R. K. MAHAJAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 15. 7. 87 of Shri Satyanand, IIIrd Additional district Judge, Gorakhpur by virtue of which the learned Additional District Judge, has set aside the decree and judgment of the lower court dated 24. 1. 1985. ( 2 ) THE learned trial Court decreed the suit of the appellant for permanent injunction and also for mandatory injunction against the defendant-respondent with respect of the disputed property. There was an allegation in the plaint that defendant dispossessed the plaintiff from the portion of the disputed land during the pendency of the suit, marked with letters A. E. F. D. in the site-plan prepared by the Amin, and also started filling the foundation and raised certain construction. ( 3 ) ADMITTEDLY, the controversy related as to whether co-sharer can file a suit for injunction and demolition against any cosharer who has raised construction. The question of law which was framed by the appellant at the time of admission is as follows : 1. Whether the judgment and decree of lower appellate court is in contravention of Section 44 of Transfer of property Act inasmuch on own finding of the lower appellate court that there being no partition between the plaintiff-appellant and Janardan and property in question being residential, the suit of the plaintiff-appellant could have been dismissed by the lower appellate court? ( 4 ) IN order to understand the controversy, few facts are essential which are narrated as appear from the record. Dhanpat had two wives, namely, Gulabi Devi and Imarti devi. Gulabi Devi had a son Benail whereas smt. Imarti Devi had 9 issues including the deceased Janardan. When Janardan died, the disputed portion of the house earmarked to him was inherited by his mother Imarti Devi. Thereafter Imarti Devi sold the property to prabhawati Devi vide sale-deed dated 11. 2. 82. The trial Court did not give finding in favour of Imarti Devi that she was wife of Dhanpat and she was residing with Janardan but the appellate court reversed that finding. It appears that the total property was initially measured as 37-6" x 46-6". Out of this total land the plaintiff and deceased Janardan transferred 15 x 37 to one Girja and subsequently the plaintiff in the year 1979 again transferred 18 x 37 to one Sheo Pujan. It appears that the total property was initially measured as 37-6" x 46-6". Out of this total land the plaintiff and deceased Janardan transferred 15 x 37 to one Girja and subsequently the plaintiff in the year 1979 again transferred 18 x 37 to one Sheo Pujan. Later on, as pointed out earlier, the remaining property was transferred by Imarti Devi, heir of deceased janardan, to Prabhawati Devi and this is how the. plaintiff-appellant challenged the said sale and raising of the construction as the said transfer was hit under Section 44 of the transfer of Property Act, 1882. The trial court decreed the suit and the appellate court set aside the decree as mentioned above. The only point which has been canvassed is that the transfer is hit under Section 44 of the transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provides that where one of two or more coowners of immovable property legal competent in that behalf transfers his share of such property or any interest therein, the transferee acquires, as to such share or interest, and so far as in necessary to give effect to the transfer, the transferors right to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the property, and to enforce a partition of the same, but subject to the conditions and liabilities affecting, at the date of the transfer, the share or interest so transferred. ( 5 ) THE simple corollary is that the transferee respondent-defendant succeeds to the right of Imarti Devi who succeeded to her son. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that defendant-respondent could not raise construction or the transfer was hit under section 44 of the Transfer of Property act, 1882, is nor sustainable at all. The court is not going to interfere with the finding of the fact regarding succession of Imarti Devi who later on sold the property to Prabhawati Devi and others. There is no material on record to interfere with the finding recorded by the appellate court as it was based on detailed discussion. It is not a perverse finding or based upon misreading of the evidence or leaving some important portion of the evidence on record to come to a conclusion that Imarti devi did not succeed her son Janardan. There is no material on record to interfere with the finding recorded by the appellate court as it was based on detailed discussion. It is not a perverse finding or based upon misreading of the evidence or leaving some important portion of the evidence on record to come to a conclusion that Imarti devi did not succeed her son Janardan. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant also failed to convince me that proviso of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would be applicable regarding the proposition that the stranger has no right to cause interference and take possession in joint property. Section 64 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to immovable property and 1 am also not convinced that how co-sharer can be ousted from a joint possession when a theory of partition has been disbelieved by the appellate and the trial Court. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the sale deed has not been proved in favour of Imarti Devi. In my opinion, it is also not being borne out from the record and it is beyond the scope of question of law. It is finding of fact. ( 8 ) MR. Faujdar Rai, learned counsel for respondent submitted that injunction cannot be granted against the co-sharer unless there was some special circumstance. In this case, rather appellant had denied the title and has set up a title in himself. He has relied upon a decision in the case of Chhedilal v. Chote lal, regarding the rights of co-sharers, which has also been relied upon by the learned appellate court in its judgment. ( 9 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, the balance of convenience lay in favour of the defendant-respondent and applying principle of justice, equity and good conscience, it does not warrant to pass a decree of demolition and mandatory injunction, as the respondent is a co-sharer. It is not the case of the appellant-plaintiff that respondent has unsurped best piece of land and he has reserved the title of the plaintiff, rather it is reverse. I, therefore, for the reasons aforementioned, uphold the finding of the appellate court and hold that the transfer is valid and the relief prayed in the suit cannot be granted. ( 10 ) THE appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.