JUDGMENT R.L KHURANA, J.—The present revision petition is directed against the judgment of conviction passed in criminal case No. 34/2 of 1994, in which the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, camp at Arki, found the petitioner guilty under Section 332, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of fine to undergo imprisonment for a period of one month. 2. Against the order of conviction and sentence as imposed by the learned Magistrate, the petitioner preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 8-S/10 of 1995. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, on 27-11-1996, dismissed the appeal. The order of conviction and sentence as awarded against the petitioner was affirmed. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence, the petitioner has preferred the present revision petition. 3. The prosecution case, in short, may be stated thus. PW1 Parkash Chand is employed and working as a conductor with the Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Local Unit, Dhalli, Shimla, (for short HRTC). On 20-10-1993, he was on duty as Conductor with bus No. HP-07-1409, running between Shimla and Deot via Arki. PW 6 Jeet Ram was the driver of the said bus. The bus reached Arki at about 4 PM. Both PW 1 and PW 6 took some refereshments and thereafter attended the HRTC office. At about 4.20 PM when the bus was to proceed towards Deot, PW 1 Parkash Chand found some gas cylinders having been loaded in the bus. He asked the passengers about the gas cylinders and advised them to keep such cylinders on the roof of the bus. The petitioner, Ram Lai, who was sitting on a cylinder, got up, caught hold of PW 1 Parkash Chand by the neck and after dragging him out of the bus gave a danda blow on his head resulting into a bleeding injury. PW 1 Parkash Chand was rescued by Sarvshri Ram Kishan (PW 2), Prem Dass (PW 3), Jeet Ram (PW 6) and Sohan Lai (PW 8). 4. On the basis of the statement of PW 1 Parkash Chand recorded under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, a case under Sections 332 and 353, Indian Penal Code, came to be registered vide FIR No, 148/93 (Ex PW 5/A) at Police Station, Arki. 4. On the basis of the statement of PW 1 Parkash Chand recorded under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, a case under Sections 332 and 353, Indian Penal Code, came to be registered vide FIR No, 148/93 (Ex PW 5/A) at Police Station, Arki. After necessary investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under Sections 332 and 353, Indian Penal Code. 5. On having been charged for the offences under sections 332 and 353, Indian Penal Code, by the learned trial Magistrate, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. In his statement recorded under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner pleaded that he is innocent. It was further pleaded that the petitioner boarded the bus at Arki. The Conductor asked him to keep the cylinder on the roof of the bus. When he refused, the Conductor had pushed him out of the bus. 6. Both the courts below have concurrently found the petitioner guilty of the offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code, for having voluntarily caused hurt to PW 1 Parkash Chand, a public servant, with the intention to prevent and deter him from discharging his duties as such public servant. The two courts below, accordingly, have convicted and sentenced the petitioner as aforesaid. Section 332, Indian Penal Code, reads : - "332. The two courts below, accordingly, have convicted and sentenced the petitioner as aforesaid. Section 332, Indian Penal Code, reads : - "332. Voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty.—Whoever voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." Before a person can be held guilty of the offence under Section 332, above, the prosecution has necessarily to prove : - (a) that the accused voluntarily caused hurt; (b) that the person was a public servant; (c) when the hurt was caused — (i) the public servant was discharging his duty as such public servant, or (ii) that the hurt was caused with the intent to prevent or deter him or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or (iii) the hurt was caused in consequence of any thing done or attempted to be done by the public servant or another public servant in the lawful discharge of his duty. In the present case, there is no denying that PW 1 Parkash Chand, at the relevant time, was a public servant. He at the relevant time was discharging his duty as such public servant being a Conductory of HRTC bus running between Shimla and Deot via Arki. 7. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place at Arki at about 4.20 PM. PW 1 was got medically examined at about 4.50 P.M. at Civil Hospital, Arki. Following injury was found on his person, vide Medico-legal certificate, Ex. PW 10/A. One number lacerated wound 2 cm x 0.5mm size 0.5 mm deep on the junction of left parieto-occupitial bones. Freshly bleeding. Underlying bones and tissues normal." The injury was simple in nature having been caused by a blunt weapon within the probable duration of less than four hours. The evidence thus establishes that hurt was sustained by PW 1 Parkash Chand when he was discharging his duties as a public servant. 8. Freshly bleeding. Underlying bones and tissues normal." The injury was simple in nature having been caused by a blunt weapon within the probable duration of less than four hours. The evidence thus establishes that hurt was sustained by PW 1 Parkash Chand when he was discharging his duties as a public servant. 8. The question which, thus, arises for determination is whether such hurt was caused by the petitioner voluntarily or such hurt was sustained otherwise by PW1. 9. The petitioner during the course of cross-examination of witnesses of the prosecution has tried to set up the case that when PW 1 was trying to push him out of the bus, his (PW 1) head happened to strike against the sill of the entry/exit door of the bus as a result of which he had sustained the injury. The petitioner, however, though in his statement under section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure has stated that on his refusal to keep the gas cylinder on the roof of the bus, PW 1 had pushed him out of the bus, he has not stated anything about the injury sustained by PW 1. 10. From the statement of the petitioner recorded under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, it is established that some occurrence involving him and PW 1 did take place at Arki. it is not the case of the petitioner that he was acting in the exercise of right of private defence. The petitioner has not been able to show that the injury was sustained by PW 1 as a result of his having accidentally hitting against the sill of the door of the bus. In view of the admitted scuffle and in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary, the only inference is that the injury was caused by the petitioner. 11. It has also come in evidence that the petitioner at the relevant time was I under the influence of liquor. He was found smelling liquor and having a slurred speech and irregular gait even at the time of his medical examination, which was carried out at about 5 PM on the same day, that is, after about 40 minutes of the occurrence. PW 10, the doctor, who carried out such medical examination, found the petitioner to be not oriented to time, place and person. He accordingly certified the petitioner to be under the influence of alcohol. PW 10, the doctor, who carried out such medical examination, found the petitioner to be not oriented to time, place and person. He accordingly certified the petitioner to be under the influence of alcohol. 12. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that since the petitioner was under the influence of liquor, the act complained of might have been committed by him under such influence of liquor and without mens rea. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held guilty of the offence. 13. Sections 85 and 86, Indian Penal Code, crystallize in tabloid form the law relating to intoxication or drunkenness as a defence or plea in mitigation of an of-, fence. Section 85 reads : - "85. Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.-Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. Section 86 further provides : "86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated—In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or .intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will." 14. Section 85 provides for the same protection as section 84, Indian Penal Code, provides for a person of unsound mind, who by reason of intoxication is "incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law"; provided, however, that the thing which intoxicated him was administered without his knowledge or against his will. (Emphasis supplied]. By virtue of section 86, Indian Penal Code, a person who gets into a state of intoxication voluntarily is presumed to have the same knowledge as he would have had, if he had not been intoxicated. 15. (Emphasis supplied]. By virtue of section 86, Indian Penal Code, a person who gets into a state of intoxication voluntarily is presumed to have the same knowledge as he would have had, if he had not been intoxicated. 15. In Sarthi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) Cr LJ 594, it has been held that when there is no suggestion that liquor was administered to the accused without his knowledge or against his will, the court must attribute to the accused the same knowledge of the consequences of their acts as if they were quite sober. Likewise, where the evidence does not disclose that the degree of intoxication was such that accused were beside their minds altogether, it must be presumed that they intended the natural consequences of their acts 16. Dealing with the scope of section 86, Indian Penal Code, the apex court in Basdev v. State of Pepsu, Air 1956 SC 488, has observed : - "It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness, knowledge is to be presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness, what about those cases where mens rea is required ? Are we at liberty to place intent on the same footing, and if so, why has the section omitted intent in its latter part ? This is not the first time that the question comes up for consideration. It has been discussed at length in many decisions and the result may be briefly summarised as follows So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being ? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being ? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts." 17. Their Lordships also quoted with approval the observations made at page 63 of Russel on Crime, tenth edition : - "There is a distinction, however, between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drunkenness and the defence of drunknness which produces a condition such that the drunken mans mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention. If actual insanity in fact supervenes as the result of alcoholic excess it furnishes as complete an answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause. But in cases falling short of insanity evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent, but evidence of drunkenness which falls short of proving such incapacity and merely establishes that the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he more readily gave way to some violent passion does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his act." 18. It is not the case of the petitioner that alcohol was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. It is, thus case of voluntary drunkardness. Nothing has come on the record to show that the petitioner was under the influence of liquor to such an extent that his mind was so obscured that he was incapacilated to form the required intention. All that the evidence shows is that at the relevant time speech of the petitioner was slurred and his gait was irregular. He was not oriented to time, place and person. 19. All that the evidence shows is that at the relevant time speech of the petitioner was slurred and his gait was irregular. He was not oriented to time, place and person. 19. Therefore, considering the entire evidence coming on record, the two courts below have rightly convicted and sentenced the petitioner for the offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code. No interference is called for by this court. Consequently, the petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.