Pundurang Barku Nathe v. Leela Pandurang Nathe and another
1997-07-10
VISHNU SAHAI
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J.:---By means of this revision application the petitioner has impugned the judgment and order dated 7-10-1992, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik, in Criminal Revision Application No. 191 of 1990, whereby the judgment and order dated 23-4-1990 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dindori, dismissing the application of respondent No. 1 for maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C has been reversed and the petitioner has been directed to pay to the respondent No. 1 maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. 2.The facts in brief are :- Respondent No. 1 Leela Pandurang Nathe, is the wife of the petitioner. The couple had 4 children; the eldest being a son, Rajaram. It is alleged by respondent No. 1 that the petitioner used to ill-treat her. One day the petitioner assaulted respondent No. 1 and drove her out of the house and also demanded divorce from her. In her application for maintenance respondent No. 1 alleged that the petitioner had refused to maintain her and prayed that as he was possessed of sufficient means she should be paid a monthly maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500/-. 3.Evidence was led by the parties before the trial Court. The defence of the petitioner was that since the respondent No. 1 was having illicit relations with Kashinath and Sahadu, she would be deemed to be living in adultery under the provisions contained in section 125(4) Cr.P.C. and hence would not be entitled to maintenance. The trial Magistrate accepted the defence of the petitioner and rejected respondent No. 1's application for maintenance. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the trial Court respondent No. 1 preferred a revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik and the same was allowed on 7-10-1992. By virtue of the said order the petitioner was directed to pay Rs. 150/- per month as maintenance to respondent No. 1 Aggrieved by the order dated 7-10-1992 the petitioner has preferred by the present revision. 4.I have heard Mr. M.D. Lonkar for the petitioner, Mr. P. Sharma holding for Mr. S.M. Gorwadkar for respondent No. 1, and Mr. M.I.P. Galeria, A.P.P for the respondent No. 2. 5.Mr.
150/- per month as maintenance to respondent No. 1 Aggrieved by the order dated 7-10-1992 the petitioner has preferred by the present revision. 4.I have heard Mr. M.D. Lonkar for the petitioner, Mr. P. Sharma holding for Mr. S.M. Gorwadkar for respondent No. 1, and Mr. M.I.P. Galeria, A.P.P for the respondent No. 2. 5.Mr. Lonkar for the petitioner has assailed the order of the Additional Sessions Judge on the ground that he was sitting as a Revisional Court and it was not proper for him to disturb the appreciation of evidence of the trial Court pertaining to the illicit relationship of respondent No. 1 with Sahadu and Kashinath. Mr. Lonkar urged that simply on a contradiction in the evidence of the petitioner and his son Rajaram on this aspect the case of illicit relationship has been rejected. Mr. Lonkar further urged that the Additional Sessions Judge has proceeded on the erroneous premise that this it was a stray occasion on which respondent No. 1 was seen having sexual intercourse with Sahadu. He urged that the Additional Sessions Judge has ignored the evidence of Rajaram which shows that on two other occasions he saw respondent No. 1 sleeping with others; once with Kashinath and once with Sahadu. In short Mr. Lonkar's contention is that there was sufficient evidence for the trial Court to conclude that since respondent No. 1 was living in adultery she was not entitled for maintenance and the Additional Sessions Judge erred in reversing its conclusion. 6.I have reflected over the submissions canvassed by Mr. Lonkar. I am inclined to agree with him that the Additional Sessions Judge, erred in not holding that respondent No. 1, had illicit relationship with Kashinath and Sahadu. But in my view this would not disentitle her from claiming maintenance from the petitioner for she would not be deemed to be "living in adultery" within the meaning of section 125(4) Cr.P.C. 7.Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. reads thus: "125(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent." A perusal of the said provision would show that a wife who is living in adultery would not be entitled for maintenance.
8.In my view the expression "living in adultery" in the sense in which it is used in section 125 Cr.P.C. connotes a wife living perpetually or semi perpetually as a wife with a male, other than her husband and having sexual relations with him. Sporadic instances of sexual relationship between a wife and a person other than her husband, would not fall within the ambit of the expression 'living in adultery'. Laymen invariably and men of law often treat the concept of wife living in adultery as synonymous with a wife occasionally committing adultery. The two are distinct and if the distinction is overlooked as it has been by the trial Court, the result would be gross miscarriage of justice. It is only a wife living in adultery who is not entitled for maintenance under section 125(4) Cr.P.C.; a wife who is occasionally guilty of committing adultery would not forfeit her claim for maintenance under the said section. 9.I am fortified in my view by the observations of Tekchand, J., in the decision rendered in (Ramsaran v. Soman Wati)1 1964(1) Cri.L.J. 483 (Punj). The said observation which are found at page 486 read thus : "'Living in adultery' is living together as husband and wife and exercising sexual rights and duties implied by such relation when legally created. Proof of occasional acts of illicit intercourse may fall short of what in intended by the expression 'living in adultery'. It suggests a man and the wife of another living continually as husband and wife. An adulterous intercourse is a condition contemplating repetition of extra marital relationship when opportunity offers itself. It is a condition of cohabitation in contradistinction to occasional acts. The wife forfeits her right to be maintained on proof of repeated adulterous meetings." 10.It would be pertinent to point out that the said observations were approved by Maheswaran, J., in the case of (Kasthuri v. Ramasamy)2, reported in 1979 Cr.L.J. 741.
It is a condition of cohabitation in contradistinction to occasional acts. The wife forfeits her right to be maintained on proof of repeated adulterous meetings." 10.It would be pertinent to point out that the said observations were approved by Maheswaran, J., in the case of (Kasthuri v. Ramasamy)2, reported in 1979 Cr.L.J. 741. Maheswaran, J., observed as under : "The term 'living in adultery' has now been consistently held to mean an outright adulterous conduct when the wife lives in a quasi- permanent union with the man with whom she is committing adultery." 11.It is bearing in mind the above connotation expression "living in adultery" that it has to be decided whether the trial Court was justified in holding that since respondent No. 1 was living in adultery she had forfeited her claim for maintenance. My answer is in the negative. 12.Even accepting the evidence of Rajaram, which is in a span of over two years, he had seen his mother (respondent No. 1, having sexual intercourse, on one occasion and on two other occasions sleeping with other persons; once each with Sahadu and Kashinath. It still cannot be concluded that respondent No. 1 was living in adultery with the said persons. At the best what can be said is that she was occasionally guilty of committing adultery. 13.Since the only ground assigned by the trial Court for not giving maintenance to respondent No. 1 was that she was living in adultery with Kashinath and Sahadu and the said ground is untenable, the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik, whereby the order passed by the trial Court has been reversed, warrants no interference. 14.In the result this revision application is dismissed, interim order is vacated and the rule is discharged. 15.Office is directed to send the record and proceedings to the trial Court by or before 17-7-1997. Revision application allowed.