R. K. MAHAJAN, J. This is a Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18-5-1982 passed by Shri U. S. Tripathi, Vllth Additional District Judge, Allahabad by virtue of which the trial court judgment and decree was set aside and the suit of the appellant for declaration that the order removing him from service is illegal, inoperative and without jurisdiction and it was further ordered that appellant con tinues in service with all benefits accruing from the past was decreed with costs. 2. The appellant filed suit for declara tion in the lower court that he was ap pointed as a Rakshak, Railway Protection Force on 14-1-1967. He was served charge sheet for unauthorised absence from 6-2- 1974 to 27-8-1974. He was served charge-sheet by registered letter under Rule 44 of Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 ( here in after referred to as Rules of 1959 ). He was at relevant time was serving at Chunar, District Mirzapur. It may be men tioned that he was ill on 3-2-1974 and remained under treatment up to 5-2-1974 and there after discharged on 6-2-1979. This period relates before the absence period. Show-cause notice was given to him. It ap pears that he did not participate in the en quiry to answer the serious misconduct of remaining absent. The grievance of the plaintiff- respondent is that he was not given list of documents, list of witness and as a result of which he has been prejudiced in his defence. 3. Show cause notice of proposed punishment was issued on 3-8-1976 and which was received by the plaintiff-respon dent on 25-8-1976 and the reply was to be given with in fourteen days of the receipt of the notice. Fourteen days expired on 8-9-1979 and order of removal is dated 26-8-1976 w. e. f. 1-9-1976. The order for termination was signed on 30-8-1976 before the expiry of period of fourteen days. 4. The case of the defendant-appellant in the lower court was that full opportunity was given to defend the case. It is also al leged by the defendant that the plaintiff has exhausted the remedy of appeal and revision before the competent authority and, as such, this Court has hardly any scope to interfere. 5. 4. The case of the defendant-appellant in the lower court was that full opportunity was given to defend the case. It is also al leged by the defendant that the plaintiff has exhausted the remedy of appeal and revision before the competent authority and, as such, this Court has hardly any scope to interfere. 5. Shri Lalji Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants submit that the appellate court has committed a grave error in hold ing that no reasonable opportunity was given to the plaintiff- respondent by way of supply of documents and also regarding the notice of punishment. He further submits that respondent did not participate in the enquiry and as such it does not deserve any relief. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the finding of the lower court is based on false and incorrect facts. 7. At the time of admission of this second Appeal grounds No. 1 and 2 of the memo of appeal were framed as substantial questions of law. They are reproduced as under: "1. Because the enquiry proceedings against the plaintiff- respondent was in accordance with the provisions of Railway Protection Force Act and the Rulesand the judgment of the Court below is wholly erroneous and illegal. 2. Because there has been no violation of Rule 44 of the Railway Protection Force Rules and the impugned order of removal does not suffer from any infirmity. " 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. I would like to quote relevant provisions of Rule 44 (1), (2) and (3) of Rules of 1959 with an advantage: "44. Procedure for imposing major penal ties- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a member of the Force any of the penalties specified in clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 41 shall be passed except after an enquiry held as far as maybe in the manner here in after provided. (2) The disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. (2) The disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges together with a statement of the allega tions on which they are based shall be communi cated in writing to the member of the force and he shall be required to submit such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. Explanation-In this sub-rule in sub-rule (3) the expression "the Disciplinary Authority" shall include the authority competent under these rules to impose upon the member of the force of the penalties specified in clauses (e) to (h) of Rule 41. (3) The member of the force shall for the purpose of preparing his defence be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official records as he may specify, provided that such permission may be refused, if for reasons to be recorded in writing in the opinion of the discipli nary authority, such records are not relevant for the purpose it is against the public interest to allow him access thereto. " 9. The emphasis has been laid down on Rule 3 for the purpose of preparing his defence he be permitted to inspect and take extracts from official records as he may specify, if the opportunity is refused then of course he has been prejudiced. 10. Shri Lalji Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants state that there was no such occasion to refuse for inspection at all. He further submitted that the finding of the lower court was correct that plaintiff- respondent was given full opportunity to defend his case. He relied upon case law reported in AIR 1996 SC1669 State Bank of Patiala and others v. S. K. Sharma. In this case the petitioner himself did not par ticipate in the enquiry. There is no question of denial of fair hearing. He himself shows dilatory tactics of non-co-operation. My at tention was diverted to the charge-sheet with regard to the charge that if the delin quent wants to inspect and take extracts of any document he shall furnish list of such record. This aspect of non-supply of docu ment is irrelevant as it appears that he was not at all interested in participating in the enquiry. 11. My at tention was diverted to the charge-sheet with regard to the charge that if the delin quent wants to inspect and take extracts of any document he shall furnish list of such record. This aspect of non-supply of docu ment is irrelevant as it appears that he was not at all interested in participating in the enquiry. 11. Learned counsel for the respon dent has relied upon very famous authority reported in JT 1993 (6) SC 1, Managing Director, E. C. I. L. , Hyderabad v. B. Karunkar. The ratio of this ruling is that a copy of the enquiry report is to be furnished to the delinquent regarding punishment. But delinquent is entitled to copy of report of the enquiry even if the statutory rules are silent or do not permit supply of the report. However, there is exception for disciplinary authority. The idea behind this ruling is that in order to meet the principles of natural justice report may be furnished. The ratio of this ruling has been complied with as the show-cause notice and enquiry report was sent by the registered post on 3-8-1976 and it was received on 25-8-1976 (obviously per version of the appellant ). The finding of fact has been recorded regarding the receipt of the charge-sheet by the lower court, receipt of the enquiry report and show- cause notice regarding punishment but this finding of fact was reversed by appellate court regard ing the non-supply of documents at the time of the enquiry by the enquiry officer. The appellate court was also influenced that the respondent-appellants were in possession of the date on which the notice was received and same was not produced and adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act was drawn. This approach of the lower court is wrong in law and in not appreciated in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is admitted fact that the notice was received regarding punishment and enquiry report but the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding notice is invalid. The order could not have been passed before expiry of two weeks. This arguments has been also countered that the evidence could have been produced by the respon dent-plaintiff to make the doubts clear. Non-producing of the evidence by him also shows adverse inference. 12. The order could not have been passed before expiry of two weeks. This arguments has been also countered that the evidence could have been produced by the respon dent-plaintiff to make the doubts clear. Non-producing of the evidence by him also shows adverse inference. 12. The fact remains that presumption can be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that in the usual course of things the notice must have been received in usual course of time and even much before 25-8-1976. 13. In my view there is no patent error or illegality or violation of any fair hearing and fair procedure in taking an action of terminating his employment. 14. I am also the view that the appel lant did not participate as apparent from the record and his non- participation also shows that he was not interested in defending the case. Enquiry officer was appointed. He could have gone and inspected the statement, relied upon or seen the documents There is endorsement on the charge-sheet given to him which he has received as record shows that he can examine the documents He can see the documents and even can take extract of them. So that is the fault of the enquiry officer if delinquent officer does not participate in the enquiry or does not demand the document. It is rather non-cooperation on his part and just putting a blame on the disciplinary authority for not adopting a fair procedure. 15. Shri Lalji Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon AIR 1996 SC 1669 State Bank of Patiala and others v. S. K. Sharma, Para 33 of the judgment is quoted with an advantage: "now in which of the above principles does the violation of sub- clause (iii) concerned herein fall. In our opinion, it falls under principles Nos. 3 and 4 (a) mentioned above. Though copies of the statements of two witnesses (Kaur Singh Patwari and Balwant Singh) were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes there from more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Bal want Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. 3 and 4 (a) mentioned above. Though copies of the statements of two witnesses (Kaur Singh Patwari and Balwant Singh) were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes there from more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Bal want Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. The respondent did not raise any objection during the enquiry that the non- fur nishing of the copies of the statements is disabling him or has disabled him, as the case may be, from effectively cross-examining the witnesses or to defend himself-The Trial Court has not found that any prejudice has resulted from the said viola tion. The Appellate Court has no doubt said that it has prejudiced the respondents case but except merely mentioning the same, it has not specified in what manner and in what sense was the respon dent prejudiced in his defence. The High Court, of course, has not referred to the aspect of prejudice at all. " 16. Shri Lal Ji Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the following authorities: 1. 1974 (2) Service Law Reporter 679 B. L. Kohli v. Union of India and others. 2. AIR 1996 SC 1669 (para 33) State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma. 3. 1975 (2) Service Law Reporter 135 Onkar Singh Khosla v. Union of India & others. 4. AIR 1966 Punjab 175bishambarlal Daya Chand v. State of Punjab. 17. In view of the latest ruling of the Honble Supreme Court the detail ratio need not be discussed as more or less the principle has been laid that if the employee has been given adequate opportunity and has been also allowed to inspect the record it would not amount denial of reasonable opportunity and failure of justice. 18. What is required under law is ade quate opportunity to meet out the case and mat adequate opportunity is misused by non- cooperation and there is no wrong done by the disciplinary authority. The respondent-plaintiff cannot blame the dis ciplinary authority. 19. Shri Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon 1972 Lab. 18. What is required under law is ade quate opportunity to meet out the case and mat adequate opportunity is misused by non- cooperation and there is no wrong done by the disciplinary authority. The respondent-plaintiff cannot blame the dis ciplinary authority. 19. Shri Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon 1972 Lab. I. C. 478 Govind Jee Khare v. State of U. P. This authority is with respect to the ratio regard ing harassment of employee without dis closing the reason to him and without af fording of opportunity of hearing to him and as such the enquiry is vitiated. In the facts and circumstances of the case the ratio of this ruling is not applicable to this case. The statement of the learned counsel for the respondent is not sustainable that no ade quate opportunity was afforded to him. 20. It may be mentioned that the respondent was absent for more than six months and such type of indiscipline is not conducive and healthy to the discipline of service and, as such, he cannot be given any benefit regarding non-supply of documents regarding that fact he was given oppor tunity, as discussed above. I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the substantial question of laws framed as there is no viola tion of Rule 44 of Rules of 1959 as well as enquiry was also conducted in accordance with the proceedings of Railway Protection Force Act and the Rules. 21. In view of the above discussion the order of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained and the same is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is maintained. The amount of Rs. 89, 379. 65 was deposited at the time of admission of this appeal and I am informed that this amount has been withdrawn. If it is so, the appellants can take steps for recovery in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. No orders as to cost. Appeal allowed. .