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1997 DIGILAW 295 (RAJ)

Nurekhan v. Harphool Singh

1997-02-26

R.R.YADAV

body1997
JUDGMENT 1. - Instant First Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 6.2.1997 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Bikaner in Civil Original Suit No. 69/94, decreeding the suit for declaration, possession and cancellation of sale-deed dated 30.6.1992. 2. Heard learned counsel of the appellants. 3. Perused the judgment and decree under appeal. 4. The plaintiff filed a suit on the ground inter alia that he is owner in possession of Chak No. 7 SLD Murbba No. 70/25 of Killa No. 1 to 22 measuring 221 Bighas, which he obtained from allotment dated 25.3.1976. It is averred in the plaint by the plaintiff that Noore Khan has no authority to utilise general power of attorney executed by him., on 30.3.1986 for executing a sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2 Peere Khan on 30.6.1992, which was cancelled way back on 11.71989. 5. The defendants filed a written statement denying the averments made in the plaint. The defendants averred in the written statement that the alleged sale-deed dated 30.6.1992 executed by Noore Khan on behalf of the plaintiff in favour of Peere Khan, is absolutely valid and legal. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, necessary issues were framed by the learned trial Court and both the parties were allowed to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. 7. In support of his claim, the plaintiff examined himself as PW 1 and Tansukh was examined by him as PW 2. He has also filed a registered Attorney-deed as Ex. 1, its cancellation as Ex. 2, and certified copy of so-called sale-deed dated 30.6.1992 alleged to have been executed by Noore Khan in favour of Peere Khan as Ex. 3, extract of Sanod Ex. 5 and copy of notice Ex. 6. 8. The defendants examined Noore Khan as DW 1, Khema Ram as DW 2, Shammiullah as DW 3, Hassan Shah as DW 4 and in support of their case they filed receipts Ex. 1 to 5, agreement to sell dated 20.3.1986 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Imamsen wife of Noore Khan and another agreement to sell dated 8.3.1986 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Smt. Imamsen wife of Noore Khan as Ex. 7. One receipt is also filed as Ex. 1 to 5, agreement to sell dated 20.3.1986 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Imamsen wife of Noore Khan and another agreement to sell dated 8.3.1986 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Smt. Imamsen wife of Noore Khan as Ex. 7. One receipt is also filed as Ex. 8 along with Attorney-deed alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Noore Khan. 9. Learned trial Court, after analytical discussion of the oral and documentary evidence on record, arrived at the conclusion that the so-called sale-deed alleged to have been executed on the basis of General power of attorney by Noore Khan in favour of Peere Khan, is void abintio. In my considered opinion, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on issues No.1 to 7 are eminently just and proper and does not require interference in the present appeal. 10. 1 am in full agreement with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on issues No. 1 to 7. The decree under appeal does not suffer from any factual or legal infirmity, therefore, the instant First Appeal is liable to be dismissed summarily. 11. The learned counsel for appellant streneously urged before me that Imamsen wife of Noore Khan was a necessary party in view of agreement to sell dated 20.3.1986 and another agreement to sell dated 8.3.1986 executed in her favour by plaintiff on 4.7.1986. Secondly the sale-deed executed by Noore Khan in favour of Peere Khan son of Noore Khan on 30.6.1992 on the basis of registered general power of attorney executed by plaintiff respondent on 30.3.1986 is legal and valid as both of them have no knowledge about cancellation of general power of attorney executed by plaintiff-respondent on 11.7.1989. Lastly it is contended that the suit for declaration, possession and cancellation of sale-deed dated 30.6.1992 was barred by limitation. 12. Before the aforesaid arguments may be dealt with I would like to observe that Imamsen in whose favour alleged two agreements to sell dated 20.3.1986 and 8.3.1986 are alleged to have been executed by plaintiff-respondent is the wife of Noore Khan in whose favour plaintiff-respondent is alleged to have executed a general power of attorney on 30.3.1986 whereas Peere Khan in whose favour Noore Khan has executed sale deed dated 30.6.1992 is the son born with union of Noore Khan and Imamsen. 13. Now I propose to discuss the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for appellant in seriatim. It is argued at the first instance by the learned counsel for appellant that in the present case Imamsen wife of Noore Khan was a necessary party in view of agreement to sale executed by plaintiff-respondent on 20.3.1986 and another agreement to sell in her favour by him on 8.3.1986. Suffice it to say in this regard that under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act a contract for the sale of immovable property does not of itself create any interest in the immovable property or charge on such property, therefore, she was not a necessary party in the present case. Secondly, admittedly from the evidence adduced from the side of the appellants themselves go a long way to prove that. it since 30.6.1992 from the date of execution of sale-deed Peere Khan was in possession, therefore, the agreement to sell dated 20.3.1986 and 4.7.1986 on the date of filing of the suit i.e. 15.7.1994 become waste-paper. It is to be noticed that if Imamsen did not prefer to file a suit for specific performance within a period of three years limitation prescribed under Indian Limitation Act the aforesaid two agreements alleged to have been executed by plaintiff-respondents become waste-paper and on this score also she was not entitled to be impleaded as a party in the present suit and an argument contrary to it raised by the learned counsel for appellant has been merely raised to be rejected therefore it is hereby repelled. 14. As regards the next contention of the learned counsel for appellant to the effect that validity of the sale-deed executed by husband of Imamsen viz. Noore Khan in favour of his son Peere Khan on 30.6.1992 on the basis of registered general power of attorney executed by plaintiff-respondent on 30.3.1986 is concerned, it has no legs to stand for the simple reason that the said general power of attorney was got cancelled by the plaintiff-respondent on 11.7.1989 in the office of Sub-Registrar where it was earlier registered. The plaintiff-respondent has proved to the hilt that he has orally informed Noore Khan on 11.7.1989 on the date of cancellation itself. The plaintiff-respondent has proved to the hilt that he has orally informed Noore Khan on 11.7.1989 on the date of cancellation itself. The plaintiff-respondent has adduced registered AD Letter dated 13.7.1989 which leads towards an irresistible conclusion that irrespective of oral information given by plaintiff-respondent to Noore Khan appellant No. I on 11.7.1989 he has also informed him through Registered AD on 13.7.1989 about cancellation of general power of attorney. The Court below has committed no error in placing reliance on the oral statement of the plaintiff-respondent about information of the cancellation of general power of attorney on the date of its cancellation to Noore Khan. The learned trial Court has further committed no error in placing reliance on the registered AD letter dated 13.7.1989, giving information to Noore Khan about the cancellation of general power of attorney. Irrespective of sufficient knowledge about cancellation of general power of attorney, Noore Khan has no legal or factual justification to execute the sale-deed in favour of his son Peere Khan on 30.6.1992. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for appellant in this regard is without substance and therefore it is hereby rejected. 15. As regards last limb of argument of the learned counsel for appellant to the effect that the suit filed by plaintiff-respondent on 15.7.1994 was barred by limitation is wholly misconceived for the reason that the suit for declaration, possession and for cancellation of sale-deed dated 30.6.1992 was filed within three years limitation prescribed under Indian Limitation Act, therefore, it cannot be said to be barred by limitation by any stretch of imagination therefore this argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel for appellant also deserves to be rejected and it is hereby rejected. 16. No other points except the points discussed above are argued by the learned counsel for appellant appearing on behalf of defendant-appellant.In view of what have been discussed above, the instant First Appeal is hopelessly devoid of merits therefore it is hereby dismissed in limine.First Appeal Dismissed. *******