JUDGMENT : Pradipta Ray, J. - The writ petitioner has filed this writ petittion challenging the resolution of the Jharsuguda Municipality dated December 22, 1995 and consequential office order dated April 12, 1996 passed by the Executive Officer, Jharsuguda Municipality cancelling the lease granted to the petitioner by Memo/Office letter No. 1689/JM/Tax-lll dated May 15,1995 (Annexure-C/1). 2. The petitioner in this writ petition has stated that he was granted the lease to collect fees from the Municipality check gates for entering/parking of heavy vehicles inside Jharsuguda Municipal area for Rs. 50,000/- per year for a period of three years commencing from May, 15, 1995. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned cancellation is totally illegal and arbitrary and the same is contrary to the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the lease has been cancelled without affording him any opportunity of hearing. 3. The Municipality has filed a counter in which it has been pointed out that the Municipality has no power, authority or jurisdiction to levy entry fee from the heavy vehicles and as such the Municipality has ultimately decided to discontinue said authorised and illegal levy of entry fee from the vehicles entering the by-pass road. During hearing Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the lease was granted to the petitioner for collection of parking fee and not entry fee although no such case has been made out in the writ petition. 4. The materials on record, i.e., annexures to the writ, petition and to the counter of the Municipality clearly point out that the petitioner applied for obtaining the right to collect entry fee and such right for collection of entry fee was given to him by the Municipality. It appears that some time in 1990 the Municipality imposed a road development fee at the rate of Rs. 5/- for each truck and heavy vehicle passing through the by-pass of the Municipality. Subsequently the said imposition was withdrawn in August, 1994. The said entry fee was re-imposed in 1995. It appears that the petitioner submitted an application before the Chairman of the Jharsuguda Municipality on April 27, 1995. The relevant portions from the said application (Annexure-A/1) are quoted below : "...That it has come to my notice that previously Jharsuguda Municipality was imposing fees from the heavy vehicles entering into the Municipality premises. It appears that the petitioner submitted an application before the Chairman of the Jharsuguda Municipality on April 27, 1995. The relevant portions from the said application (Annexure-A/1) are quoted below : "...That it has come to my notice that previously Jharsuguda Municipality was imposing fees from the heavy vehicles entering into the Municipality premises. But the same has been stopped since August, 1994. That, further it has come to my knowledge that the Municipality Authority has again decided to impose the above to raise their sources of income. Under the circumstances stated above, I request your honour to kindly consider my case favourably and accorded (sic) the lease in my favour for three years..." It will appear from the said application that the Municipality proceeded to re-impose entry fee and the petitioner applied for obtaining the right to collect such fee. The letter dated May, 15, 1995 issued by the Executive Officer, Jharsuguda Municipality (Annexure-C/1) was also clear that the petitioner was given right to collect miscellaneous fees from the heavy vehicle entering into Jharsuguda Municipality area at the rats mentioned therein. Thus, we are unable to accept the allegation that the petitioner was given the right to collect parking fee as contemplated by Section 309 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950. 5. The Municipality is a statutory body created under the provisions of Orissa Municipal Act, 1950. Being an artificial legal entity the Municipality does not have any power or authority which has not been expressly or impliedly conferred by the statute creating it. In absence of any provision authorising the Municipality to impose or levy entry fee from the vehicles passing through any municipal road or entering into municipal area, imposition of entry fee for heavy vehicles was wholly unauthorised, incompetent and illegal. After having realised the illegality of such imposition the Municipality had withdrawn such entry fee and as an obvious consequence cancelled and withdrew the right given to the petitioner to collect such entry fee. It is not a case that the Municipality cancelled the lease because of any allegation against the petitioner or for replacing the petitioner by any other lessee. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in cancelling the right to collect the entry fee as was given to petitioner by order dated May 15, 1995. 6. It is not a case that the Municipality cancelled the lease because of any allegation against the petitioner or for replacing the petitioner by any other lessee. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in cancelling the right to collect the entry fee as was given to petitioner by order dated May 15, 1995. 6. Mr Mohanty, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has cited several decisions on the question of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and right of hearing but in view of our clear finding that the petitioner was not given any right to collect parking fee and that imposition of entry fee was unauthorised and illegal, we do not feel any necessity of discussing the decisions cited by Mr. Mohanty. In any event principles of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation cannot be extended to a situation where the right claimed is not permissible under the provisions of law. 7. The petitioner has alleged that he has suffered loss because of the impugned cancellation of his right. Whether the petitioner has suffered or will suffer any loss cannot be a consideration for the Municipality to continue with an illegal and unauthorised imposition. If the petitioner has suffered any loss it is open to him to institute any legal action against the Municipality for compensation or any other relief as is permissible under the law. 8. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in the contentions of the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. P.K. Misra, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed