Honble SHARMA, J.–In what manner a statute has to be interpreted ? In a manner which is intended to make its working practicable and smooth and not to cause any hardship or to render aggrieved person without any remedy ? This crucial question arises for determination in this revision. (2). The relevant facts of the case are for present purposes to be taken to be these. The plaintiff-non-petitioner (for short plaintiff) instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant petitioner (for short defendant). It was averred in the plaint that the dairy booth was allotted to the plaintiff and physical possession handed over on 1.4.1992. Since then the plaintiff had been carrying his business in the aforesaid booth. Suddenly defendant No.2 invited application through adverti- sement published in Denik Navjyoti in respect of the said dairy booth. Apprehending dispossession from the said booth the suit for permanent injunction along with an application u/O. 39 Rr. 1 & 2 CPC was filed. (3). The defendants filed an application u/O. 7, r. 11 CPC r/w Sec. 75 & 143 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (for short Act of 1965) on the ground that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of O.7, R. 11 CPC in view of the provisions contained in Secs. 143 & 75 of the Act of 1965. (4). The Trial Court vide order, dated 25.5.1994 dismissed the said application. It is in these circumstances, this revision has been preferred. (5). Assailing the impugned order. Mr. Dilip Singh learned counsel for the peti- tioner canvassed that the legislature has imposed a clear bar in respect of the matter enumerated in Sec. 75 of the Act of 1965. No suit against the defendant Co-operative Society could have been entertained in respect of any matter touching its business of the society. The suit was not maintainable without serving two months notice prior to filing of the suit. The observation of the Trial Court that allo- tment of booths does not fall within the business of the society is ex- facie illegal as under the by laws No.3. The aims and objects of the society are to carry out the activities for the promotion, proclamation, possessing and marketing of milk and milk products for economic development of animal husbandry/farming community and in general to undertake all steps to the attainment of the aforesaid objects. The aims and objects of the society are to carry out the activities for the promotion, proclamation, possessing and marketing of milk and milk products for economic development of animal husbandry/farming community and in general to undertake all steps to the attainment of the aforesaid objects. The allotment of booths that distribution and marketing of milk and milk products by an appointment of agents and creation of distribution network for marketing through agents his matter touching the business of the society as contemplated u/S. 75 of the Act of 1965. On account of statutory embark imposed by Sec. 143 of the Act of 1965, no suit against a Cooperative Society in respect of any matter touching the business of the society could be entertained without a previous notice to two months period in writing having been delivered to Registrar. The notice not having been given admittedly the suit was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. (6). Mr. Dilip Singh learned counsel for the defendants placed reliance on Khubilal vs. Power House K.G.N.S. Samiti, Udaipur, (1). (7). On the other hand Mr. J.P. Goyal learned counsel has supported the impu- gned order and placed reliance on Chairman Town Area Committee vs. Gulam Mustafa, (2), and Municipal Council vs. G. Krishna Rao, (3), before adverting to the rival contentions it is necessary to examine the relevant statutory provisions of the Act of 1965. Section 75 of the Act read as under :– ``75. J.P. Goyal learned counsel has supported the impu- gned order and placed reliance on Chairman Town Area Committee vs. Gulam Mustafa, (2), and Municipal Council vs. G. Krishna Rao, (3), before adverting to the rival contentions it is necessary to examine the relevant statutory provisions of the Act of 1965. Section 75 of the Act read as under :– ``75. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a cooperative society; (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member,past member or deceased member and the society, is committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society, or (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee,any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer deceased agent or deceased employee of the society, or (d) between the society and the surety of a member, past member or a deceased member, or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had transaction u/S. 66, whether such a surety is or is not a member of a society. such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any, suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. (2) For the purposes of sub-sec. (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society, (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand and be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of the society. (3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. (8). A bare perusal of the above provisions go to show that the legislature was keen to provide with ordinarily the cooperative society should not be dragged in civil Courts, if this could be avoided. The Act of 1965 has provided a comparatively cheap and speedy remedy in dispossession concerning a society. Section 143 of the Act of 1965 reads as under :– ``143. ``Notice necessary in suits.–Not suit shall instituted against a co-operative society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the constitution, management or the business of the society until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar, or left at his office, stating the cause of ac- tion the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (9). A look at the above section demonstrates that this section clearly empowers the institution of a suit against cooperative society in respect of any Act touching the constitution, management or the business of the society until the expiration of the two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar. (10). Section 137 of the Act of 1965 creates a bar to the jurisdiction of the Courts. It provides that no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required u/S. 75 to be referred to the Registrar. The clear int- ention of this section is that where a remedy is provided under this Act then no suit or other proceedings shall lie in the civil Court, except to the extent permitted by the Act itself. In Khubilal case (supra) this Court propounded that the word ``business has been used in a different senses and in different contexts but its ordinary dictionary meaning is ``Activity, occupation, function, it was further held that where prima facie a matter seems to fall within the purview of the Registrar, the party should first approach the Registrar. (11). In Khubilal case (supra) this Court propounded that the word ``business has been used in a different senses and in different contexts but its ordinary dictionary meaning is ``Activity, occupation, function, it was further held that where prima facie a matter seems to fall within the purview of the Registrar, the party should first approach the Registrar. (11). In Chairman Town Area Committees case (supra) it was indicated as under :– ``A comparative examination of the wording of the two sections, Sec. 80 of the CPC and Sec. 41 of the Town Area Act obviously connotes that their wording is different and even if the view laid down in AIR 1927 PC 176 (supra) and in the authorities following the same is accepted to be correct, it can afford no guide for the interpretation of the words of Sec. 41 of the Toan Area Act. In place of the words in re- spect of any act purporting to be done in Sec. 80 we have the words `anything done or alleged to be done in Sec. 41 of the Town Area Act. The language of Sec. 41, without any difficulty, connotes that the act in respect of which a suit is brought requiring one months notice must be done or alleged to have been done. In both cases the act is a past one and does not contemplate a future act to be performed by a Town Area Committee. In that view of the matter the present suit of the plaintiffs cannot be held to be barred for want of a notice, because what the plaintiffs in this case want from the Court is that the defendant, should be restrai- ned from demolishing their wall in future. It is interesting to note that the notice of 10.5.1962, fixes the target of 17.5.1962, on which date the employees of the Town Area Committee had to demolish the wall in question. If the result would have been that the wall would have been demolished long before the suit could be instituted. I do not think that the legislature would leave any loophole in such a contingency, and leave statute has to be interpreted in a rational manner and in a way which is intended to make its working practicable and smooth and not to cause any hardship or leave an aggrieved person without any remedy. (12). I do not think that the legislature would leave any loophole in such a contingency, and leave statute has to be interpreted in a rational manner and in a way which is intended to make its working practicable and smooth and not to cause any hardship or leave an aggrieved person without any remedy. (12). Section 80 of the CPC was amended by amending Act, 1976 and provisions contained in amended Sections go to show that a plaintiff intending to institute a suit against the Government, has two options before him, either he may file a suit after serving two months notice or he may file the suit without serving the notice but in that event he must satisfy the Court that an urgent and immediate re- lief is required. In that event of first course being adopted the suit cannot be filed before the expiry of the two months of giving the notice and this explains the reason for using the word ``shall in sub-sec. (1). ``A look at Sec. 80 CPC reveals that a plaintiff intending to institute a suit against the Government, has two options before him, either he may file a suit after serving two months notice or he may file the suit without serving the notice but in that event he must satisfy the Court that an urgent and immediate relief is required. In that event of first course being adopted the suit cannot be filed before the expiry of the two months of giving the notice and this explains the reason for using the word ``shall in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 80 by the Parliament. However, in the second case he has the choice to file the suit without giving the requisite notice but only after obtaining leave of the Court and it is for this purpose that the word ``may has been used in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 80. The principle laid down in Sec. 143 of the Act is similar to that of Sec. 80 CPC but this section has not been amended and the plaintiff intending to institute a suit against the Cooperative Society does not have the choice to file the suit without giving the requisite notice and the plaintiff has to file the suit after serving two months notice, as the provisions contained in Sec. 143 of the Act are mandatory in nature. In Secs. In Secs. 75 & 143 of the Act, 1965. (13). Provisions of Secs. 75 & 143 of the Act of 1965 are attracted only if the suit is instituted against the Cooperative Society or any of its officer in respect of any act touching the Constitution, management or the business of the Society and as is observed in Khubilal case (supra) by this Court that where prima facie a matter seems to fall within the purview of the Registrar, the party should first approach to the Registrar. It follows from the said judgment that it is for the Trial Court to examine the nature of the suit and if the Trial Court is prima facie of the view that the suit has been filed against a cooperative Society or any of its officer in respect of any act touching the constitution, management or the business, it should dismiss the suit u/O. 7, R. 11 CPC in view of the provisions contained in Secs. 75, 137 & 143 of the Act of 1965 but where it does not appear prima facie that the facts mentioned in the suit do not touch a constitution, management or the business of the Society, then the Court may proceed with the suit. (14). In the case on hand the Trial Court has after examining the averments made in the plaint do not touch the constitution, management or the business of the defendant Society. Agreeing with the view expressed in Town Area Committees case (supra) I may observe that every statute has to be interpreted in a rational manner and in a way which is intended to make its working practicable smooth and not to cause any hardship or render aggrieved person without any remedy. The Khubilal case (supra) cited by learned counsel for the defendants, does not help the defendants as the ratio of the said case has already stated by me, is that there prima facie matter seems to fall within the purview of the Registrar, the party should first approach to the Registrar. In the instant case no prima facie case does exist in favour of the defendants so as to attract the provisions contained in Secs. 75, 143 & 137 of the Act of 1965. (15). In the instant case no prima facie case does exist in favour of the defendants so as to attract the provisions contained in Secs. 75, 143 & 137 of the Act of 1965. (15). Thus in my view, the Court below has not committed jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order and if the order is allowed to stand, it would not occasion failure to justice. (16). Consequently, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.