JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.: Petitioner has filed this petition wherein, he has prayed for quashing the complaint (Annexure P-l) under Section 494 I.P.C filed by respondent No. 1 against him and respondent No.2, as well as for quashing the order Annexure P-7 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmour dated 30.1.1997 in Criminal Revision Petition No.7-N/10 of 1996 and as also Annexuio P-5 summoning oruer passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Court No. 1), Paonta Sahib in case No. 125/2 of 1996 dated 23.4.1996, titled as Kaushalya Devi vs. Sumer chand and Ore 2. Brief facts giving rise to this case are That the petitioner is the husband of respondent no. l. who has filed complaint under Section 494 I.P.C against the petitioner as well as respondent No.2 on the allegations that her marriage with the petitioner took place in accordance with Hindu customs and Hindu law and they have two daughters from this wed-lock, petitioner is employed in Education department as teacher. Further case of respondent No.1 in her statement recorded in preliminary evidence on 11.4.1996 was that petitioner has married for the second time respondent No.2 Nirjala and thereafter lie is causing harassment to her as well as their two daughters. Respondent No. 1 had produced on record extract from marriage register of Panchayat (Ex.P-1) and extract from the family register of Panchayat relating to Sumer Chand petitioner (Ex.P.-2). Another witness examined as PW-2 is Madan Singh, her brother, who had supported the case of respondent No.1. 3. Trial court after consideration of preliminary evidence recorded before it, by means of order dated 23.4.1996 (Annexure P-5) was satisfied that there is prim a facie case regarding the petitioner having solemnized second marriage with Nirjala Devi, respondent No.2 despite the fact that respondent No. 1 was his first living legally wedded wife and thus, according to the trial court, there was sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioner as well as respondent No.2 for offence under Section 4941. P.C. Resultantly, petitioner and respondent No 2 were ordered to be summoned by means of bailable warrants. P.C. Resultantly, petitioner and respondent No 2 were ordered to be summoned by means of bailable warrants. Record further show s that against the summoning order, petitioner preferred revision petition which came up for consideration before the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmor District at Nahan, who by means of order dated 30.1.1997 has dismissed the same holding that the order passed by the trial court (Annexure P-5) does not suffer from any illegality or impropriety calling for interference in the proceedings before the said court and thus the revision petition was dismissed vide order contained in Ex.P.7. Complaint filed by respondent No. l against the petitioner and respondent No. l against the petitioner and respondent No.2 before the trial Court under Section 494 I.P.C. is Annexure. 1. 4. In the aforesaid background, Shri Kanwar Learned counsel for the petitioner has made two fold submissions that in order to make out a prima facie case foundation had to be laid firstly in the complaint regarding the second manage and in order to invoke Section 494 I.P.C. it had to be pleaded that while undergoing the said marriage the petitioner and respondent No.2 had performed all the ceremonies /rituals of a valid marriage in accordance with law. Secondly, thereafter there has to be some prima facie proof of such legal and valid marriage to be produced by way of evidence on record. Next contention urged by Shri Kanwar was that even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken to be correct and evidence recorded is accepted on its face value, still no case is made out against his client and as such both the courts below have fallen into error in abusing orders contained in Annexure P-5 an.1 P-7 which are liable to be reverse f. 5. Another contention urged by Shri Kanwar was that the issuance of judicial process does not have to be a handle of coercion by abusing the process of law and court, as has been done by respondent No. l in the present case and this aspect of the case has been completely ignored by both the courts below as such in; order to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse and process of law and court, this is a fit case where inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. as well as of superintendence control vested in this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India need to be exercised otherwise it will result in failure of justice. 6. On the other hand, Ms. Parmar learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has forcefully controverted all the pleas raised on behalf of the petitioner and pointed out that after appearance in conrt, the petitioners at liberty to raise all the questions urged in this court during the course of trial and pray for acquittal before the court below. Ms. Parmar further pointed out that the complaint (Annexure P-l) and the statement of witnesses examined on behalf of respondent No. l vide Annexure P-2 and documents P-3 and P-4 clearly prima facie establish the factum of taking cognizance the trial court is only required to prima facie examine the case and on this basis it was urged by Ms. Parmar that the present petition is not at all maintainable-and merits dismissal. In addition to this, Ms. Parmar supported the order of trial court on the basis of reasons given by the revisional court below in Annexure P-7. 7. In order to attract Section 494 I.P.C. for holding that who ever having husband or wife living, marries would ordinarily mean a valid marriage. In case such a marriage is not valid one there is no question of there being any marriage in the eyes of law. Simply by starting that husband has married for the second time as well as in the absence of there being anything to show that what were the ceremonies which were undergone while performing such second marriage, bald statement is not enough to prima facie establish the factum of second marriage. Simply by starting that husband has married for the second time as well as in the absence of there being anything to show that what were the ceremonies which were undergone while performing such second marriage, bald statement is not enough to prima facie establish the factum of second marriage. Needless to reiterate in this context that when a marriage is stated to have taken place it has to te a valid marriage with proper ceremonies as envisaged either under law or by the custom which governs the parties in the absence of cither mere allegation of second marriage by itself is not enough to attract Section 494 I.P.C. Further, without there being something prima facie to show that the, second marriage contracted was in accordance with law/custom and/or having been performed by certain ceremonies will not make it a valid marriage in the eyes of law so as to attract the penal consequences embodied in Section 494 I.P.C. In this context some help can be obtained from the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act which prescribed punishment for bigamy. When a reference is made to the statements of PWs 1 & 2, they have made sweeping statements in their preliminary evidence recorded for the purpose of summoning of the petitioner and respondent No.2. Something more than the performance of second marriage was required so as to prim a facie establish that the so called second marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.2 had been performed either under law or under the custom which governed the parties; and if that was so what were the ceremonies undertaken by both of them while tying the knot. 8. In support of this proposition reference can usefully be made to AIR I%5 Supreme court 1564, Bhauroo Sankar Lokhande and another vs. The state of Maharashtra and another and AIR 1991 Supreme Court 816. Santi Dev L z>-ma vs. Smt. Kanchan Prava Devi, wherein it has been held as under :- "6. Mr. 8. In support of this proposition reference can usefully be made to AIR I%5 Supreme court 1564, Bhauroo Sankar Lokhande and another vs. The state of Maharashtra and another and AIR 1991 Supreme Court 816. Santi Dev L z>-ma vs. Smt. Kanchan Prava Devi, wherein it has been held as under :- "6. Mr. Dttta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein assailed the impugned judgment contending that in the absence of acceptable proof that the marriage of the appellant with Namita Ghosh was celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and in due form, it cannot be said that the marriage had been solemnized within the ambit of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and that the finding of the High Court based on the three letters and the oral evidence to the effect that the appellant and Namita Ghosh were living together as husband and wife cannot in any way serve as proof of a valid marriage as per the Act, especially when there is no plea that the marriage was solemnised in accordance with the customary rites and usage which do not include Saptapadi. In other words, it is not the case of the respondent that the marriage was celebrated in accordance with the customs, dispensing with the ceremony of Saptapadi and usage applicable to the parties. In fact, the courts have proceeded on the footing that according to the parties the ceremony of Saptapadi is one of" the essential requirements for constituting a valid marriage. 7. The High Court in the instant case has drawn an inference that all the ceremonies essential for a valid marriage had been performed on the strength of the three letters and the oral evidence as aforementioned. We, after going through the judgment of the High Court very carefully arc of the opinion that the High Court is not at all justified in drawing such an inference in the absence of any reliable and acceptable evidence, in regard to the performance of Saptapadi. The result will be that the alleged marriage between the appellant and Namita Ghosh, celebrated in defiance of the law applicable to the parties is held to be a marriage not valid in law. The result will be that the alleged marriage between the appellant and Namita Ghosh, celebrated in defiance of the law applicable to the parties is held to be a marriage not valid in law. Hence the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable and consequently we allow the appeal by setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded by the High Court and acquit the appellant." 9. In AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1815, Punjab National Bank & Ors. vs. Suriender Prasad Sinha, it has been held as under :- "5. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading, the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the person’s impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case to harass them for vendetta." 10. In 1971 Criminal Law Journal 1400, Srichand gobindram Nagpal & ors. vs. M. Lakshmanan, it has been observed that when the allegiants in the complaint do not constitute the offence alleged -question of appreciating evidence does not arise. In AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866, R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, amongst other things it was observed that inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted again"? In AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866, R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, amongst other things it was observed that inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted again"? an accused must be tried under the provisions of law and as a rule High Court would be reluctant to interfere with such proceedings at an interlocutory stags. At the same time it was observed that it is not possible desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. 11. In AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, State of Haryana & ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lai & Ors. the broad guidelines have been laid down by the Honble Apex Court where under such powers are to be exercised either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. While placing reliance on this judgment, Shri Kanwar submitted that the case of his client is squarely covered by the observations made in para 108(1) & (3) which are to . (he following effect ;-• ... "108. XXXXXXXXXXXX (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in then-entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. xxxxxxxxxxxx (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused." XX X X X X XXX X XX On the other hand while opposing the present petition, reliance was placed on AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1, State of Bihar Vs. MuradAIi Khan and others; AIR 1982 SC. 784, Smt. (Dr.)D.Kaurvs. Smt. Kanti Khare and others. and AIR 1990 S.C. 494, Mrs. Dhanalakshmi Vs. R.Prasanna Kumar and others. 12. On the basis of thrse decision, it was urged that the complaint in the present case clearly establishes existence of prima facie case against the petitioner and respondent No.2 and, therefore, this court may not interfere in the present proceedings as prayed for by the petitioner. 13. and AIR 1990 S.C. 494, Mrs. Dhanalakshmi Vs. R.Prasanna Kumar and others. 12. On the basis of thrse decision, it was urged that the complaint in the present case clearly establishes existence of prima facie case against the petitioner and respondent No.2 and, therefore, this court may not interfere in the present proceedings as prayed for by the petitioner. 13. It was further urged that the matter be left for adjudication by the trial court as to whether the requirements of Law in relation to proving the second marriage are made out or not. 14. On the question as to powers or this court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon (1997) 2 SCC 397, Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) Vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada wherein the Honble Apex court has observed as under :•- "16. The question, therefore, whether .i is a continuing offence and limitation began tb run everyday loses its relevance, in view of the above finding. The decisions cited in support thereof, viz Vanka Radhamano-hari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy and Balram Singh v. Sukhwant Kaur hence need not be considered. It is well-settled legal position that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise the power under Sccf.on 482 of the code to prevent miscarriage of justice. In State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand two of us (K.Ramaswamy and S.B.Majmudar, JJ.) composing the Bench and in State of U.P. vs. O.P. Sharma a three-judge Bench of this court, reviewed the entire case-law, on the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of quash the complaint or the charge-sheet or the first information report and held that the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. Social stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding against the offender ? as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the Court. Same view was taken in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lai and G.L Didwania V.I.T.O. etc" 15. as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the Court. Same view was taken in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lai and G.L Didwania V.I.T.O. etc" 15. On a consideration of the judgments referred to hereinabove, it is clear that there is no hard/fast and /or inflexible rule which puts the power of this court in a straight jacket formula conferred under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, each case has to be examined on the materials placed by the parties before the court on the touch stone of principles laid down in the case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lai & Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, (supra). 16. In the present case when the facts detailed in the complaint as well as in the evidence are examined on the touch-stone of the judgments referred to hereinabove, it is clear that there is ho evidence prima facie to show that the marriage, alleged to have been performed by the petitioner with respondent No.2 was either legal or valid. Least that was expected of respondent No. 1 was to have laid some proof more than her word of mouth regarding the second marriage having been performed between the petitioner and respondent No.2. Exts. P-3 and P-4 which were pressed into service by Ms. Parmar in support of the proof of marriage also do not support the case, they only record the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.2 whether it was valid or not as also whether it was performed by ceremonies required under law or under custom is again not spelt out from both these documents and as such no benefit can be derived by respondent No. l from these documents. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion it is clear that respondent No.l has failed to bring any material on record in support of her plea of second marriage as required under law so as to bring the same within the mischief of under Section 494 I. P.CT and it is held accordingly. No other point has been urged by (he learned counsel for the parties. 18. No other point has been urged by (he learned counsel for the parties. 18. As a result of the aforesaid discussion the present petition is allowed and the proceedings launched against the petitioner in Criminal Case 125/2 of 1996 pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paonla Sahib vide Annexure P-1, summoning order passed by the said court vide Annexure P-5 which was upheld by the revisional court vide Annexure P-7 in Criminal Revision 7-N/iO of 1996 on 30.1.1997 in case titled as Sumer Chanel Vs. Kaushalya Devi & Anr, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmour district at Nahan are all quashed and set aside. -