obviously the liability would have been on the part of the lessor. What is provided and prescribed in law on the part of the lessor qua levy of property tax cannot be obliterated or refused or cancelled by inter-se contractual clauses. Despite that the aforesaid submission is made which, in our opinion, is, totally, meritless and straightway rejected and thrown in the huge dustbin. ( 35 ) IT may also be mentioned at this juncture that the provisions in respect of liability for property tax and primary responsibility statutorily cast on different persons has been succinctly provided in S. 139 of the B. P. M. C. Act. It would, therefore, be appropriate at this juncture to refer the said provision. S. 139 reads as under :"139. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-S. (2) property taxes assessed upon any premises shall be primarily leviable as follows, namely :- (a) if the premises are held immediately from the Government or from the Corporation, from the actual occupier thereof : provided that property taxes due in respect of buildings vesting in the Government and occupied by servants of the Government or other person on payment of rent shall be leviable primarily from the Government; (b) if the premises are not so held - (i) from the lessor if the premises are let; (ii) from the superior lessor if the premises are sub-let; (iii) from the person in whom the right to let the premises vests if they are unlet. (2) If any land has been let for any term exceeding one year to a tenant, and such tenant has built upon the land, the property taxes assessed upon the said land and upon the building erected thereon shall be primarily leviable from the said tenant or any person deriving title from the said tenant by the operation of law or by assignment or transfer but not by sub-lease or the legal representative of the said tenant or person whether the premises be in the occupation of the said tenant or person or legal representative or a sub-tenant : provided that where the building so erected on the land is of a temporary nature or is unauthorised the property taxes upon the land and building shall be primarily leviable from the person in whom the right to let the land vests. "the entire scheme and the frame of provisions of S. 139 is as clear as broadday light in relation to the primary responsibility for property tax. It could very well be seen from the provisions of S. 139 (1), clause (b), sub-clause (i) that if the premises are not so held, the primary liability for payment of property tax would be on the part of the lessor even if the premises are let. So the statutory provision incorporated in S. 132 (1) (b) (i) explicity and manifestly indicates that even if the premises are let, the primary liability for payment of property taxes would be on the part of the lessor. This statutory liability is shifted and accepted by the petitionerlessee. So, though the lessor is liable for payment of property taxes, the lessee has accepted ex-contractu this liability in view of the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. It is in this context the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation issued a notice and resultant recovery of the arrears of property tax from the petitioner Trust. It would also be interesting to note that even when the lessee is entering into a sublease, it can be recovered from the superior lessor and property tax can be recovered from the person to whom the premises are unlet. So bearing in mind the relevant statutory provisions of S. 139 of the B. P. M. C. Act and the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease between the parties, we are inclined to reject the last submission raised on behalf of the petitioner-Trust. So bearing in mind the relevant statutory provisions of S. 139 of the B. P. M. C. Act and the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease between the parties, we are inclined to reject the last submission raised on behalf of the petitioner-Trust. ( 36 ) IN order to justify and fortify the conclusion which we are going to take we would like to refer to the provisions of S. 132 (1) clause (c ). It is abundantly manifest that buildings and lands vesting in the Government used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for purposes of trade or profit, or vesting in the Corporation, in respect of which the said tax, if levied, would under the provisions hereinafter contained be primarily leviable from the Government or the corporation, respectively. In other words, it is amply clear. Apart from the government in whom the buildings and lands are vested, even the Corporation, a nodal agency of B. P. M. C. Act, is also liable for payment of taxes, if the property vesting in it is not used for public purpose or is used for trade and profit, the corporation itself also would be liable for making payment of property taxes. It would, therefore, become explicit that even in a Corporation in whom the lands and buildings are vested. In other words, when the Corporation is the owner, ordinarily would not be liable to pay property tax. However, if the Corporation starts receiving some gain, some profit or income may be even from rental or otherwise and the purpose of user of the premises vested in it is neither public purpose nor the charitable one, law provides that the Corporation can be levied holding primarily liable for payment of property tax. Whereas in the present case, the lessor or the person who is entitled to let the premises has been undisputedly receiving rent at the rate of Rs. 10,000. 00 from the petitioner Trust by virtue of lease deed and against shifting liability for payment of taxes which otherwise lessor would have been liable to pay. How can the petitioner lessee as Trust be held entitled to the benefit of general exemption from the payment of taxes under the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) ? 10,000. 00 from the petitioner Trust by virtue of lease deed and against shifting liability for payment of taxes which otherwise lessor would have been liable to pay. How can the petitioner lessee as Trust be held entitled to the benefit of general exemption from the payment of taxes under the provisions of S. 132 (1) (b) ? ( 37 ) AFTER having placed into focus all the relevant propositions arising from the record and after having thrown the same into scale and having given anxious thoughts to the statutory provisions and the case law relied on by the parties, we are of the clear opinion that the present petition is, totally, meritless and is required to be rejected even at the admission stage. Therefore, though the petitioner Trust is engaged in good activities and rendering good services for social justice as well as helping potential lawyers and Judges too, we have to raise our hands in helplessness as we are left with no alternative but to dutifully reject the petition in its entirety, however, leaving the parties to bear the costs. Notice discharged. .