SURINDER KUMAR v. YOUNG WOMEN CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, SHIMLA THROUGH ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
1997-07-18
KAMLESH SHARMA
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Miss Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The petitioner-tenant is aggrieved by judgment dated 20-12-1996, whereby the Appellate Authority (2), Shimla has dismissed his appeal and affirmed judgment dated 39-6-1994 of Rent Controller (2), Shimla allowing the eviction petition of the respondent-landlord on the ground of non payment of rent and also that he has acquired vacant possession of a house at Chapslee Estate, Lakkar Bazar, Shimla, which is reasonably sufficient for his requirement, 2. The only point raised before this Court on behalf of the tenant is that since house at Chapslee Estate, Lakkar Bazar, is owned by his wife he is not liable to be evicted on the ground that he has acquired that house, But in view of his admission that his wife had purchased the house at Chapslee Estate, Lakkar Bazar, with the funds provided by him and he has been residing with her, there is no merit in the submission that he is not liable to be evicted Interpreting the similar provision under the Delhi Rent Control Act as that of section 14 (3) (a) (iv) of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), the Supreme Court of India in Prem Chand v. Sher Singh, 1981 Delhi Rent Judgment 287, has held that the tenant had through his wife acquired vacant possession of a residence in Delhi and in that view of the matter he was not entitled to retain the tenanted premises In the said case the wife of the tenant had purchased a flat from DDA, which was available to the tenant Explaining this judgment in B.R. Mehta v. Smt Atma Devi and others, 1987(2) Beat Control Reporter 464, learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held ;— “……….There in that case, this Court has found in a case that the respondents wife had purchased a flat in Saket and that further found that the flat was available to the respondent. In those circumstances it was held that there was acquisition of vacant possession of a residence and as such section 14 (1) (h) of the Act would be attracted It cannot, however, be laid down as a general proposition of law that acquisition of flat by wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of flat by the tenant.
In those circumstances it was held that there was acquisition of vacant possession of a residence and as such section 14 (1) (h) of the Act would be attracted It cannot, however, be laid down as a general proposition of law that acquisition of flat by wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of flat by the tenant. The position has been very properly highlighted in the decision of the Delhi High Court in Smt Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, 1971 RCR 71 : (1970 All Indian Rent Control Journal 418) where Deshpande, J as the learned Chief Justice then was held the mere occupation of a new residence by the tenant without any legal right to do so would not be covered by proviso (h) to section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. If he goes to stay in the house of his wife, legally speaking he has no right as such to stay and can be turned out from the house at any time by its legal owner, namely, the wife. There was no law according to which the husband and the wife could be deemed to be one person Therefore, where proviso (h) required that the tenant himself should acquire vacant possession of another residence before he can become liable to eviction the effect of its language cannot be whittled down by arguing that proviso (h) would apply even if it is not the tenant himself but his wife or his other relation where to acquire such other residence. Therefore, as a general proposition of law, the acquisition of other residence must be by the tenant himself before proviso (h) to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act would apply. The learned Judge dealt with this and observed that in construing the above provision, it has to be borne in mind that the scheme of the Act had to be appreciated. Tenancy is a right vested in the tenant. The main purpose of the Act is the protection of tenants from eviction.
The learned Judge dealt with this and observed that in construing the above provision, it has to be borne in mind that the scheme of the Act had to be appreciated. Tenancy is a right vested in the tenant. The main purpose of the Act is the protection of tenants from eviction. The various provisions to sub-section (1) of section 14 laid down the exception to this rule The learned Judge observed that when proviso (h) made tenant liable to eviction, its effect was to divest the tenant of his right of tenancy, The intention of the legislature in divesting the tenant of his right was based upon the fact that the tenant had legally acquired another residence as of right. There is no law according to which husband and wife could be deemed to be one person Therefore, the correct position must be that if a wife or a husband vice versa acquires a property then the other spouse if he/she is the tenant and by such acquisition by the other spouse of a tenant and as a legal right to go there and have right of stay and then only can such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of clause (A) of section 14 (1), otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated. In other words if for all practical and real sense the tenant acquired, built or allotted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises, That is the rationale behind the scheme." Also see : Hamukhlal Raichand Shah v. Arvindbhai Mohanlal Kapadia, 1988 (2) Rent Control Journal, Vishwanath Bhalanath Yadav v Smt. Sunderabai Sopanrao Dalvl 1990 (1)Rent Control Journal 349 and Sh. Nihai Singh v. Sh. Dalip Singh Lamba, 1994 (2) Rent Control Journal 387. 3. Applying the ratio of these judgments to the facts of the present case, which are not in dispute, that t e house of the wife at Chepslee Estate.
Nihai Singh v. Sh. Dalip Singh Lamba, 1994 (2) Rent Control Journal 387. 3. Applying the ratio of these judgments to the facts of the present case, which are not in dispute, that t e house of the wife at Chepslee Estate. Lakkar Bazar is not only available to the petitioner-tenant but he is happily residing there with his wife and children, there is no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the tenant that the said house is acquired by the wife of the tenant and provisions of section 14 (35 (a) (iv) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act) are not applicable So far judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sachhida-nand Garg v. Govindlalji Mahraj,1982 (1)Rent Control Reporter 708, is concerned, it is on its facts and does not apply to the present case. 4. Another submission raised on behalf of the tenant is that the demised premises were non-residential and were being used by the tenant as godown, as stated by him and his witnesses Vijay Kumar RW-2, Joginder RW-2 A and Dharam Pal RW3, against whom the respondent-landlord has filed eviction petitions Again, there is no substance in this submission, as the tenant had tried to raised this point as an afterthought by amending his reply to the eviction petition, which was rightly rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that it would result in withdrawal of his admission that the tenanted premises are residential. There is nothing on record to establish non-residential character of the tenanted premises if it was residential premises, it could not be converted into non-residential, except with the permission of the Rent Controller, as provided under section 12 of the Act. The evidence of the witnesses of the tenant in this regard is of no assistance to him in view of the fact that they have a reason to depose against the landlord, as they themselves are facing the eviction petitions Moreover, the quarters in their occupation are admittedly residential, as such, there is no question of the demised premises, which are adjacent to these quarters, being non-residential. No other point is raised on behalf of the tenant. 5. In the result, there is no merit in this revision petition and it is dismissed. No costs. Revision petition dismissed.