M. S. PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) THE short question which has been presented before this Court is whether section 32-A of The Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ndps Act) would apply to a case where the offence has been committed before 29th may 1989 from which date the said provision of Section 32-A came into operation as newly added in the NDPS Act by section 10 of Act No. 2 of 1989. ( 2 ) IN so far as Special Criminal Application no. 1175 of 1996 is concerned it has been alleged that the offence was committed before 21st February 1988, but the judgment and order of conviction and sentence was rendered on 28th November 1989; that is to say, after 29th May 1989. In Special Criminal Application No. 101 of 1997 the offence was committed prior to 26th September 1987, but the prisoner was convicted and sentenced by Judgment and order dated 11th May 1990, that is to say, after 29th May 1989. In Special Criminal Application No. 1061 of 1996 the offence was committed before 28th February 1989, but the prisoner was convicted and sentenced by judgment and order dated 12th June 1991, that is to say after 29th May 1989. In Special Criminal Application No. 473 of 1997 the date of offence is prior to 6th august 1986, whereas the date of conviction and sentence is 2nd June 1990, that is to say, after 29th May 1989. ( 3 ) IN the background of the aforesaid brief facts the common submissions made on behalf of the petitioners is that the remissions which were available to the offenders under the NDPS Act prior to the insertion of Section 32-A in the said Act should be made available to the prisoners who are the petitioners before this Court since in their case the offence was committed prior to 29th May 1989 when Section 32-A came to be in operation as newly added in the NDPS Act. In reply it has been submitted that this Court has already held in different matters that newly added provision of Section 32-A of the NDPS act is prospecive in operation and the benefit of remissions cannot be extended to the cases where the conviction and sentence came to be imposed by the Trial court after 29th May 1989, the date from which the newly added Section 32-A has come into operation. It was further contended by Mr. D. N. Patel, learned A. P. P. that suspension, remission or commutation comes into operation only upon or after conviction and not prior thereto and therefore also applicability of Section 32-A of the NDPS Act is to be determined with reference to date of conviction. Thus, in these petitions the modality or the mechanism of prospective operation of Section 32-A of the NDPS Act is required to be laid down. ( 4 ) MR. R. M. Agrawal and Ms. Madhuben Sharma, learned Advocates appearing for the rival petitioners have placed reliance upon a Bench decision of Delhi high Court in the case of Waisuddin v. State and ors. , reported in VI 1994 (2) crimes 490 . The learned Advocates fairly conceded that in the case before the Delhi high Court not only the date of offence, but also the date of conviction and sentence preceded the date of insertion of Section 32-A into NDPS Act. However, the question which was stated for being answered by the Delhi High Court is whether Section 32-A would apply to a case where the offence has been committed before 29th may 1989 and the Division Bench has answered the question in negative by saying that the said provision would not apply to a case where the offence is committed prior to that date. It was canvassed before the delhi High Court that by virtue of Article 20 of the Constitution of India such prisoner cannot be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission of the offence. In reply it has been submitted that the remissions which are granted are by way of concession and not as a matter of right. No direct decision was stated to have been cited before the Bench, but reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar nath Hajoria and anr. In reply it has been submitted that the remissions which are granted are by way of concession and not as a matter of right. No direct decision was stated to have been cited before the Bench, but reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar nath Hajoria and anr. v. State of West bengal, reported in AIR 1953 SC 404 holding that on proper construction of article 20 of the Constitution, the sentence of fine to the extent of Rs. 47,550/- will, in any event, be required to be set aside. The observations of the Apex Court have been reproduced in Para : 8 of the citation. They would read as under :"as regards the fine of Rs. 50,000/- inflicted on the first appellant, Mr. Chatterjee objected that it could not stand to the extent of Rs. 47,550/- found to have been received by the first appellant by the commission of the offence, as it is in contravention of Article 20 of the Constitution which provides, inter alia, that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. The offences for which the first appellant has been convicted were all committed in 1947, whereas the Act which authorised the imposition of the additional punishment by way of fine equivalent to the amount of money or value of other property found to have been procured by the offender by means of the offence came into force in June 1949. Mr. Chatterjee urged that Article 20 on its true construction prohibits the imposition of such fine even in cases where the prosecution was pending at the commencement of the Constitution. This question, which turns on the proper construction of the article, was recently considered and decided in Rao shiva Bahadur Singh v. The State of vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 (G), and according to the decision the sentence of fine to the extent of Rs. 47,550/- will be set aside in any event. " ( 5 ) THE celebrated decision of the Apex court in the case of Maru Ram and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 47,550/- will be set aside in any event. " ( 5 ) THE celebrated decision of the Apex court in the case of Maru Ram and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in A. I. R. 1980 SC 2147 also came to be referred to, but the Bench said that the said case did not directly deal with the question required to be answered although it would provide considerable light and guideline for answering the question. The scope of applicability of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal procedure as also the constitutional validity thereof were some of the questions which came up for consideration in Maru Rams case (supra ). In that case it was held that section 433-A of the Code which came into force on 18th December 1978 would not be applicable where conviction is before the date. Following observations have been reproduced by the Delhi Bench :"it is trite law that civilised criminal jurispudance interdicts retroactive impost of heavier suffering by a later law. "and"the sound rationale is that expectation of convicted citizens of regaining freedom on existing legal practices should not be frustrated by subsequent legislation or practice unless the language is beyond doubt. "reference has then been made to the conclusion of the Apex Court with regard to the date from which Section 433-A introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable and the same has been explained in Para : 10 by the Delhi High court in the following manner :"in Maru Rams decision the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 433- a of the Code based on Article 20 ( 1) of the constitution failed because the Supreme court was considering the question of remission not in the case of imprisonment for fixed term sentence but in the case of life imprisonment and agreeing with earlier decisions, it said life sentence is nothing less than life long imprisonment. The Supreme court, however, added a word of caution that different consideration may weigh while considering a withdrawal of remission in case of fixed term sentences. To quote : "may be, difference may exist in cases of fixed term sentences. Cooley lends support : Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, vol. I, 8th Edn. p. 544. The Supreme court, however, added a word of caution that different consideration may weigh while considering a withdrawal of remission in case of fixed term sentences. To quote : "may be, difference may exist in cases of fixed term sentences. Cooley lends support : Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, vol. I, 8th Edn. p. 544. Privilege existing at time of commission of offence (e. g. privilege of earning a shortening of sentence by good behaviour) cannot be taken away by subsequent statute. "the Bench, therefore, proceeded to consider the question of withdrawal of benefit 6f remission by a subsequent legislation, viz. Section 32-A which was not on the statue book at the time of commission of offence in the case of fixed term sentence. It was held that the answer would depend upon whether the strict interpretation is placed on the said provision and the Bench answered that there were no compelling reasons for favouring a strict interpretation as suggested by the State. The Bench observed :"the hard fact and reality is that if section 32-A is held to be applicable where offence is committed after its enforcement, it would result in offender being subjected to longer period of incarceration as compared to the shorter period of incarceration had Section 32-A been not here on the statute book. It is possible that the petitioner may not have undergone full term of imprisonment of 10 years if after commission of offence Section 32-A had not been brought on the statute book. In absence of section 32-A the petitioner may have been granted remission. The result of making section 32-A applicable to the petitioner would be to deprive him of the benefit to which he would have been entitled under the law in force at the time of commission of offence. The effect of remission is reduction of actual period of incarceration. The acceptance of the stand of the same may throw open the question about the constitutional validity of Section 32-A itself as being violative of Article 20 (1) of the constitution. The strict interpretation would frustrate the expectation of regaining freedom at an early date on the basis of existing policy of remission. The liberal interpretation may reduce actual period to be undergone in jail. The strict interpretation would frustrate the expectation of regaining freedom at an early date on the basis of existing policy of remission. The liberal interpretation may reduce actual period to be undergone in jail. Even if two views are possible and we have to err, we would prefer the view and err on the side which favours personal liberty of a convicted person and may ressult in reducing his period of imprisonment. The other view will increase the period of actual imprisonment. We do not think that Section 32-A admits of an interpretation that it is applicable to offences committed prior to its enforcement. In our view Section 32-A is prospective in its operation. It applies to a case where offence has been committed after its enforcement. " ( 6 ) IN answer to what has been laid down by the Delhi High Court Mr. D. N. Patel, learned A. P. P. for the respondents firstly submitted that in all the matters decided by this Court Maru Rams case (supra) has been relied upon by holding that Section 32-A of the NDPS Act is prospective in operation vis-a-vis the date of conviction and sentence as per the Trial Courts Judgment. Reference in this connection was made to number of decisions, one of which has been reported in 37 (2) GLR 818 (Dineshbhai Somabhai Patel v. I. G. , pripsons ). The question which was presented before this Court was whether section 32-A of the NDPS Act had retrospective operation in respect of all offences under the said Act. Section 32-A was reproduced in Para 4 of the said citation and the same might be reproduced here :"32-A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act. Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Sec. 27) shall be suspended or remitted or committed. " (Emphasis may be noted.) the question which was considered by this Court was whether the aforesaid newly added provision of the Act would be attracted in a case where the conviction and sentences were rendered before the said provision was introduced in the statute book (29. 5. 1989 ). " (Emphasis may be noted.) the question which was considered by this Court was whether the aforesaid newly added provision of the Act would be attracted in a case where the conviction and sentences were rendered before the said provision was introduced in the statute book (29. 5. 1989 ). There was an argument from the side of the Government that looking to all the pervasive provisions under section 32-A of the NDPS Act, 1985 the prisoner would not be entitled to any remission whatsoever which would otherwise be available to him under the Jail Rules. The court refused to accept this contention and held, relying upon Maru Rams case (supra) that the aforesaid newly added provision was not retrospective or retroactive in operation and that neither expressly nor by necessary implication the said provision could be said to be retrospective or retroactive in operation. The question here is what should be the modality or mechanism of prospective operation of aforesaid provision. The submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the relevant date would be the date of offence and if the date of offence is earlier to 29. 5. 1989 (the date on which the aforesaid provision was added), the benefit of remissions, etc. as available under the relevant provision of the Code would continue to be available to such prisoner irrespective of the fact that such prisoner has been convicted and sentenced after 29. 5. 1989. For the purpose of answering the question reference will have once again to be made to what the Constitution Bench said in Maru Rams case. It might be noticed that Section 433-A was introduced in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II of 1974) by Act No. 45 of 1978. 5. 1989. For the purpose of answering the question reference will have once again to be made to what the Constitution Bench said in Maru Rams case. It might be noticed that Section 433-A was introduced in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II of 1974) by Act No. 45 of 1978. The said provision would read as under :"433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases - notwithstanding anything contained in section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishment provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment:" (Emphasis supplied.) ( 7 ) IF the provision of Section 32-A quoted hereinabove is compared with the provision of Section 433-A for the limited purpose of interpretation of the provision it can be seen that relevant phraseology is "sentence imposed". On a reference to maru Rams case (supra) it can as well be seen that the Apex Court considered whether Section 433-A is prospective in operation. To that extent there is no difficulty in reading the decision of this Court as well as the decision of the Delhi High court together. However, the difficulty arises in working out the mechanism of prospective operation of the provision. The apex Court has in fact worked out the mechanism of prospective operation in so far as Section 433-A of the Code is concerned. Accordingly, every person who has been convicted by the sentencing Court before December 18, 1978 (the date on which the said provision was newly added) shall be entitled to the benefit accruing him from the Remission Scheme or the short- sentencing projects as if Section 433-A did not stand in his way. Even if the Appellate court reverses the earlier acquittal rendered before Section 433-A came into force but allows the Appeals and convicts the accused after Section 433-A came into force, such person will also be entitled to the benefit of remission system prevailing prior to Section 433-A. In that event the appellate conviction must relate back to the date of Trial Courts verdict. So also, the person whose death has been commuted shall be entitled to benefit of remission and short sentencing project if the same was commutted before Section 433-A came into force. Coming to this conclusion the Apex court did say that civilised criminal jurisprudence interdicts retroactive impost of heavier suffering by a later law and that ordinarily, a criminal legislation must be so interpreted as to speak futuristically. It has then been observed : "what we mean to do is so to read the predicate used in Section 433-A as to yield a natural result, a human consequence, a just infliction. While there is no vested right for any convict who has received a judicial sentence to contend that the penalty should be softened and that the law which compels the penalty to be carried out in full cannot apply to him, it is the function of the court to adopt a liberal construction when dealing with a criminal statute in the ordinary course of things. This humanely inspired canon, not applicable to certain terribly antisocial categories may legitimately be applied to Section 433-A. (The sound rationale is that expectations of convicted citizens of regaining freedom on existing legal practices should not be frustrated by subsequent legislation or practice unless the language is beyond doubt.) Liberality in ascertaining the sense may ordinarily err on the side of liberty where the quantum of deprivation of freedom is in issue. In short, the benefit of doubt, other things being equal, must go to the citizen in penal statute. With this prefatory caution, we may read the section, "where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person. . . such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment. " Strict conformity to tense applied by a precision grammarian may fault the draftsman for using the past-perfect tense. That apart, the plain meaning of this clause is that "is"means "is" and, therefore, if a person is sentenced to imprisonment for life after Section 433- a comes into force, such sentence shall not be released before the 14-year condition set out therein is fulfilled. More precisely, any person who has been convicted before section 433-A comes into force goes out of the pale of the provision and will enjoy such benefits as accrued to him before Section 433-A entered, Chapter XXXII. More precisely, any person who has been convicted before section 433-A comes into force goes out of the pale of the provision and will enjoy such benefits as accrued to him before Section 433-A entered, Chapter XXXII. The other clause in the provision suggests the application of the mandatory minimum to cases of commutation which have already been perfected, and reads : "where a sentence of death. . . has been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment. The draftman, apparently is not a grammarian. He uses the tenses without being finical. We are satisfied that even this latter clause merely means that if a sentence of death has been commuted after this section comes into force such person shall not be released until the condition therein is complied with. "is" and "has" are not words which are weighed in the scales of grammar nicely enough in this Section and, therefore, overstress on the present tense and the present perfect tense may not be a clear indicator. The general rule bearing on ordinary penal statutes in their construction must govern this case. In another situation, interpreting the import of "has been sentenced" this Court held that "the language of the clause is natural" regarding prospectivity. Bouche, pierre Andre v. Supdt. , Central Jail, Tihar (1975) 1 SCR 192 at p. 195, ( AIR 1975 sc 164 ). It inevitably follows that every person who has been convicted by the sentencing court before December 18, 1978, shall be entitled to the benefits accruing to him from the Remission Scheme or short- sentencing project as if Section 433-A did not stand in his way. The Section uses the. word conviction of a person and, in the context, it must mean conviction by the sentencing court for that first quantified his deprivation of personal liberty. " with regard to applicablity of Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India the Apex court said that Section 433-A introduced in the Code is a specific explicit definite provision dealing with particular situation or narrow class of cases as distinguished from general rule of cases covered by Section 432 of the Code. " with regard to applicablity of Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India the Apex court said that Section 433-A introduced in the Code is a specific explicit definite provision dealing with particular situation or narrow class of cases as distinguished from general rule of cases covered by Section 432 of the Code. It can thus be seen that the mechanism of prospective operation of section 433-A newly introduved in the code has specifically been laid down by the apex Court in Maru Rams case (supra ). On the other hand Article 20 (1) of the constitution of India is said not to adversely affect the provision under consideration by the Apex Court. Section 433-A has also been held to be a specific explicit and definite provision dealing with a particular situation or narrow class of cases. In so far as the present cases are concerned the legislation in the form of NDPS Act is a special class of legislation affecting only specific class of offences. The newly introduced provision of Section 32-A of the Act has to be viewed from this angle. It would be interesting to see what His Lordship fazal AH, J. expressing the minority view has said in Para 97 of the citation :"taking into account the modern trends in penology there are very rare cases where, the courts impose a sentence of death and even if in some cases where such sentences are given, by the time the case reaches this court, a bare minimum of the cases are left where death sentences are upheld. Such cases are only those in which imposition of a death sentence becomes as imperative necessity having regard to the nature and character of the offence, the antecedents of the offender and other factors referred to in the Constitution Bench judgment of this court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 , P ( AIR 1980 SC 898 ). In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Parliament in its wisdom chose to act in order to prevent criminal committing heinous crimes from being released through easy remissions or substituted form of punishments without undergoing at least a minimum period of imprisonment of fourteen years which may in fact act as a sufficient deterrent which may prevent criminals from committing offences. In most parts of our country, particularly in the north, cases are not uncommon where even a person sentenced to imprisonment for life and having come back after earning a number of remissions has committed repeated offences. The mere fact that a long term sentence or for that matter sentence of death has not produced useful result cannot support the argument either for abolition of death sentence or for reducing the sentence of life imprisonment from 14 years to something less. The question is not what has happened because of the provisions of the penal Code but what would have happened if deterrent punishments were not given. In the present distressed and disturbed atmosphere we feel that if deterrent punishment is not resorted to, there will be complete chaos in the entire country and criminals will be let loose endangering the lives of thousands of innocent people of our country. In spite of all the resources at its hands, it will be difficult for the State to protect or guarantee the life and liberty of all the citizens, if criminals are let loose and deterrent punishment is either abolished or mitigated. Secondly, while reformation of the criminal is only one side of the picture, rehabilitation of the victims and granting relief from the tortures and suffering which are caused to them as a result of the offences committed by the criminals is a factor which seems to have been completely overlooked while defending the cause of the criminals for abolishing deterrent sentences. Where one person commits three murders it is illogical to plead for the criminal and to argue that his life should be spared, without at all considering what has happened to the victims and their family. A person who has deprived another person completely of his liberty for ever and has endangered the liberty of his family has no right to ask the court to uphold his liberty. Liberty is not a one sided concept, nor does Article 21 of the Constitution contemplates such a concept. If a person commits a criminal offence and punishment has been given to him by a procedure established by law which is free and fair and where the accused has been fully heard, no question of violation of Article 21 arises when the question of punishment is being considered. If a person commits a criminal offence and punishment has been given to him by a procedure established by law which is free and fair and where the accused has been fully heard, no question of violation of Article 21 arises when the question of punishment is being considered. Even so, the provisions of the Code of criminal Procedure of 1973, do provide an opportunity to the offender, after his guilt is proved, to show circumstances under which an appropriate sentence could be imposed on him. These guarantees sufficiently comply with the provisions of article 21. Thus, it seems to me that while considering the problem of penology we should not Overlook the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die/suffer or are maimed at the hands of criminals. " ( 8 ) THE need for reproducing the aforesaid para of the minority view may be visualised in the nature of the offences dealt with in the present legislation (NDPS Act ). The drug offences dealt with in this legislation aftect public at large. Above all the childhood and the youth would be at stake as a result of commission of these drug offences. It can thus be seen that the interest of the society at large is involved. The object of the present legislation has been stated in a Full Bench decision of this court in Jyotikaben Ramlal Purohit w/o. Prisoner Ramlal Gallaji Purohit v. State of gujarat and Anr. , reported in XXXVII (l) - 1996 (1) G. L. R. 395. That has also been borne in mind while upholding Section 32- a of the NDPS Act in Ishwarsinh M. Rajput v. State of Gujarat, reported in xxxi (2) - 1990 (2) G. L. R. 1365. This court has observed that there is no infraction of any Article of the Constitution of india by Section 32-A of the NDPS Act and that the classification of the prisoners convicted under this Act and those convicted under other law has a reasonable rationale. The majority view in Maru rams case (supra) also specifically refers to terribly antisocial categories of offences. Thus, the offences under the NDPS Act (as referred to in Section 32-A thereof), though fixed sentence offences, would provide a class of terribly antisocial offences, and therefore also the reading of the provision should follow the mechanism pointed out in mam Rams case. Thus, the offences under the NDPS Act (as referred to in Section 32-A thereof), though fixed sentence offences, would provide a class of terribly antisocial offences, and therefore also the reading of the provision should follow the mechanism pointed out in mam Rams case. Plain reading of the provision will also not indicate any different or contrary mechanism. ( 9 ) THE result is that if one keeps in mind the object and purpose of the present legislation, if one visualises the nature of the offences, if one bears in mind the mechanism/modality of prospective operation worked out in Maru Rams Case (supra) and if one resorts to plain reading of the provision, it can hardly be said that Section 32-A would not apply to the cases where the offence is committed prior to the date of insertion of Section 32-A in the NDPS Act in spite of the fact that the conviction and sentence are rendered after 29. 5. 1989. I am, therefore, unable to convince myself to agree with the view taken by the Delhi high Court and have to find that newly inserted provision of Section 32-A of the ndps Act would be applicable to all those cases where the conviction and sentence have been rendered by the Trial Court after 29. 5. 1989 irrespective of the fact that the offences in such cases were committed prior to that date. Following conclusions will, therefore, emerge :i) Section 32-A of the NDPS Act is prospective in operation;ii) the mechanism of such prospective operation will be : (a) Section 32-A of the NDPS Act will not apply to the cases where sentence is awarded before 29. 5. 1989; (b) Section 32-A of the NDPS Act will apply to all the cases where sentence has been awarded on or after 29. 5. 1989 irrespective of the fact that date of offence in such cases is prior to 29. 5. 1989. (c) If there is acquittal by the Trial Court rendered before 29. 5. 1989 and on appellate proceeding such acquittal is set aside and sentence is awarded after 29. 5. 1989, section 32-A of the NDPS Act will apply. The question which has been set out in the beginning would accordingly stand answered. ( 10 ) THE result is that all these petitions are dismissed. Rule will stand discharged. Rule discharged. .