Honble YADAV, J. – The instant Second Appeal has been filed by defendant-appellant Madan Lal against the judgment and decree dated 11.2.94 passed by Addl. District Judge, Chittorgarh- upholding the judgment and decree passed by Munsiff Magistrate, Chittorgarh in Original case No. 31/1980. (2). The learned trial court has decreed the suit on the ground of sub-letting as well as on the ground of default in payment of monthly rent whereas in appeal the learned lower appellate court has set aside the finding of sub-letting recorded by learned trial court and maintained its decree on the ground of default in payment of rent. (3). I have heard the learned counsel for parties at length, examined the ori- ginal record with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties. (4). It is pertinent to mention that after provisional determination of rent under sub-sec. (3) of Section 13 of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (hereinafter referred to as Act No. 17 of 1950) the defence of tenant-defendant-appellant was struck off by learned trial court on 12.8.81. An appeal was pre- ferred against striking off defence by tenant-defendant-appellant which was also dismissed by the learned lower appellate court on 11.2.94. (5). It is contended by the learned counsel for appellant Shri V.S. Gehlot that the learned trial court was bound to determine provisional rent under Section 7 of the Act No. 17 of 1950 immediately after the claim for fixation of standard rent was put forth in the written statement. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that provisional rent in the present case could be determined at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month only and both the courts below are not entitled to determine the monthly rent at the rate of 110/-. It is also urged by the learned counsel for appellant that if rent would have been calculated at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month then the determi- nation of provisional rent would have been illegal and his defence could not have been struck-off. (6). The learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff- respondent refuted the aforesaid arguments advanced on behalf of tenant-defendant-appellant and supported the judgments given by both the courts below. 75/- per month then the determi- nation of provisional rent would have been illegal and his defence could not have been struck-off. (6). The learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff- respondent refuted the aforesaid arguments advanced on behalf of tenant-defendant-appellant and supported the judgments given by both the courts below. It is urged by the learned counsel for land lord plaintiff-respondent that the present Second Appeal is concluded by concurrent findings of fact and as such liable to be dismissed. (7). In abundant caution before entering into the merits of the arguments advanced at the Bar it is held that mere provisional determination of rent under sub-sec. (3) of Section 13 is not final for passing a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent as postulated under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950. (8). Even provisional determination of rent cannot be said to be final on question of fixation of standard rent. It is equally true that after determination of provisional rent under sub-sec. (3) of Section 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950 the tenant is liable to make compliance of the order failing which the consequences enumerated under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 13 would ensue and his defence against eviction be struck off and the court is expected to proceed with the hearing of the suit. However, if the tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-sec. (4) of Section 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950, no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) shall be passed by the court against him. (9). I am of the view that before passing a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950, the courts are required to address itself on the question of actual default in payment of rent and fixation of standard rent in the light of evidence adduced by the parties after framing of issues. (10). In the present case, the judgment of both the courts below reveal that the decree for eviction has not been passed by the courts below merely on the ground of provisional determination of rent under sub-sec. (10). In the present case, the judgment of both the courts below reveal that the decree for eviction has not been passed by the courts below merely on the ground of provisional determination of rent under sub-sec. (3) of Section 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950 but the same has been passed after recording a categorical finding in the light of the evidence adduced by the parties as well as the averments made in their pleadings. Thus both the courts below have committed no substantial error of law or procedure in passing the decree for eviction under appeal against the tenant- defendant-appellant. (11). Now it must be taken to be well settled principle of law that a tenant can raise a plea about fixation of standard rent in his written statement by way of counter-claim or by raising a plea in his written statement to this effect. In the present case it was so raised by the tenant-defendant-appellant. Both the courts below after analytical discussion of the evidence adduced by the parties rightly came to this conclusion that enhancement of rent from Rs. 75/- per month to Rs. 110/- per month was within the permissible limit as contemplated under Act No. 17 of 1950. (12). Both the courts below have committed no error in arriving on the aforesaid finding on question of determination of standard rent as envisaged under Act No. 17 of 1950. I am in full agreement with the finding recorded on question of fixation of standard rent in the present case at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month. Once it is held that both the courts below have legally arrived at a conclusion that enhancement of rent from Rs. 75/- to Rs. 110/- was within the permissible limit as postulated under Act No. 17 of 1950 then the question of striking off defence cannot be argued to be illegal. (13). In my considered opinion, the arguments advanced on behalf of learned counsel for tenant-defendant appellant are devoid of merits hence it is hereby repelled. There is no substance in the present Second Appeal and it is liable to be dismissed. (14). After dictation of the judgment, the learned counsel for appellant Shri V.S. Gehlot makes a request to allow tenant- defendant-appellant a reasonable time to remain in possession over the disputed premises. There is no substance in the present Second Appeal and it is liable to be dismissed. (14). After dictation of the judgment, the learned counsel for appellant Shri V.S. Gehlot makes a request to allow tenant- defendant-appellant a reasonable time to remain in possession over the disputed premises. Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to allow the tenant- defendant-appellant to remain in possession over the disputed premises for more than two months statutory period prescribed under sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 17 of Act No. 17 of 1950. It is to be noticed that the present suit was filed on 24.7.80 and after such a long-drawn litigation between the parties for about 17 years it would not be proper to allow more than statutory period of two months prescribed under sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 17 of the aforesaid Act. (15). It is made clear that the decree-holder would be at liberty to execute the decree after expiry of two months of statutory period prescribed under sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 17 of 1950 from today. As a result of the aforementioned discussions the instant Second Appeal is hereby dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree passed by learned lower appellate court is hereby affirmed. _