Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. Application arises from a pre-emption proceeding in terms of Sec.16 (3) of the Bihar land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act. The material facts of this case are brief and can be stated thus. The disputed piece of land, measuring 7 dhurs and 15 dhurkis in area of plot No.1119 apperg taining to khata No.23 and situated at village Bareja under Kopa police station in the district of Saran was purchased by respondent No.6 for a consideration of rs.3,000.00 from respondent No.7. The purchase was made under a sale deed executed on 9/2/1990; the registration of the sale deed was completed on 8/10/ 1991. On 19/11/1991, respondent No.5 filed an application for pre-emption claiming to be an adjacent raiyat of the disputed land. Prior to the filing of the pre-emption application, respondent no.6 on 7/11/1990 executed a sale deed transferring the disputed land in the petitioners favour. The registration of the 2nd sale deed in the petitioners favour was completed on 2/5/1992. The second transfree is the petitioner before this Court, the second sale deed was executed prior to the filing of the preemption application but its registration was completed after the institution of the proceedings. It is also of importance to note that once the fact of the subsequent transfer came to light, the pre-emptor got the petitioner, the 2nd transferee, impleaded as an opposite party in the pre-emption proceeding which was decided by the Court of the 1st instance, against the pre-emptor, in presence of the petitioner 2. The Incharge D. C. L. R. Sadar, chapra, by his order dated 7-9-1992 (Annexure 2) passed in L. C. Case No.25/1991 rejected the claim of pre-emption and found that the pre-emption application, orginally made against respondent No.6 with a deposit made as per the consideration amount shown in the sale deed dated 9-2-1990 was not maintainable. According to him, the pre-emptor should have filed a pre-emptor application only against the 2nd transferee making a deposit on the basis of the consideration amount shown in the subsequent sale deed dated 7-11-1990 in the petitioners favour. An appeal filed by respondent No.5 against this order was allowed by order dated 14-6-1993 (Annexure 3) passed by the addl. Collector, Saran in L. C. Case no.25/1992. An appeal filed by respondent No.5 against this order was allowed by order dated 14-6-1993 (Annexure 3) passed by the addl. Collector, Saran in L. C. Case no.25/1992. The petitioner sought to challenge the appellate order by filing a revision before the Board of Revenue which was dismissed by order dated 24/4/1995 (Annexure 4) passed by the addl. Member, Board of Revenue in case No.265/1993. The petitioner has now come to this Court challenging the appellate and the revisional orders. 3. Before proceeding to examine the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is to be noted that both the appellate and the revisional authorities found that respondent No.5, the pre-emptor, was a boundry raiyat of the disputed piece of land. Indeed, there does not appear to be any escape from this finding as the name of the pre-emptor is shown in the northern boundry of the vended land in the sale deed dated 9/2/ 1990. It is also undeniable that neither the first purchaser, respondents No.6 nor the subsequent purchaser, the petitioner have any land in the boundry of the disputed land. The 2nd significant finding recorded by the revenue authorities is that the subsequent sale in favour of the petitioner was sham and Farzi and the original purchaser, respondent No.6, had no intention to part with the land. For this finding, which was recorded in presence of the petitioner, the Board of Revenue has given some very good and cogent reasons. 4. In these facts and circumstances, mr. M. N. Parbat, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the subsequent sale having been executed prior to the filing of the preemption application, the pre-emptors claim was fit to be rejected. According to Mr. Parbat, the pre-emptor could lawfully maintain his claim only by making an application in respect of the second sale deed, impleading the petitioner as an opposite party in such an application and after making the statutory deposit in accordance with the consideration amount shown in the 2nd sale deed. Learned counsel contended thai merely impleading the petitioner, the 2nd transferee, as an opposite party in the pending proceeding was not sufficient and for this reason his application for pre-emption was liable to be rejected. 5. Learned counsel contended thai merely impleading the petitioner, the 2nd transferee, as an opposite party in the pending proceeding was not sufficient and for this reason his application for pre-emption was liable to be rejected. 5. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon decisions of this Court (i) Ram Chandra Yadav V/s. Anutha Yadav and others, 19971 B. L. J. R.994, (ii) Raju Kumar Prasad and another v. the Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, bihar, Patna and others, 1985 P. L. J. R.215 and (iii) Saryug Prasad Singh V/s. Saryu Singh and others, 1986 B. L. J.89. 6. Taking up the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel one by one, I find that the bench decision in the case of Ram Chandra Yadav instead of helping the petitioner actually goes against him. In that decision, it was noted that in the context of a claim for pre-emption there were three possible ways in which the 2nd transfer could be made; one where a second sale deed was executed and its registration was completed before the filing of the pre-emption application in respect of the first sale deed. In such a case a pre-emption application could naturally be filed only in respect of the 2nd sale; (ii) the second possibility was where the second sale deed was executed after the institution of the pre-emption proceeding. In such a case the 2nd sale would be hit by doctrine of lis pendence and (iii) the third possibility was where though the 2nd sale deed was executed before the filing of the pre-emption application, its registration was completed after the institution of the pre-emption proceeding. 7. The case in hand falls in the 3rd category. The Division Bench decision in Ram Chandra Yadavs case held that in the cases falling in the 3rd category, it was obligatory for the pre-emptor to implead the 2nd transferee as a party in his application under Sec.16 (3) and to seek such relief as may be available to him in presence of the 2nd transferee. This is precisely what the pre-emptor did in this case. The decision in Ram chandra Yadavs case nowhere said that even in a case of the 3rd category, the pre-emption application could only be filed in respect of the 2nd sale deed after making the statutory deposit on the basis of the consideration amount shown in the 2nd sale deed. This is precisely what the pre-emptor did in this case. The decision in Ram chandra Yadavs case nowhere said that even in a case of the 3rd category, the pre-emption application could only be filed in respect of the 2nd sale deed after making the statutory deposit on the basis of the consideration amount shown in the 2nd sale deed. 8. The second Division Bench decision in Raju Kumar Prasad s case was also on a completely different set of facts. In that decision, the application for pre-emption was filed and the 2nd sale deed was executed on the same date. The pre-emptor had filed his application in respect of the first sale and though one of the grounds on which his claim was resisted was that the disputed land had been subjected to a second sale, he did not implead the 2nd purchaser as an opposite party before the court of the 1st instance. Not only this, then at the appellate stage the 2nd transferee made an application to be impleaded as a party in the appeal, the pre-emptor resisted the prayer of the 2nd transferee as a result of which he was not brought on the record of the proceeding. It was in this background that this Court held, and in my respectful opinion, quite rightly, that the claim of pre-emption was not maintainable. 9. In Saryug Prasad Singhs case, it is indeed true that a learned single judge of this Court held that no order of pre-emption could be made against the original purchaser as the order would be futile and infructuous, the original purchaser by virtue of a second sale having lost his title to the property. According to this decision a claim of pre-emption, therefore, should be made against the subsequent purchaser at the proper time by depositing the proper sum for obtaining the relief of pre-emption. The learned single Judge seems to have arrived at the above proposition on the basis of an earlier Division bench decision in Smt. Sudama Devi and ors. V/s. Rajendra Singh and others, air 1973 Pat.199 and has relied upon the observations made in paras 12, 13 and 14 of the said Division Bench decision. The learned single Judge seems to have arrived at the above proposition on the basis of an earlier Division bench decision in Smt. Sudama Devi and ors. V/s. Rajendra Singh and others, air 1973 Pat.199 and has relied upon the observations made in paras 12, 13 and 14 of the said Division Bench decision. With utmost respect, it appears to me that the learned single judge in Saryug Prasad Singhs case failed to notice the special set of facts in the case of Smt, Sudama Devi That case also was in the 3rd category, that is to say, a second sale deed was executed prior to the filing of the pre-emption application but the registration of the sale deed was completed after the institution of the proceeding. In that case when the fact of the second sale came to light before the Court of the 1st instance, the pre-emptor filed an application for adding the second transferee as a party to the application under Section 16 (3) of the Act. This Court found that the second transferee was not formally added as a party to the proceeding but notice was issued to him. The second transferee appeared and filed a show cause petition. The Court of the 1st in-stance dismissed the pre-emption application on the ground that the land had been subjected to a second sale prior to the filing of the application. The pre-emptors filed an appeal im-pleading only the original seller and the vendor. The second transferee was not made a party to this appeal. Later on, the pre-emptors filed an application before the appellate authority for adding the second transferee as a party to the appeal but this prayer was refused. Finally the appellate authority set aside the order passed by the Court of the 1st instance and allowed the pre-emption application. The position, therefore, was that the claim of pre-emption was allowed in the absence of the second transferee and it was in this background that this Court made the observation that if a sale deed was executed before the filing of the suit but was registered later, then such a transfer was not pen-dente lite, and the transferee became the owner of the property. 10. 10. With utmost respect, therefore, i am of the view that all that the division Bench decision in Sudama devis case said was to reiterate that in a case of the 3rd category, the second transferee must also be brought on the record and the claim of pre-emption must be decided in his presence. The decision in Sudama Devis case nowhere appears to have said that in such a case the claim of pre-emption can be raised only in respect of the second sale after making deposit in accordance with the consideration amount shown in the second sale deed. 11. Moreover, I find that the single judge decision in Saryugpd. Singhs case failed to notice two direct Division bench decisions on the point, one in ram Chandra Yadavs case, 1971 b. L. J. R.994 and the second in Ganesh pd. and others, V. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1985 Pat.309. The Division bench decision in Ganesh Prasads, case is directly on the point and in paras 6 and 7 of that decision, it was observed as follows: "6. The grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioners in both the cases is that, the pre-emptionrs application ought to have been filed against the subsequent sale deed dated 22nd January, 1977. According to Sec.16 (3) of the act, an application under Sec.16 (3) of the Act can be filed within the three months from the date of the registration. In view of the fact that the second sale deed was not registered till 9th February, 1977, as such the court below was right in holding that no pre-emption application can be filed against the subsequent sale deed dated 22nd January, 1977 as the same was not registered till 9th February 1977. It is, therefore, clear that the preemption application was maintainable so far as the 1st sale deed is concerned. "7. A pre-emption application is required to be filed against the 1st sale deed. The only thing which is required is that the vendor of the second sale deed ought to be added as a party in the preemption application. It is an admitted position that the petitioners in CWJC No.72 of 1979 who are the subsequent purchasers have been added as parties in the preemption case. Therefore, in the present case, no prejudice will be caused to the subsequent purchasers. It is an admitted position that the petitioners in CWJC No.72 of 1979 who are the subsequent purchasers have been added as parties in the preemption case. Therefore, in the present case, no prejudice will be caused to the subsequent purchasers. Hence, I hold that in a case of this type, it is not necessary to file a pre-emption application in respect of the subsequent sale deed which was not registered on the date of filing an application for pre-emption. It is also not necessary to file a pre-emption application against the subsequent sale deed as all the authorities have concurrently held that the subsequent sale deed is a sham transaction. " 12. I may further note that following the Division Bench decision in ganesh Prasads case (supra), I had taken a similar view in Fauzdari Choud-hary V/s. The Addl. Member, Board of revenue, 1992 B. B. C. J.679. It is, thus, apparent to me that the view taken by the learned single Judge in Saryug Pd. Singhs case, 1986 B. L. J.89 is in direct conflict with two earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court and that decision therefore, cannot be said to lay down the correct law. 13. For the reasons stated above, I am unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. At this stage, it may further be added that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the submissions made by Mr. Par-bat, on behalf of the petitioner, must also fail for the simple reason that the revenue authorities found that the second transfer was sham and Farzi and that finding of fact is unassailable. 14. On the basis of the above, I find no merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed. Application Dismissed.