R. K. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant in Money Suit No. 10 of 1980 of the court of Subordinate Judge, Patnagarh, presently designated as Civil Judge (Senior Division), patnagarh has preferred the present appeal against the judgment and decree whereby the plain tiff'suit for money on the basis of document, Ext. 1 (which the trial Court termed as pro-notes) has been decreed. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff's case, in short, is that the defendant being in need of money approached the plaintiff for a loan to which the plaintiff agreed and advanced a sum of Rs. 9,000/- with an understanding that she would transfer her land by registered sale deed after obtaining necessary permission from the revenue authorities. As a matter of fact, defendant made application to the S. D. O. , Patnagarh, seeking necessary permission as required under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, but no permission was accorded since defendant's daughter raised objection the proposed sale. In view of such objection being raised, plaintiff obtained the document. Ext. 1 wherein the defendant promised to return back the whole amount. Plantiff then demanded for refund of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 9,000/- but it was not heeded to. This led the plaintiff to file the suit for recovery of the said amount. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT filed written statement and denied to have incurred loan of Rs. 9. 000/-from the plaintiff, as alleged. She. however, admitted that she had agreed to transfer certain land to the plaintiff, but since she belongs to scheduled tribe and prior permission of the revenue authority was necessary to effect transfer, the plaintiff brought her to Patnagarh and obtained her signatures on various papers, including the suit document. Ext. 1. Neither the contents were read over and explained to her nor she was made aware of the nature of the documents. On objection being raised by her daughter in the permission proceeding, the revenue authority refused to grant permission whereupon the plaintiff filed the present suit for realisation of Rs. 9,000/- alleging that the same had been advanced to her as interest free loan. Besides the above, the defendant has also urged that the suit is barred by limitation. ( 4 ) ON the above pleadings, the learned trial Court framed 5 issues of which the main issues were whether the suit document. Ext. 9,000/- alleging that the same had been advanced to her as interest free loan. Besides the above, the defendant has also urged that the suit is barred by limitation. ( 4 ) ON the above pleadings, the learned trial Court framed 5 issues of which the main issues were whether the suit document. Ext. 1 is a valid one and whether the suit is barred by limitation. ( 5 ) THE plaintiff in support of his case examined himself as P. W. 3 and his Advocate as P. W. 2. As against this, the defendant examined herself alone. On consideration of the evidence led by the parties, learned Subordinate judge accepted the plaintiff's case that the defendant had incurred a loan of Rs. 9,000/- at different times from the plaintiff, for repayment of which she had agreed to sell certain lands and accordingly applied for necessary permission from the revenue authority. On objection being raised by her daughter, she executed the document, Ext. 1 promising to repay the aforesaid amount as and when demanded. Admittedly there being no payment, she is liable to pay the same to the plaintiff. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, the trial Court held that the suit document, Etx. 1 cannot be treated as an acknowledgement of liability falling within the ambit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. It is a promise made in writing to pay the whole debt which she incurred from the plaintiff and as such Section 25 (3) of the Contract Act is attracted and therefore, the suit is within time. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendant challenging the judgment and decree of the trial Court contended that there are suspicious circumstances to doubt the genuineness of Ext. 1, notwithstanding whether it is an acknowledgement of liability or a promise in writing to repay the debt. Elaborating the argument, he contended that the plaintiff's case as laid in the plaint and the evidence led in support thereof are at variance. In paragraph 1 of the plaint it is alleged that he advanced interest-free loan of Rs. 9,000/- but when cross-examined he stated that the loan was advanced at three different times, inasmuch as Rs. 4,000/- in the year 1973, Rs. 1,000/- in 1975 and Rs. 4,000/- in 1977. In paragraph 1 of the plaint it is alleged that he advanced interest-free loan of Rs. 9,000/- but when cross-examined he stated that the loan was advanced at three different times, inasmuch as Rs. 4,000/- in the year 1973, Rs. 1,000/- in 1975 and Rs. 4,000/- in 1977. It is in the evidence of the plaintiff that for the loan amount of 1973 and 1975 documents were obtained from the defendant, but for the reason best known to him those were withheld from the Court, Next he urged that it being the case of the plaintiff that on the legal advice of P. W. 2 a practising Advocate of patnagarh, he got the permission petition. Ext. 2 drafted; no explanation has been offered regarding non-mention of the payment of the whole consideration amount of Rs. 9,000/- in three instalments. Lastly he sumitted that as stated by the plaintiff (P. W. 3), Akshay bariha, defendant's son-in-law was present when Ext. 1 was executed, there was no reason why he was not cited as a witness in the said document. This shows that defendant's son-in-law was not present at the time of execution of Ext. 1 and taking advantage of her illiteracy, her signature was obtained without making her aware of nature and implication of the said document. So far as question of limitation is concerned, he would contend that Ext. 1 if read as a whole, would show that it is an acknowledgement of liability which falls within the ambit of Section 18 of the limitation Act and the debt being time barred, the suit should have been dismissed on that ground alone. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand strenuously urged that the learned trial Court on assessment of the evidence was satisfied that the defendant had incurred loan of Rs. 9,000/- which she promised to pay under Ext. 1 and there is no compelling reason to take a different view and upset the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court. He further contended that the document, Ext. 1 has been rightly construed to be falling within the ambit of Section 25 (3)of the Contract Act and not Section 18 of the limitation Act. 1 and there is no compelling reason to take a different view and upset the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court. He further contended that the document, Ext. 1 has been rightly construed to be falling within the ambit of Section 25 (3)of the Contract Act and not Section 18 of the limitation Act. ( 8 ) IN view of the contentions raised by the counsel for the parties, two points that arise for consideration are : (1) Did the defendant incur loan of rs. 9,000/- from the plaintiff? and (2) Whether Ext. 1 is an acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act or a promise in writing to pay the time. barred debt under Section 25 (3)of the Contract Act? ( 9 ) POINT No. 1 : Order 6, Rule 2, C. P. C. postulates that every pleading shall contain only a statement in concise form all the material facts which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. It is, therefore, essential that the pleading should state those facts which will put the defendant on his guard and tell him what he has to meet when the case comes on for trial. This being the statutory provision, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence in contradiction of what has not been pleaded in the pleading. In the present suit for money plaintiff's pleading is silent as to when he advanced a sum of Rs. 9,000/- to the defendant and whether it was an oral transaction or based on a pronote. The pleading in that respect is cryptic in naure. It is stated that the defendant in order to meet her legal necessities, proposed to sell her land to the plaintiff on obtaining necessary permission. Expecting that such permission would be granted, the plaintiff advanced Rs. 9,000/- as an interest-free loan. When examined in Court, the plaintiff, p. W. 3 has given altogether a different story which is at variance with the pleading. In paragraph 8 of his cross-examination he stated that in 1973 and 1975 defendant received rs. 4,000/- and Rs. 1,000/- respectively from him towards consideration of the land which she proposed to sell by executing necessary agreement. The rest amount of Rs. In paragraph 8 of his cross-examination he stated that in 1973 and 1975 defendant received rs. 4,000/- and Rs. 1,000/- respectively from him towards consideration of the land which she proposed to sell by executing necessary agreement. The rest amount of Rs. 4,000/- was paid in the year 1977 but on that occasion she did not execute any document in support thereof. This evidence runs contrary to what has been pleaded in the plaint. Moreover, the true agreements which the plaintiff alleges to have been executed by the defendant in the year 1973 and 1975 had not seen light of the day. Besides that, grave doubt arises as to if any amount was advanced to the defendant towards part consideration for sale of her land. As stated by P. W. 2, a practising advocate of Patnagrah Bar, necessary application for permission was made by the defendant on 4. 7. 1997. If at all the defendant was in need of money to meet her legal necessities and agreeing to sell her land, she took Rs. 4000/- as part consideration from the plaintiff in 1973, there was no reason why application for grant of necessary permission was not made to the Revenue authority in the very same year and no explanation has been offered by the plaintiff for the delay in making the application. ( 10 ) ADMITTEDLY the defendant entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff to sell a piece of land for Rs. 9. 000/- and since she belongs to scheduled tribe application for permission was made to the Revenue authority, but permission was refused on objection being raised by her daugher. Plaintiff asserts that defendant executed Ext. 1 promising to pay back the whole amount which she had received from him. This has been stoutly denied by the defendant. P. W. 1 was examined as a scribe of Ext. 1. According to him, he scribed the said document as per instruction of the defendant in presence of her son-in-law Akshay Kumar Bariha and the contents of the said document was read over and explained to her whereafter she put her signature. He further stated that Muralidhar panigrahi and others were also present at the time of execution of the said document. Admittedly signature of Akshay Kumar Bariha was not obtained on Ext. 1 and no reason was assigned as to why he was not cited as a witness. He further stated that Muralidhar panigrahi and others were also present at the time of execution of the said document. Admittedly signature of Akshay Kumar Bariha was not obtained on Ext. 1 and no reason was assigned as to why he was not cited as a witness. Moreover, except P. W. 1, the scribe, the other witnesses who, according to P. W. 1 were present, were not examined to corroborate his evidence. Another circumstance which militates against the truth of the plaintiff's case is that, there is no mention in the permission application that the whole consideration amount had earlier been paid to the defendant. P. W. 2 admits that by the time he drafted Ext. 1 no money, to his knowledge, had been paid by the plaintiff. All these circumstances taken together lead me to believe that nothing had been paid to the defendant in advance towards consideration for sale of her land it was only after objection was raised by the defendant's daughter before the revenue authority that the plaintiff obtained Ext. 1 to lay a claim in future. ( 11 ) POINT No. 2 : In view of my findings with regard to point No. 1, the question whether the document, Ext. 1, is an acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act or a promise in writing to pay a time barred debt under Section 25 (3)of the Contract Act, becomes academic. ( 12 ) THERE is clear distinction between an acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 (old Section 19) of the Limitation Act and a promise to pay a barred debt under Section 25 (3) of the Contract Act. All that is needed under Section 18 is that an acknowledgement of liability in respect of property or right has been made before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application in respect of such property or right coupled with the other formal requirements as signing in writing by such party against whom the property or right is claimed or by some person through whom he derived title or liability. So far as Section 25 (3) of the Contract Act is concerned, the position is different. So far as Section 25 (3) of the Contract Act is concerned, the position is different. Emphasis under this section is on the promise to pay in writing wholly or in part of a debt which has become barred by time; in other words even when the debt is barred the debtor may make a promise in writing signed by him or by his agent generally or specially authorised to pay wholly or in part a particular debt. It contemplates a fresh promise to pay either wholly or in part a barred debt. An acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act implies promise to pay. But so far Section 25, contract Act is concerned, it is necessary that promise to pay should be expressed. On a comparative study of both the sections as aforesaid and applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, I would hold that ext. 1 falls within the ambit of Section 25 of the Contract Act. Since I have doubted the genuineness of Ext. 1 and have disbelieved the plaintiff's case of advance of a sum of Rs. 9,000/- towards consideration for sale of land to the defendant. 1 have no other option but to dismiss the suit. In view of discussions made above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court are set asids and consequently the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to cost throughout. Appeal allowed. .