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1997 DIGILAW 315 (BOM)

Sudha Keshav Divekar v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission Bombay and another

1997-07-10

R.M.LODHA

body1997
JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J.:---By means of this writ petition, the widow of Lt. Commander Keshav Nagesh Divekar, who was in employment with the respondent Oil and Natural Gas Company seeks to challenge the order passed by the Central Government Labour Court No. 2, Bombay on 15-6-92. 2.Short facts necessary for consideration of the controversy advanced during the course of arguments by the petitioner are that Lt. Commander Keshav Nagesh Divekar ('the employee') retiree from Indian Navy, and after his retirement he was employed by the respondent No. 1(Oil) and Natural Gas Commissioner (O.N.G.C.) somewhere in the year 1985 on adhoc basis as Chief Officer. 'Sagar-Samrat'. The employee was paid wages computed on daily basis. He made application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (I.D. Act') praying therein that he was entitled to regular pay scale of the 'Chief Officer' and which is paid by O.N.G.C. to similarly situated employees. According to him since the wages paid to him were at low rate, he claimed before the concerned Labour Court that it be pleased to determine the dues and direct the O.N.G.C. to pay the said amount to the employee. It appears that the employee died during pendency of the application before the Central Government Labour Court No. 2 who is now represented by present petitioner. The claim of the employee was contested by O.N.G.C. on various counts including that the employee was not a workman since he was engaged as a Chief Officer and was also employed in supervisory capacity. The O.N.G.C. also set up the plea that the application was not tenable in the eye of law and claim was misconceived. The concerned Labour Court after hearing the parties found that the employee was entitled to be paid wages on the principle of 'equal wages for equal work'. However, the concerned Labour Court observed that since the employee was retired from the Indian Navy and was already getting pension, the said amount of pension deserves to be deducted and accordingly passed the impugned order. 3.Mr. Ganguli, the learned Counsel for petitioner submits that the concerned Labour Court was not justified in deducting the amount of pension from the due wages. 4.I have considered the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and in my view this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on more than one grounds. 3.Mr. Ganguli, the learned Counsel for petitioner submits that the concerned Labour Court was not justified in deducting the amount of pension from the due wages. 4.I have considered the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and in my view this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on more than one grounds. Firstly, it would be seen that the concerned Labour Court allowed the claim of the employee on the ground of equal pay for equal work. The application was made by the employee under section 33-C(2) and it is well settled that the proceedings under section 33-C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings. A claim based on equal pay for equal work cannot be said to be pre-existing right amenable to execution in the proceedings under section 33-C(2). The reason being that such claim based on equal pay for equal work not adjudicated or recognised earlier, is sought to be determined in the proceeding under section 33-C(2) which is not incidental to the benefit claimed and within the scope of inquiry in such proceedings. The virgin area of dispute between employer and workman pertaining to the workman's claim of equal wages for equal work, cannot be covered for the first time in the proceedings under section 33-C(2). Such exercise by the Labour Court is not permissible. Apparently the application made by the employee in this case under section 33-C(2) was misconceived. In (Municipal Corporation of Delhi appellant v. Ganesh Razak and another, respondent)1, 1995(1) S.C.C. 235 , the Apex Court held that in the proceedings under section 33-C(2) the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate dispute of entitlement on basis of claim of workman. The ratio of the Apex Court in Ganesh Razak's case is succinctly summed up in head note of the report which reads thus: "Where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under section 33-C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. The power of the Labour Court under section 33-C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests." 5.Apparently, therefore, the application under section 33-C(2) partly granted by the Labour Court on the principle of equal pay for equal work is faulty. However since O.N.G.C. has not challenged that part of the order, I am not upsetting the order passed by the Labour Court but nevertheless by further granting relief to the petitioner, the mistake already committed by Labour Court cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court is extraordinary and it is never invoked where it may result in compounding the mistake already committed by the subordinate Court or Tribunal. Secondly, it would be seen that if the employee's claim was based on the ground that he was entitled to a regular pay scale or the principle of equal pay for equal work he ought to have produced his appointment order and terms and conditions of his employment and the other evidence relating to duties and employment. Admittedly, the employee did not produce his appointment order nor terms and conditions of his employment were placed on record nor any evidence to that effect was produced. In absence thereof it could not be held that employee was entitled to regular pay scale. Thirdly, on the general principles also the Labour Court cannot be said to have erred when it held that since the employee was retiree from Indian Navy and was also getting the amount of pension, the said amount is liable to be deducted from the wages payable to the employee even after applying principles of equal pay for equal work. Thirdly, on the general principles also the Labour Court cannot be said to have erred when it held that since the employee was retiree from Indian Navy and was also getting the amount of pension, the said amount is liable to be deducted from the wages payable to the employee even after applying principles of equal pay for equal work. 6.For all these reasons, no case for interference is made out in extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, and, writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.