A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal from Jail, Madia Naik (hereinafter referred to as accused) calls in question legality of conviction under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, the I. P. C.) and imposition of sentence of imprisonment for life as done by learned First Addi. Sessions Judge, Berhampur. Accused was found guilty of having committed homicidal death of Anirudha Naik (hereinafter referred to as deceasedt) and offence punishable under Section 323, I. P. C. for having given a blow on Surath Naik (P. W. 4 ). He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months therefor. One Radhakanta Pradhan also faced trial, but was acquitted. ( 2 ) A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice. On 26-1-1990, Suratha Naik (P. W. 4) the son of P. W. 2. Bijaya Naik (informant) was listening to Radio sitting on the verandah of one Jaya Behra of Gandadhar Mochi Sahi. Radhakanta was also there. There was some altercation between Surath and accused ijersons as to whether 26th January is Indeiendence Day or Reiublic Day. Accused and Radhakanta left the place and went away towards P. W. D. road. At about 8 p. m. in the night both of them came near the house of P. W. 2, which adjoins the house of his brother deceased Anirudha. Dispute as to whether 26th January is Independence Day or Republic Day started afresh and in course of quarrel a blow was given by the accused to the deceased. Radhakanta instigated accused-appellant to assault Surath, P. W. 4. Though P. W. 2 requested that for such a small matter there should not be any dispute, but no one paid any heed. Accused Madia gave a blow with a bamboo stick which he was holding to the left shoulder of Suratha (P. W. 4) causing injury. Receiving injury he ran away from the place. At that time the deceased came and tried to pacify the accused. A blow was again given on the head of the deceased which resulted in bleeding injury and instantaneous death. The incident was witnessed by P. W. 2 Bijaya Naik. P. W. ( 3 ) JAMBU Naik (wife of deceased ). P. W. 4, Suratha Naik, one Pankaja Naik. P. W. 2s daughter Sabita Naik and others. Written report was lodged at Jagannath prasad Out Post. The incident was witnessed by P. W. 2 Bijaya Naik. P. W. ( 3 ) JAMBU Naik (wife of deceased ). P. W. 4, Suratha Naik, one Pankaja Naik. P. W. 2s daughter Sabita Naik and others. Written report was lodged at Jagannath prasad Out Post. Station Diary entry was made and formal F. I. R was drawn up at Buguda P. S. investigation was undertaken and on completion thereof charge sheet was submitted. 3. In order to establish accusations prosecution examined nine witnesses. Accused persons pleaded innocence and stated that they have been falsely implicated. Placing reliance on evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3, and 4, learned trial Judge found the accused-appellant guilty as aforesaid. It may be noted here that P. W. 1 a co-villager of the accused and deceased claimed that the former made extra judicial confession before him about commission of offence. His evidence was also referred to lead further prob to the prosecution case. ( 4 ) IN support of appeal. Mr. A. R Dash, learned counsel for accused-appellant submitted that the so called eye witnesses were related to the deceased and therefore, their version should not have been accepted. It is stated that their evidence does not have a ring of truth on it, and learned trial Judge should have discarded it. Alternatively, it is submitted that with a small bamboo stick assault was made in the night and it cannot be said that accused-appellant intended to cause a particular injury which resulted death of the deceased. Mr. R. K. Mohanty, learned Addi. Govt. Advocate on the other hand supported judgment of conviction. ( 5 ) THERE is no probation in law that a person who is related to the deceased has to be termed as an unreliable witness. More often than not a relation is supposed to be truthful witness. That is because a relation would not normally implicate an innocent person and would shield real culprit. Interestedness should be to get a person convicted. When allegation of interestedness is made the accused is required to establish it and to show that the witnesses had partisan approach. In such a case, the Court is required to make a careful analysis of the evidence to find out whether allegation of partisan approach is borne out from materials on record. When allegation of interestedness is made the accused is required to establish it and to show that the witnesses had partisan approach. In such a case, the Court is required to make a careful analysis of the evidence to find out whether allegation of partisan approach is borne out from materials on record. Facts showing that the witness is biased or partial in relation to the parties or the cause has to be elicited in cross-examination or if denied independently proved. It has always been permissible to call evidence to contradict a witnesss denial of bias or partiality towards one of the parties and to show that he is prejudiced so far as the case being tried is concerned. In Attorney General v. Hitchcock, observed as follows: It is certainly allowable to ask a witness in what manner he stands affected towards the opposite party in the cause and whether he does not stand in such a relation to that person as is likely to affect him and prevent him from having an unprejudiced state of mind. It is not sufficient to plead bias or interestedness solely on the basis of relationship. In the case at hand, learned trial Judge has elaborately dealt with and analysed evidence of P. Ws. 2. 3 and 4. Additionally. P. W. 1 is a co-villager on whom accused-appellant could repose confidence to make a confession. He has no reason to falsely implicate the accused. Therefore, there is an additional piece of evidence in the form d extra judicial confession to implicate the accused-appellant. There is no substance in the plea raised by the accused-appellant that he has been falsely implicated. The evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 does not suffer from any infirmity. So far as P. W. 1 is concerned his evidence has also been analysed with great detail. He has been rightly accepted by learned trial Judge to be a truthful witness. Learned trial judge was justified in his conclusion that accused was the author of the crime. ( 6 ) SO far as question of applicability of Section 302, I. P. C. is concerned, it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever a single blow is given that would rule out application of Section 302, I. P. C. It would all depend upon size of weapon place where injury was inflicted and background facts. ( 7 ) THE ingredients of Clause Thirdly of Section 300, I. P. C. were brought out by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, in his terse language: To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300. 3rdly: First, it must establish, quite objectively that bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the in jury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words: (at p. 468 ). The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he in tended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence of the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classious. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classious. The test laid down in Virsa Singhs case (supra) for the applicability of Clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system arid has become part of the rule of law. Under Clause Thirdly of Section 300, I. P. C. , culpable homicide is murder if both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, viz, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. Consideration of all these aspects in the case at hand shows that particular injury which resulted death was not intended. The case would be covered by second limb of Section 304, Part-Il, I. P. C. ( 8 ) CONVICTION is altered from Section 302, I. P. C. to Section 304, Part-Il, I. P. C. , Custodial sentence of eight years would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. S. C. Datta, J.- I agree. Appeal allowed partly. .