Judgment P.K.Sarin, J. 1. This criminal revision application is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.1.1991 passed by Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial No. 2886/390 by which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has ordered for summoning the petitioners under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) to face trial as accused. 2. It appears that the petitioners have been summoned as accused by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 319 of the Code in respect of an incident which took place on 3.11.1975 resulting into murder of the father of the informant. The petitioners were not sent up for trial by the police and the accused against whom charge-sheet was submitted by the police faced trial. In the said trial witnesses has been examined on behalf of the prosecution. It further appears that an application was filed on 2.7.1988 by the informant for summoning the petitioners as accused in the said case. The said application could not be disposed of earlier and ultimately it was disposed of by the impugned order dated 31.1.1991. The learned Sessions Judge found that the statements of witnesses examined in the case show the complicity of the present petitioners as well as the accused. The Public Prosecutor appears to have opposed the said application. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the objection raised by the Public Prosecutor and exercising the power under Section 319 of the Code ordered for summoning the petitioners as accused. Copy of the application under Section 319 of the Code filed by the informant has been annexed as annexure-I of the petition while the synopsis of arguments filed on behalf of the State against the said application in annexure-3 of the application. The synopsis of argument shows that the learned special Public Prosecutor had contended that 15 years had elapsed but the trial could not be concluded and only two witnesses, the doctor and the Investigating Officer were to be examined in the case and the prolongation of trial may result into death and retirement of many prosecution witnesses who were likely to be re-examined and it would prejudice the prosecution as well as the accused persons. 3. 3. It further appears that the informant who had moved the application for action under Section 319 of the Code subsequently filed an application for withdrawal of application under Section 319 of the Code. The copy of the said application is at Annexure 2 of the application. 4. This Court while staying the operation of the impugned order on 22.2.1991 has observed that the main trial shall not await the disposal of this application. The learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the trial has been concluded and the judgment has been delivered against the accused persons who had faced trial. 5. We have to consider the fact whether the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge suffers from any infirmity or illegality so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there has been inordinate delay in passing the impugned order for summoning the petitioner as accused when the prosecution evidence was practically over and only two witnesses remained to be examined. It is contended that the incident is of 1975 and the impugned order has been passed on 31.1.1991 i.e. about 15 years after the incident. It is contended that no such order should have been passed after lapse off such a long period as it amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishna V/s. State of Bihar, 1986 BBCJ 802 . wherein this Court had set aside the order passed under Section 319 of the Code on account of delay. In the said case the order passed under Section 319 of the Code was passed after a lapse of nearly 17 years and the Court observed that passing of such an order after 17 years would amount to abuse of the process of Court. 7. Section 319 of the Code lays down that : "Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of an offence. 7. Section 319 of the Code lays down that : "Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of an offence. it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person or the offence which he appears to have committed." Sub-section (2) of Section 319 of the Code provides that : "where such person is not attending the Court. he may be arrested or summoned as the circumstances of the case required for the purpose aforesaid." There is no ambiguity in the provisions of Section 319 of the Code and it is clear without any doubt that this power is to be exercised after some evidence is led before the Court. Said power would not be negatived on account of delay in opening of the case or examining the witnesses. The power under Section 319 of the Code could not become nugatory only on account of lapse of time since the date of incident. If that be accepted that the power under Section 319 of the Code cannot be exercised on account of delay and if it is exercised that would amount to abuse of the process of Court, it would make the entire Section 319 itself nugatory. If complicity of some persons comes to light after evidence is led the Court would not become helpless on account of delay to summon such persons to face trial and find out whether they have committed the offence. Provision has been made for advancement of the ends of justice that the person accused be tried and the Court cannot be made to remain silent spectator and avoid its responsibility on account of delay which may be due to several unavoidable causes. 8 The Apex Court in the case of Kishun Singh V/s. State of Bihar, 1993 (2) PLJR (SC) 21, has considered the scope of Section 319 of the Code and has observed that the provisions of Section 319 of the Code come into operation at the post-cognizance stage when it appears to the Court from the evidencc recorded at the trial that any person other than named as offenders appears to have committed any offence in relation to the incident for which the co-accused are on trial. The Apex Court after referring its earlier decision in the case of Raghubansh Dubey V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 1767 and Hareram Satpati V/s. Tikaram Agrawal, AIR 1978 SC 1568 . has observed that once the cognizance of the offence is taken it becomes the duty of the Court to find the real offenders and if it comes to the conclusion that besides the persons put up for trial by the police some others are also involved in commission of crime, it is the Courts duty to summon them to stand trial along with those already named, since summoning them would be only a part of the process of taking cognizance. In view of the observation of the Apex Court it is the Courts duty to summon any person whose complicity comes to light before a Court taking cognizance of the offence. When duty is cast upon the Court to summon such person and Court summons such person in discharge of its duty as mandated by Section 319 of the Code. it cannot be said to be an act amounting to abuse of the process of Court. Any action done by a Court in discharge of its duty which is mandated by the express provisions of the Code cannot be called abuse of process of Court. Therefore, in view of the observation in the aforesaid case, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and reliance placed by him on the decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishna V/s. State of Bihar, (supra) is of no avail. His contention on this score cannot be sustained in view of the observation of the Apex Court regarding the duty of the Court under Section 319 of the Code. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has next contended that the trial itself has ended against the other co-accused persons as such. Now the present petitioners can not be tried. This contention also appears to be without force. The trial appears to have concluded because this Court has made observation on 22.2.1991 that the main trial shall not await the disposal of this application. Sub-section (4) of Section 319 lays down that where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses reheard. The trial appears to have concluded because this Court has made observation on 22.2.1991 that the main trial shall not await the disposal of this application. Sub-section (4) of Section 319 lays down that where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses reheard. If the proceeding is to commence afresh and the witnesses have to be reheard the conclusion of trial against other co-accused persons would not affect the trial of the persons summoned under sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the Code and the accused would not be prejudiced in any manner due to conclusion of the trial against other accused persons. If the witnesses examined at the trial against the petitioners are found not to be trustworthy it would be for the trial Court to consider the same and pass appropriate orders at the conclusion of the trial. No comment can be made about the evidence which might come at the trial against the present petitioners. The learned counsel for the petitioners has cited cases which are State of Bihar V/s. Ram Naresh Panday, AIR 1957 SC 389 and Balwant Singh V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 2265 . These decisions relate to the consideration of Public Prosecutors duty under Section 321 of the Code of making request or withdrawal of the prosecution. In the present case the controversy in question is not regarding withdrawal from the prosecution as such the said cases do not appear to be of any assistance to the petitioners for the purposes of present petition. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also cited the case of Amlesh Chandra V/s. The State, AIR 1952 Cal 481 , wherein the duty of a Public Prosecutor while addressing Jury has been pointed out while considering the scope of Sections 286 and 297 of the Code of 1898. The said case also does not appear to be of any assistance to the petitioners for the purpose of present petition. The said case also does not appear to be of any assistance to the petitioners for the purpose of present petition. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Balappa V/s. State of Karnataka, 1986 Cr LJ 653, wherein the Karnataka High Court on perusal of evidence found that the evidence led in the case did not disclose an offence against the petitioner so as to summon them under Section 319 of the Code. There appears to be no such factual position here that the evidence of the prosecution does not disclose commission of any offence by the petitioners. In the case of Dr. S.S. Khanna V/s. Chief Secretary, Patna, (1983) 3 SCC 42 , the Apex Court has held that there is no legal bar based on the principle of issue of estoppel to proceed under Section 319 of the Code against a person complained if on the same material the Court has dismissed a complaint under Section 203 of the Code. In the said case the Court had found that the Magistrate had good reason to summon the appellant under Section 319 of the Code as it appeared from the evidence that there was a strong case made out against the appellant for joining him in a criminal case as an accused. Thus, in a case where the complaint had been dismissed under Section 203 of the Code the power of the Court to summon any person as an accused under Section 319 after evidence led at the trial has not been held to be barred. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the informant has no locus standi to file an application under Section 319 of the Code as it is only the Public Prosecutor who is authorised to act on behalf of the prosecution. The power under Section 319 of the Code is to be exercised by the Court. It is not dependent on any partys application. Moving of an application bringing certain facts to the knowledge of the Court or drawing attention of the Court towards a particular fact is for the purpose that if deemed proper Court may act. The application moved by the informant was for drawing the attention of the Court that the complicity of the petitioners appears from the evidence led by the prosecution. The application moved by the informant was for drawing the attention of the Court that the complicity of the petitioners appears from the evidence led by the prosecution. The opposition of the Public Prosecutor or subsequently withdrawal of the application by the informant would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to act under Section 319 of the Code. It is the Courts duty to act under Section 319 of the Code and that power cannot be divested by any application for withdrawal of application by any party or any opposition made by the Public Prosecutor. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this score also does not appear to carry any force and is rejected. 12. In the circumstances, there appears to be no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. The criminal revision application is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The stay order dated 22.2.1991 is vacated.