J. C. GUPTA, J. Parties counsel are present and since the relevant material has already been placed on record by the par ties with the affidavits, it is not necessary to summon the lower courts record. 2. This application in revision is directed against the order dated 5-9-98 passed by IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sultanpur in S. T No. 85/90 under Sections 302/396/323/149/147/148, IPC, State v. Krishna Mohan and others, whereby the learned Sessions Judge al lowed the application moved on behalf of opposite party No. 2 for recalling PW1 for further cross-examination. The order ap pears to have been passed by the learned Session Judge in exercise of powers under Section311, Cr. P. C. 3. The facts relevant for the purpose of this revision in brief are that opposite party No. 2 alongwith others are facing trial before IIIrd Addl. Sessions Judge and in the said trial the stage of defence has reached. It further appears that after the statement of DW 1 was recorded and the General Diary (Dincharya Bahi of Lekhpal) had been brought on record wherein certain entries are said to have been made by PW 1 showing his presence at a place far removed from the place of incident, an application was moved by ac cused Sheetla Prasad for recalling P W 1 for further cross-examination with regard to the entries of the general diary of the lekhpal. This application was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge by the order dated 21-8-98 on the ground that the ac cused persons had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that the Court did not think it necessary to recall the said witness for further cross-examina tion. It further appears that thereafter an application was moved on behalf of another accused-opposite party No. 2 for recalling the said witness stating therein that the accused persons had no knowledge of the aforesaid entries at the time when PW 1 was cross-examined and therefore, for the ends of justice it was necessary that the defence be given an opportunity to effectively cross-examine the said witness regarding his presence at the place where he is said to be on duty at the relevant time. This time the learned Magistrate by the impugned order has al lowed the application and has recalled P W 1 for fur the rcross-examination. 4. This time the learned Magistrate by the impugned order has al lowed the application and has recalled P W 1 for fur the rcross-examination. 4. Learned Counsel for the applicant vehemently argued before this Court that the impugned order amounts to reviewing the earlier order dated 21-8-98 passed by the Court below which was not permissible in law under the provisions of Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in support of his argument he placed reliance on a number of decisions which I will refer in the later part oof this judgment. 5. In order to appreciate the argu ment of the learned Counsel for the ap plicant, it is necessary to have a glance on the provisions of Section 362, Cr. P. C. which runs as follows: "362. Court not to alter judgment.- as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical arithmetical error. " 6. A plain reading of the above provisions will indicate that the bar created under Section 362, Cr. P. C. applies only to judgments and final orders whereby proceeding is disposed of. It could not be doubted that the prmiple applicable to judgments and final orders does not apply to interlocutory orders. This view of mine is supported by the decision in Sahdeo Tft pathi v. pipti Pasin, 1969 Cr. L. J. 1527, wherein it was held that the order rejecting prayer for cross-examination of a witness is not a judgment within the mean ing of Section 362, Cr. P. C, being in nature of interlocutory order, the Court, in the ends of justice, can allow the prayer made second time even on the same fact. 7. Learned Counsel for the applicant on the other hand relied upon the decision in the case of Sankatha Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1962 SC 1208 . In the said case after conviction had been recorded by the Magistrate, the accused persons filed ap peal which was -dismissed as neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared to argue the appeal. The order dismissing appeal further indicated that the appeal was dismissed on merits after perusal of the record by the Appellate Court. In the said case after conviction had been recorded by the Magistrate, the accused persons filed ap peal which was -dismissed as neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared to argue the appeal. The order dismissing appeal further indicated that the appeal was dismissed on merits after perusal of the record by the Appellate Court. There after an application was made by the ap pellants with the prayer that the appeal be restored to its original number so that justice could be done. The said application was allowed by the Appellate Court and the order dismissing the appeal on merits were recalled. When the appeal came up for hearing before the successor-in- office, the previous order restoring the appeal was recalled on the ground that the Appel late Court had no power to reviewer recall the earlier order whereby appeal has been disposed of and therefore, the order of restoration of appeal was ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The High Court in revision agreed with the view of the Ap pellate Judge and dismissed the revision application. The matter was taken to the Apex Court and it was in these cir cumstances, that it was held that as the appeal had been disposed of finally on merits by the earlier order, the successor-in-office had no power or jurisdiction to review or recall that order. 8. The other case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the applicant is Bin-deshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2432 . This case also related to a final order and it was held that there was no provision in Cr. P. C. empowering the Magistrate to review or recall a final judi cial order passed by him earlier. 9. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another, 1990 SCC (Crl.) 327. In this case the High Court by its earlier order had rejected the ap plication moved under Section 482, Cr. P. C. by which the order of the Magistrate summoning the applicant was challenged. Since the order of the High Court had/acquired the status of a final order, it was held that the High Court had no power to review or recall the earlier order in view of the provisions of Section 362, Cr. P. C. 10. P. C. by which the order of the Magistrate summoning the applicant was challenged. Since the order of the High Court had/acquired the status of a final order, it was held that the High Court had no power to review or recall the earlier order in view of the provisions of Section 362, Cr. P. C. 10. The next case relied upon is Raju and another v. State of UP, 1983 Cr. LJ. 635. The facts of this case would also reveal that when the appeal pending before the High Court was decided on merits after rejection of adjournments application moved on behalf of the counsel for the appellants, it was held that the High Court had no power to alter or recall the judg ment in view of the bar created under Section 362, Cr. P. C. 11. In the present case undisputedly the trial in question has not yet been con cluded, it could also not be said that by the earlier order dated 21-8-98 the learned Judge had disposed of the case pending before him. In my opinion, therefore, the order dated 21-8-98 is not covered by the provisions of Section 362, Cr. P. C. 12. Learned Counsel for the ap plicant in revision then heavily placed reliance upon the decision of a Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sridhar Das v. State of West Bengal, 1996 Cr. L. J. 813. It transpires from the facts narrated in the said report that in the session trial pending before the trial Court three witnesses, namely, PW 3, PW 6 and PW 8 were examined and they were declared hostile and cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as on behalf of the accused persons and were discharged. An application was moved on behalf of the prosecution containing the prayer for re- examination of those wit nesses and the same was rejected on 22-8-94. Subsequent second application con taining same prayer was also rejected on 14-11-94 by the same Court. However the third application moved on behalf of the Public Prosecutor was subsequently al lowed and it was this order which was challenged before the High Court. Subsequent second application con taining same prayer was also rejected on 14-11-94 by the same Court. However the third application moved on behalf of the Public Prosecutor was subsequently al lowed and it was this order which was challenged before the High Court. The learned Judge who decided the revision was of the view that the prosecution could not be allowed to fill up the lacuna of the prosecution case brought out by the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses on behalf of the accused persons by re- ex amination of those witnesses by recalling them by the prosecution to the prejudice of the accused persons. It was in these circumstances that an observation was made that subsequent application with the prayer of recalling the witnesses for re-ex amination was not maintainable in law. 13. It was then next argued by the applicants counsel that there was no jus tification for the court below to have or dered recalling of PW 1 for further cross-examination by invoking the provisions of Section311,cr. P. c 14. Under Section 311, Cr. P. C the Court has unrestricted powers of sum moning of witnesses. There is a duty caused upon the court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and one of such is the examination of witnesses of its own accord. The object underlying Section 311, Cr. P. C. is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bring ing the valuable and material evidence on record. If after examining the record, the court feels that some points had been left obscure and in order to elucidate them it is necessary to recall certain witnesses, it has the power to recall and re- examine them under the provisions of Section 311, Cr. P. C. It is, therefore, clear that the Court not only has the power but a duty is cast upon every court to summon or recall wit nesses for a just decision of the case for meeting the ends of justice. However while exercising the said power Court should always keep in mind that it is not to be exercised to fill up its lacuna. 15. However while exercising the said power Court should always keep in mind that it is not to be exercised to fill up its lacuna. 15. In the case in hand after when the statement of DW 1 was recorded and the dincharya Bahi of the Lekhpal had been brought on record, it transpired to the defence that the said document contained some entries which prima facie showed presence of PW 1 at a place far removed from the scene of occurrence and there fore, his presence at the time of incident was doubtful. Whether or not those entries were made by the Lekhpal in his own hands or have any bearing on the testimony of PW 1, the said questions can only be ex amined and appreciated after when PW 1 is given an opportunity to meet those entries. It is in this background that the trial Court thought it expedient in the interest of justice to recall PW 1 for further cross-examination and it is relevant to mention here that the trial Court has restricted further cross-exam Ration only to that extent. It may also be mentioned here that in pursuance of the impugned order further cross-examination of PW 1 has already been completed. 16. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no force in this application in revision and the same is accordingly dis missed. The Trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial expeditiously and conclude the same preferably within a period of two weeks from the date of com munication of this order or from the date a certified copy of the same is produced. 17. A certified copy of this order may be supplied to the parties counsel within three days on payment of usual charges. Petition dismissed. .