JUDGMENT The Court: The basic issue involved in this appeal is whether an order dismissing an application under s. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 preferred to as the Act) is an "award" directing "reinstatement" within the meaning of the phrase under s. 17B of the Act. 2. The issue arises out of the dismissal of the respondent No.3 from service by the appellant. According to the appellant the respondent No.3 refused to abide by a transfer order and used abusive language against the management. According to the respondent No.3 the transfer order was issued mala fide. A show-cause notice was issued by the appellant to the respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 answered this but did not participate in the inquiry proceedings. On the basis of the enquiry report the order of dismissal was passed by the appellant. According to the appellant immediately thereafter one month's wage was sent to the respondent No.3 and an application was made under s. 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Conciliation Officer. viz. the Assistant Labour Commissioner for approval of the order of dismissal because of an industrial dispute pending before the 7th Industrial Tribunal with regard to one Sujit Mullick. 3. A preliminary objection was taken by the respondent No.3 relating to the maintainability of the application under s. 33(2)(b) on the ground that he had not been paid one month's wages which is a precondition to the making of an application under that section. This objection was overruled by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Being aggrieved the respondent No.3 filed a writ application [C.O. No. 660 (W) of 1986]. This application was dismissed on 13th May, 1987 stating that all points would be considered by the Competent Authority when the application under s. 33(2)(b) would be heard on merits finally. 4. According to the appellant pursuant to notices given by the Assistant Labour Commissioner all the documents relating to the disciplinary proceedings as a result of which the respondent No.3 was dismissed-from the copy of the charge-sheet to the copy of the money order receipt showing payment of one month's salary to the respondent No.3, had been produced before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. The appellant's witness was also subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the respondent No.3. Thereafter the appellant's representative admittedly failed to appear on 2 days. The appellant's witness was also subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the respondent No.3. Thereafter the appellant's representative admittedly failed to appear on 2 days. On the second date namely, 8th February, 1989 the Assistant Labour Commissioner passed the following order : "The workman appears. None from the applicant company. The company also remained absent on the previous date without intimation. The application is hereby dismissed." 5. According to the respondent No.3 by reason of this order of dismissal, the dismissal order had become void ab-initio and he was entitled to be reinstated in service with the appellant. He accordingly filed a writ application being [C.R. No. 9314 (W) of 1989] for a writ of Mandamus commanding the appellant to allow the respondent No.3 to join his services and to pay him his back wages. An interim order was passed on the writ application directing the appellant to pay the respondent No. 3 his wages for 3 months. This was done. 6. The appellant also filed a writ application being [C.R. No. 11954 (W) of 1989] challenging the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 8th February, 1989 dismissing the application under s. 33(2)(b). The submission of the appellant in its writ application, inter alia is that the Assistant Labour Commissioner could not dismiss an application under s. 33(2)(b) for default and that he was bound to take a decision on the basis of the evidence already on record and pass a speaking order. 7. Both these writ applications were directed to be heard together. They were both assigned to a Learned Single Judge for hearing. The respondent No.3 thereafter filed an application in December, 1995 under s. 17B in the appellant's writ application [C.R. No. 11954 (W) of 1989]. The Learned Single Judge allowed the application on 27.9.96. The two writ applications are still pending. 8. In the appeal from the order dated 27.9.96 the operation of the decision of the Learned Single Judge has been stayed. 9. Before us the appellant submitted that s. 17B of the Act provides for interim payment of wages when an award directing reinstatement is challenged by the employer in any proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court. According to the appellant the order dated 8th February 1989 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner was neither an award nor did it direct reinstatement. According to the appellant the order dated 8th February 1989 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner was neither an award nor did it direct reinstatement. The appellant has contended that in order to be an award the decision had to be taken by the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal on an industrial dispute or a question relating thereto. According to the appellant the Assistant Labour Commissioner was only a Conciliation Officer and could not adjudicate on an industrial dispute at all. The submission was also that an application under s. 33(2)(b) could not be dismissed for non-prosecution. Reasons had to be given on merits. On the facts it is submitted that the respondent No.3 was self-employed and carried on family business since his dismissal. Reliance has been placed on a letter written by the respondent No.3 dated 10.2.83 as well as a report of an investigating agency to support this submission. 10. The respondent No.3 has contended that no affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by the appellant to the application under s. 17B before the Learned Single Judge and it was not open to the appellant to make out a new case on facts for the first time before the Appeal Court. Re has denied that he was gainfully employed since his dismissal. It was submitted that the application under s. 33(2)(b) of the Act was not maintainable because the appellant had not paid one month wages to the respondent No.3 prior thereto. It is submitted that no distinction could be drawn between the rejection of an application on merits and dismissal of an application for non-prosecution. According to the respondent No. 3 the Tribunal was fully justified in dismissing the application under s. 33(2)(b) as the appellant was unnecessarily and deliberately prolonging the matter. It was also submitted that there was a statutory ban on the employer from passing an order of dismissal and as the ban was not lifted by the Tribunal by approval of the order of dismissal, the order of dismissal had no effect in law and that therefore the respondent No.3 continued in the service of the appellant and was entitled to all back wages. 11. Several decisions have been cited by both the parties. 11. Several decisions have been cited by both the parties. The Learned Single Judge in allowing the respondents application relied upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Sheikh Shamser Ali vs. M/s. Kesoram Industries Cotton Mills Ltd. (1987) 2 CRN 8 and Bata India Ltd. vs. 7th Industrial Tribunal & Ors., reported in 1993 (II) CRN 464 to hold that the order dismissing the appellant's application under s. 33(2)(b) for default was an award directing reinstatement under s. 17B. 12. The answer to the issue framed at the outset of this judgment lies in the language of and the context in which s. 17B and s. 33(2)(b) of the Act are placed in the Scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is trite law to restate that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 affords protection to a workman from wrongful dismissal. The protection comes in many forms one of the basic being the right to raise an industrial dispute for adjudication by the specially constituted forum under Chapter III of the Act. The Conciliation Officer is not one of the authorities constituted under the Act to adjudicate the dispute under Chapter III. The "normal channel", if one may terms it so, is through the State Government under s. 10 of the Act after conciliation proceedings under s. 12 terminate in failure. 13. An additional protection is given to a workman under s. 33 of the Act. The relevant provisions of s. 33 read: "33. Condition of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceeding.––(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator, a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall,–– (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute; save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman,–– (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * "(5) Whether an employer makes an application to a Conciliation Officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section (2) for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of such application, such order in relation thereto as it deems fit." 14. The difference between a situation covered under s. 33(1)(b) and s. 33(2)(b) is that under s. 33(1)(b) the employer is stopped from dismissing the employee on the conclusion of his enquiry and compels him to seek permission of the Tribunal. On the other hand, under s. 33(2)(b) the employer may pass the order of dismissal whereafter the employer is required to apply for approval of the action taken. In other words, under s. 33(1)(b) the common law right of the master to dismiss his servant for proper cause is subjected to a ban. Pending the removal of the ban by grant of permission under s. 33(1) the employer can only temporarily terminate the relationship of master and servant by suspending his employee. If permission is granted, the employer may then dismiss/discharge the workman. Pending the removal of the ban by grant of permission under s. 33(1) the employer can only temporarily terminate the relationship of master and servant by suspending his employee. If permission is granted, the employer may then dismiss/discharge the workman. If permission is refused the suspension would be wrong and the workman would be entitled all his wages from the date of his suspension (See: Hotel Imperial vs. Hotel Workers' AIR 1959 SC 1342 ). However, under s. 33(2)(b) if the approval is granted under s. 33(5), the termination relates back to the date of the dismissal. If the Tribunal does not approve the action taken by the employer under s. 33(2)(b), the order of dismissal would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the services of the employer. It is not necessary to provide for reinstatement in the order passed under s. 33(5) as "by the very action of the disapproval the dismissal or discharge of the workman is of no effect and the workman concerned continues to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the employer". [See : Strawboard Mfg. Co. vs. Gobind 1962 (1) LLJ 420 , 425 (SC); Tata Iron & Steel Co. vs. Modak 1965 (II) LLJ 128 , 132, 133, 134 (SC)]. It follows that under s. 33(2)(b) unless and until the action of the employer is approved, the relationship of employer and employee is finally severed. 15. It is in this background of the law that s. 17B must be read and construed. vs. Modak 1965 (II) LLJ 128 , 132, 133, 134 (SC)]. It follows that under s. 33(2)(b) unless and until the action of the employer is approved, the relationship of employer and employee is finally severed. 15. It is in this background of the law that s. 17B must be read and construed. "17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts.––Where in any case a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court : Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be." 16. The section in terms applies to an award by Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by which reinstatement has been directed and such award has been challenged by the employer before the High Court or Supreme Court. Having regard to the express statutory provisions it is clear that an order by a Conciliation Officer under s. 33(5) cannot come within the phrase "award directing reinstatement". To hold that it does would, in our opinion, be contrary to the basic rule of statutory interpretation that where the words of the statute are clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in cases of ambiguity in the statute (See: Croxford vs. Universal Insurance Co. [1936] 2 KB 253, 281). We do not find any ambiguity in the section so as to warrant the inclusion of an order under s. 33(5) which may be passed, (as it was in this case) by a Conciliation Officer. 17. [1936] 2 KB 253, 281). We do not find any ambiguity in the section so as to warrant the inclusion of an order under s. 33(5) which may be passed, (as it was in this case) by a Conciliation Officer. 17. If the intention of Parliament was to treat the decision under s. 33(5) as an award there was nothing to stop it from expressly saying so. The word used is "order" and not "award". The observations of the Supreme Court in the Automobile Products of India Ltd. and Ors. vs. Rukmaji Bala and Ors. AIR 1955 SC 258 on the construction of s. 33 are instructive on this aspect : "There is no reason to think that the Legislature, by a side wind as it were, vested in the Conciliation Officer and the Board the jurisdiction and power of adjudicating upon disputes which they normally do not possess and which they may not be competent or qualified to exercise. Further, if the purpose of the section was to invest all the authorities named therein with power to decide industrial disputes one would have expected some provisions enabling them to make and submit an award to which the provisions of the Act would apply." 18. Apart from the plain words of the section definition of the word "award" in s. 2(b) is also indicative of the fact that an award is passed only upon an adjudication. '2(b) "award" means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under s. 10-A.' 9. For the purposes of this case the significant words in this definition are "determination of an industrial dispute". The "determination" contemplated by the definition is of the industrial dispute or a question relating thereto, finally on merits. It is also to be noted that in the definition, as in s. 17B, the Conciliation Officer is not included as one of the authorities who can pass an award [See: Cox & Kings (Agents) Limited vs. Workmen 1977 (1) LLJ 471 (page 476)]. 20. The award of a Tribunal etc. is also required to be published by the appropriate Government within a month from the date of its receipt. 20. The award of a Tribunal etc. is also required to be published by the appropriate Government within a month from the date of its receipt. Section 17-A provides that the award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication and subject to the provisions of sub-s. (1) shall come into operation from such date as may be specified therein and if no date is so specified from the date when the award becomes enforceable as aforesaid (See: Hotel Imperial vs. Hotel Workers: AIR 1959 SC 1342 , 1348). 21. The order under S. 33(5) has none of these features. The scope of enquiry by an authority under s. 33(2)(b) is limited. This was lucidly stated by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Testeels Ltd. vs. N. M. Desai Conciliation Officer and Anr. AIR 1970 Guj 1 [upheld by the Supreme Court in N. M. Desai vs. Testeels AIR 1980 SC 2124 ]. "Now where an application is made by the employer for the requisite approval under s. 33(2)(b). What the Conciliation Officer would have to consider is whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for discharge of the employee in question. If the employer has held a proper inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the employee and if it does not appear that the proposed discharge of the employee amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice, the Conciliation Officer would have to limit his inquiry only to the question whether a prima facie case has been made out or not. If he comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out, he would have to grant approval to the employer." 22. Similarly, in Punjab National Bank vs. All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation AIR 1960 SC 160 , 170 it was said : "Where an application is made by the employer for the requisite permission under s. 33 the jurisdiction of the tribunal in dealing with such an application is limited. It has to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for the dismissal of the employee, in question. It has to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for the dismissal of the employee, in question. If the employer has held proper enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the employee, and if it does not appear that the proposed dismissal of the employee amounts to victimisation or an unfair labour practice, the tribunal has to limit its enquiry only to the question as to whether a prima facie case has been made out or not. In these proceedings it is not open to the tribunal to consider whether the order proposed to be passed by the employer is proper or adequate or whether it errs on the side of excessive severity; nor can the tribunal grant permission, subject to certain conditions, which it may deem to be fair. It has merely to consider the prima facie aspect of the matter and either grant the permission or refuse it according as it holds that a prima facie case is or is not made out by the employer." (See also The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The State of Mysore and Ors. AIR 1960 SC 1352 ). 23. Thus apart from the fact that under s. 33(5) there is no adjudication or final determination of the justness of the order of dismissal, given the nature of the limited jurisdiction of the authorities under s. 33, they cannot direct reinstatement although the consequence of a refusal to grant approval may render the order of dismissal void. 24. This is also the view of the Madras High Court in M/s. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Madras and Ors. AIR 1961 Mad. 297 which held: "It is needless to point out that what the officer is entitled to do is either to grant approval or refuse approval. It is not in his province to direct reinstatement with back wages. Even on the question whether approval should be granted or refused, the powers of the officer under s. 33(2)(b) are limited." 25. Finally, unlike an award it is nobody's case that an order under s. 33(5) is required to be or was in fact published in this case. 26. The matter may be considered from another angle. Even on the question whether approval should be granted or refused, the powers of the officer under s. 33(2)(b) are limited." 25. Finally, unlike an award it is nobody's case that an order under s. 33(5) is required to be or was in fact published in this case. 26. The matter may be considered from another angle. If an application is duly made by the employer under s. 33(2)(b) and an order is passed under s. 33(5) approving the action of the employer, this would not conclude the matter as the workman could still raise an industrial dispute challenging the order of dismissal on merits which can then be referred for adjudication under s. 10 before the competent forum for passing an award (See Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs. Its workmen AIR 1960 SC 160 , 170; Punjab Beverages vs. Suresh Chand AIR 1978 SC 995 , 999). It is clear therefore that the order under s. 33(5) is not a final determination and cannot itself be an award. 27. Even if an employer contravene s. 33(2)(b) as is contended by the employee in this case, the employee cannot claim reinstatement. He must invoke s. 33A of the Act. Section 33A of the Act reads : "33-A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings.––Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Conciliation Officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in witting in the prescribed manner,–– (a) to such Conciliation Officer or Board, and the Conciliation Officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such industrial dispute; and (b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." 28. The language of s. 33A makes it clear that a contravention of s. 33 by the employer does not ipso facto mean that an employee is entitled to continue in service. He can make such a claim only after there is an adjudication on a dispute raised by him either under s. 10 or s. 33A when the employer would be entitled to justify the impugned dismissal on merits (See: Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs. Its workmen AIR 1960 SC 160 , 170; Punjab Beverages vs. Suresh Chand AIR 1978 SC 995 , 1002). 29. In the Punjab Beverages case (supra) the employer's application under s. 33(2)(b) had been withdrawn. It was contended by the workmen that he was entitled to receive from the employer his salary and other benefits and on the basis that he continued in service. He applied for computation of the amount under s. 33(2). The Supreme Court rejected the submission and said : "The workman can proceed under s. 33C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated, on a complaint under s. 33A or on a reference under s. 10, that the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman." 30. It also follows from the language of s. 33A that the Conciliation Officer apart from promoting a settlement has not been conferred with the power to adjudicate or pass an award nor can he direct reinstatement. 31. All these provisions of the Act evidence a conscious distinction between a situation where the Tribunal or other forum directs reinstatement and a situation where the employee is considered in continuous employment. An order rejecting an application under s. 33(2)(b) falls within the second category. Reinstatement is directed under s. 11-A of the Act in cases when an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of the workman has been referred for adjudication. Section 11-A provides that the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be must be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and in directing reinstatement the adjudicating authority is required to take into account the circumstances of each case [Vide s. 11-A : East India Hotels Ltd. vs. Workmen (1974) 3 SCC 712 ]. The Conciliation Officer has not been conferred with this power. The Conciliation Officer has not been conferred with this power. Furthermore, there is a discretion in the Tribunal and other forum not to direct reinstatement or to direct reinstatement subject to certain conditions even though the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified. Under s. 33 however there is no scope for any forum, exercising discretion in the matter of the continuous employment of the workmen. The only thing that the authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission, i.e. to lift or maintain the ban............... "Imposition of conditions is wholly collateral to this purpose and the authority cannot impose any condition" (See: Automobile Products of India Ltd. vs. Rukmaji Bala, AIR 1955 SC 258 ). The entitlement of the worker to payment of wages in a case where the order of dismissal is not approved is not because the order under s. 33(5) directs reinstatement but because the employee is in continuous service. 32. For all these reasons we are unable to concur with the view expressed by the earlier Division Bench judgments of this Court. The decision in Sheikh Shamser Ali vs. M/s. Keshoram Industries Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) merely states without any reasoning that an order under s. 33(2)(b) of the Act can be enforced in an application under s. 17B. In Rata India Limited vs. Seventh Industrial Tribunal & Ors. 1993 (II) CHN 464 (page 467) an application was made under s. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the writ petitioner company before the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for approval of such order. By an order dated September 20, 1988 the Tribunal rejected the said application and refused to accord approval to such order of dismissal. 1993 (II) CHN 464 (page 467) an application was made under s. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the writ petitioner company before the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for approval of such order. By an order dated September 20, 1988 the Tribunal rejected the said application and refused to accord approval to such order of dismissal. The Division Bench was persuaded to construe s. 17B as including an order under s. 33(5) firstly, because it would be in keeping that the policy behind s. 17B which, according to the Division Bench, was to ameliorate the hardship and difficulties suffered by workman by reason of endless litigation, secondly, that although the order under s. 33(5) disapproving the action of the employer did not actually direct reinstatement in service, factually and effectively, the workman was restored back to the position which he held before the order of dismissal and thirdly, because the decision of the Tribunal under s. 33(2)(b) so "a matter relating to employment or non-employment of the workman and is certainly a determination by the Tribunal in respect thereto." 33. We have already indicated our reasons for holding that the object of the statute must be found primarily from the express words used and it is only in the case of any ambiguity that the Courts can interpret the section in the light of inter alia the policy which might lie behind the enactment of a particular action. There is no such ambiguity in this case. Furthermore, it is not as if s. 17B is the only provision under which an employee can ask for payment of arrear and current wages. Once the application under s. 33(2) (b) is rejected, he can file an application before the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (See: Sunil Kumar Dey vs. Naihati Electrical Supply Co. Ltd. 1986 Lab IC 769) or he could file an application under s. 33-C(2) before the Labour Court [See : Punjab Beverages Put. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand (supra)] or he could file an application before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Ltd. 1986 Lab IC 769) or he could file an application under s. 33-C(2) before the Labour Court [See : Punjab Beverages Put. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand (supra)] or he could file an application before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Indeed the Division Bench itself at page 471 of the report said that even if the provision of s. 17B did not apply nevertheless "the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction which is invoked by the employer by making an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging such order of disapproval by the Tribunal passed under s. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is fully competent to direct payment of such wages of the workman concerned both arrear as well as current, whether an application has been made before the authority of Payment of Wages Act for recovery of such wages or not." 34. The second reason of the Division Bench fails to note the distinction between a case of continuous employment where there is never any final severance of the relationship of the employer and the employee as obtains in situations covered by s. 33 and cases where there is in fact a complete severance of the relationship, which severance is set aside by a reinstatement order. As far as the third reason is concerned, under the Act all matters relating to employment or non-employment of a workman do not necessarily culminate in an award. Besides, as already seen, there is no final determination under s. 33(2)(b) and it is subject to challenge under s. 10 and s. 33A by the workman. 35. In view of the difference of opinion between the one expressed by this Court in this judgment and one that expressed in the Division Bench judgments of this Court in Sheikh Shamser Ali vs. M/s. Kesoram Industries Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) and Bata India Limited vs. 7th Industrial Tribunal (supra), we refer the issue framed at the outset of this judgment to the Chief Justice for resolution of the matter by a Larger Bench. 36. However irrespective of the question where an order under s. 33(5) is an award directing reinstatement under s. 17B or not the decision under appeal cannot be sustained as we cannot hold, in the facts of this case that there was any order under s.33(5) at all. 36. However irrespective of the question where an order under s. 33(5) is an award directing reinstatement under s. 17B or not the decision under appeal cannot be sustained as we cannot hold, in the facts of this case that there was any order under s.33(5) at all. The Conciliation Officer was bound to give a decision on the application either allowing it or refusing it. The decisions have uniformly held that in granting or refusing an approval, the authority must give reasons on the merits of the case as to why the application under s. 33(2)(b) is allowed or refused. In Tata Iron & Steel Co. vs. Modak 1965 (II) LLJ 128 (SC) (page 133) it has been held: "The direction that the said proceeding should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible emphasizes the fact that the legislature intended that proper orders should be passed on such applications without delay, but according to law and on the merits of the applications themselves." [See also Testeels Limited vs. N.M. Desai AIR 1970 Guj 1 (FB); AIR 1980 SC 2124 and Punjab Beverage Pvt. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand & Anr AIR 1978 SC 995 ]. By merely dismissing the application for non-prosecution the Conciliation Officer failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law. In the case of Bata India Limited vs. 7th Industrial Tribunal & Ors. (supra) the Division Bench was considering a case where the application of the employer under s. 33(2)(b) had been rejected on merits. 37. The Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court has in The Management of Associated Industries (Assam) Ltd., vs. Jadumoni Bhanio and Ors. 1971 Lab IC 1005 held that "there is no power in the Labour Court to dispose of an application by merely dismissing it for non-prosecution. Section 33(5) clearly indicates that the Labour Court shall hear the application and pass such order in relation thereto as it deems fit". 38. Besides in this case where all the documents were admittedly produced before the Conciliation Officer and the oral evidence had been recorded the authority also could not dismiss the application for non-prosecution but should have given a decision on the basis of materials on record just as a court cannot dismiss a suit after recording evidence, for non-prosecution [See: Mathuji Valad Gangajee Dhage vs. Kondaji Valad Bagaji & Ors. (1905) 7 BLR 262]. 39. (1905) 7 BLR 262]. 39. In any event an order such as the one that was passed by the Conciliation Officer in this case would at the highest only mean that there was in fact no application under s. 33(2)(b) at all. This would tantamount to a contravention of s. 33 so that the employer would be liable to punishment under s. 31(1) and the respondent workman could invoke the remedy of moving the appropriate Government for making a reference under s. 10 or file a complaint under s. 33A. There is no distinction between the dismissal of an application for default and a situation where an application having been made is withdrawn by an employer. It has been held that where the application for approval under s. 33(2)(b) is withdrawn by the employer and there is no decision on it on merits, it cannot be said that the approval has been refused by the Tribunal. "The Tribunal having had no occasion to consider the application on merits, there can be no question of the Tribunal refusing approval to the employer. It cannot be said that where the application for approval is withdrawn, there is a decision by the Tribunal to refuse to lift the ban. The withdrawal of the application for approval stands on the same footing as if no application under s. 33(2) has been made at all." (See: Punjab Beverage Pvt. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand & Anr. AIR 1978 SC 995 ). 40. For the reasons aforesaid we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge dated 17th September, 1996. 41. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.