Project And Development India Ltd. v. State Of Bihar
1997-04-21
S.K.CHATTOPADHYAYA
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment S.K.CHATTOPADHYAYA, J. 1. The management of Project and Development India Limited has impugned the award of Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Dhanbad dated 1.12.95. 2. The facts, which are required to be noticed for disposal of this application, be stated in short: An Industrial Dispute was raised on behalf of the workman, which was sponsored by the Union namely, PDIL Employees Union and State Government by Notification dated 26.11.91 referred the matter to the Tribunal for deciding the following question : "Whether retirement from service of Shri Braj Kishore Singh-Senior Technical-633/500 with effect from 31.12.89 by the management of Project and Development India Ltd.. Sindri, Dhanbad is justified? If not. to what relief he is entitled to ?" 3. It was asserted on behalf of the workman that he was appointed as a peon by the Fertiliser Corporation of India (FCI in short) on 10.3.1955 prior to working as mazdoor for about one year. The FCI was split up into two units in 1967, one being Fertiliser Corporation of India Limited and secondly Project and Development India Limited. Service of the workman was transferred from FCI to Project and Development India Limited (PDIL in short) in the year 1968. Though he gave his date of birth as 31st January. 1937 at the time of his initial recruitment, but by mistake this date was not correctly recorded in the relevant records of the Company. After knowing of this fact, he represented before the Management for correction of his date of birth and Chief Personnel Officer directed him to produce original school leaving certificate by letter dated 26.8.1987. He produced the same on 10.6.1988 but even then he was informed by the management on 11.1.1989 that he was to superannuate as per entry made in the records of the company in this regard. Several representations were made mentioning specifically that he would attain the age of superannuation on 31.1.1995 on reaching the age of 58 years but such information was not entertained by the management. Ultimately, he was made to retire with effect from 31.12.89. The workman raised the dispute that his age of superannuation being 58 years, he had a right to serve the company till 31.1.95 and the action of the management to superannuate him prematurely is illegal, malafide and unjustified. The workman, it was asserted, was entitled to be reinstated with full back wages and other consequential benefits. 4.
The workman raised the dispute that his age of superannuation being 58 years, he had a right to serve the company till 31.1.95 and the action of the management to superannuate him prematurely is illegal, malafide and unjustified. The workman, it was asserted, was entitled to be reinstated with full back wages and other consequential benefits. 4. On the other hand, in the written statement, the management took a stand that the workman was appointed as a mazdoor with effect from 15.3.1954 in Sindri Fertiliser and Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. and worked as such till 10.2.55. With effect from 11.2.55 he was placed as peon and his service card was opened on 23.3.55 wherein the workman himself declared his date of birth as 1932. At the time of retirement he was holding the post of technician. It was further stated that as per practice of the management, date of birth was to be counted from first day of January of that year and the age of superannuation being 58 years, the workman was to retire from service with effect from 31.12.89. In the year 1981 workman submitted matriculation certificate and got one increment with effect from the date of publication of the result i.e. 4.2.80. The management received a confidential information to the effect that several employees were enjoying benefits of extra increment by producing false and fabricated certificates in which the name of the concerned workman was also cited as an example. For verification of the genuineness of the certificates produced by the workman, an information was sought for from the Secretary, Bihar School Examination Board, Patna and on perusal of the reply of the Secretary, it transpired that said certificate was not a genuine one. A charge-sheet was issued to the workman on 10.1.84 asking him to submit his reply but no such reply was submitted by the workman. Taking into consideration of the fact that the workman was to retire very shortly, a sympathetic view was taken and he was not dismissed from service. Thereafter, on the basis of another document i.e. school leaving certificate granted by the Head Master of Hariji Uphar Uchha Vidyalaya on 25.4.89 the workman again recked up the dispute for his date of birth. His date of birth in the said certificate was mentioned as 31.1.1937 being suspicious.
Thereafter, on the basis of another document i.e. school leaving certificate granted by the Head Master of Hariji Uphar Uchha Vidyalaya on 25.4.89 the workman again recked up the dispute for his date of birth. His date of birth in the said certificate was mentioned as 31.1.1937 being suspicious. An officer was deputed to visit the school to find out the admission register of 1947 but the Head Master could not show the said admission register. The Head Master gave out that no document of pre-inde-pendence era was available in the school. Further stand of the management is that Certified Standing Order of the company does not provide for correction of age of an workman recorded in the service record. This provision, according to the management, was incorporated in the Certified Standing Order with a view to obviate the possibility of future litigation relating to age or date of birth at the time of superannuation. On such pleadings, the Tribunal examined witnesses of the management and the workman and perused the documents filed by the respective parties. Having considered the evidences on record, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the date of birth of the workman is 31.1.1937 as per the school leaving certificate (Ext. W/2) and admission register (Ext. W/1) but inadvertently date of birth was recorded as 1.1.1932 in the record maintained by the management. Having concluded as such, the Tribunal directed the management to pay full back wages and other benefits to the concerned workman with effect from 1.1.1990 to 31.1.1995. 5. Mr. Bahadur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended at the first place that the Tribunal was erred in law in not holding that the workman was not legally entitled to challenge the date of birth after 35 years of his service. In this connection, he submits that when the petitioner was appointed initially as a peon, his service record was opened on 23.3.1955 where he declared his year of birth as 1932. The matriculation certificate produced by him in the year 1981 was found to be a forged and fabricated one. as a result of which a charge-sheet was submitted to him on 10.1.1984.
The matriculation certificate produced by him in the year 1981 was found to be a forged and fabricated one. as a result of which a charge-sheet was submitted to him on 10.1.1984. Similarly school leaving certificate alleged to have been issued by the Head Master of the school on 25.4.89 was also found to be a bogus one and when said admission register could not be made available by the Head Master being of pre-independence era. the Tribunal had acted contrary to law in holding that as per the aforesaid two certificates the date of birth of the concerned workman was 31.1.1937. In support of his contention, he has relied on the decision in the case of Union of India V/s. Ram Suia Sharma, reported in 1996 SCC (L&S) 605. 6. Learned counsel secondly contended that the reference itself was incompetent inasmuch as the individual workman had no locus standi to raise the dispute regarding superannuation from service in view of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Continuing, he submits that under the said provision, a workman can raise dispute only regarding termination, dismissal etc. and not regarding order of superannuation. Particularly, drawing my attention to page 46 of the writ application, he submits that the workman in his individual capacity, by letter dated 27.12.89, requested the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer. Government of Bihar, Dhanbad to refer the industrial dispute to the Tribunal. According to him. the workman requested the Assistant Labour Commissioner to take up his case for conciliation at an early date but there is nothing on record to show that a conciliation proceeding was initiated before the dispute was referred to the Tribunal. In support of his contention, he has relied on a decision in the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. V/s. Industrial Tribunal of Gujrat & Ors.. reported in AIR 1968 SC 529 . 7. Challenging the maintainability of the reference, Mr. Bahadur submits that the case of the workman admittedly was not sponsored by the Union of PDIL and as such, the notification dated 26.11.91 mentioning that industrial dispute exists between the management of PDIL and their workman represented by General Secretary, Fertiliser Corporation. PDIL Employees Union, is an error apparent on the face of the record.
Bahadur submits that the case of the workman admittedly was not sponsored by the Union of PDIL and as such, the notification dated 26.11.91 mentioning that industrial dispute exists between the management of PDIL and their workman represented by General Secretary, Fertiliser Corporation. PDIL Employees Union, is an error apparent on the face of the record. The union, according to the learned counsel did not represent the workman, which will be apparent from paragraph 3 of the Notification as contained in Annexure-2. 8. On the aforesaid premises, the learned counsel has urged that the entire approach of the Tribunal is vitiated in law. and as such, liable to be quashed by this Court. 9. Mr. K.S. Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4, the concerned workman, on the other hand, has contended that Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act does not prohibit a workman to raise the dispute individually because it contemplates that an individual workman may raise dispute where employers discharges, dismisses, retrenches or other wise terminates the services of the workman. In this connection, he has relied on a decision in the case of Ruston & Hornsby(I) Ltd. V/s. T.D. Kadam, reported in 1976 (3) SCC 71 . Further relying on the decision in the case of Shambu Nath Goyal V/s. Bank of Baroda, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1088 . he has contended that the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. (supra) has been distinguished by their Lordships in this case. Lastly it is contended on behalf of the respondent No. 4 that when the Tribunal, on appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, has come to a finding that by inadvertence the date of birth of the workman was recorded in the service book as 1.1.32 in place of 31.1.1937, the High Court, in exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, will not disturb those findings of fact. 10. To appreciate the first contention of Mr. Bahadur, the findings of the learned Tribunal may be looked into. According to the witnesses of the management. Debi Prasad Dutta (M/1). the age of respondent No. 4 was recorded as 1.1.1932 in character verification roll and service-sheet as per his own declaration. This witness is the Personnel Officer of the management and he has proved the character verification roll as Ext. M/3 and service-sheet as Ext. M/2.
According to the witnesses of the management. Debi Prasad Dutta (M/1). the age of respondent No. 4 was recorded as 1.1.1932 in character verification roll and service-sheet as per his own declaration. This witness is the Personnel Officer of the management and he has proved the character verification roll as Ext. M/3 and service-sheet as Ext. M/2. This witness also deposed that matriculation certificate and mark-sheet filed by the concerned workman were found to be fabricated documents on verification. Two more documents namely, charge-sheet (Ext. M/24) and order of punishment (Ext. M/25) were proved by this witness but, according to the Tribunal, the point taken by the management in this regard is irrelevant for adjudicating the present dispute. The Tribunal has come to this finding on the ground that the concerned workman deposed that at the time of initial appointment his date of birth was 31.1.1937 but inadvertently it was recorded as 31.1.1932 in the record of management. He relied on admission register (Ext. W/l) of Hariji Uphar Uchha Vidyalaya. which shows his date of birth as 31.1.1937. Entry of this register was proved by a teacher of the said School, Rajeshwar Prasad Singh. The Tribunal has noticed that Ext. M/3, the character verification roll, is the oldest document which indicates the date of birth of respondent No. 4 as 1.3.1932. However, it has not given any importance of Ext. M/3 on the ground that the workman being non- executive, was governed by the Certified Standing Order of the Company. According to it, there is no proof of the fact that in compliance of clause 6(b) of the Standing Order. he was sent to the Medical Officer for determination of his age or he made any written declaration. It appears that admittedly the workman did not file pre-employment, medical certificate. Thus the Tribunal came to the conclusion that if the workman was not in possession either of the documents mentioned in clause (6)(a), it was incumbent upon the management to send him to the Company Medical Officer for medical examination. Though MW-1 appears to have stated that prior to joining, any employee should be medically examined but as because he has not stated specifically as to whether the concerned workman was medically examined or not at the time of joining the Company.
Though MW-1 appears to have stated that prior to joining, any employee should be medically examined but as because he has not stated specifically as to whether the concerned workman was medically examined or not at the time of joining the Company. the Tribunal concluded that the respondent No. 4 was not examined by the Company Medical Officer at the time of joining. which is infraction of the Standing Order. Similarly, Ext. M/3 does not bear the signature of the workman, which according to the Tribunal, is enough to suggest that no such declaration was made by the concerned workman regarding his age. The Tribunal has also considered the letter dated 11/16th April. 1974 (Ext. M/14) by which Personnel Officer requested the Chief Medical Officer, FCI, Sindri Unit to examine the concerned workman and issue necessary certificate in proof of his age, as workman has not submitted pre-employment medical certificate. As because the report of Medical Examination was not produced by the management before the Tribunal. it came to a conclusion that either the workman was not medically examined or the management did not send the workman for medical examination for obvious reason, 11. This finding of the Tribunal, in my view, is not in accordance with law inasmuch as the Tribunal has failed to notice the matriculation certificate submitted by the workman. which was found to be forged and as such, a charge-sheet was issued to him. Similarly, the Headmaster of the Hariji Uphar Uchha Vidyalaya could not show the admission register of the workman and the said Headmaster clearly said that no document of pre-independent era was available in the school. Under these circumstances, Ext. W/l, admission register of the said school, which was alleged to have been provided by Rajeshwar Prasad Singh, should not have been relied by the Tribunal. The very conduct of the concerned workman shows that in order to get extension of his service period. he adopted some unfair means but the management took a humanitarian ground by not dismissing him from service, as he was to retire very soon. The Tribunal utterly failed to take into consideration the letter of the respondent No. 4 addressed to the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Concilliation Officer. in which he admitted that he was sent for medical check up and assessment of his age.
The Tribunal utterly failed to take into consideration the letter of the respondent No. 4 addressed to the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Concilliation Officer. in which he admitted that he was sent for medical check up and assessment of his age. According to him, by inadvertence his age was recorded as 31.12.1929 in some of the records of the employers. He further admitted that he was examined by one Dr. B.C. Aich. the then Chief Medical Officer of M/s. FCI Ltd., who assessed his age as aforesaid. Apprehending his superannuation, he requested the Assistant Labour Commissioner to take up his case for conciliation at an early date. 12. Thus, the conclusion arrived by the Tribunal that there was violation of Standing Order, in my view, is an error of records, which vitiates the whole finding. 13. The most important factor of the case is that the Tribunal has failed to notice that the reference itself was incompetent inasmuch as uncontrovertedly the concerned workman did not raise any dispute with the management. He straight way requested the Assistant Labour Commissioner as well as Conciliation Officer to refer the Industrial dispute to the Tribunal. 13-A. In the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have dealt with this aspect of law by observing as follows: "If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management. any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute. as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute." 14. Mr. Mazumdar, however, relying on the decision in the case of Shambu Nath Goyal (supra), contended that the Supreme Court. distinguishing the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited (supra) has held that the Court cannot canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion. as if it was a judicial or quasi! judicial determination. In my view. the case of Shambu Nath Goyal (supra) is easily distinguishable from the instant case. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships found from the record.
as if it was a judicial or quasi! judicial determination. In my view. the case of Shambu Nath Goyal (supra) is easily distinguishable from the instant case. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships found from the record. which was accepted by the Tribunal that there was an existence a dispute which was legitimately referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the power conferred by Section 10(1) on the Government to refer the dispute-can be exercised not only where an industrial dispute exists but when it is also apprehended and if from the material placed before the Government, it reaches an administrative decision whether there exists an industrial dispute or an industrial dispute is apprehended and in either event it can exercise its power under Section 10(1). 15. In the instant case, as I have noticed above, there was no material placed before the Tribunal for coming to the conclusion that any dispute had ever existed between the appellant-company and the respondent No. 4 as well as the State Government. The very letter of respondent No. 4 to the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer will reveal that instead of raising any dispute with the management the concerned workman merely apprehended that he would be superannuated on the basis of date of birth entered in his service record and as such, approached to the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer. Mr. Mazumdar has failed to point out that the respondent No. 4, on such apprehension, made any request to the management itself to consider his case. 16. Considering pros and con of the case. I am of the view that the Tribunal has committed a gross illegality in entertaining into the reference and as such, the award is vitiated on both accounts and liable to be set aside. 17. In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned award dated 1.12.1995 is set aside. However, no order as to costs.