ORDER C.K. Prasad, J. 1. Petitioner was a bus driver under the employment of respondent No.1. He was convicted by trial Court for an offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code. His service was terminated by order dated 18-11-1971 w.e.f. 18th September, 1971. Aggrieved by his conviction, petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 554 of 1971 before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court by Judgment dated 14-4-1971 allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction of the petitioner. Thereafter, by order dated 31st August, 1977, petitioner was reinstated in service and the said order states as follows :- "Shri D. P. Tiwari is reinstated in service with effect from the date of his taking over charge as Bus Driver in the scale of Rs. 390-570/-. The period from 18th September, 1971 till he takes over the charge of the post of Bus Driver is treated as dies-non." It appears that the petitioner besides one Shri R. C. Singh was also convicted and his service was also terminated. He was also reinstated in service in the same terms as that of the present writ petitioner. He filed an application before the Labour Court making a grievance that the stand of the employer that he shall not be paid wages from the date of termination of service upto the date of his reinstatement, is illegal. The contention of the aforesaid Shri Singh was accepted by the Labour Court by order dated 20th March, 1981 (Annexure F). 2. Thereafter it appears that the petitioner filed an application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) praying therein that the wages for the period from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement be granted to him. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) vide its impugned order dated 23rd of November, 1984 rejected the said application. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Shri Rao appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that after the acquittal of the petitioner, the petitioner was reinstated in service and as a consequence, he was entitled for the entire back wages, from the date of his termination till the date of reinstatement. 3. Shri Rao appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that after the acquittal of the petitioner, the petitioner was reinstated in service and as a consequence, he was entitled for the entire back wages, from the date of his termination till the date of reinstatement. Shri Chaphekar however appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 submits that while reinstating the petitioner in service after the acquittal, it was made clear that the period from 10th September, 1971 till he takes over the charge of the post of Bus Driver shall be treated as dies-non, the authority exercising the power under section 33C(2) of the Act cannot go into the validity of the said question. Shri Chaphekar further submits that the proceeding under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is analogous to execution proceeding and the Court exercising the power acts as an executing Court. He submits that there being no prior adjudication, the relief sought for by the petitioner was not fit to be granted by the authority exercising the power under section 33C(2) of the Act and the same was rightly not granted to the petitioner. 4. I find substance in the submission of Shri Chaphekar. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, (1995) 1 SCC 235 , wherein it has been held as follows : "12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under section 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under section 33C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution." Accordingly, there is no difficulty in saying that the proceeding under section 33C(2) is analogous to execution proceeding and the authority exercising the said power acts as an Executing Court. 5. While directing for reinstating the petitioner in service it was made clear that the period from 10th September, 1971 till he takes over the charge on the post shall be treated as dies-non. In my opinion legality or validity of the said clause in the order of reinstatement cannot be gone into by the authority exercising the power under section 33C(2). There is no prior adjudication about the right of the petitioner. In substance, what can be safely said is that the relief of the petitioner to ignore the condition of reinstatement and to give him back wages which, in my opinion will amount to going behind the order. This in my opinion is not permissible. Accordingly, I am of the view that the application filed by the petitioner before the authority exercising the power under section 33C(2) of the Act, was absolutely misconceived and the same was rightly rejected. 6. I do not find any merit in the writ petition, it is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. Security cost, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner.