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1997 DIGILAW 313 (RAJ)

MANOJ v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

1997-03-03

S.C.MITAL

body1997
Judgment ( 1 ) THIS petition has been preferred under S. 482, Cr. P. C. seeking to quash FIR of Case No. 53, dated 4-6-1996 under Ss. 498-A and 406, IPC, police station, Khanda Falsa, Jodhpur and in the alternative to treat the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to give appropriate remedy to the petitioners in the interest of justice. ( 2 ) THE brief facts are that Smt. Rashmi the daughter of Dev Dutt Kalla resident of Jalap Mohalla, Jodhpur was married to petitioner No. 1 Manoj Joshi son of Shri Mandal Dutt Joshi resident of Lodha-Ki-Gali, Veer Mohalla, Jodhpur on 8th February, 1996. It is alleged that she was turned out of her matrimonial home just after two days by the petitioners after treating her with cruelty to satisfy the demand of Rs. 2 lacs for starting business by petitioner No. 1. She again went to petitioners house but they threatened her and repeated their demand for Rs. two lacs without which she had no place to live with them. She was again turned out on 2-3-96. Her parents went to meet the petitioners on 3-3-96 with her, but the petitioners hurled abuses and said that she could not live there without payment of Rs. 2 lacs. Despite this she again went on 4-3-1996 on the festival of Holi, but again she was treated with cruelty. She was turned out. The petitioners refused to return the dowry articles and the ornaments. All the efforts by the maternal uncle and other relatives failed and the petitioners even threatened to perform second marriage of the petitioner No. 1. Shri Amar Singh and Kamlesh continued to give threatenings to her. She also came to know that her husband petitioner No. 1 Manoj was living in the house of Prem Babu with a girl Parmindra Kaur, a Supervisor in Angan Wari at Deedwana. The maternal uncle and other relatives met the parents of the girl Parmindra Kaur, who knew this fact, but expressed their helplessness. The parents of Parmindra Kaur brought this fact to the notice of Shri Mandal Dutt, the father of her husband, but he did not pay any heed to call back his son. Ultimately her father-in-law Shri Mandal Dutt Joshi admitted on 9-5-96 that his son is not in his control and his son has brought bad name to him in the society. Ultimately her father-in-law Shri Mandal Dutt Joshi admitted on 9-5-96 that his son is not in his control and his son has brought bad name to him in the society. A quarrel also took place between her husband Shri Manoj and father-in-law about relations with Parmindrakaur and during that quarrel her father-in-law even threatened his son that he would commit suicide. Ultimately he committed suicide on the same day. On the above report a case u/ss. 498-A, 406, IPC, FIR No. 53/96 was registered which now the petitioners have prayed to be quashed through this petition. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Public Prosecutor as well as the learned counsel for the complainant. I have also gone through the documents submitted by the petitioners. Before I deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it will be relevant and useful to consider the powers of this Court to quash FIR or the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under S. 482, Cr. P. C. This question has engaged the mind of the Apex Court in number of cases. In AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527) State of Haryana v. Choudhary Bhajan Lal, their lordships of the Supreme Court have after considering number of decisions observed as follows in Para 108 :"in the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers u/s. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First. 1. Where the allegations made in the First. Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under S. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted al legations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. " ( 4 ). The aforesaid decision has been reiterated in 1995 (7) JT (SC) 299 : (1996 Cri LJ 381) Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill with B. R. Bajaj v. State of Punjab. It was held that the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill with B. R. Bajaj v. State of Punjab. It was held that the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR. Relying upon the case State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Pirthi Chand 1996 Cri LR (SC) 61 : 1996 (2) SCC 37 : (1996 Cri LJ 1354) and other cases referred in the judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has laid down in 1996 SCC (Cri) 497 : (1996 Cri LJ 1878) State of U. P. v. O. P. Sharma, that High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its power under Art. 226 when efficacious remedy is available u/s. 482, Cr. P. C. The observations made in Para 11 are very relevant :"when Investigating Officer spendsconsiderable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the court, further action should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to quash the chargesheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The accused involved in an economic offence destabilises the economy and causes grave incursion on the economic planning of the State. When the legislature entrusts the power to the police officer to prevent organised commission of the offence or offences involving moral turpitude or crimes of grave nature and are entrusted with power to investigate into the crime in intractable terrains and secretive manner in concert, greater circumspection and care and caution should be borne in mind by the High Court when it exercises its inherent power. Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in jeopardy and to grave risk. The accused will have field day in destabilising the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions. " ( 5 ). Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in jeopardy and to grave risk. The accused will have field day in destabilising the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions. " ( 5 ). 1996 SCC (Cri) 628 : (1996 Cri LJ 1372) (State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, 1996 SCC (Cri) 150 : (1996 Cri LJ 1127) State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri, II-1995 (1) Crimes 566 State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal, 1994 Cri LR (SC) 589 Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, 1994 SCC (Cri) 477 Union of India v. B. R. Bajaj, 1996 (1) RCD 519 (Raj) Samoti Devi v. State of Rajasthan and 1996 Cri LR (SC) 61 : (1996 Cri LJ 1354) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Pirthi Chand have been referred to on behalf of the non-petitioners to support their contention that while considering the petition under S. 482, Cr. P. C. this Court should not shift or appreciate the evidence and if on the basis of the allegations in the FIR/complaint a prima facie case is made out then this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction to quash the proceedings/this Court should also not. enter into any discussion to judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations. The police has statutory power as well as duty to investigate the case and such powers cannot be interfered in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court. The contention that the proceedings have been initiated mala fide is also not tenable, because animus of the complainant or the prosecution is irrelevant if on the basis of the allegations a prima facie case is made out against the accused. ( 6 ). The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819 State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Gaiha, AIR 1988 SC 709 : (1988 Cri LJ 853) Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, 1994 Cr LR (Raj) 418 Sharda Devi v. State of Rajasthan and 1992 Cri LJ 4016 Jitender Mohan Gupta v. State, wherein it has been laid down that FIR can be quashed if no case is made out from the allegations of the FIR/ complaint even if considered on the face value or the facts constitute only civil wrong. The Courts should also consider the specific features in the case to form an opinion whether, in the interest of justice to continue the prosecution because legal procedure cannot be utilised to wreak vengeance or for any oblique purpose particularly where chances of conviction are almost ruled out. ( 7 ). I am of the view that in all the above referred cases the principles of law enunciated in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha (supra) and State of Hanyana v. Choudhary Bhajan Lal (supra) have been reiterated and, therefore, it will be just and proper to test the present case as to whether it is covered in any one of the categories of the cases given in para 108 (State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal ). Before doing so it is also profitable to reproduce the observations in para 109 made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court :"we also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. " ( 8 ) THE bare reading of FIR lodged by Smt. Rashmi Kalla shows that she has made specific and clear allegations against the petitioners treating her with cruelty and demand of a sum of Rs. 2 lacs for starting business for the petitioner No. 1 and preventing her to live in her matrimonial home till she arranges the money from her parents. Her parents and relatives approached the petitioners more than once to settle the dispute, but they were also abused and insulted by the petitioners. She went to her husbands house on 2-3-1996 and again on 4-3-96, but she was pushed out of the house. In the above circumstances when she demanded back her ornaments, the petitioners did not return the articles. As such on this FIR a case under Ss. 498a and 406, IPC has been registered. I am of the view that the allegations stated above prima facie constitute an offence under Ss. In the above circumstances when she demanded back her ornaments, the petitioners did not return the articles. As such on this FIR a case under Ss. 498a and 406, IPC has been registered. I am of the view that the allegations stated above prima facie constitute an offence under Ss. 498a and 406, IPC, which requires investigation and this case is not covered in any one of the categories or circumstances mentioned in Para 108 (State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra ). 8a. The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that Smt. Rashmi stayed at the husbands house for a very short period of two or three days and she herself left the matrimonial home because the petitioner No. 1 Manoj wanted that the account in the name of Kumari Rashmi Kalla alone may be converted into joint account with his name. Account No. 15055 in SBBJ, Khanda Falsa, Jodhpur in which Rs. 20,558. 84 was in the name of Kumari Rashmi Kalla, which the petitioner No. 1 could not have done so if she had been treated by him with cruelty. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that this FIR has been lodged as a counter move of the incident of suicide committed by Mandal Dutt Joshi the father of petitioner No. 1, who left a suicide note that he was threatened by Brij Mohan Kalla and his sons and one Advocate Shri G. K. Chanda that they will destroy his family. An inquiry under S. 174, Cr. P. C. was conducted, but police did not register any case despite commission of a cognizable offence and the petitioners further persued the matter with the higher authorities and the informant Smt. Rashmi got irritated and annoyed on it and now wants to put pressure on the petitioner No. 1 not to pursue his demand for investigation of the circumstances leading to the death of his father. In view of the circumstances, it is urged that the petitioners have been falsely implicated in this fabricated, afterthought FIR. There is inordinate and unexplained delay in making the. FIR on 4-6-96, whereas the alleged maltreatment was done just after the marriage on 8th February, 1996 i. e. in the month of March, 1996. In view of the circumstances, it is urged that the petitioners have been falsely implicated in this fabricated, afterthought FIR. There is inordinate and unexplained delay in making the. FIR on 4-6-96, whereas the alleged maltreatment was done just after the marriage on 8th February, 1996 i. e. in the month of March, 1996. There is no reason or circumstances that the petitioners or the father of petitioner No. 1 would demand dowry because petitioner No. 1 is engaged in insurance agency business and serving in a Government Department. Since the year of engagement he deposited more than Rs. 20,000/- of insurance commission money in the name of his wife Smt. Rashmi. Annexures P8 to P18 goes to show that the petitioners wife continuously remained with him happily and voluntarily left the house. The petitioner was at Deedwana in District Nagaur at the alleged time of committing cruelty serving in Bal Vikas Pariyojana Department as revealed from Annexures 21 and 20. The other petitioners are living separately and they have been roped in by Smt. Rashmi without any basis just to wreak vengeance. It is further vehemently argued that in the above circumstances no offence under S. 498a, IPC is prima facie made out and ingredients of the offence under S. 406, IPC are also missing from the bare reading of the FIR because there is no allegation about misappropriation and the petitioners never refused to return the ornaments. The petitioners have returned the ornaments. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor argued that Smt. Rashmi has given list of some ornaments, which have not been returned even now by the petitioners. Their contention is that the police should be allowed to perform its statutory duty and exercise its powers to investigate the commission of cognizable offences disclosed to have been committed by the petitioners in the First Information Report. ( 10 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and I have also perused the documents placed on record on behalf of the petitioners. It has to be seen from the FIR whether it discloses a commission of cognizable offence by the petitioners. If the contents of the FIR show the ingredients and constitute the offences under Ss. 498a and 406, IPC then it will be unwarranted to quash the FIR. It has to be seen from the FIR whether it discloses a commission of cognizable offence by the petitioners. If the contents of the FIR show the ingredients and constitute the offences under Ss. 498a and 406, IPC then it will be unwarranted to quash the FIR. As I have already stated, allegations in the FIR prima facie show the ingredients of the offences under Ss. 498a and 406, IPC. at this stage this Court would not enter into arena of appreciation of evidence and to arrive at any conclusion about the merits of the case. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners are entirely questions of fact which cannot be answered at this stage unless an investigation is conducted in the case registered on the FIR of Smt. Rashmi. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to 1995 Cr LJ 3939 (Supchand v. State of Maharashtra), wherein while hearing appeal the Court held on the basis of record that it was insufficient for conviction of accused husband under Ss. 306, 498a, IPC. Similar was the situation in 1996 Cr LJ 2628 (State of Karnataka v. Dr. H. A. Ramaswamy. In 1991 Cr LJ 660 : ( AIR 1991 SC 816 ) (Santi Deb Berma v. Smt. Kanchan Prava Devi while hearing appeal it was found that the evidence on record failed to establish second marriage and the accused was acquitted of the offence under S. 494, IPC. Reliance was placed on 1977 Cri LJ 1158 (SC) : ( AIR 1977 SC 1766 ) Sardar Singh v. State of Haryana that mere failure or omission to return property was not sufficient to constitute offence under S. 409 or 406, IPC. In 1986 Cr LJ 1851 (Calcutta High Court) Mahipal Bahadur Singh v. The State it was held that no offence under Ss. 120-B and 406, IPC was made out if the accused kept the amount belonging to the trust as fixed deposits in their personal names. The aforesaid decisions given in appeal on the basis of evidence on record are of no assistance to the petitioners in the instant case in which the matter is at the threshold of investigation. Even if the investigation has been completed, I am not inclined to consider the evidence collected during investigation and to shift or appreciate it in order to examine whether any offence is made out at this stage. Even if the investigation has been completed, I am not inclined to consider the evidence collected during investigation and to shift or appreciate it in order to examine whether any offence is made out at this stage. In the end, I am firmly of the view that the instant case does not fall in any of the categories specified in Para 108 of the decision, State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra ). It is also not one of those rare of the rarest cases where this Court may exercise its inherent powers, which is used sparingly in appropriate cases. ( 11 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that the petition has no force and the same is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.