JUDGMENT ARUN KUMAR GOEL, J.— Petitioner(hereinafter referred to as the tenant) has filed this revision petition under Section 16 of the H.P Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) preferred an eviction petition claiming himself to be a specified landlord within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act. 2. Ground on which eviction was claimed was that since the petitioner is retiring on 31-1-1990 and the premises are required by him for his personal and bonafide requirement and he being a specified landlord, does not own any other suitable accommodation in the urban area concerned. Premises in question are situate within the municipal limits of Palampur town in its Ward No. 3. It is not in dispute that the premises initially belonged to one Yog Raj Sangrai, who had three sons and widow by the name of Bhagirathi. Petitioner is one of his three sons. Premises were let out by the said Yog Raj to the tenant in the year 1975. this petition was filed under Section 15(2) of the Act. From the records it appears that leave to defend was accorded to the tenant. Thereafter the parties went to trial on the following issues: 1. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties OPA. 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form ? OPR. 3. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition ? OPR. 4. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties ? OPR. 4-A Whether premises in dispute is required by the petitioner for his bona fide personal use ? OPA. 5. Relief. 3. By means of impugned judgment, Rent Controller below held issues No. 1 and 4-A in the affirmative, whereas issues No. 2 to 4 were held in the negative and consequently under issue No. 5, order of eviction of the tenant from the premises in question was passed. While allowing the petition, it was held that the petitioner is a specified landlord also he requires the premises in question bona fide for his personal use. 4. Mr. Deepak Gupta, learned counsel for the tenant has submitted that landlord is not a specified landlord within the meaning of the Act. The eviction petition was bad for want of non-joinder of necessary parties viz. 4. Mr. Deepak Gupta, learned counsel for the tenant has submitted that landlord is not a specified landlord within the meaning of the Act. The eviction petition was bad for want of non-joinder of necessary parties viz. two brothers and mother of the landlord as also there existed no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and within the local area concerned, the landlord had sufficient accommodation, therefore, the Rent Controller below has fallen into error while ordering the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. In support of his this submission, Mr Deepak Gupta placed reliance on a decision reported in 1995(3) Supp. SCC 196, Niranjan Dass v, Tarlok Chand 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the landlord has urged that in the present case the landlord being one of the owners was entitled to maintain the eviction petition on the ground of his being a specified landlord in invoking Section 15 of the Act. He had retired from the Army on 31-3-1990, as such the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller below deserves to be upheld. On the question of non-joinder of necessary parties while contraverting this plea, it was urged on behalf of the landlord that the affidavit had been filed by Smt. Bhagirathi before the Rent Controller below which clearly established that the landlord is entitled to maintain the eviction petition and there is no question of non-joinder of necessary parties. Alternatively, it was urged that the petition will not fail on this ground. But the case needs to be remanded back on that ground and allowing an opportunity to the landlord to join such parties for whose non-joinder the petition is found to be bad by this Court. In support of his case, reliance was placed on behalf of the landlord on a decision of this Court reported in 1997(1) Shimla law Cases, 69, Subhash Gupta v. N.K. Bansal. 6. In order to properly appreciate the respective submissions made on behalf of the parties, evidence examined by them before the Rent Controller also needs to be looked into. Landlord has appeared as PW-1 and has pledged his oath on material aspects of the case, who amongst other things, has stated that he does not own any house in Palampur town and had retired from the Army in January, 1990. Landlord has appeared as PW-1 and has pledged his oath on material aspects of the case, who amongst other things, has stated that he does not own any house in Palampur town and had retired from the Army in January, 1990. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the tenant used to pay the rent to his mother and the premises which are in the occupation of State Bank of Patiala, rent of those premises was being credited to the joint account of all three of them what was received by the landlord himself It was further admitted by the landlord that during the time of his younger brother when he was in service, rent was never demanded by the said brother and similarly while he was on leave, landlord also did not pay the cent to him. 7. On the other hand, tenant has appeared as RW-1, who has stated that Yog Raj, owner of the premises had specifically informed him that he had executed a will and since he is not sure whether his sons would look after his two wives, therefore, in the will, he had made provision to receive the rent which he had bestowed upon his wife. Tenant further stated that none of the sons of Yog Raj ever claimed rent from him and rent of State Bank of Patiala was being deposited in the joint account of the three sons. He denied the suggestion of the landlord in cross- examination that Bhagirathi (widwo of Yog Raj) was receiving the rent on behalf of all the three brothers since all of three were in service. He further stated that Yatinder was earlier working in Palampur. This is the entire material evidence which is there on the record. 8. In order to succeed it was necessary for the landlord to have proved that he is a specified landlord within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act which is to the following effect: — "2(1) "Specified landlord" means a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State;" 9. In this case, there is no evidence on record to show that the landlord is a person, who is entitled to receive the rent in respect of the building "on his own account" (emphasis supplied), within the meaning of the definition of specified landlord. The entire building of which the tenament in question is a part, admittedly belonged to Yog Raj who has bequethed the property in question by means of a Mill. Existence of will is not disputed even by the landlord. Not only this, on 20-4-1996, a specific direction was given by the Rent Controller for production of the Will and from 20-4-1996 to 18-6-1996, six opportunities were given to the landlord for production of the Will Finally, it was ordered that the Will had not been produced despite last opportunity since it was stated to be not traceable, as such it could not be produced and the case was listed for arguments on 26-6-1996. Production of will was necessary in order to controvert the claim of the tenant that as per will, rent of the premises in question had been assigned to the widwo of Yog Raj who was entitled to receive the same as, according to tenant, landlord was not entitled to receive the rent of the premises on his own account within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act. No attempt appears to have been made even to lead secondary evidence of the will in question. Why and for what reasons, is known only to the landlord and none else. On the other hand, rent was being received by Smt. Bhagirathi as is evident from the receipts Exts. RW-1/A to RW-1/G. 10. No doubt, affidavit of Smt. Bhagirathi was placed on record and it is at page 211 of the fie of the Rent Controller who had stated that since her three sons including the landlord were living away while in Govt service and in their absence, they had authorised her to collect the rent from the tenants on their behalf and because the landlord has retired from Army, he had taken charge of her of collecting rent. She has further stated in the affidavit that she had given receipts of rent to the tenants on behalf of her son. She has further stated in the affidavit that she had given receipts of rent to the tenants on behalf of her son. Even this affidavit does not advance the case of the landlord in any manner whatsoever because this clearly states that right to receive the rent was of all the three sons and not exclusively of the landlord on his own account within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act supra. That being so, landlord cannot be said to be a specified landlord within the meaning of the Act and was not entitled to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises in question Moreover this matter need not detain this court in view of the decision reported in the case of Niranjan Dass v. Trilok Chand (supra), where the facts were almost identical. Relevant paras from the said judgment are extracted below - "3. Two questions of law are argued before us by the learned counsel for the tenant-appellant. (1) The definition of a landlord clearly postulates that specified landlord is a person who receives the rent on his own i account. In this case admittedly the property after the death of the predecessor-in-title has devolved on five co-owners. Therefore, there is no question of specified landlord (in this case, the respondent) being entitled to receive the rent on his own account. (2) Then again Section 15(2) will not apply to the facts of this case. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that both the courts below have held against, the appellant is entitled to succeed on this legal interpretation. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, in opposition, would contend that an agreement has been entered into amongst the co-owners to the effect that the respondent would be entitled to receive the rent on his own account and he had been managing property for long. This affidavit is dated 11th day of August, 1991. Hence, Section 2(i) is satisfied. 7. Section 2(i) of the Act defines a specific landlord as follows : "That the landlord must be a person who is entitled to receive the rent This means a legal entitlement. Secondly such an entitlement, to receive the rent must be on his own account. This affidavit is dated 11th day of August, 1991. Hence, Section 2(i) is satisfied. 7. Section 2(i) of the Act defines a specific landlord as follows : "That the landlord must be a person who is entitled to receive the rent This means a legal entitlement. Secondly such an entitlement, to receive the rent must be on his own account. Where, therefore, admittedly a property by devolution has devolved on five co-owners, it cannot be said that one of the co-owners (the landlord in this case) is legally entitled to receive on his own account. No doubt, what is pressed into service is an affidavit dated 11-8-1991 which has come to be filed pending civil appeal in this Court. This affidavit states the respondent landlord is entitled to receive the rent on his own account and he has been managing the property so long. We are unable to conclude the title could be renounced in this fashion and the entitlement could be conferred on the respondent through this affidavit. Besides this has come to be filed after the eleventh hour however before the twelfth. Whatever it may be, this cannot make the landlord legally entitled to receive the rent on his own account." In view of this decision of the Honble Apex Court, it cannot be said that the landlord who filed the eviction petition against the tenant, is a specified landlord so as to invoke the provisions of Section 15 of the Act to ask for the summary eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. 11. To be fair to the learned counsel for the landlord, it may be appropriate to consider the decision of Subhash Chand Gupta v. N.K. Bansal, (supra) on which reliance has been placed by him. If a reference is made to this decision, it is clear that it is a judgement on its own facts, wherein the specified landlord while seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises in estion had impleaded his other co-owners on record as proforma respondents. Besides this, family settlement had also been placed on record whereunder the premises had fallen to the share of the landlord and it was in those circumstances that the eviction of the tenant was claimed. In addition to this, one of the co-owners had appeared in support of the eviction petition. Besides this, family settlement had also been placed on record whereunder the premises had fallen to the share of the landlord and it was in those circumstances that the eviction of the tenant was claimed. In addition to this, one of the co-owners had appeared in support of the eviction petition. When a reference is made to the pleadings in the present case as well as to the evidence produced by the parties in the present case, it is clear that its is lacking both in evidence as well as pleadings and the other persons i.e., two brothers as well as their mother to whom the rent had been allegedly assigned by the owner Yog Raj as per his will, had not been made a party. None of the co-owners have stepped into the witness box to support the case fo the landlord. As a consequence of this there arises no question of bona fiade requirement of the landlord in the eviction petition filed by the landlord. 12. So far the plea raised on behalf of the tenant that the landlord was admittedly owning a house at a place known as Bundla near palampur and thus, it would fall within the local area of Palampur and as such the petition was liable to be dismissed, has been raised simply to be rejected. So far the term local area is concerned, it has not been defined, however, urban area has been defined in Section 2(k) of the Act. Learned counsel for the tenant fairly stated that Bundla is not within the urban area of Palampur where admittedly the premises in question are situate. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to mention here that eviction is being sought by the landlord from the premises to which Rent Act is Applicable. Parties are not at variance that Bundla does not fall within the area administered by Municipal Committee, Cantonment Board, Notified Area Committee and has also not been declared by the State Government by notification to be an urban area for the purpose of this Act. In order to invoke the provisions of the Act, it has to be shown that the premises to which the Act is applicable are situate within such area to which the Act extends. 13. In order to invoke the provisions of the Act, it has to be shown that the premises to which the Act is applicable are situate within such area to which the Act extends. 13. Term local area came to be considered before the Honble Apex Court in the context of examination of validity of U.P. Sugarcane Cass Act (22 of 1956) in the case of Diamond Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 652, Per majority decision, appeal of the appellant was allowed and the order passed by the High Court was set aside thereby writ was issued directing that the respondents in that case do forebear from levying and collecting cess from the appellants in that case on account of arrears of cess for the crushing season 1954-55 and successive crushing seasons under the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, Learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court out of whose decision the appeal had arisen had held that the factory premises was the local area under the provisions of U.P. Supgarcane Cess Act and on these basis, dismissed the writ petition, in appeal while allowing the writ petition, it was by the Honble Apex Court as under :- "25.....After giving careful consideration to the view taken by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in ILR (1942) All 302 : AIR 1942 All 156 (supra) about the meaning of the words "local area" and proper weight to the rule of inter pretation mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the Constitution makers did not use the words "local area" in the meaning which the learn Judge attached to it. We are of the opinion that the proper meaning to be attached to the words "local area" in Entry 52 of the Constitution (when area is a part of the State imposing the law) is an area administered by the local body like a municipality, a district board, a local board, a union board, a panchyat or the liek. The premises of a factory is therefore not a "local area". 26. It must therefore be held that Section 3 of the UP. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, empowering the Governor to impose a cess on the entry of sugarcane into the premises of a factory did not fall within Entry 52 of the State List. The premises of a factory is therefore not a "local area". 26. It must therefore be held that Section 3 of the UP. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, empowering the Governor to impose a cess on the entry of sugarcane into the premises of a factory did not fall within Entry 52 of the State List. As there is no other Entry in either State List or Concurrent list in which the impugned law could fall there is no escape from the conclusion that this law was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The law as enacted in Section 3 of the UP Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, must therefore be struck down as invalid?" 14. That being so, the argument raised on behalf of the tenant that the premises situate at Bundla would fall within the local area as envisaged under Section 15(2) of the Act is rejected. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this revision petition deserves to be allowed and it is ordered accordingly. Consequently the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller, Palampur in R.R.A. No. 9/1989 on 21-9-1996, in case titled Ved Prakash v. Ramesh Sondhi, is hereby quashed and set aside and the eviction petition filed by the landlord is consequently rejected. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the decision in the present petition will not be a bar to the landlord claiming eviction in accordance with other provisions under the Act, if he can legitimately do so. No costs. Revision allowed.