JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. The tenant-appellant has filed this Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 31-10-1990 rendered by the 1st Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Shajapur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 10-A/90 thereby affirming with modification the judgment and decree dated 18-1-1990 rendered by Civil Judge Class I, Sarangpur in COS No. 54-A/83. The Trial Court answered issue No. 1 about the purpose of letting in the affirmative i.e. holding that the accommodation was let for non-residential purpose, but the Appellate Court modified the finding and held that it was let out for composite purpose and further held that this reversal of finding has no adverse impact on the decree for eviction as the Respondent is entitled to seek eviction from entire accommodation even on proof of bona fide requirement either under section 12(1)(e) or 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as held by the Division Bench of this Court in 1982 JLJ 319 , Jagjit Kumar v. Jagdishchandra. The Appellate Court also found that the Respondent is entitled to obtain the decree also under section 12(1)(e) of the aforesaid Act (para 14 of the impugned judgment). 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the Respondent filed the suit for eviction of the suit-accommodation, let out at a monthly rent of Rs. 65/- for composite purpose of residential and non-residential on the ground of bona fide need, for composite i.e. residential and for non-residential purpose. The Respondent was a public servant and filed the suit on his retirement. The appellant contested the suit. On evaluation of the evidence, the Trial Court concluded that the accommodation was let out only for non-residential purpose and not for composite purpose. The Trial Court found it proved that the accommodation let out was required bona fide by the Respondent for starting the business and for this purpose he had no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation at Sarangpur. On these findings, the Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The objection about jurisdiction was also negatived. Thereafter, the appellant filed the aforesaid First Appeal, in which the fortune did not fluctuate. On these findings, the Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The objection about jurisdiction was also negatived. Thereafter, the appellant filed the aforesaid First Appeal, in which the fortune did not fluctuate. The First Appellate Court maintained the decree of eviction, but with modification as noted above, passed by the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court also rejected the contention about absence of jurisdiction. Dissatisfied the appellant has filed this Second Appeal. 3. This Second Appeal was admitted for final hearing by this Court on 15-1-1991 on the under noted two substantial questions of law. - "1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of the suit filed by a retired Government servant for bona fide requirement for residential and non-residential purpose in view of sections 23-A, 23-J and section 45 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act? 2. Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's requirement can be said to be bona fide?" 4. I have heard Shri A. H. Khan, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri S. S. Garg, learned counsel for the Respondent. 5. As regards question No. 1, I find that the same was considered by the Trial Court in paras 25 to 27 of the judgment and was considered by the First Appellate Court in para 15 of the appellate Judgment. Both the Courts noticed that the suit was filed on 20-4-1983 whereas the Act conferring jurisdiction for specified categories of landlords on Rent Controlling Authority, came into force on 16-8-1983. It was noticed that there was no provision for transfer of the pending suits to the Rent Controlling Authority. This being so, there was no question of bar of jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings initiated before the commencement of Act No. 27 of 1983, enforced from 16-8-1983. Even otherwise, the appellant got the benefit of regular trial as also of two appeals. No prejudice is thus, shown to have been caused. The contention of jurisdiction is thus, manifestly meritless and deserves to be rejected. 6. In these facts and circumstances, it becomes luculent that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred in terms of sections 23-A, 23-J and section 45 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. 7. No prejudice is thus, shown to have been caused. The contention of jurisdiction is thus, manifestly meritless and deserves to be rejected. 6. In these facts and circumstances, it becomes luculent that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred in terms of sections 23-A, 23-J and section 45 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. 7. As regards the question of bona fide need, I find that the Trial Court framed issues Nos. 1 to 3. The Trial Court considered the question in paras Nos. 15 to 18. The Trial Court evaluated the evidence, The Trial Court noted that the appellant-defendant did not produce material witness Gulam Hussain. The First Appellate Court reappraised the evidential material in paras Nos. 12 to 14 of the impugned judgment and concluded that the Respondent has retired from service and needs the suit accommodation for residence (para 14) and for starting the business for his livelihood (paras Nos. 12 and 13). 8. The aforesaid conclusions reached by the First Appellate Court are on firm foundation. This is a finding of fact. 9. It is, thus, clear as under :- a) The Trial Court found that the accommodation was let only for non-residential purpose and further found that it was bona fide required by the Respondent to start his business on his retirement and passed the decree of eviction. The issue No. 3 relating to bona fide requirement for residence was negatived only on the ground that the accommodation was found to be let out only for non-residential purpose. b) The First Appellate Court, however, modified the finding on issue No. 1 and held that the accommodation was let for composite purpose at different times. The First Appellate Court also found that the bona fide need for residence was also proved. c) The First Appellate Court also found, placing reliance on 1982 JLJ 319 (supra) that the decree of eviction from entire accommodation is permissible under the law even on proof of bona fide requirement for one of the purposes i.e. residential or non-residential, as the contract is indivisible. 10. The aforesaid position of law is not disputed before me. 11. I find that the Appellate Court rightly altered the finding on issue No. 1 and held that the purpose of letting was composite, and that decree was sustainable. 12. 10. The aforesaid position of law is not disputed before me. 11. I find that the Appellate Court rightly altered the finding on issue No. 1 and held that the purpose of letting was composite, and that decree was sustainable. 12. In AIR 1974 SC 405 , Baburao Bagaji v. Govind, it is held as under :- "Before a finding of fact by a Trial Court can be set aside, it must be established that the Trial Judge's findings were clearly unsound, perverse or have been based on grounds which are unsatisfactory by reason of material inconsistencies or inaccuracies." X X X 13. I find that the finding on issue No. 1 was rightly modified by the First Appellate Court on account of material inaccuracies in evaluation of the evidential material. The finding as recorded by the First Appellate Court is proper and legal. It is thus, rightly held that the purpose of letting was composite. The Trial Court had not passed the decree under section 12(1)(e) only because of its finding on issue No.1. The First Appellate Court held that the Respondent-landlord is entitled to obtain eviction also on the ground specified under section 12(1)(e). However, the First Appellate Court also noticed the position of law and stated that the decree of eviction is permissible under the law even on proof of one of the purposes. The decree of eviction is thus, rightly sustained with modification. The counsel for the appellant is unable to point out any error even in this modification. 14. As I am in general agreement with the reasons and conclusions, I find it unnecessary to restate the effect of evidence or reiterate the reason. In AIR 1967 SC 1124 , Girjanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, it is held as under :- "It is not the duty of the Appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the Trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." -x- -x- -x- 15. I am thus, satisfied that in the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the requirement of the Respondent is rightly held to be bona fide and the conclusion is free from any infirmity. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." -x- -x- -x- 15. I am thus, satisfied that in the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the requirement of the Respondent is rightly held to be bona fide and the conclusion is free from any infirmity. Moreover, it is a finding of fact indicating no perversity. It is non-interferable under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. The conclusion about bona fide requirement is, thus, sound and is not liable to be demolished. 17. In the circumstances, I find that this appeal is devoid of merit and deserves the fate of dismissal. 18. Accordingly, I dismiss this appeal, but with no orders as to costs. Counsel's fee for each side shall be according to the schedule, if certified. 19. A decree be drawn up accordingly. 20. Records of the Courts below shall now be returned.