JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.: The regular second appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 4.8.1993 of the learned District Judge Shimla, whereby the judgment and decree dated 22.12.1988 of the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Shimla, were set aside. 2. The plaintiffs own their respective residential houses in separate portions of khasra No. 161 of Chakkar Area in Tehsil and District Shimla. The land comprising of khasra No. 161 is described in the revenue record partly as Abadi Deh and partly as agricultural and assessed to land revenue. 3. The defendant-Municipal Corporation, Shim la, in the year 1986 issued notices to the plaintiffs under section 102, HP. Municipal Corporation Act, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Act, inviting objections to the assessment of the rateble value of their properties for the purpose of levy of house lax. Such notices were challenged by the plaintiffs by way of the civil suit, out of which the present appeal has arisen, on the grounds:- (a) The house properties of the plaintiffs are situated outside the municipal limits: and (b) No facilities which the defendant Municipal Corporation is bound or provide under the Act stand provided. Therefore, they are not liable to pay the taxes under the Act 4. While resisting and contesting the suit, the defendant averred that the whole area of Chakkar was included within the municipal limits vide notification dated 24.7.1950. Since the house properties of the plaintiffs fall within the municipal limits, the defendant has the power to impose tax in respect thereof. Objections as to the jurisdiction of the court, maintainability of the suit, mis-joinder of parties and verification of the plaint were further raised. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, followings issues were framed by the learned trial court:- 1. Whether the notices issued to the plaintiff by the defendants under section 102 of H.P. Municipal Corporation Act. are, illegal, void and without any jurisdiction? OPP 2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of section 392 of H.P.NT.C. Act, 1979? OPD 4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties? OPD 5. Whether the plaint is not properly verified as required under law? OPD 6. Relief. 6. The learned Sub Judge decided issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs and issues No.2 to 5 against the defendant. OPD 4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties? OPD 5. Whether the plaint is not properly verified as required under law? OPD 6. Relief. 6. The learned Sub Judge decided issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs and issues No.2 to 5 against the defendant. As a result of such findings the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed on 22.2.1988. The defendant was restrained by way of a permanent injunction from imposing and recovering of the proposed taxes from the plaintiffs. 7. On the appeal having been filed by the defendant, the learned District Judge vide the impugned judgment and decree set aside the findings of the learned trial court and ordered the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the properties of the plaintiffs were within the municipal limits and as such the defendant was competent to impose taxes under the Act. With regard to non-providing of necessary facilities under the Act by the defendant, the learned District Judge observed that the plaintiffs have a separate remedy for the enforcement thereof. 8. The plaintiffs have now come up before this Court by way of the present second appeal assailing the impugned judgment and decree of the learned District Judge. It has been contended that the findings of the learned District Judge holding that the properties of the plaintiffs are within the municipal limits are wrong, in the year 1950, Shimla was apart of the State of Punjab, while Chakkar area being a part of the then Tehsil Kasumpti of erstwhile Mahasu District formed part of the then State of Himachal Pradesh. No part of State of Himachal Pradesh could have been included in the municipal limits of Shimla by the State of Punjab. It was further been contended that even otherwise in lieu of the taxes to be imposed, the defendant under the. Act is bound to provide facilities, such as, roads, light etc. Since such facilities have net been provided the defendant cannot impose any tax under the Act. 9. Shri K.L. Bali, Advocate the learned counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, has supported the impugned judgment and decree of the learned first appellate court for the reasons and on the grounds stated therein. 10. Since such facilities have net been provided the defendant cannot impose any tax under the Act. 9. Shri K.L. Bali, Advocate the learned counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, has supported the impugned judgment and decree of the learned first appellate court for the reasons and on the grounds stated therein. 10. There is no denying that at the relevant time Chakkar area was a part of the then State of Himachal Pradesh whereas the area forming part of the municipal limits of Shimla was apart of State of Punjab. 11. In exercise of the powers conferred on him under sections 290,290-A and 290-B of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor General was pleased to make an Order, known as The Provinces and States (Absorption of Enclaves) Order,1950. The Order came into force on and with effect from 25th day of January, 1950. Vide this order certain "Enclaves" were transferred from one Province to another Province. "Enclave" has been defined under Article 2(b) of the said Order as meaning the area specified as such in any of the Schedules to this Order. Article 3(1) of the Order provides:- "As from the appointed day, even- enclave specified in the First Schedule shall cease to form part of the surrendering unit, and shall be included in, and form part of the absorbing unit. 12. Item No. III of the First Schedule to the Order shows that besides certain other areas, 61 acres of Chakkar area including Himachal Pradesh portion of prospect HL11 was transferred from Himachal Pradesh to the State of Punjab. Therefore, on and with effect from the appointed day, that is, 25th day of January, 1950, 61 acres of Chakkar area including Himachal portion of prospect Hill became a part of the State of Punjab. 13. The State of Punjab, through notification dated 22.7.1950 (Ex.DW2/A) issued through its Revenue Department included the area transferred to it by the Order of 1950 within the limits of Shimla District with effect from 25th day of January, 1950. The area of Chakkar so included in Shimla District has been described in ExDW2/A as under:- "The entire village of Kareru Pargana Jajhot Tehsil Kasumpti, District Mahasu (Himachal Pradesh) measuring 61 acres, known as Chakkar and Khasra Nos. The area of Chakkar so included in Shimla District has been described in ExDW2/A as under:- "The entire village of Kareru Pargana Jajhot Tehsil Kasumpti, District Mahasu (Himachal Pradesh) measuring 61 acres, known as Chakkar and Khasra Nos. 1,499, 502, 505 and 507 measuring 8 bighas 15 biswas = 1.6 acres of village Bharhai, Pargana Jajhot Tehsil Kasumpti, District Mahasa (Himachal Pradesh)." 14. Yet vide another notification dated 24.7.1950 of the local Government Department of the State of Punjab, the Chakkar area described above, came to be included within the municipal limits of Shimla with effect from 25th day of January, 1950. 15. Admittedly, the house properties of the plaintiffs are situated in a part of khasra No. 161 of the then village Kareru. As stated above die whole of village Kareru came to be included in Shimla District and municipal limits of Shimla vide notifications dated 22.7.1950 and 24.7.1950 respectively with effect from 25th day of.January,1950. 16. Therefore, on the material placed on the record, the learned District Judge has rightly held that the properties of the plaintiffs are situated within the municipal limits of Shimla and the defendant is fully competent to impose taxes under the Act in respect thereto. 17. The second contention raised on behalf of the plaintiffs is that since the defendant has failed to provide the necessary facilities which it is bound to provide under the Act to the Chakkar area, it cannot impose the taxes. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance on the decision of Delhi High Court in Man Mohan Tuli v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & anr., AIR-1983 Delhi 152. 18. Section 89, of the Act as then in force authorised the defendant to impose the following taxes:- (a) Taxes on lands and buildings; (b) Octroi; (c) A tax on vehicles and animals; (d) A tax on advertisements other than advertisements published in newspapers; (e) A tax on buildings payable along with the application for sanction of the building plan; and (f) a development tax on the increase in urban land values caused by execution of any development or improvement work. Section 90 further provides that taxes on lands and buildings shall consist of:- (i) A water tax of such percentage of the rateable value of lands and buildings as the Government may deem reasonable for providing water supply in the city; (ii) a fire tax on such percentage of rateable value of lands and buildings as the Government may deem reasonable for expense necessary for conduct and management of the Fire Service and for the protection of life and property in case of fire; (iii)a general tax of not more than, fifteen percent of the rateable value of lands and buildings within the city. 19. Section 91 further provides that water tax shall be levied only in respect of the lands and buildings to which a water supply is furnished from or which are connected by means of pipes with Municipal water works or which are situated in any portion of the city in which the Commissioner has given public notice that sufficient water is available from Municipal water works for a reasonable supply to all the lands and buildings in the said portion. Under sub-section (2) to section 91, fire tax is to be levied in respect of all lands and buildings in the city in respect of which the general tax is levied or would have been levied but for the exemption given by or under, the provisions of the Act. 20. It is well settled that a tax is an imposition made for public purpose, without reference to any services rendered by the State or any specific benefit to be conferred upon the tax payer. The object of the levy being to raise the: general revenue. In other words, tax is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for a public purpose enforceable by law and there is no element of "quid pro quo" between the tax payer and public authority. 21. The imposition of property tax by the defendant under the Act does not involve the element of "quid pro quo" between the parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that unless the necessary facilities are provided by the defendant. it is debarred from imposing the property tax. 22. The ratio laid down in Man Mohan Tulli v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, it cannot be said that unless the necessary facilities are provided by the defendant. it is debarred from imposing the property tax. 22. The ratio laid down in Man Mohan Tulli v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The properties involved in the said case lay on the border line of Union Territory of Delhi and the adjoining State of Uttar Pradesh. Such properties were subject to taxes as imposed upon it by the Nagar Palika, Ghaziabad. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi also sought to impose property tax thereon. The action was challenged by the owner of the properties by way of a writ petition. The question was came up for consideration was:- " Whether properties lying on the border line of Union Territory of Delhi and the adjoining State are liable to municipal property tax of Delhi?" 23. It was not the case of the owner of the properties in the said case that property tax could not be levied by either of the two municipal authorities. The properly was so situated that it could not be said to be falling within (he territory of one State. His complaint was that the two municipal authorities in two different States could net simultaneously charge his properties to property tax. Besides, it had come on the record that the concerned area was not developed according to the Master plan, zonal plan or the development plans of Delhi Development Authority. It was only after the development plans having taken place that the Municipal Corporation Delhi could have made the necessary services available. Moreover there were physical impediments from the northern and northern side (the only two sides from which the properties touched Delhi) in rendering the municipal services. The properties could be approached only from the area failing in the State of Utter Pradesh. It was on these facts that it was held that the Municipal Corporation, Delhi could not levy the property tax on these properties. 24. ln Refugees Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (IlR (1972) 1 Delhi 725) the facts and contentions raised were the same as tie facts and contentions raised in the present case. Punjabi Bagh area before 1959 was a rural area near Delhi. Thereafter it was included in the urban area of Delhi. 24. ln Refugees Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (IlR (1972) 1 Delhi 725) the facts and contentions raised were the same as tie facts and contentions raised in the present case. Punjabi Bagh area before 1959 was a rural area near Delhi. Thereafter it was included in the urban area of Delhi. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi started levying property tax to the said area with effect from 1.4.1962. The action of the Municipal Corporation was assailed on two grounds and one of such grounds being that in absence of quid pro quo, the corporation had no authority of levy property tax It was held:- "The Corporation is entitled to levy and collect taxes as provided under section 113 and other sections irrespective of the performance of the functions mentioned in section 42, and it cannot be contended that unless the said functions are performed by the Corporation, no taxes can be levied and collected by it So far as the obligatory functions mentioned in section 42 are concerned, the Corporation is liable to perform them in accordance with the provisions of the section and if it fails to do sc. the remedy is to get the performance of the obligatory functions enforced by 2 Court of law." 25. The ratio laid down in the above noted case by the Delhi High Court is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 26. Even otherwise, it is significant to note that the plaintiff Hari Chand while appearing as PW 1 has not stated even a single word regarding the non-providing of facilities or non-performance of obligatory functions by the defendant. He has categorically admitted that he has been provided with a water connection by the defendant. Therefore, in the present case, it cannot be said that the necessary facilities have not been provided by the defendant. 27. No other point was urged before me by the learned counsel for the parties. 28. Consequently, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.