TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) IN this batch of Writ Petitions, the petitioners call in question the validity of assessment orders dated 20th October, 1989, passed by the Respondent/commercial Tax Officer, Madikeri and the penalties imposed thereby for assessment years 1976-77, 1977-78, 1978-79 and 1981-82. ( 2 ) THE petitioner owns a Cardamom Estate also known as"kanakandy Estate" at Bhagamandala, of Madikeri Taluk. For the assessment years mentioned earlier, he filed his returns under the kamataka Sales Tax Act, declaring his income at nil as the petitioner claimed to have transacted no business during the said years. Proposition Notices were all the same issued to him in respect of all the four years on the 8th of May 1989, proposing to levy tax on the turn-overs mentioned in the same. The petitioner filed a common statement of objections to all the Notices inter alia contending that the proposed Assessments were barred by limitation, in the light of the provisions of Section 12 (5) of the Kamataka Sales Tax Act. The assessing-Authority did not agree and over-ruled the objection in the assessment orders made by him all dated 20th of October, 1989. While doing so he referred to an order passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax under Section 12 (6) (b) of the Act, deferring til! further orders assessments in the case of the petitioner. This order remained in force till the same was revoked by the Commissioner on 12th of october 1988. The Assessing Authority, also appears to have taken note of Karnataka Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1989 (Karnataka act No. 8/89), whereunder after sub-section (5), the following provisions was deemed always to have been inserted namely:- provided that assessment proceedings relating to any year ending before the date of commencement of the Karnataka Sales tax (Amendment) Act, 1985 shall be completed within a period of four years from such commencement; provided further that nothing in this sub-section limiting the time within which assessment may be made shall apply to an assessement made in consequence of or to give effect to any findings, directions or orders made under Section 20, 21 22, or 22a or any. judgment or order made by any Court. "the Assessing Authority was of the view that since the period prescribed for completion of the assessment expired on 31. 7. judgment or order made by any Court. "the Assessing Authority was of the view that since the period prescribed for completion of the assessment expired on 31. 7. 1989 that is four years from the date Act No. 27/85 had come into force and since the Commissioner of Sales Tax had deferred the completion of assessment till 12th of October, 1988, any assessment completed on 20th of October, 1989 was within time. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petitions assailing the order passed by the Assessing Officer, as already indicated earlier. ( 3 ) MR. Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioner made a two fold submission in support of the Writ Petitions. Firstly he argued that act No. 8/89, by which the proviso extracted earlier had been retrospectively incorporated in the parent Act did not apply or cover cases in which assessments had become time barred as per the legal position prevailing before the incorporation of the said provision. In all such cases argued the learned Counsel the proviso even though added retrospectively would not have the effect of extending the period of limitation for completing the assessment proceedings. In support he placed reliance upon two single Bench decisions of this Court, in 1) M/s. KARNATAKA CONSUMER FEDERATION vs state OF KARNATAKA and ANOTHER, 2) Sri K. KUMHAMBU vs 1. W. P. No. 11517/89 DD: 9. 11. 1993 the ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, mangalore, wherein this Court has taken the view that in the absence of any specific provision in the Act, providing for cases that have already become time barred as per the earlier provisions, the amended provision would not have the effect of extending limitation. ( 4 ) ALTERNATIVELY Mr. Bhat submitted that even if the period of limitation is deemed to be four years from the first of August 1985, as held by the Assesssing Authority the impugned assessments completed on 20th of October, 1989, would clearly fall beyond the said period. He urged that the order passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, deferring the assessment proceedings indefinitely had to be ignored not only because the said order was passed without any notice to the petitioner but also because the same was not justified or tenable on the grounds stated therein. He urged that the order passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, deferring the assessment proceedings indefinitely had to be ignored not only because the said order was passed without any notice to the petitioner but also because the same was not justified or tenable on the grounds stated therein. He placed heavy reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in FAG PRECISION bearings vs SALES TAX OFFICER (I) AND ANOTHER in support of his submission. ( 5 ) I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions made at the Bar. The addition of the proviso to Section 12 (5) of the act, by Karnataka Act No. 8/89 is retrospective. In other words the proviso shall be deemed to have always existed regardless of the date the amending Act came into force. When so viewed, any assessment proceedings covered by the proviso for any year ending before the date of commencement of Karnataka Sales Tax Amending act, 1985 could be completed within a period of four years from such commencement. The extended period of limitation prescribed by the fiction of law shall be deemed to be the period that was prescribed by the parent Act from the inception. The view taken by two Hon'ble Judges of this Court in the decisions cited by Mr. Bhat, is not however in tune with the above line of reasoning for it appears that the retrospective addition of the proviso was considered by the said two decisions to be insufficient to extend the period of limitation for completion of assessment, in cases, in which the same had not been completed as per the original period prescribed for doing so. For completion of any such assessments within the extended period declare the two decisions something more ought to have been provided for in the Act. I have not been able to persuade myself to subscribe to that view and this I say with utmost respect to the hon'ble Judges who decided the said cases, I have if I may say so with great humility serious doubts about the correctness of the view taken in the said decisions. In the ordinary course I would have referred the point for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger bench of this Court but keeping in view the fact that the petitioner must succeed on the alternaive submission urged by Mr. In the ordinary course I would have referred the point for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger bench of this Court but keeping in view the fact that the petitioner must succeed on the alternaive submission urged by Mr. Bhat, I consider it unnecessary to do so. ( 6 ) COMING then to the alternative submission Mr. Bhat's argument as noticed earlier was twofold. Firstly it was argued that before an order deferring the assessment could be passed the Commissioner ought to have issued a notice to the petitioner/assessee to show cause why any such order be not made. Secondly, it was contended that deferring of proceedings was permissible only in extraordinary circumstances and for valid reasons other than the failure or inability of the Assessing Authorities to complete the proceedings within the time prescribed. I see merit in both these submissions which find considerable support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Fag precision Bearings vs Sales Tax Officer (I) and Another, relied upon by Mr. Bhat. The Supreme Court was in that case dealing with the validity of a similar order passed by the Commissioner of sales Tax under Section 42 (11} of the Gujrat Sales Tax Act, staying the assessment Proceedings against the assessee. The order proceeded on the basis that since the Proceedings, could not be completed within the time limit prescribed under Section 423 (1) of the Act, it was appropriate to stay the same. This order, the Supreme Court felt was bad for precisely speaking the same reasons as have been urged by Mr. Bhat in the present case. The Court held that the commissioner had not before passing the order granted an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause why the assessments should not be stayed nor was the reason indicated for stay of the assessment valid in the eye of law. The following passages from the judgment succinctly states the position. "in the instant case, the reasons and circumstances necessiating stay are that the assessment was in progress and "since some more time will be taken and the assessment proceedings are not likely to be completed within the prescribed time. . . . it is considered proper to stay the assessment. The following passages from the judgment succinctly states the position. "in the instant case, the reasons and circumstances necessiating stay are that the assessment was in progress and "since some more time will be taken and the assessment proceedings are not likely to be completed within the prescribed time. . . . it is considered proper to stay the assessment. " To accept the aforesaid as good reason to stay assessment proceedings is to hold that the commissioner, or the State Government, can give a go-by to the statutory provision prescribing the period during which assessment proceedings shall be completed only because the sales tax authorities have not completed the assessment proceedings shall be completed only because the sales tax authorities have not completed the assessment proceedings within the stipulated time. We cannot accept this as a good reason. The aforestated power to stay assessment proceedings can be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances and for supervening reasons which cannot be attributed to the defaulter or failure of the assessing authorities. It would be a valid exercise of the power to stay assessment proceedings of a class of assessees, for example, when a point of law involved in such assessments is pending decision in. a higher Court. It would be a valid exercise of such power in an individual case where, for example, search and seizure of the assessee's premises had unearthed material which requires to be sifted and analysed before a satisfactory assessment order be can be passed. It is not enough that the order should state, as has been done in the present case, that the assessment proceedings were pending and would take "some more time. " ( 7 ) IN the present case, also the order of the Commissioner, deferring the proceedings was passed without any notice to the petitioner. The relevant record produced by the Government pleader does not bear any testimony to the fact that any notice was at any stage issued to the petitioner to showcause why the proceedings be not deferred. That apart the only reason given by the Commissioner for deferring the proceedings is that the same cannot be completed within the available period. The present is therefore a case which is identical to the case decided by the Supreme Court. That apart the only reason given by the Commissioner for deferring the proceedings is that the same cannot be completed within the available period. The present is therefore a case which is identical to the case decided by the Supreme Court. In the result the deferment order shall have to be eschewed from consideration and treated to be non-est in the eye of law. If that be so, the period of 4 years reckoned from the first of August 1985, expired on 31st of July 1989. The impugned orders of assessments have been made long thereafter on 20th of October, 1989, and are therefore clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed, hence unsustainable. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances these petitions succeed, the impugned orders of assessment including the penalties imposed thereby are quashed, but the parties left to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .