JUDGMENT S. Narayan, J.: This is an application by the plaintiff/appellant for injunction restraining the defendant/respondent from transferring the suit property or any part thereof and/or from parting with possession thereof or from otherwise encumbering the suit property of any part thereof in any manner during the pendency of the instant appeal. It may be added here that by the order dated April 3, 1997 the instant appeal has been admitted with the direction to call for the Lower Court Records and to issue notices upon the respondent. While admitting the appeal there was an interim order of status quo as on date till the disposal of the application for injunction. 2. In a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff/appellant filed a petition under Or. 39 Rr. 1 & 2 read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for issuing an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant/respondent from transferring the suit property or any part thereof and/or from parting with possession thereof or from otherwise encumbering the suit property upon hearing the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff alone, the Trial Court refused to grant any ad interim injunction ex parte for the reasons stated therein and further, directed to issue notice calling upon the defendant to show cause within 10 days from the date of receipt of the notice as to why the prayer for the temporary injunction should not be granted. Being aggrieved with this order, the plaintiff preferred this appeal without waiting for the final disposal of the petition for temporary injunction. 3. In the suit, the plaintiff sought for specific performance of a contract of a sale pursuant to an agreement entered into by and between him (the plaintiff) and the defendant on August 8, 1994. The agreement being a written one was for sale of suit property being land measuring about 2 Cottahs 2 Chattacks 30 sq. ft. together with a three storied building thereof for a total consideration of Rs. 20,00,000/-. Out of the said consideration, a total sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- was already paid to the defendant. The transaction of sale was to be completed within six months from the execution of the agreement for sale. ft. together with a three storied building thereof for a total consideration of Rs. 20,00,000/-. Out of the said consideration, a total sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- was already paid to the defendant. The transaction of sale was to be completed within six months from the execution of the agreement for sale. While asserting his readiness to perform his part of the obligation under the agreement the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was avoiding and neglecting to complete the said transaction in pursuance of the agreement for sale dated 8.8.1994 and, hence was the necessity for the suit. It was also alleged that the defendant was preparing to sell out the suit property to some third party on some higher consideration. There was, therefore, also necessity for order of an interim injunction. 4. Even though there was no defence set up by or on behalf of the defendant, the Trial Court proceeded to pursue a letter purported to have been addressed by an advocate for the defendant and also took into account the doctrine of lis pendens and, ultimately, refused to pass an ex parte order of interim injunction. However, before this Court the defendant/respondent has used an affidavit-in-opposition controverting the case of the plaintiff/appellant. In nutshell, the defendant/respondent has contended, inter alia, that the plaintiff had no right to ask for specific performance of the agreement dated August 8, 1994 because the same was no longer in existence and, in fact, the said agreement had been substituted by another agreement arrived at and entered into between the parties in the first week of March, 1995. The agreement dated August 8, 1994 is said to have been altered after once the plaintiff could not keep in with the terms of the said agreement. 5. Though not expressing any sort of our opinion with regard to the merit, it is to be noticed on the very surface of the case and counter case of the parties that there was most certainly an agreement of sale dated August 8, 1994 between the parties with certain terms and stipulations with reference to which there was also part payment either by way of earnest money or otherwise. However, according to the defendant/respondent the aforesaid written agreement of sale was repudiated and substituted by some subsequent oral agreement of sale with some different terms and conditions. However, according to the defendant/respondent the aforesaid written agreement of sale was repudiated and substituted by some subsequent oral agreement of sale with some different terms and conditions. Since the so-called substituted agreement for sale was admittedly the oral one, Learned Counsel for the defendant/respondent sought reliance to be placed on papers showing payments by the plaintiff of certain amounts more than what was agreed as per earlier agreement and also on some papers filed under s. 230A of the Income Tax Act, 1971, which were signed by none else than the defendant himself. This controversy on the factual score may require investigation or inquiry and, accordingly, we do not propose to form an opinion at the present stage excepting however that the case of the plaintiff/appellant was not as such to be discarded at the very initial stage. The task requires consideration in the instant controversy, either in this appeal before this Court or by the Trial Court while disposing of the prayer of temporary injunction upon hearing both the sides. 6. Turning attention to the impugned order, it is to be seen that what weighed much with the Trial Court was the doctrine of lis pendens. In the opinion of the Trial Court if during the pendency of the suit, the subject matter under the suit was transferred in favour of a third party, a doctrine of lis pendens would be attracted and such transfer would be subjected to the result of the suit and, hence the plaintiff was to suffer nothing out of it. As against this Shri S.P. Roychowdhury, Learned Counsel for the appellant sought reliance to be placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Muktakesi Dawn and Qrs. vs. Haripada Mazumdar and Anr., reported in AIR 1988 Cal 25 . On the strength of this decision, the Learned Counsel urged that r. 1 of Or. 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure did clearly provide for interim injunction with respect to the suit property inspite of the fact that there was already a Rule of lis pendens enacted under s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. This was for a simple reason that the said Rule of Law may not always be good enough to take full care of the Plaintiffs interest vis-a-vis such a transfer. This was for a simple reason that the said Rule of Law may not always be good enough to take full care of the Plaintiffs interest vis-a-vis such a transfer. Thus, in view of this in-built legal proposition it may not always be desirable for a Court of Law to reject the prayer for interim injunction outright on the ground of lis pendens. We would, therefore, propose to consider this aspect of the case taken together with the totality of the facts at the time of hearing of the appeal. 7. As to the delay aspect regarding the institution of the suit after a lapse of two months of receiving the letter of refusal from the defendant it is deemed proper to consider this aspect of the case while hearing of the appeal and, accordingly, it is kept open till then. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, we would prefer to record that the interim order of status quo as granted while admitting the appeal by the earlier order dated April 3, 1997, would continue till the disposal of the appeal or until further orders whichever may be earlier. The hearing of the appeal is, however, directed to be expedited. 9. Since the defendant/respondent has already entered into appearance, the service of notice of appeal is disposed with. The respondent would, however, be entitled to a copy of the memorandum of appeal if not served as yet. There shall be also an order upon the appellant to prepare informal paper book, of course, inclusive of all papers used by the Trial Court subject to objection and inclusion any more paper as suggested by the respondent. Such paper books must be filed within eight weeks from the date hereof. 10. The application for injunction dated 3.4.97 is thus disposed of without any order for costs. D. P. Kundu, J.: I agree. Petition for interim injunction allowed.