JUDGMENT - SIRPURKAR V.S., J.:---Rule, heard forthwith, with the consent of the parties. Petitioner No. 1, who is the Chairman of the erstwhile Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Deulgaon Raja (hereinafter called 'the Market Committee' for the sake of brevity), and petitioner No. 2, who is a member of the Managing Committee of the said Market Committee, have filed this petition, praying for a writ to quash an order dated 24-12-1996 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Buldhana (herienafter called 'the DDR' for the sake of brevity), superseding the Market Committee under section 45(1) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for the sake of brevity). 2. The Market Committee had assumed the charge on 19-6-1993 in pursuance of the elections held on 10-5-1993. The said elected Committee has ordinarily the life of five years, under section 14(3) of the Act. A notice came to be given to the said Committee as required by section 45(1) of the Act. It was alleged in the said notice by the DDR that since there were complaints received by his office regarding the irregularities in the construction of Shopping Complex as also regarding the financial affairs of the Committee, a team was appointed for enquiring into the said matters and the said team of the enquiry had submitted the report of its investigations on 2nd March, 1996, after a thorough enquiry regarding the said complaints. So also the Assistant Engineer in his office had enquired into the affairs of the construction activity by checking and cross-checking the concerned record available in the office and had filed his report on 27-3-1996, and that on the basis of the said report, the DDR had come to the conclusion that the members of the Committee, including the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Directors had misused and abused their positions and had also committed financial irregularities. The said notice is exhaustive and number of allegations have been made in the same. It was alleged that though the shopping complex involved the expenditure of Rs. 19,52,170.00, the tenders were not properly published and they were deliberately published in the insignificant newspapers. There were number of irregularities committed in the matter of the tender notice, which was published again. It was alleged that though the revised proposal of Rs. It was alleged that though the shopping complex involved the expenditure of Rs. 19,52,170.00, the tenders were not properly published and they were deliberately published in the insignificant newspapers. There were number of irregularities committed in the matter of the tender notice, which was published again. It was alleged that though the revised proposal of Rs. 34,04,295.00 was passed, the Market Committee deliberately published the tender-notice as per the old rates and that too in the insignificant newspapers. It was alleged that though Shri Agrawal was prepared to construct 2% below the tender rate, the said contract was awarded in favour of one Shri Pathak whose tender was 4½% above the tender rate. It was also pointed out that the said contractor, Shri Pathak, was not even qualified to undertake the constructions of such high value as he was a registered contractor having the classification of 4-A. It was pointed out further that the material, which was used for this construction, was bound to be tested and test report was bound to be kept in the separate register, but the said reports were never obtained; so also the requisition statements regarding the materials, including the bricks, sand, cement, tins, door-frames, window-frames, were not maintained. It was pointed out that there were irregularities in the purchase of building material and heavy payments were made, without obtaining the reports from the construction Committee. The conditions in the PWD Manual and the rules provided therein were breached. The test reports of the material were also not obtained and the inferior material was used. The proper registers were also not maintained indicating the use of the material on the daily basis. So also the payments were made to the contractor, without obtaining the sanction from the construction Committee. It is also pointed out that the Market Committee withdrew Rs. 3,00,000/- from the Provident Fund Account of the employees and was used for the said construction, without the permission of the competent authorities. Thus, the first charge was regarding the irregularities in the construction. The second charge was regarding the irregularities committed in the financial affairs and it gives complete details regarding each illegal transaction which was done by the Market Committee. The third charge is regarding the irregularities in the construction done at Deulgaon Mahi and Sindkhed Raja. Thus, the first charge was regarding the irregularities in the construction. The second charge was regarding the irregularities committed in the financial affairs and it gives complete details regarding each illegal transaction which was done by the Market Committee. The third charge is regarding the irregularities in the construction done at Deulgaon Mahi and Sindkhed Raja. It has been pointed out in the third charge that the expenditure was made without there being any provision in the budget; so also the Market Committee had spent about Rs. 36,000/- for construction of auction-platform at Kingaon Raja, without there being any budgetary provision. It is alleged in this charge that there are number of irregularities including there being no Stock Book. So also it is alleged that though the bore well at Deulgaon Raja was capable of giving adequate water supply, the Market Committee had shown that the water was purchased by tankers and huge amount was spent on that. Charge No. 4 is about the expenditure of Rs. 87,000/- for repairs of the godowns in the sub-market of Deulgaon Mahi, which expenditure was done without calling for tenders and without obtaining the estimates from the Architects. It has been shown that the Market Committee had spent Rs. 34,735/- for repairs of the walls of the godowns without obtaining the estimates of the said expenditure and the said expenditure was even not got regularised. It has been pointed out that diaries were purchased for Rs. 9,500/-, without there being any justification for the same. In charge No. 5, it is suggested that the Board of Directors made purchases worth Rs. 1,70,887.91, without inviting tenders, and the said material was not recorded in the proper registers. Therefore, all these transactions had become suspicious. The sixth charge concerns the irregularities regarding the supervision fee, which was lost because of negligence on the part of the Market Committee, and though the Market Committee had filed a dispute against Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Corporation for the recovery of huge amount, the said case was deliberately got withdrawn by the Market Committee, which had put the Market Committee to a loss of Rs. 5,31,550/-. Not only this, but for this case, the Committee unnecessarily spent Rs. 5,000/- on account of the legal fees and also spent Rs. 2,550/- towards the travelling allowances of the Directors. 5,31,550/-. Not only this, but for this case, the Committee unnecessarily spent Rs. 5,000/- on account of the legal fees and also spent Rs. 2,550/- towards the travelling allowances of the Directors. The seventh charge mentions the financial irregularity in keeping huge sums in the office without depositing them in the Deulgaon Raja Bank. The eighth charge is regarding the incorrect allowances drawn by the Directors towards travelling allowances. The ninth charge concerns the misuse of telephones and the unnecessary expenditure for the same. The tenth charge is regarding the irregularities in the payments of tanker-charges. It is suggested that the Market Committee had spent Rs. 4,000/- more for the purchase of water by tankers. The eleventh charge is regarding the writ petition filed by the Market Committee, wherein 20,923 rupees were unnecessarily spent. 3. The notice was served on 16th July, 1996. It seems that there is a marathon explanation by the Market Committee, wherein the said charges were denied. There are number of admissions given in this explanation. The Market Committee asserted that there were no irregularities in the constructions. It was admitted that the contractor had used grey tiles instead of white-tiles, but that fault was attributed by the Committee to the contractor. It was asserted that the standard material was used and the test-reports were also available. It was admitted that in view of the urgency, the amount was withdrawn from the Provident Fund Accounts of the employees. In respect of the other charges, it was pointed out that some irregularities were attributable to the Secretary of the Market Committee. In short, the Committee tried to justify its action. It was specifically denied that the borewell had enough water supply and, therefore, amounts spent for purchase of water were justified. The Committee also justified the expenditure made for diaries, repairs work for the godown at Deulgaon Mahi etc., and also justified its action in withdrawal of the case on the ground that the said case was rightly withdrawn owing to the existing legal position. They further justified the keeping of the amounts as also the expenditures incurred on the vehicles and the telephones. 4. They further justified the keeping of the amounts as also the expenditures incurred on the vehicles and the telephones. 4. It seems that in pursuance of the proviso to section 45 of the Act, the DDR also made a reference to the State Marketing Board for consulting the same and, ultimately, after giving adequate opportunities, the DDR passed the impugned order on 24-12-1996. It is this order which has been challenged in the present petition. 5. Shri S.V. Manohar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, mainly contended that there was no effective consultation as required by the proviso of section 45(1) of the Act, as the said State Marketing Board had refused to give its opinion. According to the learned Counsel, if such opinion is refused to be given then it cannot be said that the State Marketing Board was properly consulted. Shri Manohar in this behalf invited the attention of the Court to the said proviso which runs as under :- "Provided that no Market Committee shall be superseded without the said State Marketing Board referred to in section 44 being previously consulted." 6. It is now a settled legal position by various judgments of this Court that the consultation with the State Marketing Board is a must. It is also a settled legal position that the said consultation has to be an effective consultation and not a mere show of consultation. Shri Manohar submitted that the State Marketing Board in this case had refused to give any opinion as to whether it agreed with the action of the superseession or not, since it had merely informed the DDR that the DDR should proceed according to the law. The learned Counsel, therefore urged that since the body, which was bound to be consulted, had refused to express any opinion, its silence amounted to denial of effective consultation. According to the learned Counsel, it is incumbent upon the body which is liable to be consulted to express its opinion one way or the other, in the absence of which, the consultation becomes a mere formality and amounts to no consultation in law. The learned Counsel also more heavily relied upon the observations made by this Court in the reported judgment in (A.P.M.C. v. D.D.R., Amravati)1, 1986 Mh.L.J. 374. The learned Counsel also more heavily relied upon the observations made by this Court in the reported judgment in (A.P.M.C. v. D.D.R., Amravati)1, 1986 Mh.L.J. 374. He also relied upon the observations made by the Apex Court in (Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court)2, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 370. The learned Counsel was at pains to point out that these observations have been relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforementioned reported judgment. 7. It would be proper to consider the observations of the Apex Court as also the observations of this Court in the aforementioned decisions. In Chandramouleshwar Prasad's case, the Supreme Court has observed : "Consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal in his mind which is not communicated to the proposer the direction to give effect to the counter proposal without anything more, cannot be said to have been issued after consultation." On the basis of these observations, this Court in APMC's case (supra), after referring to the cases of (Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth)3, 1977 S.C.C. 193 and (S.P. Gupta v. President of India)4, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149, proceeded to observe as under :- "Consultation is thus not an empty formality or a ritual. It has to be real, full and effective. Unless there has been full consideration of all the matters relevant to the question, it cannot be said that the process of consultation has taken place. Indeed there is a corresponding duty also on the body whose consultation is mandatory to give its opinion. In the matter at hand, nothing of this type has taken place. Mere sending of a copy of the show cause notice without anything more cannot amount to a consultation within the letter and spirit of the proviso. Neither the defence put up by the Market Committee nor the relevant material on the basis of which proposed supersession was to take place was placed before the Federation. No opinion could be given only on the basis of a show cause notice issued by the respondent. Neither the defence put up by the Market Committee nor the relevant material on the basis of which proposed supersession was to take place was placed before the Federation. No opinion could be given only on the basis of a show cause notice issued by the respondent. The way, reply was sought from the federation, it is clear that the authorities treated the requirement of consultation in a most casual fashion as if it is a mere ritual. Not even minimal requirement was fulfilled. There was no occasion for the federation to discharge its duty of giving the opinion. There was no occasion for the two minds to be able to confer and give each other's opinion in respect of the topic at hand. For all these reasons, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that order of supersession was passed without consultation." (Emphasis supplied) Relying on these observations, the learned Counsel submitted that there was a corresponding duty in the State Marketing Board to give its opinion, and since the State Marketing Board had failed to give its opinion, there was no effective consultation. 8. It will, therefore, be necessary to see whether there was an effective consultation in this case. It has come in the affidavit of respondent No. 2/DDR that the show-cause-notice was a detailed notice which gave a thorough idea of the happenings prior to giving of the said notice, including the setting up of an enquiry Committee and obtaining the reports thereof. It is further clarified by the respondent No. 2 in his affidavit that by a letter dated 17-9-1996, he sought the consultation of the State Marketing Board. It is further reiterated in this affidavit that all the points, which were referred to in the show-cause-notice, have been included in this letter. Not only this but the reply of the Market Committee and the remarks of the respondent No. 2 thereupon have also been put to the State Marketing Board. A glance at the show cause notice itself suggests that the said show cause notice gives a complete idea of the allegations, along with the necessary details. As a matter of fact, the said details are more than necessary to suggest the meticulous care taken by the respondent No. 2/DDR to collect the material against the said Committee. A glance at the show cause notice itself suggests that the said show cause notice gives a complete idea of the allegations, along with the necessary details. As a matter of fact, the said details are more than necessary to suggest the meticulous care taken by the respondent No. 2/DDR to collect the material against the said Committee. If this notice, along with the reply of the Market Committee which is also no less an elaborate, along with the comments of the DDR, has been put to the State Marketing Board, it cannot be said that the necessary details were not put to the State Marketing Board. In fact, that is not the complaint of the learned Counsel also. The learned Counsel goes further and says that on the basis of this material, it was imperative for the Board to give an opinion, one way or the other. The opinion, which was given by the Board, is being read by the learned Counsel as a diabolical opinion, or a refusal to express any opinion. 9. It would be better to see what that opinion really is. The opinion given by the State Marketing Board is reflected in its letter dated 28-11-1996 which was produced before us during the hearing. In the said letter, there is a clear-cut acknowledgment by the Board of having received all the necessary papers, along with the letter by the DDR dated 17-9-1996. The Borad has, in unequivocal terms, conveyed that the DDR was free to take the action according to law, on the merits. It cannot be said that this is not the expression of the opinion by the Board. The Board has not, in any manner expressed any opinion adverse to the proposal which was sent to it. If it was of the opinion that it was not agreeable to the action of the supersession, it would have undoubtedly expressed the same in the specific words. The Board has not suggested its demur with the proposed action but has given the attitude to the DDR to proceed with the action on merits, according to law. This certainly could not be called to be a refusal to give any opinion. In our opinion, the Board has, in fact, given a green signal to the DDR to proceed with the matter on merits according to law. This certainly could not be called to be a refusal to give any opinion. In our opinion, the Board has, in fact, given a green signal to the DDR to proceed with the matter on merits according to law. Therefore, in our opinion, the criticism by the learned Counsel that the Board had failed to give any opinion and, therefore, the body which is consulted was not, in fact, consulted, cannot be held to be justified. 10. However, we would approach the problem from other angle also. Was it really necessary for the State Marketing Board to give its opinion one way or the other? We feel that the borad was free to express its opinion in any manner. The Board could have even expressed its opposition to the proposal of supersession. Question is, could such refusal be said to be fatal to the ultimate decision on the part of the DDR? Our earnest opinion is that even if the Board had refused to agree with the proposal of supersession, the DDR could still have proceeded ahead with the action, the only requirement being that it had to be shown that the DDR had taken into consideration the opinion of the Board, a body which was bound to be consulted. If the DDR had shown that he was alive to the contrary opinion on the part of the State Marketing Board, and in spite of the same, had decided to proceed, in our view, the process of consultation would still have been complete. 11. Shri Manohar then invited our attention to the sentence in the reported judgment which we have emphasised. We feel that the said sentence is being blown out of proportion and being read out of the context. This Court had undoubtedly found a corresponding duty on the part of the body whose consultation was mandatory, to give its opinion. The learned Counsel wants this sentence to be read as being compulsory on the said body to agree or not to agree with the proposal. In our opinion, such cannot be the import of this sentence. All that is essential for such body, according to us, is to give its opinion and, indeed, in this case, the said opinion has undoubtedly been given. The said sentence, which has been emphasised, has to be read in terms of the accompanying sentences. In our opinion, such cannot be the import of this sentence. All that is essential for such body, according to us, is to give its opinion and, indeed, in this case, the said opinion has undoubtedly been given. The said sentence, which has been emphasised, has to be read in terms of the accompanying sentences. In that case, the DDR had merely sent a copy of the show cause notice to the said body. The Division Bench of this Court disapproved of such a casual action. This Court, therefore, laid a great stress on the sufficient material being made available to the said body and proceeded to hold that if such material was not made available, there could be no effective consultation as the body, which was bound to be consulted, would have no material to consider the aspect one way or the other. Such is not the case here. We find from the order that meticulous details regarding the consultation have been taken care of by the DDR. Not only this but the Board has expressed its opinion that the DDR should proceed according to law. In our opinion, the expressions by the Board in its reply letter dated 28-11-1996 amount to the expression of the opinion of the Board. Even if, therefore, it is held that there is a corresponding duty on the body, which is consulted, to express its opinion, in our view the said opinion has not only been expressed but the said opinion has been taken into consideration by the DDR in arriving at the final conclusion. As we have already observed, the opinion by the Board would not be and could not be binding on the DDR for that is not the import of section 45(1) of the Act. What is necessary is consultation and not concurrence. Once it is found that the Board has been effectively consulted and the opinion expressed by the Board is taken into account in the decision-making process, regarding the supersession, the requirements of the proviso to section 45(1) of the Act would be completely satisfied. We, therefore, hold that in this case, there was a proper consultation of which an adequate notice has been taken by the respondent No. 2 while deciding the question of supersession. 12. Shri Manohar then suggested that the DDR had appointed a Committee to go into financial transactions. We, therefore, hold that in this case, there was a proper consultation of which an adequate notice has been taken by the respondent No. 2 while deciding the question of supersession. 12. Shri Manohar then suggested that the DDR had appointed a Committee to go into financial transactions. There is a clear-cut reference to the said Committee in the show-cause-notice itself. It is also evident that the report by this team-cum-Committee as also the report by an Assistant Engineer have been relied upon by the DDR for coming to the conclusion that this was a fit case where the show-cause-notice should have been issued. The learned Counsel pointed out that the copies of these reports were not supplied to the petitioners or any of the members of the Market Committee, and this non-supply amounted to the denial of natural justice and, more particularly, the doctrine of audi alteram partem. We are afraid, the principles of natural justice are being stretched too far in the present case by the petitioners. It is not the petitioners' case that they did not have an opportunity to give reply to the show-cause-notice. It is again not their case that they have not been given proper opportunities to explain the matters raised in the show cause notice. Now, in fact, in the order itself, the respondent No. 2 has recorded that firstly a full opportunity was given to all the members to give a reply of the show-cause-notice. Some of the members of the Market Committee had applied for extra time, which was also given to them. Not only this but the members of the Market Committee were also heard and it was only thereafter that the action of supersession was ordered. Shri Manohar also did not dispute these observations in the order. In our opinion, the complaint that the reports by the earlier team of enquiry should have been made available to the members of the Market Committee, is wholly unjustified. The whole record was available to the members of the Market Committee. It is not as if that they were not given any opportunity to consult the record. There is no complaint made in their explanation also that they demanded such copy and that copy was denied to them. The whole record was available to the members of the Market Committee. It is not as if that they were not given any opportunity to consult the record. There is no complaint made in their explanation also that they demanded such copy and that copy was denied to them. Even if they had demanded that copy, we are afraid that the said report could have been refused to be supplied by the DDR, as it was his administrative enquiry. It was only being made in his capacity as a supervising authority, and those reports were only sought for coming to the conclusion as to whether an action should be taken or not. An authority like DDR had to keep a control over the Agricultural Produce Market Committees and had to be a watchful sentinel of its affairs. In pursuance of that duty if he collected some information, it was not necessary that such information should have been passed to the concerned members of the Committee even if such information was not asked for. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned Counsel that there was a denial of natural justice and trampling of the rights of the members of the Committee or of the doctrine of audi alteram partem, in this case. 13. Lastly, Shri Manohar tried to take us to the merits of the order and further tried to assert that the findings of fact by the DDR were unsustainable and that there was a complete non-application of mind for arriving at those findings. We hasten to add that, firstly, it will not be the task of this Court to go behind those findings on merits. They are all findings of facts which this Court would be slow to test in the writ jurisdiction. They are essentially the product of the enquiry made by the DDR'. It will not be, therefore, possible for us to test correctness of these findings of facts. The learned Counsel, however, contended that from the very appearance of those findings, it could be said that the findings were arrived at without application of mind. They are essentially the product of the enquiry made by the DDR'. It will not be, therefore, possible for us to test correctness of these findings of facts. The learned Counsel, however, contended that from the very appearance of those findings, it could be said that the findings were arrived at without application of mind. The learned Counsel was at pains to point out the finding on charge No. 10, which pertains to the filing of the writ petition to challenge the action on the part of the State Government to bifurcate the Market Committee of Deulgaon Raja into two Market Committees in Deulgaon Raja and Sindkhed Raja. The learned Counsel pointed out that the Market Committee has been found to be guilty for making the expenses on account of this writ petition, which expenditure could have been made by the Market Committee from its funds. The learned Counsel pointed out that if the petition was filed by the Market Committee to protect its own interest and if the said petition was in the nature of the public interest litigation, then the Market Committee was perfectly justified in spending for that writ petition. The learned Counsel further criticises the finding arrived at by the DDR that this expenditure was wholly unjustified and pointed out that merely because the Market Committee had acted against the directions of the State Government, it could not be said that they had misspent the amount. 14. As a matter of fact, the finding is not that such petition should not have been filed at all. The DDR/respondent No. 2 has held, and in our opinion rightly, that if at all such a petition had to be filed, then the expenditure should not have been made from the coffers of the Market Committee. According to the respondent No. 2, the said expenditure should have been made by the Committee personally, if they were so much interested in filing the writ petition. In our opinion, the finding of the respondent No. 2/DDR is perfectly justified. After all, it cannot be forgotten that in the bifurcation of the Deulgaon Agricultural Produce Market Committee, even the personal interests of the Directors and the Members of the elected Committee were involved, as possibly they would have lost their status, owing to the bifurcation, as elected representatives, as the Government is empowered to nominate the Committees on such bifurcation. After all, it cannot be forgotten that in the bifurcation of the Deulgaon Agricultural Produce Market Committee, even the personal interests of the Directors and the Members of the elected Committee were involved, as possibly they would have lost their status, owing to the bifurcation, as elected representatives, as the Government is empowered to nominate the Committees on such bifurcation. There was hardly any justification for the Market Committee to spend for this litigation from its own pocket. Be that as it may, even, if it is held that the expenditure was justifiable, that by itself cannot change the tenor of the whole order, and there is very little which has been criticised by the learned Counsel as unsustainable or as a result of non-application of mind. It cannot be said that the finding on charge No. 10 was as a result of non-application of mind. 15. Shri Manohar tried to assail some other findings. However, we have already indicated that it would not be proper for us to go into those findings, particularly because those findings would be the findings of facts. This is apart from the fact that the learned Counsel could not justify his contention that any findings in this order are unjustified on merits. 16. In the result, the petition has no merits and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. -----