Judgment SHIV KUMAR SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) "in Indiapersons are not permitted to take forcible possession. They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. " this observation was made by the Privy council in the year 1924 in Midnapur zamindar Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy. ( 2 ) THOUGH right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it is still a legal right under Article 300a of the Constitution of india. Clause (f) of Article 19{1) and Article 31 were deleted by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth amendment) Act, 1978. Right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right within the meaning of Part-Ill of the Constitution and now Article 300a lays down that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. ( 3 ) THIS is a general principel of law that no act can be done by the strength of ones own hands but help of the law should be taken and the procedure which is prescribed for that act must be acted upon. In the case on hand. it appears that the Rajasthan State Road transport Corporation (for short rsrtc)has not obeyed and law regarding the dispossession of Om Prakash from the shop. The employees of the RSRTC damaged the shop and all the material as well as the structure was thrown out for which Om Prakash lodged a complaint with the police. ( 4 ) A few facts deserve recall here. Om prakash instituted a civil suit against the RSRTC, alwar and Ganeshi Lal in the Trial Court. Along with the suit an application under order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC was also filed. It was averred the Ganeshi Lal purchased a piece of land measuring 60 x 87 feet from one prabhu Dayal. The said land was acquired by rsrtc and in lieu of that a piece of land was returned later on. Om Prakash took the said land from Ganeshi Lal in the capacity of tenant and installed a stall in the month of march, 1969 and since then he Has been in possession of the said land and running his business in the capacity of tenant of Ganeshi lal and has been continously paying the rent. Om Prakash took the said land from Ganeshi Lal in the capacity of tenant and installed a stall in the month of march, 1969 and since then he Has been in possession of the said land and running his business in the capacity of tenant of Ganeshi lal and has been continously paying the rent. It was also pleaded in the alternative that even if his tenancy was not accepted he could not be dispossessed without due process of law from the said land being in continuous possession over the last 18 years. ( 5 ) THE RSRTC disputed the said application and the Trial Court dismissed it vide order dated September 11, 1987. Om Prakash preferred appeal against the said order but was unsuccessful. Thereafter assailing both these orders S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 1169/95 was filed by him. ( 6 ) AS no interim relief was granted in favour of Om Prakash, it appears that he was forcibly dispossessed by RSRTC. Thereafter om Prakash instituted a suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act. Alongwith the suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, CPC was filed by him. Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) and Judicial Magistrate, alwar vide order dated January 3, 1996 directed rsrtc under Section 151, CPC to restore the possession of the shop. The RSRTC preferred S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 80/ 1996 against the said order. ( 7 ) AS both the revisions relate to one shop and questions of law and fact are identical, therefore, both these revisions are decided by a common judgment. ( 8 ) I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contention and carefully perused the impugned order, ( 9 ) MR. Dilip Singh, learned Counsel for om Prakash canvassed that RSRTC have no authority to forcibly dispossess Om Prakash from the disputed shop. A person who is in a peaceful possession of property cannot be deprived of the possession of the same except in accordance with law. A reliance has been placed on M/s. Chandra and Co. v. State of rajasthan. Mr. Dilip Singh learned Counsel supported the order dated January 3, 1996 passed by Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Alwar. ( 10 ) ON the other hand Mr. A reliance has been placed on M/s. Chandra and Co. v. State of rajasthan. Mr. Dilip Singh learned Counsel supported the order dated January 3, 1996 passed by Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Alwar. ( 10 ) ON the other hand Mr. Manish bhandari learned Counsel contended that Om prakash was the trespasser and no relief could be granted to him under Section 151, CPC as he was rightly dispossessed by RSRTC. Mr. Bhandari learned Counsel has placed reliance on East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank, sohan Lal v. Union of India and Anr, D. H. Maniar v. Woman Laxman Kudav, Lallu yeswant v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Ors. 6 and k. K. Verma v. Union of India. ( 11 ) M/s. Chandraand Co. (supra) was the case where this Court propounded thus: "a person who is in possession of property cannot be deprived of the possession of the same by the State, or its officers, except in accordance with law and in a case, where the State or its officers have dispossessed such a person of the property in his possession without any authority of law it would be open to him to seek redress against the aforesaid unlawful action of the State and its officers by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. He cannot be non-suited on the ground that he was an unauthorised occupant of the said property and had no right or title in the same. ( 12 ) EAST India Hotels Ltd. (supra) was the case in which where Honble two Judges of the Supreme Court had expressed conflicting views while interpreting Section 6 of the specific Relief Act in Para No. 26 of the judgment it was observed thus: "in my considered view, therefore, that possession obtained either by violence, misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, undue influence, seemingly innocuous but hidden with oblique motive or any other mode or method unlawful or otherwise except in due course of law attracts section 6. Law frowns upon such conduct. " ( 13 ) ). Law frowns upon such conduct. " ( 13 ) ). In Sohan Lals (supra) was the case where it was indicated thus: "nevertheless, the decree agains the union of India cannot be executed against defendant 2, the appellant herein, for he cannot be adversely affected by a decree for Specific Performance when no valid and enforceable contract has been proved between the parties to the suit in respect of the house of which the appellant is the owner in possession. " ( 14 ) D. H. Maniar (supra) was the case in which it was held thus:-"the learned Judge also seems to be making a difference between the filing of a suit against a licensee whose licence has been terminated treating him as a trespasser and an application under Section 41 of the SCC Act. For the purpose of the point at issue the distinction is more illusory than real. Two remedies, previously, were available to the licensor. He could avail the one or the other. The scope of the trial, disposal and further remedies in the two proceedings were different. But it is wholly wrong to say that if a licensor filed an application under Section 41 of the SCC Act instead of filing a regular civil suit he by implication treated the occupant of the premises against whom the SCC application was filed as a subsisting licensee. " ( 15 ) LALLU Yeswant Singh (supra) was the case where it was Honble Supreme Court observed thus: we are unable to appreciate how this decision assists the respondent. It was not a suit under Section 9 of the Specific relief Act. In (1881) ILR 5 Bom. 387, it was recognised that if there is a breach of the peace in attempting to take possession, that affords a ground for criminal prosecution, and, if the attempt is successful, for a summary suit also for a restoration to possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief act 1 of 1877 - Dadabhai Narsidas v. The Sub-Collector of Broach. In (1890)ilr 15 Bom. In (1890)ilr 15 Bom. 238 it was observed by sargent, C. J. , as follows: "the Indian Legislature has, however, provided for the summary removal of any one who dispossess another, whether peacefully or otherwise than by due course of law; but subject to such provision there is no reason for holding that the rightful owner so dispossessing the other is a trespasser, and may not rely for the support of his possession on the title vested in him as he clearly may do by English Law. This would also appear to be the view taken by west, J. , in (1881) ILR 5 Bom. 387. " ( 16 ) IN K. K. Verma (supra) was the case where Division Bench of Bombay High Court defined nature of possession of tenant holding over without consent, as under: "under the Indian Law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by Statute. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief act, a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under Section 9 and claim possession against the true owner. Therefore, the law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. Whereas the trespassers possession is never juridical and never protected by law, the possession of an erstwhile tenant is juridical and is protected by law. Therefore, as far as the Indian Law is concerned, an erstwhile tenant can never become a trespasser. It may or may not be that in English Law in certain circumstances he can become a trespasser and it does seem that the landlord can enter the premises and deprive the erstwhile tenant of his possession, but in India a landlord can only eject his erstwhile tenant by recourse to law. " ( 17 ) ). In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an authorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law. " ( 17 ) ). In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an authorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law. The remedy under Section 6 of the Specific relief Act is summary and its object is to prevent self help and to discourage people to adopt any means fair or foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was in due course of law. ( 18 ) IN East India Hotels Ltd. (supra) was the case, the Supreme Court observed thus: "what is meant by due course of law? due course of law in each particular case means such an exercise of the powers by duly constituted Tribunal or court in accordance with the procedure established by law under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must thus be a Tribunal competent by its constitution, that is by law of its creation, to pass upon the subject matter of the suit or proceeding; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, it must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance. Due course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the Tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right determination of the controversy by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of fact of liability be conclusively proved or presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course of law in a comprehensive sense. In Rudrappa v. Narsingrao, a Division bench consisting of Sir L. J. Jenkisn, C. J. , as he then was, and Batchelor, J. held that the words "due course of law" in Section 9 of the special Relief Act (old Act ). "as merely equivalent to the word legally is, we think, to deprive them of a force and a significance which they carry on their very face. "as merely equivalent to the word legally is, we think, to deprive them of a force and a significance which they carry on their very face. For a thing, which is perfectly legal, may still be by no means a thing done in due course of law: to enable this phrase to be predicated of it, it is essential, speaking generally, that the thing should have been submitted to the consideration and pronouncement of the law, and the due course of law means, we take it, the regular normal process and effect of the law operating on a matter which has been laid before it for adjudication. " (emphasis supplied)in that case when the owner unilaterally dispossessed the tenant holding over, the court upheld the decree for possession under section 9. The Court future held that: "this, is our opinion, is the primary and natural meaning of the phrase, in strict compliance of law though it may be applied in a derivative or secondary sense to other proceedings held under the direct authority of the law; in this sense it may be said, for instance, that revenue or taxes are collected in due course of law. " (emphasis supplied) speaking for a Full Bench of five Judges per majority of four in Tamizuddin v. Ashrub all, Ghose, J. (one of concurring Judges) held that when tenancy was: "not put an end to, as the law requires, he remains upon the land as a tenant, and necessarily, if he is illegally ejected, he is entitled to claim possession as a tenant. His possession is very different from that of a person who entres into the land as a trespasser but if he is evicted illegally, he is entitled to be put back in possession according to provision of Section 9 of the Specific relief Act though he has no title to the land. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 19 ) SUB-SECTION (4) of Section 6 of specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as under: "nothing in the section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to said property and to recover possession thereof. " ( 20 ) A look at Sub-section (4) of Section 6 demonstrates that in a suit filed by Om prakash under Section 6 of the Specific Relief act, RSRTC can establish its title with regard to shop in dispute and if successful can recover possession thereof. " ( 20 ) A look at Sub-section (4) of Section 6 demonstrates that in a suit filed by Om prakash under Section 6 of the Specific Relief act, RSRTC can establish its title with regard to shop in dispute and if successful can recover possession thereof. ( 21 ) IF possession of the disputed shop is restored in accordance with the order dated january 3, 1996 passed by Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Alwar, RSRTC shall not suffer irreparable loss and if the said order is allowed to stand, it would also not occasion failure of justice. I see no reason to interfere in the said order as in my view no jurisdictional error has been committed by the Court below in passing the said order. ( 22 ) ). In view of discussion made herein above S. B: Civil Revision Petition No. 80/96 fails and is hereby dismissed. ( 23 ) ). S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 1169/ 1995 has become infructuous in view of the suit instituted by Om Prakash under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and it stands dismissed. Observations made with regard to jurisdiction of the trial Court and with regard to appreciation of facts shall not affect the final adjudication of suit. ( 24 ) ). Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the trial Court to decide the civil suit pending before it under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act within three months from the date of receipt of this order. Learned Counsel are expected to assist the trial Court in completion of the trial of the civil suit within this period. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on March 17, 1997. Costs easy. C. R. P. No. 80/1996 dismissed C. R. P. No. 1169 dismissed as infructuous.