JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is plaintiffs appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, directed against the judgment and decree dated 25.11.95, passed by XII the Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, in Civil Appeal No. 61-A of 1995 arising out of judgment and decree dated 30-7-1991, passed by IXth Civil Judge Class II, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 147-A of 1988. 2. The facts of this case relevant for the decision of the appeal are as follows:- The appellant filed Civil Suit No. 147-A of 1988 for ejectment in respect of suit house bearing Municipal Corporation No. 665, 667/1, 667 (2), 667/3, Kotwali Bazar, Jabalpur, in occupation of respondents No. 1,2, 3 and 5. The name of the house is "udrat Manzil" and is shown in the plaint map as such having two storey. The suit house was let out of late Shikharchand Jain at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month mainly for non-residential purpose, but the tenant was permitted to use the second storey for residential purpose. The suit house was let out by the then co-owners, namely. Barkatullah, Anna Bi, Jalaluddin and Hamida Bi. It was stated in the plaint that original owner of the suit house was Sheikh Gullu. After his death, Barkatullah and Shamshuddin succeeded in his property. After death of Shamshuddin his widow Anma Bi his son Jalluddin and his daughter Hamida Bi inherited his share in the property. Thus, the persons mentioned above, let out the suit house as per Ex. D-1 on 1.5.68. After the death of Barkatullah, his three sons Hafizullah, Habibullah, Inayatullah, his wife Rafiquan Bi and his author Sona Begum (Sona Bai) were entitled to inherit the suit property to the extern of share of Barkatullah as per Muslim Law. The other co-owners representing the line of Shamshuddin were Amna Bi Jaialuddina and Hamida Bi. 3. Initially, Civil Suit No. 147-A/88 was filed by Hafizullah, Hbibullah, Inayatullah, Refiquan Bi. Smt. Sona Bai, Jalaluddin, Smt. Begum Bi wife of Jalaluddin and Smt. Hamida Bi. The original defendants were Shikharchand and Balaprasad. Subsequently, the plaint was amended. The names of Habibullah. Inayatullah, Refiquan Bi, Smt. Sona Bai, Jalauddin and Smt. Begum Bi were deleted from the array of plaintiffs. Only two plaintiffs remained; Hafizullah and Smt. Hamida Begum. Jalaluddin was transposed as defendant No. 4. The original defendants were Shikharchand and Balaprasad. Subsequently, the plaint was amended. The names of Habibullah. Inayatullah, Refiquan Bi, Smt. Sona Bai, Jalauddin and Smt. Begum Bi were deleted from the array of plaintiffs. Only two plaintiffs remained; Hafizullah and Smt. Hamida Begum. Jalaluddin was transposed as defendant No. 4. So far as Habibullah, Inayatullah and Refiquan Bi were concerned, it was claimed they by will dated 12.2.75 Barkatullah be quested his share in the property to Halizullah. All those heirs accepted the will and so their names were therefore, deleted. 4. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, the defendant No. 1 Shikhar Chand Jain died. His widow Champabai and his son Puran Chand were brought on record. The defendant No. 2 also died. His widow and his son Krishna Kumar were brought on record. It appears from record that the new defendant No. 5, Indra Kumar Jain is also legal representative of late Shikhar Chand Jain. However, he acquired an interest in the suit property by virtue of two sale deeds executed by Smt. Begum Bi and Smt. Sona Bai consequently, sale-deeds dated 2.2.1982, Ex. D-12 and 20.9.82. Ex. D-13 made in favour of defendant No. 5, were also challenged as void in the eyes of law. 5. It was claimed in the plaint, as amended finally, that the suit house was bona fide required for the office and residence of Halizullah, the plaintiff No. 1. It appears that the claim was of composite need covered by Section 12(1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act' for short). The plaintiff No. 1 stated that he had no alternative accommodation of his own in the city of Jabalpur. It was also claimed that suit accommodation was sub let by defendant No. 1, Shikhar Chand Jain to defendants No. 2 and 3. It was claimed that Indra Kumar, the defendant No. 5 had illegally divided the property. Thus, a ground under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act was made out. There was another ground for eviction i.e. under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act to the effect the defendants No. 1 to 3 disclaimed the title of the plaintiff No. 1, Hafizullah. 6. Thus, a ground under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act was made out. There was another ground for eviction i.e. under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act to the effect the defendants No. 1 to 3 disclaimed the title of the plaintiff No. 1, Hafizullah. 6. The defence raised by defendants No. 1 to 3 and 4 to 5, in their separate written statements amounts to that there was a partition of the suit house between Barkatullah and Shamshuddin in the year 1975 or there about. They were not co-owners of the suit house. The southern portion of the house fell to the share of Shamshuddin. After the death of Barkatullah, his heirs inherited the northern portion of the house and southern portion fell to the share of Jalaluddin. The share of Shamshuddin was transferred by him, by a registered gift-deed dated 17.4.74 to his wife Smt. Begum Bi and she was accordingly, placed in possession of her share. The rent of southern portion was apportioned to Begum Bi at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month. This was accepted by the plaintiff No. 1. This portion belonging to Begum Bi was subsequently sold by registered sale-deed dated 2.2.82 to Indra Kumar Jain and he become the sole owner of that portion. It was also claimed that Sona Begum, the sister of plaintiff No. 1, had also transferred her share in the suit property to defendant No. 5, Indra Kumar Jain by registered sale deed dated 20.9.82. It was denied that Hafizullah became the sole owner of share of Barkatullah. 7. It was also claimed that the suit house was let out for business purpose and the plaintiff No. 1 had an alternative accommodation in his possession. The suit house was sub let according to the lease deed dated 1.5.68, Ex. P-1. Therefore, there was no ground made out under section 12 (1)(b) of the Act. It was also claimed that in Civil Suit No. 15-A/82 the plaintiff No. 1 had obtained a decree against Begum Bi by playing fraud. There was a civil suit pending against that judgment and decree. It was registered as Civil Suit No. 173-A/84. The defendant No. 5 became the owner of the suit house to the extent of 9/16 share in the suit property and he was not it liable to be ejected. There was a civil suit pending against that judgment and decree. It was registered as Civil Suit No. 173-A/84. The defendant No. 5 became the owner of the suit house to the extent of 9/16 share in the suit property and he was not it liable to be ejected. It was also claimed that plaintiff No. 1 had accepted the rent of the share in the suit house to the extent of his 1/2 share and he was, therefore, stopped from challenging the title of the defendant No. 5. It was said that the suit was not maintainable. It was barred by principles of res-judicata. 8. The trial Court, inter alia, held that the plaintiff and Jalaluddin were not the sole owners and landlords of the suit house and the plaintiff No. 1 alone was not entitled to get a decree of eviction. It was also found that the suit house was let out to Shikhar Chand Jain for business purposes. The second storey was also given for business purposes, the suit house was required by the plaintiff No. 1 for his profession and so far as ground floor and the first floor was concerned, he had no alternative accommodation of his own for this purpose. It was also found that plaintiff No. 1 did not require the second storey for his residence as he had an alternative accommodation of his own in the city of Jabalpur. But, no decree under Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act could be granted in respect of second storey of the suit house as it was let out for business purposes. It was, however, found that the ground under Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act was not made out. Itwas also found that ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act was not made out. The Court came to the conclusion that despite the findings recorded by it, suit of the plaintiff has to he dismissed, as he alone could not evict the defendants No. 1,2, 3 and 5. 9. During the pendency of the appeal, Jalaluddin died and his legal representative were brought on record pursuant to order dated 25.9.92. The lower appellate Court admitted in evidence the certified copy of order dated 12.11.1987. 9. During the pendency of the appeal, Jalaluddin died and his legal representative were brought on record pursuant to order dated 25.9.92. The lower appellate Court admitted in evidence the certified copy of order dated 12.11.1987. It also permitted the respondent No. 4 to file certified copy, by way of additional evidence, of the order dated 8.1.88, passed in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 6/87. This was done by the Court below in exercise of its powers under order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The cross objection was also filed by the respondents No. 1 to 4. It has been disposed of along with the impugned judgment and decree. 10. The Court below, alter hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants. It has held that bona-fide requirement of plaintiff No. 1 for his profession was established. It was also established that the plaintiff No. 1 had no alternative accommodation for carrying on his profession. This requirement was limited to first storey and ground floor as he was carrying on his profession in a ranted premises. The need for residence, however, was rejected on three grounds - (i) that entire premises ware let out for business purpose (ii) the plaintiff no. I was living in his own house; and (iii) a portion of the suit house was sold by the co-owners and, therefore, the plaintiff No. 1 was not entitled to get a decree for substantial portion. The lower appellate Court also held that no decree could be passed under Section 12 (1) (b) of 'the Act'. No ground under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act was made out. The lower appellate Court held that so far as the will was concerned, the competent Court rejected it. It was, therefore, held that plaintiff No. 1 acquired an interest in the share of Barkatullah, after his death, along with Habibullah, Inayatullah, Rafiquan Bi and Sona Bai (Begum) as per Mulim Law. The other co-owners would be heirs of Shamshuddin. It was held that defendant No. 4 and his wife had transferred their respective shares in the suit property to Indra Kumar Jain, defendant No. 5 by sale deed, Ex. D-12-A (photocopy), dated 2-2-82 and by Ex. D-13-A (photocopy), dated 20.9.82 by Sona Begum. The other co-owners would be heirs of Shamshuddin. It was held that defendant No. 4 and his wife had transferred their respective shares in the suit property to Indra Kumar Jain, defendant No. 5 by sale deed, Ex. D-12-A (photocopy), dated 2-2-82 and by Ex. D-13-A (photocopy), dated 20.9.82 by Sona Begum. Thus, the position of Indra Kumar Jain was that of co-owner along with plaintiff and others. For this reason, it was held that the trial Court rightly declined to grant a decree for eviction of the defendants No. 1.2. 3 and 5. 11. In this appeal, this Court, on 15.1.1996 framed the following substantial question of law:- Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant who is a owner, is entitled to sue the defendant despite the refusal on part of other-co-owner for eviction of the tenant and if yes, whether the appellant is entitled to a decree on the ground of section 12 (1) (f) of the Act ? 12. The question of law framed by this Court is in two parts. The first part relates to the right of the plaintiff to evict the defendants No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 ever though, the other co-owners, the defendant No. 4 and another heir Sona Begum had sold their shares in favour of the defendant No. 5, Indra Kumar Jain. The second part relates to bona fide requirement of the plaintiff for evicting the defendants No. 1, 2, 3, and 5. It is obvious that, if this Court comes to the conclusion, that appellant can evict the aforesaid defendants in the suit for eviction filed by him, despite, the sale-deeds executed in favour of the defendant No. 5, the question of eviction under Section 12 (1) (e) or 12 (1) (f) of the Act would arise. The other grounds under section 12 (1) (c) and 12 (1) (b) of the Act are also dependent upon the answers to question raised above. Even though no question of law was framed by this Court on the grounds under Section 12(1) (c) and Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, the counsel for the parties were also heard on these points. Both the counsel did not dispute that the Court had ample powers to frame any substantial question of law, which appeared to this Court, necessary for just decision of this appeal. 13. Both the counsel did not dispute that the Court had ample powers to frame any substantial question of law, which appeared to this Court, necessary for just decision of this appeal. 13. We may recapitulate facts before starting facts discussion on the first part of the question. The lease deed, Ex. P-1 dated 1.5.68 shows that suit premises were let out to Shikhar Chand Jain jointly by Barkatullah, Jalaluddin, Amna-Bi and Hamida Bi. The aforesaid persons where undisputedly the co-owners, when the suit house was let out. The civil suit No. 196-A/86 tiled by the plaintiff No. 1 stood dismissed. This suit stood dismissed as per order dated 11.4.88, passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 48/88, Ex. D 11. The result as it obtains today is that the will dated 12.2.75 alleged to the executed by Barkatullah in favour of the plaintiff No. 1 was not accepted by the Court in that suit and the registered sale-deed, dated 20.9.82, Ex. D-13 was held to be valid. It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, during the argument, that this matter is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court. Be it as it may, this Court as a court of co-ordinate Jurisdiction, cannot sit in judgment over the order dated 11.4.88, passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 48/88. This Court must, therefore, accept the legal position that the sale deed executed on 20.9.82 by Sona Begum, Ex. D-13 was a valid document. The plaintiffs brought to my notice judgment and decree dated 9.1.82, passed in Civil Suit No. 15-A/81 Ex. P-42 whereby the hibaname executed by Jalaluddin on 17.4.74 in favour of his wife Begum Bi was held to be invalid. It was also pointed out that order in M.J.C. filed along with application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the lower appellate Court, shows that the judgment and decree dated 9.1.82 was ultimately maintained by the trial Court in the review application filed by Hamida Bi, the plaintiff No. 2. The record also shows that an appeal against the review application was pending on behalf of Jalaluddin and Begum Bi. This memo of appeal too was accepted by the Court under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. on behalf of defendant No. 1.2,3 and 5. It was, therefore, urged that sale deed dated 2.2.83. Ex. The record also shows that an appeal against the review application was pending on behalf of Jalaluddin and Begum Bi. This memo of appeal too was accepted by the Court under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. on behalf of defendant No. 1.2,3 and 5. It was, therefore, urged that sale deed dated 2.2.83. Ex. D-12 executed by Begum Bi in favour of defendant No. 5, was invalid. However, the matter is still sub juice as the defendant Jalaluddin and Begum Bi had filed an appeal against the order review passed by the trial Court. It would be, therefore, safe to ignore the sale-deed, Ex. D-12 dated 2.2.82 executed by Begum Bi in favour of Indra Kumar Jain. Even otherwise this sale deed dated 2.2.82 be valid, it does not affect the share of plaintiff No: 1 Hafizullah who gets the share of Barkatullah along with other co-owners. The dispute is between plaintiff No. 2, Hamida Bi and Begum Bi, claiming through Jalaluddin. No doubt, it is true that the other sale deed dated 20.9.82, Ex. D-13 in favour of defendant No. 5 was executed during the pendency of this suit and Indra Kumar Jain was added as a party (Defendant No. 5,) pursuant to the order passed by District Judge, in C.R. No. 1/85. It is also undisputed before me that the suit property was not partitioned. Therefore. Indra Kumar Jain, being the purchaser of the undivided share of Sona Begum, is a co-owners of the property. In other words, he is a co-owner along with the heirs of Barkatullah and Shamshuddin. It does not matter that the second sale deed made during the pendency of the suit. The unilateral action of Sona Bi of executing the sale deed during the pendency of suit amounts of dissent on her part in favour of defendants No. 1.2,3 and 5. It may be an implied dissent; but dissent it is. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that despite of Ex. D-13, dated 20.9.82 in favour of the defendant No. 5, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendants No. 1,2,3 and 5 did not end. It was claimed that the whole of reversion did not merge into title of the defendant No. 5. Therefore, the partial sale of property could not split the integrity of the tenancy. D-13, dated 20.9.82 in favour of the defendant No. 5, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendants No. 1,2,3 and 5 did not end. It was claimed that the whole of reversion did not merge into title of the defendant No. 5. Therefore, the partial sale of property could not split the integrity of the tenancy. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon the majority decision rendered by S.S. Sandhawalia. C.J. in the case of Sharfuddin and others Vs. Bibi Khatija and another, A.I.R. 1988 Pat 58. The counsel for the appellants also referred to the cases of Shantaram Laxmanrao Kekre Vs. Shyam Sunder and another A.I.R. 1972 M.P. 17, K.P. Pathak Vs. Dr. Riyazuddin and others, A.I.R. 1976 M.P. 55. Sardarilal Vs. Narayanlal A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 8, Dr. T. S. Subramanian (Deceased), by Lrs. Vs. The Andhra Bank, Ltd. A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1420, Smt. Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak and others, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1599, Roshan Singh and others Vs. Zile Singh and others A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 881 Mohar Singh (Dead by L. Rs.) Vs. Devi Charan and others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1365 Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and others, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2335, Sarvinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh and others 1997 (1) M. P.L.J. 324 and Bardi Narain Jha & others Vs. Rameshwar Dayal Singh & others, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 186. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents No. 1,2,3 and 5 on the other hand, argued that none of the authorities, cited by the appellants, are apt. It was urged that it was as clear day fight, the respondent No. 5 had become one of the co-owners alognwith the plaintiffs. The learned counsel argued that defendant No. 5 was one of the co-owners and he cannot be evicted. The other defendants i.e. defendants No. 1, 2, and 3 also cannot be evicted without a partition between the co-owners. No ground for eviction under Section 12 of the Act was made out. 16. Alter hearing the counsel for the parties and considering some what deeply the intricate and interesting question of law involved in this appeal, I am unable to agree with the view of the majority in Sharfuddin's case, (supra). With great respect, the majority opinion in that case reveals an inner inconsistency. S.S. Sandhawalia. C.J. in paragraph 1, has quoted Smt. Kanta Goel Vs. With great respect, the majority opinion in that case reveals an inner inconsistency. S.S. Sandhawalia. C.J. in paragraph 1, has quoted Smt. Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak, and others, (supra), in which it was observed that:- We are not called upon to consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the evicting co-owners. It is apparent from the aforesaid that the Supreme Court left open the question in that case. Therefore, there was no question of any binding precedent when the piquant situation anise i.e. one of the co-owners objected to eviction. Yet, the learned Chief Justice has treated in paragraph 21 at page 66 and in paragraph 67 at page 67 the cases of Sri Ram Pastiche Vs. Jagannath, (supra) and Smt. Kanta Gael Vs/. B.P. Pathak (supra), respectively as binding precedents. In none of these cases, the question involved, regarding the maintainability of ejectment suit when a co-owner objected to eviction was decided. May, the question was left open in Smt. Kanta God's case (supra). The learned Chief Justice makes a quantum jump in logic when he concludes:- 24. To my mind, it appears that once the final Court has held categorically that one co-owner can singly maintain a suit for eviction under the rent law, it inevitably follows that he can maintain it successfully. It is difficult, if not illogical, to drawn any finical distinction that though the single co-owners can maintain the suit, yet in the event of one of the co-owners colluding with the tenant or desiring his continuance the same would raise a legal bar for evicting the tenant who undoubtedly has incurred the liability of such eviction under the rent law. If a single co-owner can otherwise maintain a suit for eviction against the tenant, then on principle there seems no reason why the same ratio would not apply in the event of one of the many co-owners-colluding or siding with the tenant. If the law as now settled by the Supreme Court does not even require implicating of all other co-owners as plaintiffs of defendants, it would be illegal to suggest that he can maintain the suit but get no meaningful relief. 17. If the law as now settled by the Supreme Court does not even require implicating of all other co-owners as plaintiffs of defendants, it would be illegal to suggest that he can maintain the suit but get no meaningful relief. 17. The learned Chief Justice totally ignored the fact that so long as there is no partition there is no distinction between one co-owners and another. The observation of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasrieha's case (surpa), at page 2339, paragraphs 29 & 30 are that:- 29. Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite properly along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a pan-owner or fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the properly being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants. 30.........We are of the opinion that a co-owner is as much as owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is .... These observations were quoted by the learned Chief Justice in paragraph 21, at pages 66-67 and reiterated by Krishna Iyer, J., in Smt. Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak and others, (supra), but the significance of these words was not articulated in the opinion rendered by the learned Chief Justice. If a co-owner is as much an owner of the property as any other sole owner is, then what is to choose between one filing the suit and another disagreeing with him. The Court cannot give primacy to the person who has filed the suit as against the person who does not want eviction. If contrary be the legal position in a given case, the person seeking eviction may have a minus clue of share as against a person objecting to eviction and yet the person filling the suit shall have a primacy. If contrary be the legal position in a given case, the person seeking eviction may have a minus clue of share as against a person objecting to eviction and yet the person filling the suit shall have a primacy. When the shares are not determined by way of the partition, it would be most dangerous to give primacy to any of the parties. That is what the learned Chief Justice seems to have done, when he held, that the co-owner, tiling the ejectment suit, be permitted to pursue the remedy despite the consent or collusion of the other co-owner. Now, collusion is another thing than consent. When you collude with the opponent, you want to do positive harm to person against whom you collude. If there be a collusion it has to be proved by evidence. But giving consent to tenant against eviction may be an enlightened self-interest. Unless and until there be partition, the Court must act as a neutral umpire between all the co-owners. It cannot-pit right of one co-owner against another during the course of their joint ness. This is based on the theory that when there are number of co-owners, they are supposed to act in concert. When one co-owner brings a suit for ejectment against a tenant or a trespasser, it is (sic) that the his action is for and on behalf of all the co-owners. Therefore, the Courts have been granting decrees of ejectment on the basis of presumption aforesaid. This is the golden thread that runs all through out the decided cases rendered by Supreme Court in the cases of landlord and tenant i.e. the cases of Sri Ram Pasricha (supra) and Smt. Kanta Goel, (supra). The case of ejectment of a trresspasser by one of the co-owners is deemed to be for and on behalf of all the co-owners. Here also one co-owner does not act in his individual capacity. He may be aggrieved by wrong committed by a tresspasser individually but in theory all other co-owners are deemed to be equally aggrieved by an act of tresspass. In case one of the co-owners defends the tresspasser, the other co-owners can never succeed to eject his because when a person enters the property with connivance of a co-owner, he cannot be deemed to be a tresspasser. In case one of the co-owners defends the tresspasser, the other co-owners can never succeed to eject his because when a person enters the property with connivance of a co-owner, he cannot be deemed to be a tresspasser. Therefore, consensus among various Courts has been that suit against a tresspasser by a co-owner is for and on behalf of all the co-owners. 18. Reverting to right of one of co-landlords objecting to eviction, I cannot see any reason to hold that the co-landlord filing the suit for ejectment under Section 12 of the Act, has any superior right than that of the objector. Once the objection is raised by a co-owner, it is apparent that the landlord tiling the suit is not acting for and on behalf of all the co-owners. The objecting landlord could equally, say bona fide when he says that the interest of the body of the landlord lies in retaining the tenant. The question here is not, who is right? the question is Once this objection is raised, the theory that the plaintiff was filing the suit for and on behalf of the body of landlords, is shaken and once it is shaken, the very foundation on which the suit was filed initially, is knocked down. It is obvious that the structure raised without a proper foundation is likely to fall like a pack of cards. Thus, in the principle, I am unable to accept the view of Sandhawalia. C.J. and Uday Singh, J. in Sharifuddin's case, (supra). 19. So far as precedents are concerned, they also go against the decision of the majority in Sarfuddin case (supra). A part from the dissent of Lalit Mohan Sharma, J., for the reasons given in that case, the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Palsingh Vs. Sundersingh (dead) by LRs. and others, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 758, has clarified the ratio between Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and others (supra) and Smt. Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak and others, (supra). The Supreme Court opined that ratio was limited to that one of the co-owners could maintain a suit for ejectment without imp leading the other co-owners if they do not object. The Supreme Court left open the question when there was objection by one of the co-owners. 20. The situation is piquant here as there is no partition among the co-owners. The Supreme Court left open the question when there was objection by one of the co-owners. 20. The situation is piquant here as there is no partition among the co-owners. Despite this fact, at least one of the co-owners has transferred her share to defendant No. 5, Indra Kumar Jain. He easily steps in her shoes and become a co-owner of the property without his share being specified. Can he still be evicted as tenant in the capacity of one, the legal representatives of Shikhar Chand Jain. The learned counsel for the appellants argues that there can be no splitting of the tenancy. Its integrally remains indivisible. If this be so, a co-lessor can claim bona fide requirement of a portion of a leased premises and can got a decree for eviction under section 12 of the Act. The decree for ejectment as passed, Shall be subject to right of the tenant to get the property partitioned qua co-owner. 21. The argument appears to be attractive. However, a little deeper consideration of the matter would reveal that by the sale deed Ex. D-13 one of the tenants has become the owner of a portion of the property. Unless and until there is a partition among the co-owners, there can be no defined share in possession of any of the co-owners. The plaintiffs cannot say that the respondents are the tenants of a particular portion of the suit premises when one of the tenants has become a co-owners. The answer to the question is in the discussion of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Singh (dead by L. Rs.) Vs. Devi Charan and others, (supra), and Sardarilal Vs. Narayanlal (supra). The Supreme Court pointed out that a landlord cannot split a tenancy and recover possession of a part of tenancy ordinarily. However, Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act was an exception to the general rule. It enables the assignee of a part of revelation to exercise all the rights of a landlord in respect of the partition of reversion assigned to him subject to other covenant running with the land. This was the true effect of the words shall pass all right...........of lessor as to the property or part transferred" occurring in section 109 of Transfer of Property Act. This was the true effect of the words shall pass all right...........of lessor as to the property or part transferred" occurring in section 109 of Transfer of Property Act. It was also held in that case that once portion of reversion is so assigned, there is no need for consensual adornments. The adornment is brought about by the operation of law. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) concluded as follows:- ...........The limitation on the right of the landlord against splitting up of the integrity of the tenancy, inheriting in the inhibitions of his own contract, docs not visit the assignee of the part of the reversion. There is no need for the consent of the tenant for the severance of the reversion and the assignment of the part so severed. ......... (Page 1367, Paragraph 5). 22. Therefore, the plaintiffs have not proved any assignment of any specific part in the suit properly. How can they unilaterally evict the respondents of whom one has the equal status of the co-owner of the property V As already seen, the Supreme Court itself has held that a co-owner is as good as another co-owner. If all the co-owners had partitioned the property by meter and bounds, and if plaintiff had got a specific part in the property then they could have treated the defendants as tenant of the part of reversion assigned to them and could file a suit for eviction from that part. A Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sardarilal Vs. Narayanla (supra) laid down that Section 109 of Transfer of Property Act does not apply to a case where only a share in the property is leased or a share in any part thereof is transferred. This case affirmed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in the case of B.P. Pathak Vs. Dr. Narayanla (supra) laid down that Section 109 of Transfer of Property Act does not apply to a case where only a share in the property is leased or a share in any part thereof is transferred. This case affirmed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in the case of B.P. Pathak Vs. Dr. Riyazuddin and others, (supra) G.P. Singh, C.J. speaking for the Full Bench, construed Section 109 of Transfer of Property Act, at page 11, paragraph 7, as follows:- "We have earlier pointed out drat the words" any part of his interest therein as used in S. 109 do not refer to any fractional share hut only to an interest which is not" the entire interest of the lessor but some thing less than that: for example, where the lessor, instead of selling the property leased of a part thereof, mortgages or leases the same it would he said that he has transferred a part of his interest therein. Gases where there is only a transfer of fractional share in the properly leased or in a part thereof would he governed by S. 37, and not by SAW. A transferee of a share in the property leased or in any part there of will become a co-owner with the lessor and will stand in the same position as a co-lessor. It is well settled - and this legal position is not disputed before us - that a co-lessor cannot terminate the lease and an effective quit notice for terminating the lease has to be given on behalf of all the co-lessor. (See Nanalal Vs. G.J. Motorwala A.I.R. 1973 Guj 131 (F.B.); Abdul Hamid Vs. Bhuwaneshwar Prasad A.I.R. 1953 Nag 18. The difficulty in the construction pointed out by Shri Sanghi, therefore, does not arise if S. 109 is so understood. In the Full Bench case the Court was considering the assignment by a Single landlord the accommodation to two co-owners specifying the part transferred. 23. The latest case of the Supreme Court is SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhary Vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate, (1196) 6 S.C.C. 373, requires detailed consideration. In this case, number of cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and others, were considered. Their Lordship also approved the Full Bench decision in Sardarilal's case, (supra). 24. 23. The latest case of the Supreme Court is SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhary Vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate, (1196) 6 S.C.C. 373, requires detailed consideration. In this case, number of cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and others, were considered. Their Lordship also approved the Full Bench decision in Sardarilal's case, (supra). 24. The decision recorded by the Apex Court is last word on the point and, therefore, it is not necessary to discuss other cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. In this case, a shop was owned by Sheikh Mohammad Choudhari. After his death, in 1956 the shop was inherited by the Appellant, his elder brother Sheikh Jafar and two other brothers. During the minority of the appellants, his elder brother Jet out of the shop of the respondents. A portion of the shop measuring 23 x 12 fell to share of appellant in partition and the remaining portion to Sheikh Ahmed Choudhari. Since the respondent did not pay and the shop was required by the appellant, he tiled a petition for eviction before the Rent Controller who ordered eviction in respect of the share claimed by the appellant. The order was confirmed in appeal by the District Judge. The High Court reversed judgment of the Court below on the ground that despite partition between the co-owners, the lease was not affected. It remained indivisible and, therefore, the petition at the instance of one of the co-landlords, was not maintainable. During the pendency of the appeal of the appellant, the respondent purchased remaining portion of the shop from the wife of Sheikh Ahmed Choudhari the brother of the appellant. She had become the owner of the suit property by virtue of gift from her husband. The Supreme Court after considering Section 5, 8. 36, 37 and 109 of Transfer of Property Act summed up its conclusions in Paragraph 37 at page 384 as follows:- 37. In view of the above discussion, it is obvious that the law with regard to the splitting of tenancy is not what the High Court has set out in the impugned judgment. As pointed our earlier, a co-sharer cannot initiate action for eviction of the tenant from the portion of the tenanted accommodation nor can he sue for his part of the rent. As pointed our earlier, a co-sharer cannot initiate action for eviction of the tenant from the portion of the tenanted accommodation nor can he sue for his part of the rent. The tenancy cannot be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by unilateral act of one of the co-owners. If, however, all the co-owners or the co-lessor agree among themselves and split by partition the demised property by metes and bounds and come to have definite, positive and identifiable shares in that property, they become separate, individual owners of each severed portion and can deal with that portion as also the tenant there of as individual owner of each severed portion and can deal with that portion as also the tenant there of as individual owner/lessor. The right of joint lessors contemplated by Section 109 comes to be possessed by each of them separately and independently. There is no right in the tenant to prevent the joint owners of co-lessors from partitioning the tenanted accommodation among themselves. Whether the premises, which is in occupation of a tenant, shall be retained jointly by all the lessors or they would partition it among themselves, is the exclusive right of the lessors to which no objection can be taken by the tenant, particularly where the tenant knew from the very beginning that the property was jointly owned by several persons and that, even if he was being dealt with by only one of them on behalf of the whole body of the lessors, he cannot object to the transfer of any portion of the property in favour of a third person by one of the owners or to the partition of the property. It will, however, be open to the tenant to show that the partition was not bona fide and was Sham transaction to overcome the rigors of Rent Control laws which protected eviction of the tenants except on specified grounds setout in the relevant statute. 25. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid decision unless a portion of reversion, is assigned by virtue of transfer or to partition to a co-owner, he cannot unilaterally file a suit for eviction from a portion of the reversion. He can tile a suit for and on behalf of all the owners in respect of entire demise with express or implied consent of the owners. He can tile a suit for and on behalf of all the owners in respect of entire demise with express or implied consent of the owners. However; when tenant purchased 1/2 portion of the shop allotted to brother of the appellant during the pendency of appeal before the Supreme Court the Supreme Court came to the following conclusion in paragraph 40 at page 385 :- 40. We have already indicated above that during the pendency of the appeal in this Court the respondent has purchased the remaining portion of the shop, which had fallen in the share of the appellant's brother. This portion measures 23x7. It has been purchased from Smt. Zubedabi wife of the appellant's brother, in whose share the said portion had fallen on partition, and who had gifted that portion to his wife. The copy of the sale deed has been filed in this Court, to which no objection has been taken by the counsel for the respondent. The respondent does not deny the transaction. He having purchased the remaining portion of the shop, became the owner thereof and his interest as a tenant merged in his right as an owner of that portion. He therefore, remained a tenant only in respect of the disputed portion and consequently the suit filed by the appellant in respect of that portion was clearly maintainable. 26. It is obvious that the plaintiffs face a similar position here with a rider that the property is not partitioned. The defendant No. 5 has become a co-owner, albeit, of undivided portion of the house. How can he be evicted ? His share qua sole owner has not been specified. It would be most unjust and inequitable to throw out a co-owner from the possession of the suit accommodation merely because as a tenant he has purchased that share of a co-owner. His legal right to retain possession till partition qua co-owner cannot be whittled down. The Supreme Court case Sarvinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh and others, (supra), relied upon by the appellants, is not applicable to the facts of this case. It is not necessary to deal with other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in view of the decision in SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhary Vs. Gundappa Amabadas (supra). In this case, the cases of Mohar, Singh, (supra) and Badri Narain Jha, (supra) were considered and distinguished. 27. It is not necessary to deal with other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in view of the decision in SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhary Vs. Gundappa Amabadas (supra). In this case, the cases of Mohar, Singh, (supra) and Badri Narain Jha, (supra) were considered and distinguished. 27. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the Court below rightly held that the suit filed by plaintiffs was not maintainable. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are confirmed. The suit filed by the appellants is dismissed. No costs.