Capital Electronics, Behala v. Learned Judge, Eight-U Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal
1997-07-30
Prabir Kumar Sengupta
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT The Court: The petitioner employer has in this writ petition challenged the validity of the reference No. 122-I.R/18/11B/171/9 dated 24.1.1994 made under section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 by the appropriate Government for adjudication of the issue as to whether the dismissals of the respondent Nos. 5-7 are justified and what relief, if any, are the workmen entitled to. 2. The challenge has been thrown because of the facts and circumstances of this case which are stated hereunder. 3. These respondent Nos. 5-7 along with several other workmen who were employees under the petitioner employer in respect of three separate units were dismissed from service by their respective Unit Management. The said workmen having raised a dispute as to their dismissal, an order of reference dated 10th July, 1990 under reference 1252-I.R./IR/11L-60/87 was made by the appropriate Government. In will appear from the said order of Reference that the particular workmen were not identified with their respective employer and all workmen were clubbed together under four different employers for the said Reference for the purpose of adjudication of the dispute under Reference. 4. The Learned Tribunal rejected the Reference of the dispute by his order dated 9th of June, 1992 and sent the same to the appropriate Government for necessary action. It is not in dispute that the Learned Tribunal rejected the Reference of the dispute is the same was incapable of execution because the particular workmen were not identified in the said Reference with their respective employer. It is also not in dispute that the appropriate Government upon receipt of the said Award did not publish the same under provision of section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In these state of things the appropriate Government made three separate References. One such Reference being No. 122-I.R/18/11B/171/9 dated 24.1.94 is under challenge in this writ petition. By the aforesaid three References the appropriate Government pitted the particular employer against its respective employees and made the Reference for adjudication of the self-same dispute as to whether the dismissal of the respective employees is justified and what relief, if any, are the worker entitled to. 5.
By the aforesaid three References the appropriate Government pitted the particular employer against its respective employees and made the Reference for adjudication of the self-same dispute as to whether the dismissal of the respective employees is justified and what relief, if any, are the worker entitled to. 5. The petitioner employer raised an objection before the Tribunal as to the maintainability of the said Reference by a petition dated 20.4.1995 and it appears that while the same was pending for disposal this writ petition was moved challenging the validity of the said Reference dated 24.1.94 as aforesaid in this writ petition. 6. Mr. Arunabha Ghosh, the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner company, raised a plea as to the non-maintainability of the said Reference on the ground that the Award under the first Reference having not been published under section 17 of the said Act, the proceeding under first reference has not yet been concluded under section 20(3) of the said Act and therefore the appropriate Government was not empowered to make a second Reference on the self-same issue. Mr. Ghosh in support of his contention referred to the provisions of section 17 A and sub-section (3) of section 20 of the said Act and contended that every Award of Tribunal should be published by the appropriate Government in the manner as it thinks fit under section 17 and upon publication of such Award the same would be enforceable under section 17 A of the said Act upon expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication. Then only the proceeding under reference would conclude under sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Act. The power to withhold the publication of the Award has also been provided in section 17 A of the said Act and the manner for withholding publication of the same has also been provided therein. It is also not in dispute that the appropriate Government did not exercise any power under section 17 A of the said Act for withholding the publication of the said Award of the learned Tribunal made under first reference. Mr. Ghosh, accordingly upon reference to section 20(3) of the said Act, contended that the proceeding upon first reference under section 10 of the said Act shall be deemed to be in existence. In other words, Mr.
Mr. Ghosh, accordingly upon reference to section 20(3) of the said Act, contended that the proceeding upon first reference under section 10 of the said Act shall be deemed to be in existence. In other words, Mr. Ghosh contended that since the Award was not published, so it did not become enforceable and in view of the provision of sub-section (3) of section 20 of the said Act, the proceeding did not conclude and therefore the subsequent reference of the self-same dispute which is still under reference as above is not maintainable. 7. Mr. Ghosh in support of his contention referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 SC 1018 (State of Bihar vs. D.N. Ganguly and Ors.). In the said decision the Supreme Court upon interpretation of section 10(1) of the said Act held that the Act does not expressly confer any power on the appropriate Government to cancel or supersede a' reference made under section 10(1) of the said Act, nor such power could be claimed by implication on the strength of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The relevant observations in this regard can be had from paragraphs 9, 12 and 15 of the said report the portions of which are quoted hereunder: Para 9......."It is well settled that this section embodies a rule of construction and the question whether or not it applied to the provisions of a particular statute would depend on the subject matter, context, and the effect of the relevant provisions of the said statute. In other words, it would be necessary to examine carefully the scheme of the Act, its object and all its relevant and material provisions before deciding whether by the application if the rule of construction enunciated by section 21, the appellant's contention is justified that the power to cancel the reference made under section 10(1) can said to vest in the appropriate Government by necessary implication. If we come to the conclusion that the context and effect of, the relevant provisions is repugnant to the application of the said rule of construction, the appellant would not be entitled to invoke the assistance of the said section.
If we come to the conclusion that the context and effect of, the relevant provisions is repugnant to the application of the said rule of construction, the appellant would not be entitled to invoke the assistance of the said section. We must, therefore, proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the Act itself." Para 12.........."In our opinion, if the legislature had intended to confer on the appropriate Government the power to cancel an order made under section 10(1), the legislature could have a specific provision in that behalf and would have prescribed appropriate limitations on the exercise of the said power." Para 15.........."Apart from these provisions of the Act, on general principles it seems rather difficult to accept the argument that the appropriate Government should have implied power to cancel its own order made under section 10(1)". 8. Mr. Tapan Kumar Dutta, the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents workmen could not dispute the proposition of law enunciated as aforesaid by the Supreme Court. The aforesaid Supreme Court decision, therefore, makes the position clear that while the proceeding under reference has not been concluded under the provision of the Act, the appropriate Government is not empowered to make a further reference either by rescinding or by setting aside the reference already made in this regard. Once this position of law is accepted, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned reference, in view of non-publication of the Award on the basis of the earlier reference, was beyond the authority of the appropriate Government. Therefore, the same cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the reference No. 122-I.R dated 24.1.1994 is set aside. 9. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case and particularly in view of the fact that the dispute under reference has not yet been adjudicate upon merits it is desirable and Justice Demands that the dispute under reference between the particular employer and its workmen should be adjudicated under the relevant provisions of law. 10. I, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case and for the purpose of adjudication of the dispute as aforesaid between the parties, direct the appropriate Government to publish the Award dated 9.6.1992 made under reference No. 1252-IR dated 10.7.1990 forthwith and preferably within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order.
10. I, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case and for the purpose of adjudication of the dispute as aforesaid between the parties, direct the appropriate Government to publish the Award dated 9.6.1992 made under reference No. 1252-IR dated 10.7.1990 forthwith and preferably within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order. Upon publication of the said Award the reference No. 1252-IR dated 10.7.1990 shall stand concluded and the appropriate Government will be at liberty to proceed afresh in the matter under the relevant provision of law. 11. It is made clear that since the dispute as above is pending, for a long time without being adjudicated on merits, so the appropriate Government will make all possible endeavours to proceed further in the matter afresh within a period of one month from the date of publication of the Award. Appeal disposed of with directions.