Judgment :- The appellant/accused preferred this appeal against the conviction and sentence passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in Sessions Case No. 135 of 1987 on 2. 1988. 2. The brief facts of the Prosecution are as follows: On 18. 1987 the accused had a plastic bag in his hand going along Nethaji Subash Chandrabose Road, Madras City. P.W.1 George was the Preventive Officer in the Madras Customs Department. He found the appellant/accused in front of ‘Ninan’s Restaur rant’ in Nethaji Subash Chandrabose Road, Madras, at about 11 a.m. on 18. 1987. P.W.1, George suspected the appellant/ accused and then he took him to the Customs House for interrogation. At the Customs House, he searched the bag of the accused in the presence of P.W.3 Varadhan, Superintendent of Customs at Madras and P.W.4 Krishnadass. Consequent to this search of the bag of the accused, P.W.1 George found inside a polythene bag marked as M.O.1, and the polythene bag contained brown colour powder which was brown sugar and which is a narcotic substance. Thereupon the same was seized by P.W.1 George under the mahazar dated 18. 1987 marked as Ex.P-1, which was written by another Preventive Officer of the Customs House at Madras examined as P.W.6 Sinha, and the said mahazar was attested by P.W.3 Varadhan, Superintendent of Customs at Madras and P.W.4 Krishnadass. P.W.5 Ethirajan was another Preventive Officer of the Customs House at Madras and he recorded the statement of the accused dated 18. 1987 marked as Ex.P-8 in this case. On the next day, i.e., on 18. 1987, the appellant/ accused was arrested under the Arrest Memo marked as Ex.P-2 in this case and the accused was produced before the Magistrate on the same day, i.e., on 18. 1987. Then on 28. 1987, a requisition was made to the Court for drawing the sample from M.O.1 and for sending the same for chemical analysis, and the said requisition of the Prosecution is marked as Ex.P-4 in this case. There upon a sample was taken from M.O.1 in the open Court and the same was sent to the Forensic Laboratory for chemical analysis, along with the letter of the Court dated 9. 1987 marked as Ex.P-6 in this case. P.W.2 Lakshmanaswamy is the Scientific Assistant in Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory. On analysis, P.W.2 Lakshmanaswamy found that the sample contained diacetylmorphine and phenubarbital. 1987 marked as Ex.P-6 in this case. P.W.2 Lakshmanaswamy is the Scientific Assistant in Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory. On analysis, P.W.2 Lakshmanaswamy found that the sample contained diacetylmorphine and phenubarbital. Ex.P-7 is the report of the Chemical Examiner dated 29. 1987. Thereupon the Assistant Collector of Customs (Prosecution) Preventive Department, Madras preferred the complaint against the appellant/ accused before the lower court. 3. On the basis of the above materials, the learned Sessions Judge, Madras framed the charge under Sec.8(c) and Sec.21 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and the same was read over to the accused, who pleaded not guilty to the said charge. 4. After the trial was completed, the accused was examined under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C, with reference to the incriminating circumstances available in the evidence against him. The appellant/ accused at the end stated that one Gunanayagam cheated him with reference to a borrowing from him and he took a bag from his house and came out and he was caught by the Preventive Officer and he gave the statement marked as Ex.P-8 because P.W.5 Ethirajan threatened to break his bones, if he did not give such a statement as dictated by him. The accused has not examined any defence witness. 5. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed before him, the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madras came to the conclusion that the appellant/ accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged and in the result he convicted the appellant/ accused under Sec.8(c) and Sec.21 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, and the appellant/ accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years. Aggrieved against the Judgment of conviction and sentence the appellant/ accused has come up in appeal. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant/ accused as well as the learned Public Prosecutor the point that arises for determination is as to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and as to whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court below on the appellant/accused is sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7.Point: The Prosecution case is that on 48. 7.Point: The Prosecution case is that on 48. 1987 at about 11 a.m., while the appellant/ accused was going along Nethaji Subash Chandrabose Road at Madras with a bag in his hand, he was intercepted by the Preventive Officer of Madras Customs Department examined as P.W. 1 George, and the appellant/ accused did not answer properly, and so he was taken to the Customs House where he was interrogated, and later his bag was searched, and a polythene bag marked as M.O.1 was found inside, and the said polythene bag contained brown sugar. Then the appellant/ accused gave a statement under Ex.P-8 and on the next day he was arrested and produced before the Magistrate. In support of the above Prosecution case, seven witnesses were examined and eight documents were marked. P.W.1 George speaks to the seizure of contraband goods, the arrest of the accused and then his remand later before the Magistrate. P.W.3 Varadhan and P.W.4 Krishnadoss attested the mahazar dated 18. 1987 marked as Ex.P-1 for the seizure of the bag of brown sugar marked as M.O.1. P.W.5 Ethirajan recorded the confession statement of the accused on 18. 1987 marked as P-8. P.W.6, Sinha is the Preventive Officer of the same Customs Department, who wrote the mahazar under Ex.P-1, and he speaks to the signature of the Assistant Collector of Customs, who lodged the complaint in this case. P.W.7 Subramaniam is the Property Clerk of the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.II) Court, Madras 8. P.W.2 Lakshmanasamy is the Scientific Officer of Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory at Madras, who analysed the sample taken from M.O.1 and gave the chemical analysis report on 29. 1987 marked as Ex.P-7 in this case. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant/ accused argued that there was no independent witness examined to prove the seizure of contraband goods, and P.W.4 Krishnadoss is an obliged witness as pointed out by the lower court in paragraph 5 of its judgment, and there is considerable delay in sending the contraband goods to the court as it was recovered on 18. 1987 and as it was sent to the Court on 9. 1987, and except the interested testimony of P.Ws.1 and 3 there is nothing on record to prove the seizure of contraband goods, and in such circumstances it must be held that the seizure is not proved. 1987 and as it was sent to the Court on 9. 1987, and except the interested testimony of P.Ws.1 and 3 there is nothing on record to prove the seizure of contraband goods, and in such circumstances it must be held that the seizure is not proved. He further contended that the prosecution failed to prove the arrest as well as the seizure and they have not proved their case as the arrest was on 18. 1987 at 11 a.m. and the accused was not produced within 24 hours before the Magistrate, and he was produced before the Magistrate on 18. 1987 at 3.30 p.m., and it exceeds 24 hours from the time of arrest, and as such the detention of the accused, even if true, is illegal, and in those circumstances the accused must be acquitted. 9. The above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant/ accused are untenable for the following reasons: The accused was not arrested on 18. 1987 at 11 a.m. as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Per contra, the appellant/ accused was intercepted by P.W.1 George at Nethaji Subash Chandra Bose Road, at 11 a.m. On 18. 1987 and he did not answer properly, and so he was taken to the Customs House for interrogation as spoken to by P.W. 1 George. This version of P.W.1 George was put to the accused when he was questioned under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C, and the appellant/ accused admitted the same. That apart this version of P.W. 1 George of intercepting the appellant/ accused at Nethaji Subash Chandhra Bose Road, at 11 a.m. on 18. 1987 and later taking the accused to the Customs House for interrogation as not at all challenged during the cross examination P.W.1. Therefore it is wrong to state that the accused was arrested on 18. 1987 at 11 a.m. 10. Now turning to the question of non-examination of independent witness for the seizure of the contraband goods, even though the lower court has commented in paragraph 5 of its judgment that P.W.4 Krishnadoss is a person obliged to the Customs authorities and he is not an independent witness, this Court as the appellate court has got the right to reappraise the evidence on record especially in a case of conviction like this one. This appellate court need not accept all the findings of the lower court. This appellate court need not accept all the findings of the lower court. This appellate court has to consider as to whether the evidence of P.W.4 Krishnadoss, who attested the mahazar for the seizure of M.O.1 and under Ex.P-1, is worthy of acceptance. P.W.4 Krishnadoss stated in his chief-examination that he is a field staff of J.P. Engineering Company which is especially, clearing and forwarding agent at Madras, and it was his duty to attend to the clearing and forwarding of the goods of the said Company, and on 18. 1987, he went to the Customs House to attend to his work of clearing and forwarding, and at that time P.W.1 George brought the accused to the Customs House, and his bag was searched, and thereupon the polythene bag containing the brown sugar marked as M.O.1 was seized under the mahazar marked as Ex.P-1, and he attested the same, and thereafter M.O.1 was sealed and a copy of the mahazar marked as Ex.P-l was given to the accused. The testimony of P.W.4 Krishnadoss as spoken to on many aspects about the seizure were not at all cross-examined. Only two questions were put to him during his cross-examination, one relating to the clothes above M.O.1 and another suggestion that he was obliged to depose falsely because he has got his work in the Customs House, which was denied by P.W.4. Nothing less and nothing more were asked during the cross-examination of P.W.4 Krishnadoss. Therefore it goes unchallenged that he was present at the time of the seizure as he has got some work with regard to his "profession in the Customs House and he had seen the seizure of M.O.1. He is not a total stranger there because he came to the Customs House to attend to his work of clearing and forwarding the goods of his Company. When confronted about the testimony of P.W.4 Krishnadoss during the examination of the accused under Sec.313 of the Cr.P.C, he did not deny the same and instead the appellant/ accused stated that a copy of the mahazar marked as Ex.P-1 attested by P.W.4 Krishnadoss was given to him. When confronted about the testimony of P.W.4 Krishnadoss during the examination of the accused under Sec.313 of the Cr.P.C, he did not deny the same and instead the appellant/ accused stated that a copy of the mahazar marked as Ex.P-1 attested by P.W.4 Krishnadoss was given to him. That being the answer of the appellant/ accused to the testimony of P.W.4 Krishnadoss it is too much to say that he is an obliged witness and therefore it is not safe to accept his evidence for the seizure as pointed out by the lower Court and as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. In my view, the evidence of P.W.4 Krishnadoss is natural and it has struck me as honest and trustworthy and therefore his evidence is entitled to acceptance. His evidence is corroborated by the testimony of P.W.3 Varadhan, who is the Superintendent of Customs at Madras and who also attested the mahazar marked as Ex.P-1 in this case. So the evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.4 coupled with the mahazar marked as Ex.P-1 a copy of which was furnished to the accused, will amply prove the seizure of M.O.1 from the appellant/ accused at the Customs House, Madras on 18. 1987 at 12.15 p.m. 11. After the seizure of M.O.1 on 18. 1987 at 12.15 p.m. as mentioned in the mahazar marked as Ex.P-1, later on the appellant/accused was interrogated by P.W.5 Ethirajan, and before P.W.5 Ethirajan, who is another Preventive Officer of the Customs Department, the appellant/Accused gave a statement under Ex.P-8. It is in the evidence of P.W.5 Ethirajan that the appellant/accused himself wrote the statement under Ex.P-8 from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. and thereafter it was attested by himself and P.W. 3 Varadhan. P.W.5 Ethirajan denied the suggestion put to him during his cross-examination that he dictated the statement and he induced the accused to give the statement on the representation that the accused will be let off, if he had given the statement connecting one Gunanayagam. A reading of the statement of the appellant/accused marked as Ex.P-8 would go a long way to show that it is a voluntary one and it could not have been induced by P.W.5 Ethirajan for the reason that many circumstances, which are within the excluding knowledge of the accused, were set out in this statement. A reading of the statement of the appellant/accused marked as Ex.P-8 would go a long way to show that it is a voluntary one and it could not have been induced by P.W.5 Ethirajan for the reason that many circumstances, which are within the excluding knowledge of the accused, were set out in this statement. For instance, the circumstances that one Gunanayagam borrowed from the accused, and Gunanayagam failed to repay the loan amount to the accused, and for that purpose he came over to India from Ceylon clandestinely in a boat, and he met Gunanayagam who was postponing the repayment of the loan, and as a result during his absence the accused took away a bag containing brown sugar from his house and tried to sell the same in the Parrys Corner, Madras on 18. 1987. These circumstances are not known to the Officers of the Customs Department and yet they have been mentioned in the statement under Ex.P-8 along with the address of the appellant/ accused at Ceylon. Therefore the statement marked as Ex.P-1 is a voluntary statement given by the accused especially when he did not say any threat or inducement before the Magistrate on 18. 1987, when he was remanded by the said Magistrate. 12. A perusal of arrest Memo marked as Ex.P-2 would reveal that the appellant/ accused was arrested on 18. 1987 at 11 a.m. and thereafter he was produced before the Magistrate on the same day at 3.30 p.m. without any delay. When confronted about the arrest on 18. 1987 at 11 a.m. during the examination of the accused under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C, he admitted the same. 13. Therefore there is no delay much less inordinate delay, in producing the accused before the Magistrate after the arrest. It is futile to contend in view of the above circumstances that the detention of the accused is illegal as he was not produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours after his arrest. .14. 13. Therefore there is no delay much less inordinate delay, in producing the accused before the Magistrate after the arrest. It is futile to contend in view of the above circumstances that the detention of the accused is illegal as he was not produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours after his arrest. .14. The learned counsel for the appellant/ accused further argued that what was seized from the accused was not produced before the Magistrate’s Court, and no sample was taken in the presence of the accused, and the sample taken in the absence of the accused is of no consequence, and the sample taken by the Scientific Officer examined as P.W.2 Lakshmansamy before the Magistrate cannot be availed of by the Prosecution, and there was no explanation to show as to where the contraband was kept from 18. 1987 to 9. 1987 when it was produced before the Magistrate, and the sample taken should not be accepted as one taken from M.O.1, and the delay in sending M.O.1 to the Court after a lapse of 24 days from 18. 1987 itself will vitiate the prosecution, and the mandatory provision of Secs.52 and 53 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act were not complied with, and so the accused must be acquitted. The learned counsel for the appellant further stated that the accused has the right of silence, and he must be informed, that he need not make the statement, and in such circumstances the statement given by him without any warning should not be taken into Consideration. In support of the above contentions, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions reported in N.S.R.Krishan Prasad v. Directorate of Enforcement, 1992 Crl.L.J. 1888 and State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994)3 S.C.C. 299 . .15. Even in the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994)3 S.C.C. 299 at 322, it was laid down as follows: ."The provisions of Secs.52 and 57 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances act, which deal with the steps to be taken by the Officers after making arrest or seizure under Secs.41 to 44 are by themselves not mandatory. If there is noncompliance or if there are lapses like delay etc.. If there is noncompliance or if there are lapses like delay etc.. then the same has to be examined to see whether any prejudice has been caused to the accused and such failure will have a bearing on the appreciation of evidence regarding arrest or seizure as well as on the merits of the case." 16. So, it follows from the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994)3 S.C.C. 299 at 322 will make it clear that the provisions of Secs.52 and 57 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act are not mandatory and if there is non-compliance, it must be seen as to whether any prejudice was caused to the accused. The answer to the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused with regard to the delay in sending M.O.1 in this case to the Court lies in Sec.52 (3) of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, which states as follows: "Every person arrested and article seized under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.41, Sec.42, Sec.43 or Sec.44 shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to .(a) the Officer-in-charge of the nearest police station, or .(b) the Officer empowered under Sec.53. 17. The officer empowered under Sec.53(1) of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act in the case of the Central Government can be an Officer of the Customs Department notified by the Central Government. In this regard, the Government of India issued a Notification bearing No.S.O.823 (E) dated 14th November, 1985 which invested the Officers of and above the rank of Inspector in the Customs Department with the powers specified in Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.53 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. In this case P.W.3 Varadhan is the Superintendent of Customs, who is a Gazetted Officer, and he is empowered under Sec.53(1) of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, as he is above the rank of an Inspector in the Customs Department. P.W. 1 George, who is the Preventive Officer in the Customs Department, says in his evidence that after sealing M.O.1 recovered from the appellant/ accused herein it was kept by the Superintendent of Customs examined as P.W.3 Varadhan. Sec.52(4) of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act states that the Officer to whom the article is forwarded under Sub-sec. (3) shall, with all convenient despatch, take such measures as may be necessary for the disposal according to law of such person or article. Sec.52(4) of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act states that the Officer to whom the article is forwarded under Sub-sec. (3) shall, with all convenient despatch, take such measures as may be necessary for the disposal according to law of such person or article. In other words P.W.3 Varadahan in this case must take such measures necessary for the disposal according to law of such article or such person. The law as governing the person is that the arrested person must be produced before the Magistrate within 48 hours as mentioned in Sec.57 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. In the present case, the accused was arrested on 18. 1987 at 11 a.m. as per the arrest Memo marked as Ex.P-2 and he was produced before the Magistrate on the same day i.e., on 18. 1987 at 3.30 p.m. The law as governing the property is that so far as the Customs Department is concerned, there are designated godowns, where the property recovered should be kept in safe custody. The police Officer has no specified or authorised godown to keep the seized articles in safe custody. Sec.52 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act does not say that the article seized should be forwarded immediately to the Magistrate and instead it says that every article seized must be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the Officer empowered under Sec.53 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, who in this case is P.W.3 Varadhan. The Central Government issued a Notification in Standing Order No.2 of 1988 for Narcotics Control Bureau at Delhi stating that agencies of Central and State Government, who has been vested with the powers of investigation under the new law, must specifically designate their godowns for storage purposes, and the godowns should be selected keeping in view of their security angle, juxtaposition to courts etc., and such godowns, as a matter of rule, be placed under the over-all supervision and charge of a Gazetted Officer of the respective enforcement agencies, and such Officers should not be below the rank of Superintendent in the Department of Customs. I am satisfied that taking the seized article and keeping the same for safe custody with P.W.3 Varadhan in this case was not in violation of any of the provisions of the NDPS Act. I am satisfied that taking the seized article and keeping the same for safe custody with P.W.3 Varadhan in this case was not in violation of any of the provisions of the NDPS Act. I am fortified with this view by a decision of our Madras High Court reported in Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau etc., v. C.Govindasami, (1994) 1 L.W. (Crl.) 65. 18. In view of the above provisions of law read with the relevant Notifications that P.W.3 Varadhan is justified in keeping M.O.1 recovered from the appellant/accused herein their godowns in the Customs Department and then taken to the Magistrate before whom a sample was collected by the Scientific Officer as spoken to by P.W.2 Lakshmanasamy. Right before the Magistrate a totally independent person, namely, P.W.2 Lakshmanasamy came and collected the sample of about 10 grams of the seized material. P.W.2 Lakshmanasamy was not at all cross-examined on behalf of the accused and so his evidence goes unchallenged. P.W.1 George stated in his evidence that M.O.1 was sealed by the Superintendent examined as P.W.3 Varadhan and it was sent to the godown in the Customs Department and later on it was produced before the Magistrate on 9. 1987 under the list of properties marked as Ex.P-3. He gave a petition for drawing a sample under Ex.P-4, and on 9. 1987, the sample was taken before the Magistrate’s Court. This evidence of P.W. 1 George was not at all questioned during his cross-examination. It follows from the above evidence and the circumstances of the case that it is the very same material object which was recovered from the accused and later a sample was taken therefrom by the Scientific Officer examined as P.W.2 Lakshmanasamy to whom no animosity was attributed. It is not even suggested to P.W.1 George or P.W.3 Varadhan that the sample was taken before Magistrate’s Court is not the same as that of M.O.1 but the sample is a different one or the M.O.1 produced on 9. 1987 is altogether different one from what was recovered from the appellant/ accused. It is not even suggested to P.W.1 George or P.W.3 Varadhan that the sample was taken before Magistrate’s Court is not the same as that of M.O.1 but the sample is a different one or the M.O.1 produced on 9. 1987 is altogether different one from what was recovered from the appellant/ accused. The arguments of the learned counsel that a contraband recovered should be sent through court for analysis is not well founded in view of the decision of our High Court reported in Jesudoss v. State, 1996 M.L.J. (Crl.) 590, wherein it was laid down as follows: “It was contended that under Sec.52(3) of the Act, the searching Officer shall take such measures as may be necessary for disposal according to law of the article/contraband seized and by virtue of this section the article/contraband seized must have been despatched for chemical analysis through court. This contention cannot be accepted because Sec.52(3) of the Act does not say so. Time and again this Court as well as the Apex Court have held that even though the mahazar witness turns hostile, the evidence relating to search and seizure could be relied upon on the basis of the evidence of the searching officer, if his evidence is found to be trustworthy and reliable.” 19. In view of the foregoing reasons and also the facts and circumstances of the case, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that there is no delay or inordinate delay in sending the contraband seized from the accused to the Court, and the seized contraband is not different from the sample taken, and it is not necessary to send the sample through the court for chemical analysis, and there is no contravention of Sec.52 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, and as such the prosecution is not vitiated. 20. 20. One another contention that was advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused is that Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act states that when any officer duly authorised is about to search the accused, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer or to the nearest Magistrate, and in the present case such an option was not given to the appellant/ accused, and so the mandatory provision of Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act is not followed and hence the prosecution is vitiated. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the appellant also had drawn my attention to the decision reported in Ali Mustafa v.State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 244 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Pirthi Chand and another, (1996) 2 L.W. (Crl.) 428. .21. The learned Public Prosecutor refuted the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/ accused and stated that the accused was taken immediately before the Gazetted Officer by giving such an option and thereby the provision in Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act was complied with. He drew support from two decisions of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (1996)1 Crimes 54 (S.C.) and Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996)1 Crimes 55 (S.C). 22. A careful reading of the above decisions of the Supreme Court will make it clear that under Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the accused may require the search to be conducted in the presence of a nearest Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. The option under Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act is only of being searched in the presence of such nearest Officer. The use of the word “nearest” in Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act is relevant. Such an option was given to the accused and he was taken before P.W.3 Varadhan, who is a Gazetted Officer and before whom the search was conducted. Therefore P.W.1 George was justified in taking the accused to the nearest Gazetted Officer, namely, P.W.3 Varadhan and thereby complied with the provision in Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. 23. Such an option was given to the accused and he was taken before P.W.3 Varadhan, who is a Gazetted Officer and before whom the search was conducted. Therefore P.W.1 George was justified in taking the accused to the nearest Gazetted Officer, namely, P.W.3 Varadhan and thereby complied with the provision in Sec.50 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. 23. Taking into consideration the above facts and circumstances of the case and the materials of record, I am of the view that the prosecution has proved the case beyond all reasonable doubt and the appellant/ accused is guilty of the offences under Sec.8(c) and Sec.21 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, and I answer this point accordingly. .24. Now turning to the question of sentence, the appellant was questioned by the lower court with regard to the same and the appellant/ accused replied that as he had only a small quantity of brown sugar, a lesser sentence has to be given to him. Till date, the appellant/ accused is in detention. He was convicted on 2. 1980 and he is in detention from the date of arrest i.e., from 18. 1987. He has not paid the fine for which an additional sentence of two years is imposed. The appellant/accused is a citizen of Ceylon who infiltrated into India clandestinely in a boat and he was in possession of a Narcotic Substance of 260 grams. It is fortunate for the accused that he has not been charged for illegal entry into this country without a valid passport and without a valid visa. However, Sec.21 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act states that whoever in contravention of any provision of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act possesses any manufactured drug shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years and with a fine of Rs.1,00,000. Thus the minimum punishment has been imposed by the lower court and there is no exenuating circumstance to modify or reduce the sentence. 25. Thus the minimum punishment has been imposed by the lower court and there is no exenuating circumstance to modify or reduce the sentence. 25. Hence I hold that the appellant is convicted for the offence under Sec.8(c) and Sec.21 of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and so the appeal is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed confirming the judgment and the sentence passed by the lower Court and I answer the point accordingly. 26. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment and the sentence of the Court of Principal Sessions Judge at Madras passed on 5.2,1988 in Sessions Case No. 135 of 1987 are confirmed.