Judgment :- 1. Defendants in O. S. No. 9382 of 1978, on the file of IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras are the Appellants. 2. Suit filed by plaintiff was to declare that the alteration made by the District Police Office, Chengalpattu, in the date of birth of the plaintiff in the Service Register from 1-4-1925 to 1-4-1921, without notice to plaintiff, is irregular, unauthorised, not valid in law and not binding on plaintiff. As a consequence, a further relief is also sought for in the nature of permanent prohibitory injunction from restraining the defendants from retiring the plaintiff from service on the basis of the said illegally altered date of birth. Costs of the suit is also sought to be recovered. 3. The material averments in the plaint are as follows:— On the date of suit, plaintiff was working as Sub Inspector of Police in the Prohibition Intelligence Bureau, at Madras. He was enlisted as a Constable in the Police Force of the then Madras State Government on 1-11-1941. At the time of enlistment, he produced the Record-sheet issued by the Headmaster of the District Board Higher Elementary School, Alandur, where he had studied. The date of birth of the plaintiff as per the Record-sheet is 1-4-1925 and the same was entered in the Service Records. Plaintiff served as Constable for some years, and later, as Head Constable in various Police Stations in Chengalpattu District. It is averred that in the year 1962, plaintiff came to know that the date of birth in his Service Register had been altered from 1-4-1925 to 1-6-1921 without any notice to him. It is his case that there is already a record with the defendants wherein his date of birth was entered as 1-4-1925, and the correction of the same as 1-6-1921 was without notice to him and, therefore, it cannot bind him in any way. 4. It is further averred that as soon as the plaintiff learnt about the unauthorised correction, he submitted a petition requesting the Superintendent of Police, to have the original date of birth restored. Plaintiff also attached his E.S.L.C. Certificate containing the said date of birth as additional evidence. 4. It is further averred that as soon as the plaintiff learnt about the unauthorised correction, he submitted a petition requesting the Superintendent of Police, to have the original date of birth restored. Plaintiff also attached his E.S.L.C. Certificate containing the said date of birth as additional evidence. The Superintendent of Police gave a reply on 1962 stating that if his date of birth was taken as 1-4-1925 as per the School Certificate, his age at the time of enlistment will be 16 years and 7 months and that it would be a question of enlistment on false pretenses for which he could be dismissed. Plaintiff, thereupon, gave a reply that he is willing to face the charge as it is not his mistake and he had not suppressed any fact. But the Authorities did not pursue the matter, nor did they give any reply to the plaintiff. It is further alleged that subsequent petitions were also filed. But all of them were dismissed on the ground that the correction could not be entertained after 22 years of service. He also moved an Application in the year 1966 to the second defendant, which was also rejected. A complaint was given to the Governor in 1972, but the same was also rejected as belated. Again another representation was given to the Governor on 11.2.1972, which was also dismissed in 1976. It is said that the plaintiff was directed to retire on 30-6-1976, on the basis of the date of birth altered by the Department. He filed a writ petition before this Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus calling upon the defendants to forbear from retiring the plaintiff with effect from 30-6-1976. But the same was dismissed, directing the plaintiff to file a civil suit and, therefore, he has filed the present suit. He also said that since urgent relief is required, he may be exempted from issuing a notice under Section 80, C.P.C. 5. In the written statement filed by first defendant, which was adopted by second defendant, it is said that the suit is not maintainable either on law or on facts. It is also said that the plaintiff is not entitled to declaration as prayed for. On the date when he was recruited, he gave a solemn declaration that his date of birth is 1-6-1921. The same binds him. It is also said that the plaintiff is not entitled to declaration as prayed for. On the date when he was recruited, he gave a solemn declaration that his date of birth is 1-6-1921. The same binds him. The Village Karnam has also certified the date of birth of the plaintiff as 1-6-1921. A Medical Officer also examined him wherein it was found that he was aged 20 years in 1941. It was thereafter the date of birth was stated as 1921 in the documents. It is further said that if the date of birth was 1925 only, plaintiff would not have been enlisted as a Constable and he would have been rejected for enlistment as under-aged. The minimum age was 17, and plaintiff would not have reached that age. Having taken the benefit of the representation declaring the age as 1-6-1921, he cannot have the same corrected as now sought for. He further contended that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Even though the plaintiff came to know that the date of birth may not be correct even in the year 1962, the present suit was filed only 16 years thereafter. 6. Trial Court considered the documentary evidence filed by plaintiff and also his oral evidence. On the side of the appellants, only documentary evidence was filed as Exs. B-1 to B-11. Trial Court held that (1) the suit is bad for non-issuance of Section 80, C.P.C. Notice. (2) The suit is barred by limitation. (3) The plaintiff is also estopped from filing such a suit after having given such a declaration that his date of birth is 1-6-1921. (4) Orders passed by the defendants are all valid. The suit was dismissed without costs. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment, plaintiff preferred A.S. 646 of 1984, on the file of City Civil Court, Madras. The lower Appellate Court reversed all the findings of the trial court and decreed the suit. By the time the decree was passed, the plaintiff had already retired from service and, therefore, permission was given to the plaintiff to take appropriate proceedings on account of his premature retirement and also to get monetary benefits. It is against the said judgment, defendants have preferred this Second Appeal. 8. By the time the decree was passed, the plaintiff had already retired from service and, therefore, permission was given to the plaintiff to take appropriate proceedings on account of his premature retirement and also to get monetary benefits. It is against the said judgment, defendants have preferred this Second Appeal. 8. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were raised for consideration:— “(1) Whether the suit for declaration for alteration of date of birth is barred by limitation when the plaintiff has not filed the suit within 5 years from the date of entry into service as per G.O.Ms. No. 1288 Public (Services) dated 21-4-1975? and (2) Does not the plaintiff estops in claiming that his date of birth is 1-4-1925 when he entered in service by stating that his date of birth is 1-6-1921?” 9. The first question that arises for consideration is, whether the suit is barred by limitation. 10. As per G.O.Ms. No. 1288 Public (Services) dated 21-4-1975, any correction to the date of birth must be made within five years from the date of entry. On the basis of that Rule, it can be said that atleast plaintiff will be getting five years from the date of the Rule and the suit must have been filed before the expiry of the period, therefore, a reasonable interpretation will have to be given for the Rule. Those persons who are due to retire on that date, cannot wait for another period of five years to get the date corrected. The intention of the Rule is that if at all any correction is to be made in the Service Register, that must be done within a reasonable time after they entered the service. 11. In (1994) 2 SCC 491 ( State of Orissa & others v. Brahamarbar Senapathi), the case related to a person who was promoted as Disinfector and Senior Helper. The Orissa General Financial Rules provided for a period of five years for getting the date of birth corrected on their entering into Government service. While interpreting the Rule, their Lordships said thus:— “Long delay in making such an application is fatal..” In that case, the person concerned, as per the service. Records, was to retire on 31.5.1989. A few days before his retirement, i.e. , on 24.4.1989, he filed an application for correction of his date of birth. While interpreting the Rule, their Lordships said thus:— “Long delay in making such an application is fatal..” In that case, the person concerned, as per the service. Records, was to retire on 31.5.1989. A few days before his retirement, i.e. , on 24.4.1989, he filed an application for correction of his date of birth. The administrative Tribunal passed an order in favour of the Officer and prohibited the Government from retiring the Officer concerned. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court. After extracting the relevant Rule, their lordships further held thus:— “.From what has been stated in paragraph 7 of the order of the Tribunal, it would appear that the respondent became aware of the entry in the service register in the year 1970. Admittedly, no action has been taken within five years thereafter. Under those circumstances, Rule 65 as referred to above is clear that his claim for alteration shall be summarily rejected without any further inquiry..” From the above it is clear that the date of knowledge is also relevant consideration and even after knowing that the date of birth has been wrongly entered, if the officer concerned did not take any effective legal steps, the claim should not be entertained by Court. 12. In 1994 Supp. (1) SCC-155 (Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department and others v. R. Kirubakaran), in paragraph 7 of the judgment, their Lordships considered about the tendency of the public servants coming forward with applications for change of date of birth, and what are the consequences that will follow if such suits are entertained. Paragraph 7 of the judgment reads thus:— “An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, in as much as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, in as much as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the office concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion for ever. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, in as much as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the office concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion for ever. Cases are not unknown when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior. According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the Court of the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the Court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the Court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be filed within the time, which can be held to be reasonable. The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of hi s date of birth, in his service book.” 13. In (1995) 2 SCC 82 (Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri), their Lordships dismissed a similar claim on the ground that the application was made beyond three years. In (1995) 3 SCC 17 ( Union of India & others v. Kantilal Hematram Pandya ), it was held that unexplained and inordinate delay in seeking interference by Court is sufficient to discard the claim. 14. On the basis of these decisions, let us consider the facts in the case on hand. The entire service record of the respondent is before Court. 14. On the basis of these decisions, let us consider the facts in the case on hand. The entire service record of the respondent is before Court. It is seen that he himself made an application to get himself enrolled to the Police Service. In page 9 of his Service Register, the original application filed by him is appended. The Application is dated 13-10-1941. Therein, he has said his age as 20 and he has also said that he has studied up to 8th standard. If he has represented that his age is 20 in October 1 941, naturally he must have be born in 1921. His application was accepted and thereafter he filed a declaration marked as Ex. B-1 in the case. Ex. B-1 reads thus:— “I, the applicant for admission to the Madras Police Force in the District of Chengalpattu, do solemnly and sincerely declare that the answers furnished by me for the following questions are entirely true and accurate. I realise that if I am enlisted and if the statements made by me are found to be false, I shall render myself to be dismissed for obtaining the employment under false pretext.” Such declaration was given on 1-11-1941. Thereafter, he himself fills up the various entries, and one such entry is the date of birth. He has declared that his date of birth is 1-6-1921. In the later portion, he himself has further declared that he has completed the age of 20. Thereafter, in Tamil, in his own hand, he has filled up the various other columns in the application. It was thereafter on his application he was appointed and he was taken as a Police Constable. Ex. B-2 is the further letter written by the plaintiff himself that his date of birth is 1-6-1921. 15. Sometime in 1955, the Postal Life Insurance Scheme was introduced. Plaintiff also wanted to join the Scheme and for that purpose, he filed the application dated 19-4-1955. As per the details given by him, he was also enrolled in the Scheme. The date of birth as entered in the P.L.I. Policy is 1-7-1921. It is further seen from the various other pages of the Service Register that on the date of enrollment, he has completed 20 years of age. As per the details given by him, he was also enrolled in the Scheme. The date of birth as entered in the P.L.I. Policy is 1-7-1921. It is further seen from the various other pages of the Service Register that on the date of enrollment, he has completed 20 years of age. In this connection, it may also be noted that if he had not completed 17 years of age on the date of enrollment, he would not have been qualified for recruitment. Knowing the consequences, and for the purpose of availing the benefit of employment, he himself represents that his date of birth is 1-6-1921. It was long thereafter, various applications have been filed by him to have the date of birth corrected. One by one those Applications were rejected. The first of such applications was sent in the year 1962. Plaintiff was informed that he himself has represented the date of birth as 1921, and if he wants to get a correction, he must be prepared to face a charge for giving false information, for getting himself enrolled as a constable. Even in the plaint, the various dates on which he sent representations and how the Department reached on the same, are stated. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, it is stated that his request for correction of his age from 1-6-1921 to 1-4-1925 was rejected by the Department as early as 24-8-1962. Thereafter, till 1978, various representations and reminders were being sent by him one after another and all those representations were rejected as time-barred. In the cause of action column, plaintiff has said that all his applications were dismissed, and the various dates are, 15-3-1962, 22-6-1966, 11-2-1962 and 7-2-1974. These are the only few dates referred to in the cause of action. But in evidence, it is seen that plaintiff has mentioned about various other representations which were also rejected. 16. In this connection, it may also be noted that in paragraph 4 of the plaint, he himself has admitted that there is an unauthorised entry or correction in the date of birth and he came to know about the Same in the year 1962. I have already said that the initial appointment was on the basis of his own application, wherein he has stated his date of birth as 1-6-1921. I have already said that the initial appointment was on the basis of his own application, wherein he has stated his date of birth as 1-6-1921. Thereafter, it is seen that the date has been corrected as 1-4-1925, which is again corrected as 1-6-1921. The case of the plaintiff is that the subsequent correction from 1-4-1925 to 1-6-1921 is without notice to him, and even about the subsequent unauthorised correction, he came to know in 1962. If the plaintiff has slept over the matter for 17 years, what is the legal consequence? 17. In A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1007 ( Inder Singh v. Delhi Development Authority ), the question that came for consideration was, whether there was any bar of limitation under the Arbitration Act for the contractor to seek for a Reference. The Application will have to be filed under S. 137 of the Indian Limitaiton Act, 1963, within a period of three years from the date when the cause of action arose. The question was, when does the cause of action arise? In paragraph 4 of the judgment, their Lordships have said thus:— “.It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under S. 8 or a reference under S. 20 of the Act.” From this, an inference can be drawn that a dispute arises when the claim is rejected. That is the date of cause of action. In this case, that was in the year 1962. The said decision was followed by the Supreme Court in (1993) 4 SCC 338 ( Panchu Gopal Bose v. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta ). Their Lordships said that all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are made application under the Arbitration Act also. Except the difference of the wordings, their Lordships said that for the purpose of Section 37(1) of the Arbitration Act, action and cause of action in the Limitation Act should be construed as ‘arbitration’ and cause of arbitration. Their Lordships said that all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are made application under the Arbitration Act also. Except the difference of the wordings, their Lordships said that for the purpose of Section 37(1) of the Arbitration Act, action and cause of action in the Limitation Act should be construed as ‘arbitration’ and cause of arbitration. It was further held that ‘The limitation would run from the date when cause of arbitration would have accrued, but for the agreement. Just as in the case of actions the claim is not to be brought after the expiration of a specified number of years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, so in the case of arbitration, the claim is not to be put forward after the expiration of the specified number of years from the date when the claim accrued’. 18. The above two decisions were followed by out High Court in a recent judgment reported in 1995-2-L.W. 694 (The Madras Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Madras-6 v. O. Ramakrishna Reddy) where also it was held that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders all of which were unsuccessful. From 1962 to 1978, the Government had only one particular stand that the claim is rejected. Merely a Writ Petition, on the basis of a direction in it will not change the nature of claim. The final reply was only a confirmation of the earlier one, i.e. , the reminder which was sent through direction of Court also stood rejected. If the plaintiff came to know that his date of birth was wrongly entered or corrected as 1921, and that too in the year 1962 itself, he cannot wait indefinitely till 1978 to have the same corrected. The suit is hopelessly barred. 19. In a very recent decision of our High Court, a learned Judge of this Court has also taken the same view. That is reported in (1996) 2 M.L.J. 464 =1996-1-L.W. 683 (M. Radhakrishnan v. The Dt. Educl. Officer, Dindigul). The learned Judge said that the relevant Article applicable in the present case is Articles 113 of the Limitation Act. As per the provision, the suit is to be filed within three years from the decree when the right so accrued. That is reported in (1996) 2 M.L.J. 464 =1996-1-L.W. 683 (M. Radhakrishnan v. The Dt. Educl. Officer, Dindigul). The learned Judge said that the relevant Article applicable in the present case is Articles 113 of the Limitation Act. As per the provision, the suit is to be filed within three years from the decree when the right so accrued. Admittedly, in this case, plaintiff was aware of the wrong entry in the E.S.L.C. book with regard to his date of birth and community even as early as in the year 1966. The suit is filed beyond the period prescribed under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act. i.e., three years. It was held that the suit was hopelessly barred. 20. In that view of the matter, I hold that the suit is barred by limitation. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff was sending reminders after reminders and only in the year 1975, he got the final reply pursuant to the Order in the writ petition and, therefore, the suit cannot be said as barred, has no support of law. That finding of the lower Appellate Court is, therefore, set aside. 21. Question No. 2 : According to me, in this case, the finding of the trial Court that the principle for estoppel applies is correct. Having given a declaration that what he has stated is true and also after having affirmed that he is ready to face the legal consequences of giving false information, and having obtained employment on the basis of the date of birth given by him, he cannot thereafter plead before Court that his date of birth has to be corrected. He took advantage of the date of birth given by him. But for that statement, he would not have been recruited, for, he would not have been qualified, on account of under-age. The defendants believed his statements and acted on the same. Plaintiff took benefit of the same and, for years together, he, availed the benefit, including the benefit of P.L.I. Now, at the fag end of his career, he wants to have the date of birth corrected, so that he can continue in service for a further period of four years. This, according to me, cannot be encouraged. Plaintiff has to fail in view of his own conduct. 22. The principle of estoppel squarely applies to the facts of the case. This, according to me, cannot be encouraged. Plaintiff has to fail in view of his own conduct. 22. The principle of estoppel squarely applies to the facts of the case. The lower Appellate Court has taken a strange view that since the second correction was made without notice to the plaintiff, he is entitled to continue in service for another period of four years. Before granting such relief, the Court should have ascertained as to what is the correct age, and what was the representation made by him before he was appointed. The decision of the lower Appellate Court has failed to do all these things. Therefore, the finding of the lower Appellate Court is set aside, and the judgment of the trial Court is restored. 23. Even though the trial court has dismissed the suit on the ground that Section 80. C.P.C. Notice has not been issued, I do not want to pronounce a decision on that point, since both the parties have fought the case on merits. 24. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed, and the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent is dismissed. The appellants are entitled to costs in all the three Courts.