CHIDANANDA ULLAL, J. ( 1 ) THE instant regular first appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 1424 of 1990 passed by III Additional City Civil judge, Bangalore City, whereby the said City Civil Judge was pleased to decree the suit of the respondent. ( 2 ) I heard the learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri R. Gururajan and the learned Counsel for the respondent, Sri H. Neelakanta Rao. I have also perused the case records including the records of the Court below. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case in brief are as hereunder: that the respondent had joined the establishment of the appellant 1 on 3-12-1959; that he had studied in R. B. A. N. M. S. High School, bangalore and at the time of his joining the establishment of appellant 1, he had shown his qualification as IVth form in his employment application dated 5-10-1959 as at Ex. D3. In the said application he had also shown his age as 27 years, whereas his date of birth appeared to have not been filled therein. In the employment application, Ex. D3, as against the column date of birth there came to be an entry as at Ex. D3 (a), 'as 27-2-1934' however the year 1934 was overwritten as 1933'. It is claimed that the respondent had appeared for his SSLC examination and in the transfer certificate issued by the above High School, his date of birth was shown as 15-9-1934'. ( 4 ) IT is contended further by the respondent in the plaint that he had come to know for the first time in and around the year 1988 that his date of birth was entered as 2-12-1932' in the service records of his employer. That he came to know the said fact when he had applied for bus pass to his college-going son and immediately on 8-8-1988, the respondent represented the appellant 1 by his representation vide copy at ex. P7 for rectification of the mistake in the entry as to his date of birth based on the SSLC and the Transfer Certificate wherein his correct date of birth was shown as 15-9-1934. P7 for rectification of the mistake in the entry as to his date of birth based on the SSLC and the Transfer Certificate wherein his correct date of birth was shown as 15-9-1934. That the appellant 1 refused to entertain such a request made by the respondent and with the result the respondent was obliged to file the suit for declaration that the correct date of birth of the respondent was 15-9-1934 and not 2-12-1932 and also with a prayer for mandatory injunction directing the appellants to correct the entry of date of birth in their records as 15-9-1934'. ( 5 ) THE appellants having entered appearance filed written statement before the Court below, the III Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore city, (hereinafter referred for convenience as the 'city Civil Judge') wherein they have contended that as per the standing orders of the appellant 1, Company, the age of superannuation of an employee was 58 years; that the claim made by the respondent could only be "subject matter of an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the industrial Disputes Act and therefore the suit was not maintainable. It was further contended that the respondent was not entitled to for the relief under the Specific Relief Act. That he joined the services of the appellant 1, Company by filing an Employment Application as at Ex. D3, wherein he had shown his age as 27 years, that the respondent had not disputed the correctness or otherwise the said declaration given by him at any point of time and therefore it was not open for him to seek for any change regarding his date of birth so entered in the service records. The appellant 1, Company further contended in the written statement that the suit filed by the respondent was barred by limitation. They further pleaded their ignorance with regard to the taking up of the sslc examination by the respondent in the year 1974. The appellant 1, Company further contended in the written statement that the suit filed by the respondent was barred by limitation. They further pleaded their ignorance with regard to the taking up of the sslc examination by the respondent in the year 1974. ( 6 ) IT is further contended in the written statement that the appellant 1, Company had not accepted the date of birth of the respondent as 15-9-1934' and that the respondent did know about the declaration given by him and he did not complain about the entries made in the service records thereto and he had raised such a plea when he was about to be retired and therefore the representation given by him on 8-8-1988 was not considered by the appellant 1, particularly when the date of retirement of respondent was 31-12-1990. That the appellants therefore prayed that the suit of the respondent be dismissed. ( 7 ) BASED on the pleadings, the learned City Civil Judge had framed the following six issues:"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that his correct date of birth is 15-9-1934? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the age certified as 27 years as on 2-12-1959 is void, illegal and cannot be enforced? 3. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff has to invoke the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and the suit is not maintainable? 4. Whether the defendant proves that this Court has no jurisdiction? 5. Whether the defendant proves that the suit is barred by time? 6. To what relief plaintiff is entitled to?" ( 8 ) ON appreciation of evidence on record and upon hearing the parties, the learned City Civil Judge had recorded his findings as against the above issues as hereunder. "1. affirmative, 2. affirmative, 3. negative, 4. negative, 5. negative, 6. as per final order". ( 9 ) FINALLY the learned City Civil Judge passed the impugned judgment and decree in the suit of the respondent by declaring that the correct date of birth of the respondent was 15-9-1934 and he further directed the appellants to correct the said date of birth of the respondent in the service records maintained by them. ( 10 ) HAVING been aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the appellants preferred before this Court the instant appeal. ( 10 ) HAVING been aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the appellants preferred before this Court the instant appeal. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri R. Gururajan at the outset argued that the respondent had since resorted to the suit for declaration of his date of birth at a very belated stage on 12-3-1990 when he had to retire from service on 31-12-1990, the same was not maintainable. He further argued that at the time of his appointment in the appellant 1, Company he had declared his age as 27 years and he had not produced any document evidencing his date of birth and it is for that reason the appellant 1, Company had decided that as on the date of his employment application i. e. 5-10-1959, the respondent had attained the age of 27 years. Sri Gururajan, however, fairly admitted that the appellant 1, Company, did receive the copy of the representation dated 27-1-1990 with regard to the change of date of birth of the respondent and he further admitted that a reply was also given to the respondent on 5-2-1990 by the appellants as at Ex. P10, whereby the respondent was notified that the request of the respondent had been examined and the same could not be considered. As could be seen, in the said communication, it is further stated therein that as per the certificate of the Medical officer of the appellant 1, Company dated 2-12-1959, his age had since been shown as 27 years and as such his date of birth had been accepted as 2-12-1932 for all purposes. Sri Gururajan, however, argued that appellant 1, Company did not admit that they did receive the copy of the petition in the year 1988, copy produced at Ex. P7. It is also the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the suit of the appellants in the form it was filed before the learned City Civil Judge was not maintainable for, according to him, the same was a dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. P7. It is also the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the suit of the appellants in the form it was filed before the learned City Civil Judge was not maintainable for, according to him, the same was a dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In support of his argument that the suit for change of date of birth on the eve of superannuation of an employee cannot be entertained by an employer, Sri Gururajan had cited before me the following decisions (1) C. H. Narayana v M/s. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, bangalore and Others. (2) State of Tamil Nadu v T. V. Venugopalan. (3) R. Kuppuraj v Bharat Gold Mines Limited. He had also produced Xerox copy of the judgment dated 7-1-1997 in w. A. No. 467 of 1995 passed by the Division Bench of this Court confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Narayana's case referred to at SI. No. (1) above. ( 12 ) WHILE summing up his argument, Sri Gururajan submitted that in view of the above circumstances, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned City Civil Judge is totally erroneous, and therefore, called for to be interfered with by this Court in the instant appeal. Therefore, he prayed that the impugned judgment and decree be setaside in allowing the appeal. ( 13 ) AS against the above argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant, the learned Counsel for the respondent, Sri Neelakanta Rao, argued that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned city Civil Judge is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and that the same does not call for any interference in the hands of this Court. At the threshold, Sri Neelakanta Rao, had argued that it is totally incorrect on the part of the other side to argue that it is at the fag end of the service of the respondent and on the eve of his superannuation he had approached the appellant 1, Company, for change of his date of birth. In this context he pointedly drew my attention to the copy of the representation the respondent had given in the month of August 1988 marked as Ex. P7. In this context he pointedly drew my attention to the copy of the representation the respondent had given in the month of August 1988 marked as Ex. P7. According to Sri Neelakanta Rao the said representation is dated 8-8-1988 and the office of the appellant 1, Company had also acknowledged receipt of the same by putting the seal of the office of the appellant 1, Company in the right hand top of Ex. P7. I do find such a seal as submitted by Sri Neelakanta Rao and it has been shown as dated 11-8-1988. No doubt the receipt of Ex. P7 had been disputed by the learned Counsel for the appellant while addressing his argument but the same does not appear to be correct for the reason that in Ex. P8, a letter dated 17-9-1988 addressed to the respondent, it had been stated therein that the same was addressed to the respondent with reference to his letter dated 8-8-1988. In the representation at Ex. P7, the respondent had represented appellant 1, Company, that he had come to know that his correct date of birth had not been incorporated in the service records and that he had appeared for the SSLC examination in the year 1974 and his date of birth was entered therein as 15-9-1934'. In the said representation while so requesting, the respondent had also appeared to have furnished copies of the original certificates i. e. , SSLC and Transfer Certificate. It is pertinent to observe here that in the reply as at Ex. P8 of the appellant 1 Company, as a reply to Ex. P7 of the respondent, the appellant 1 did refer to the Transfer Certificate produced by the respondent and it had been stated therein as per the standing Order No. 35 of the Standing Orders of the appellant 1, Company, the declaration made by the respondent at the time of his employment as proof of the age was a basis and further that their Company medical Officer had also certified his age as 27 years as on 2-12-1959 and that in the said circumstances it was not possible for them to effect change of date of birth at that belated stage. Sri Rao vehemently argued that the employment application as at Ex. Sri Rao vehemently argued that the employment application as at Ex. D3 was filled up by the appellants and the respondent had only contributed his hand for the same and beyond that he did not do anything about. He further argued that in the employment application, Ex. D3 even if the age of the respondent was mentioned as 27 years, in the column meant for entering the date of birth originally left blank, was meddled with and some entry came into existence to show the original entry as 27-2-1934 and once again the same was corrected to be as 27-2-1933 by overwriting the year 1934' as 1933'. He further argued that appellant 1, Company had not decided the date of birth at any point of time till the respondent had represented in the month of August 1988 to correct his date of birth and therefore according to him there was no basis worth the name for the appellant 1, Company, to hold that 2-12-1932 was the date of birth of the respondent to retire him from service with effect from 31-12-1990. To counter the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the suit of the respondent was not maintainable, Sri Rao had cited before me a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ishar Singh v National fertilizers and Another , wherein the Supreme Court held that under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure a civil suit by an employee before superannuation for correction of the date of birth is maintainable and further that the employee is not entitled to for backwages after the employee stands superannuated. In the said decision, the Supreme court held as follows:"date of birth Correction Proper forum. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sections 2-A and 33-C. Law is settled that matters which come within the purview of section 9 of the CPC are maintainable in the Civil Court. A suit for correcting the date of birth in the record would be maintainable in Civil Court. In fact, asking for a correction of that type may be for various purposes and need not necessarily be confined to the question of claiming the relief (Superannuation as per corrected date of birth in instant case) available under the Industrial disputes Act. A suit for correcting the date of birth in the record would be maintainable in Civil Court. In fact, asking for a correction of that type may be for various purposes and need not necessarily be confined to the question of claiming the relief (Superannuation as per corrected date of birth in instant case) available under the Industrial disputes Act. Where the suit for correction of date of birth is filed before an employee is superannuated on basis of the date of birth on record none of the situations contemplated under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act had happened so as to give the employee a cause of action to approach the Industrial Court. The maintainability of the suit has to be decided with reference to the date of institute of the proceeding and since on the date when the civil suit was filed none of the eventualities covered by Section 2-A had happened, he could not have approached the forum under the 1947 I. D. Act for relief. Thus the Civil suit would not be barred by section 2-A of the I. D. Act. If for part of the reliefs the suit is maintainable in the forum where it has been laid, it is not open to the forum to shut out its doors to the suitor. In that view of the matter, so far as the relief of rectification of the record relating to the date of birth is concerned, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to grant that relief. However, where the employee stood superannuated even on basis of the corrected date of birth by the time the civil suit came to be decided in his favour, the relief of backwages could not be granted by the Civil Court. The employee can avail of the remedy under section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act". Therefore, Sri Rao submitted that the suit of the appellant in the form it was filed before the learned City Civil Judge was perfectly maintainable. ( 14 ) SRI Rao next argued that when the respondent had represented in the year 1988 by resorting to Ex. Therefore, Sri Rao submitted that the suit of the appellant in the form it was filed before the learned City Civil Judge was perfectly maintainable. ( 14 ) SRI Rao next argued that when the respondent had represented in the year 1988 by resorting to Ex. P7, representation, immediately after his coming to know of the fact that there was wrong entry as to his date of birth, the appellant 1, Company, would have considered that request in view of the fact firstly that there was no entry in the employment application, Ex. D3, of the respondent as to the date of birth and secondly that at no point of time the appellant 1, Company, either called upon the respondent to give proof as to his date of birth or communicated the respondent as to its decision to hold that 2-12-1932 was the date of birth of the respondent for the purpose of the service records of the respondent. He further submitted that the Transfer Certificates and further the SSLC, copies produced at Ex. P5 and Ex. P6 respectively conclusively demonstrated that the date of birth of the respondent was 15-9-1934 and the same is having evidentiary value to prove the correct date of birth. In support of such an argument, Sri Rao cited before me a reported decision reported in 1988 (1) LLN 264. In the said decision the high Court of Judicature at Bombay in paras 6 and 7 of the judgment held as hereunder:"date of birth Dispute regarding Reference of Labour court on appreciation of evidence, coming to a conclusion as to correct date of birth It is a finding of fact by Labour Court cannot be interfered with by High Court under Article 226 of constitution of India School Leaving Certificate is a better evidentiary value to prove correct date of birth than primary vaccination certificate". Yet another decision, Sri Rao, cited before me is A. Devadass v Managing director, K. S. R. T. C. , Bangalore and Another. Yet another decision, Sri Rao, cited before me is A. Devadass v Managing director, K. S. R. T. C. , Bangalore and Another. In the said decision the learned Single Judge of this Court in a service matter held as hereunder:"service Alteration in date of birth Refusal to accede to employee's request for alteration of date of birth need not be preceded by an enquiry Even if employee obtains a declaration regarding date of birth from a competent Court, the employee does not get a right to seek alteration as the contract is based on the age given by the employee which determines the period of service Unless the service conditions or contracts of employment specifically permits the employee to claim correction of date of birth, the employee does not get any right to claim correction and there is no obligation on the employer to accept or act upon such altered date of birth, however subject to certain exceptions Where employee continued in service beyond the date of superannuation service cannot be said to be 'authorised service' Employee will not be entitled for any annual increments and leave encashment for period subsequent to date of superannuation". ( 15 ) SRI Rao while taking me through the evidence on record and further the impugned judgment and decree summed up his argument to say that the impugned judgment passed by the learned City Civil Judge is sound particularly when the same is based on the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Ishar Singh's case, referred to above. He therefore prayed that the appeal be dismissed and impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned City Civil Judge be confirmed. ( 16 ) HAVING heard both sides the points for my consideration are as follows: (1) Whether the appellant 1, Company, had ever decided the date of birth of the respondent to retire him from service with effect from 31-12-1990? (2) Whether the respondent had approached the appellant 1, company, belatedly on the eve of his superannuation? (3) Whether the suit of the respondent is maintainable before the Civil Court? (4) Whether the impugned judgment and decree is just and proper? ( 17 ) NOW I deal with the above points in its order. (2) Whether the respondent had approached the appellant 1, company, belatedly on the eve of his superannuation? (3) Whether the suit of the respondent is maintainable before the Civil Court? (4) Whether the impugned judgment and decree is just and proper? ( 17 ) NOW I deal with the above points in its order. Regarding Point No. 1: It is not in dispute that when the respondent had joined the services of the appellant 1, Company, he had filed an employment application as at Ex. D3 wherein he had given his age as 27 years and whereas he had not furnished his date of birth therein, no matter that in Ex. D3, employment application, the date of birth of the respondent had been later entered as 27-2-1934 at the first instance and thereafter it is overwritten and corrected as 27-2-1933 as at Ex. D3 (d ). It is the consistent case of the appellants that the respondent while joining the services of the appellants, did not furnish his date of birth and that it is for the reason it had been taken that as on the date of employment application i. e. , 5-10-1959, the respondent had attained the age of 27 years and that in determining the date of birth and age of the respondent, the declaration made by him at the time of his employment at Ex. D3 was admitted as the proof of his age and that the Company Medical officer had also certified the age of the respondent as 2-12-1959. The said fact was set-out in a copy of the letter dated 17-9-1988 addressed by the appellant 1, Company, to the respondent as at Ex. P8. In paras 2 and 3 of Ex. P8 it had been stated by the appellant 1, Company, as hereunder. "2. From the records, it is clear that you have declared your age as 27 years on 5-10-1959 in employment application furnished to us. You had not produced any documentary proof in support of your date of birth, at the time of appointment. Hence, the age was certified by the Company doctor and the same was accepted. 3. It is seen from the copy of Transfer Certificate produced by you now that the same contradicts with your earlier declaration. You had not produced any documentary proof in support of your date of birth, at the time of appointment. Hence, the age was certified by the Company doctor and the same was accepted. 3. It is seen from the copy of Transfer Certificate produced by you now that the same contradicts with your earlier declaration. The declaration made by you at the time of employment and the certificate issued by the Company's Medical Officer is final and conclusive and binding on you. In this connection we also invite your attention to Standing Order No. 35 of the Standing Order of Bangalore complex, applicable to you. According to this, in determining the date of birth and age, the declaration made by you at the time of your employment is admitted as a proof of your age. The company's Medical Officer has also certified your age as 27 years on 2-12-1959. In view of these circumstances, it is not possible to effect change of date of birth at this belated stage". ( 18 ) FROM the above, one thing is clear that the appellant 1, Company, was not clear as to what was the date of birth of the respondent that was reckoned by them for the purpose of service records, more particularly for the purpose of reckoning the date of superannuation, for in the above communication, nowhere it is stated by the appellant 1, Company, as to what was the date of birth that was decided by them. It is pertinent to mention here that even in the written statement filed by the appellants before the learned City Civil Judge while traversing the plaint averments, the appellants had also not stated in clear terms as to what was the date of birth that was decided by the appellants and whether the same was, in fact, decided either with reference to the employment application dated 5-10-1959 as at Ex. D3 or the Medical Certificate stated to be dated 2-12-1959 as at Ex. D4. ( 19 ) IT is to be pointed out here that determination of date of birth by the appellants in given cases as that of the respondent for the purpose of service record is a legal necessity in view of the fact that, that date is having a bearing on superannuation of the employees. D4. ( 19 ) IT is to be pointed out here that determination of date of birth by the appellants in given cases as that of the respondent for the purpose of service record is a legal necessity in view of the fact that, that date is having a bearing on superannuation of the employees. In the instant case, it appears to me that the appellants had not decided at any time as to what was the date of birth of the respondent for the purpose of his service record and further to retire him, no matter that they had retired the respondent with effect from 31-12-1990. On appreciation of evidence both oral and documentary it further appears to me that the entry of date of birth of the respondent shown as 27-2-1934' overwritten and corrected as 27-2-1933 as it had appeared in Ex. D3 (d) in Ex. D3, the employment application is an interpolation and the same was not originally entered therein. As a matter of fact, the same was also not acted upon or else the respondent would not have been retired on 31-12-1990 by the appellants. It further appears to me that if the employment application dated 5-10-1959 of the respondent as at Ex. D3 was reckoned, his date of birth would have been decided as 5-10-1932. Such a decision would have been taken by the appellants by taking note that the respondent had declared his age as 27 years as on 5-10-1959. Unfortunately that is also not the date, the appellants had decided to be the date of birth of the respondent. Another interesting aspect of the case is that according to the appellants the medical certificate as at Ex. D4 was reckoned for the purpose of deciding the date of birth of the respondent, but in no part of the Ex. D4, medical certificate, the age of the respondent is mentioned. Furthermore, the said medical certificate was also not dated as 2-11-1959' and therefore it is obvious that it is incorrect on the part of the appellants to say in Ex. P8 that the respondent was aged 27 years as on 2-12-1959. The said date appears to have been taken for the reason that in left hand corner (bottom) the signature of the respondent appears to have been fixed as on 2-12-1959 as at Ex. D4 (a ). P8 that the respondent was aged 27 years as on 2-12-1959. The said date appears to have been taken for the reason that in left hand corner (bottom) the signature of the respondent appears to have been fixed as on 2-12-1959 as at Ex. D4 (a ). The concoction on the part of the appellants in this regard is very much on the glare, for Ex. D4 is stated to have come into existence on 2-11-1959, whereas the signature of the respondent was taken subsequently as late as on 2-12-1959. Therefore it appears to me that Ex. D4 is a concocted document on the very face of it and in the said circumstances, I don't think that the same is of any assistance for the appellants to decide the date of birth of the respondent, more so when the same does not contain the age of the respondent. ( 20 ) IN the totality of the circumstances, on appreciation of evidence both oral and documentary, one thing is clear that the appellants had not communicated the respondent, the date of birth the appellants reckoned for the purpose of service record of the respondent, more particularly for the purpose of his superannuation from service, least of it not even decided at any point of time the date of birth of the respondent for the said purpose. As a matter of fact, the appellants would have decided the date of birth of the respondent either one way or the other before superannuating him on 31-12-1990, at least when the respondent had represented on 8-8-1988 by his representation as at Ex. P7. Hence, I am at loss to understand as to how and on what basis the appellants have decided to retire the respondent from his service with effect from 31-12-1990, in the aforementioned circumstances. One thing I have conspicuously noted in the instant case is that neither in the pleadings of the appellants nor in their evidence, both oral and documentary the appellants had nowhere stated as to what was the date of birth of the respondent the appellants decided and reckoned for the purpose of service records and more importantly for the purpose of superannuation. In the absence of that, in my considered view the decision of the appellants to retire the respondent with effect from 31-12-1990 without deciding his date of birth one way or other is erroneous. In the absence of that, in my considered view the decision of the appellants to retire the respondent with effect from 31-12-1990 without deciding his date of birth one way or other is erroneous. Therefore, I answer point no. 1 in the negative and in favour of the respondent. ( 21 ) REGARDING Point No. 2: The learned Counsel for the appellants had contended that the respondent had approached them as well as the learned City Civil Judge for the purpose of change of date of birth very belatedly on the eve of his superannuation. The learned Counsel for the appellants had also cited good number of decisions referred to in para (8) supra, to the effect that when an employee approaches belatedly at the fag end of his service to change the date of birth, such a prayer should not be considered, but in my considered view that does not appear to be the correct situation in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. It is on record that the respondent had approached the appellants as early as on 8-8-1988 by representing the appellants as at Ex. P7 with a prayer that his date of birth as in his SSLC and Transfer Certificate is set-out as 15-9-1934 be corrected in the service records, By a cursory look into Ex. P7, letter addressed by the respondent to the appellants, it is clear that he was representing the appellants quite some time earlier to Ex. P7 to give effect to the change of date of birth and that finally on 17-9-1988, the appellants by their reply thereto to Ex. P7 as at Ex. P8 had declined to the request of the respondent to give effect to the change of date of birth and the reason that was assigned therein is that it was a belated stage. In this context, it is worth referring to the averments in para (7) of the plaint that the respondent had come to know that during the year 1988 he had submitted an application for a bus pass to his college going son and surprisingly during that time he had come to know that his date of retirement was entered as 31-12-1990 and it is for that reason he had represented the appellants by way of representation to them on 8-8-1988 for giving effect to his correct date of birth i. e. 15-9-1934. I do understand if the appellants had decided the date of birth of the respondent for the purpose of service records one way or the other and notified the respondent thereto well in time, unfortunately in the instant case of the respondent that is not the case at all. From the pleadings as well as the evidence on record it is clear that much earlier to the actual date of retirement on 31-2-1990, in the month of August 1988, the respondent had represented the appellants to enter his date of birth as 15-9-1934 based on his SSLC and TC and that even then the appellants had not decided as to what was the actual date of birth of the respondent for the purpose of service record and for the purpose of superannuation at any point of time as pointed out by me earlier while discussing point No. 1. In the said circumstances, it cannot be argued that the respondent had approached the appellants belatedly for giving effect to for the change of date of birth. In my considered view, it is a primary duty of the employer to decide the date of birth of an employee one way or the other with due notice thereto to the employee, as the same has got civil consequences, particularly for the purpose of retiring an employee from service. But when the employer does not decide that issue and randomly decides to retire an employee, it cannot be said that the same is just and proper, besides legal. That exactly is the situation in the instant case on hand. In that view of the matter, I hold that the respondent had approached appellant 1, Company well in time and not on the eve of his superannuation. I answer point No. 2 accordingly in favour of the respondent. ( 22 ) REGARDING Point Nos. 3 and 4: Point No. 3 is on the point of maintainability of the suit by the respondent before the learned City civil Judge. I answer point No. 2 accordingly in favour of the respondent. ( 22 ) REGARDING Point Nos. 3 and 4: Point No. 3 is on the point of maintainability of the suit by the respondent before the learned City civil Judge. The learned Counsel for the appellants on the said point of maintainability, had argued that the dispute between the respondent on the one side and the appellants on the other was a dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or in other words, according to him, the dispute with regard to entering of the date of birth in the service records is a dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the instant suit filed by the respondent before the learned City Civil Judge is not maintainable, and therefore, he prayed that the impugned judgment and decree of the court below be set aside on the point of maintainability of the suit alone. He had also taken me through Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 to substantiate his arguments. It is relevant to quote here section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The same reads as hereunder:"2 (K) "industrial Dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person"; ( 23 ) FROM the above definition at times it may appear to one that the dispute between the respondents on the one side and the appellants on the other in the matter of entering the correct date of birth in the service records is an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the industrial Disputes Act. But that legal point is no more res Integra in view of the fact that the decision of three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble supreme Court reported in Ishar Singhs' case, supra, very well relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent. In this context, I should point out that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the said decision binds this Court under Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India. In this context, I should point out that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the said decision binds this Court under Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India. In the above decision, the Supreme Court clearly held that under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court for entertaining of suit by an employee before superannuation for correction of date of birth and as such a suit is maintainable before the Civil Court. ( 24 ) IN view of the above ruling laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court, I am but to hold that the suit the respondent has resorted to before the learned City Civil Judge is perfectly maintainable. As a matter of fact, the learned City Civil Judge in passing the impugned judgment and decree solely and rightly based his reasonings on the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. ( 25 ) IN the result, I don't find any good reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned City Civil Judge. Hence, I hold point No. (iii) in the affirmative and point No. (iv) in the negative, both in favour of the respondent. ( 26 ) IN view of the above conclusions I reached, the appeal herein filed fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Decree to follow. --- *** --- .