R. K. MAHAJAN, J. This is a first ap peal against the judgment and decree dated 2nd February, 1982 passed by Sri R. C. Awasthy, District Judge, Fatehpur by virtue of which the learned District Judge decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents for cor rection (rectification) in the plaint and specific performance of the same against the defendants. It was further directed that the agreement shall stand corrected as to be in respect of plot Nos. 179-A and 179-B and the defendant No. 1 was directed to execute a sale-deed in respect of the same plots in favour of the plaintiffs after accepting the balance consideration of Rs. 13, 000/- within a month. It was further ordered that the defendants 2 to 4 will also join in the sale-deed as it was held that during the pendency of the suit, the defendant No. 1 sold the property in suit to defendants 2 to 4 and by the defendant No. 4 in favour of defendants 2 and 3. The defendants were also ordered to pay the costs. If the defendants fail to comply with the decree within a month, the plaintiffs shall have a right to deposit the sale consideration in Court and get the sale-deed executed through the Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are these: An agreement to sell was executed by the defendant No. 1 on 20-1-1975 with respect to agricultural land measuring 7 bighas 5 bighas and 18 bighas for a con sideration of Rs. 21, 000. Rs. 8, 000 was paid as earnest money by the plaintiffs. The amount was paid with stipulation that in case within four years, the defendant No. 1 did not pay back the money, then he would not liable to execute the sale-deed for his land. On the relevant date, the money was not paid and a notice was given on 11 -8-1979 by way of telegram to defendant No. 1 to receive Rs. 13, 000/- and to execute the sale-deed within two days and also attend the office of the Sub-Registrar for the registra tion purpose. The defendant No. 1 failed to appear before the Sub Registrars office. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, the defendant No. 1 executed a sale-deed of the disputed land in favour of defendants 2 to 4 who are his relations and daughter-in-laws etc. 3. The defendant No. 1 failed to appear before the Sub Registrars office. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, the defendant No. 1 executed a sale-deed of the disputed land in favour of defendants 2 to 4 who are his relations and daughter-in-laws etc. 3. The sale-deeds have not been produced in court and the trial Court has also not held them to be valid as they were effected during the pendency of the suit. 4. The plea of the defendant-appel lants in the trial Court is that the plaintiffs father Shiv Bali Singh was the President of Regional Co-operative Secretary Joniha since 1975 and also the Block Pramukh. The defendant No. 1 was a member of the said society and used to take loan from there and in that connection his thumb-impressions used to be obtained by supervisors and other employees who were under the subordina tion of said Shiv Bali Singh. Thus it was asserted that the signatures of the defen dants were forged on blank papers which were later on converted into an agreement to sell. It may be mentioned that the trial Court has also repelled the plea of forgery on consideration of the oral evidence ad duced as well as the report of the finger expert. The trial Court has also held that the defendant obtained the specimen of the thump impressions for comparison but did not send the same for comparison. 5. The only question which is to be examined in this appeal is whether the agreement would be rectified. Initially the agreement was made in respect of plot Nos. 189-A and 189-B but later on the mistake was detected and amendment was made in the plaint and consequently the agreement was rectified in respect of plot Nos. 179-A and 179-B instead of Plot Nos. 189-A and 189-B. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the entire record and the evidence on record. Sri Satya Prakash, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the agree ment dated 20-1-1975 was not got registered according to Section 17 of the Registration Act before the registration authority. It was further submitted that there was no meeting of mind of sale of Plot Nos. 179-A and 179-B or plot Nos. Sri Satya Prakash, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the agree ment dated 20-1-1975 was not got registered according to Section 17 of the Registration Act before the registration authority. It was further submitted that there was no meeting of mind of sale of Plot Nos. 179-A and 179-B or plot Nos. 189-A and 189-B. The argument proceeds that the plaintiffs never saw the revenue papers to ascertain the plot numbers. So his argument is that regarding plot Nos. 179-A and 179-B no rectification could be made. It has also been submitted that the Court has not considered the bona fide purchase of the defendants 2 and 3 and this important feature vitiate the finding of the trial Court. The learned counsel for defendant-respondents further submits that the defendant No. 1 was not the owner of Plot Nos. 189-A and 189-B but was owner of Plots 179-A and 179- B measuring 7 bigha 5 biswa 18 biswansis. He further submits that the name of the defendant No. 1 was never mutated on plot Nos. 189-A and 189-B but was only agreed of which the defendant No. 1 was the owner. He further submits that the defendant No. 1 failed to examine the thumb-impression on the agreement. His further submission is that the transferring of the land in dispute by the defendant No. 1 in favour of his relations and others was to frustrate the claim of the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit. He further submits that the defendant No. 1 has not filed any appeal and as such the present appeal filed against the judgment and decree of the trial Court by Bodha and Smt. Piyaria is not maintainable. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have considered their argu ments. After considering the facts and cir cumstances of the case as well as perusing the evidence on record, I am of the view that the submissions made on behalf of the ap pellants lack force and there is no infirmity of the appraisal of the evidence by the Court below with respect to legal as well the fac tual aspect. I negatives the plea on the fol lowing reasoning to dismiss the appeal. 8. Firstly, the submission that the agreement could not be rectified is of no avail. For formation of contract, it is essen tial that the parties mind must meet. I negatives the plea on the fol lowing reasoning to dismiss the appeal. 8. Firstly, the submission that the agreement could not be rectified is of no avail. For formation of contract, it is essen tial that the parties mind must meet. They must be at idem. Consent has been defined under Section 13 of the Act. In this case, the plaintiffs agreed to purchase the land from defendant No. 1 of which he is bhumidhar/owner. This finds fact corroboration from the oral evidence of P. W. 1 Bhagwan Singh and D. W. 1 Amrit Singh and other evidence on record. Their evidence clearly pointed out the Plot Nos. 179-A and 179-B. How a person can enter into agreement if he is not the owner of the same. There is no bar of Section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act to remove the am biguity. Considering the view of the village background and the track from which they belong, extract evidence is always there to consider the contract. There was amutal mistake which can be rectified under Sec tion 26 of the Specific Relief Act, Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act is quoted below:- "26. When instrument may be rectified - (1) When, through fraud or mutal mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing (not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), applies) does not express their real intention, then- (a) either party or his representative in inter est may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or (b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or (c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause (b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument. (2) If, any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-sec tion (1), the Court finish that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the Court may, in its discretion, direct rectification of the instrument so -as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value. (3) A contract in writing may first be rec tified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the Court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced. (4) No relief for the rectification of an in strument shall be granted to any party under this section unless it has been specifically claimed: Provided that where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the Court, shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim. " 9. The Court has ample power in this case to correct rectify the mistake in the agreement and the Court below was not in wrong in allowing the amendment to rectify the agreement and passing the decree. 10. Secondly, after perusing the material evidence on record, I am also of the view that the defendants 2 to 4 are not bona fide purchasers of the property in dispute under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as they knew the agreement of sale was effected during the pendency of the suit. The reasoning of the Court below in this point is not liable to be disturbed. 11. Thirdly, regarding Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which re lates to the transfer of property pending the suit, the language of the same is being quoted as under:- "52. The reasoning of the Court below in this point is not liable to be disturbed. 11. Thirdly, regarding Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which re lates to the transfer of property pending the suit, the language of the same is being quoted as under:- "52. Transfer of property pending suiting relating thereto-During the pendency is any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unob tainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for. the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. " 12. The Court below while giving find ing on issue No. 4 (a) and (b) held that after perusing the statement of Amrit Singh, it appears that the sale-deed was executed in July, 1979, while the suit was filed in Decem ber", 1979 but strangely enough the sale-deeds were not filed and the Court below was of the view that withholding the sale-deeds negatived the plea of bona fide pur chaser. The Court below was also of the view that the sale-deeds were executed during the pendency of the suit. 13. Fourthly, during the course of argu ments by the learned counsel for the appel lant, nothing has been pointed out to repel this finding recorded by the Court below. The Court below was also of the view that the sale-deeds were executed during the pendency of the suit. 13. Fourthly, during the course of argu ments by the learned counsel for the appel lant, nothing has been pointed out to repel this finding recorded by the Court below. I have already observed that there was efforts on the part of plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 by way of executing the sale-deed in favour of other defendants, frustrated the right of the plaintiffs. Since the sale-deed was executed during the pendency of the suit, this obviously hit by the principle of is pendent which lays down that the property, if transferred, do not affect the right of other otherwise this save the right of the parties who are litigating bona firefly and this Sec tion is not meant for the fraudulent transfer. 14. Fifthly, non-filing of appeal by the defendant No. 1 also shows the way in which the property was dealt with. The appeal has been filed only by the transferee and they have right to file appeal. I find no infirmity in the lower court findings they are well reasoned. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .