Honble MUKHERJI, C.J.–The New India Assurance Company Limited is the appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 21/96, which impugns the judgment dated 27.3.1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 286/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Usman & Ors.). (2). The New India Assurance Company Limited is the appellant in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 22/96, which is directed against the self-same judgment dated March 27, 1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 288/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Khimraj & Ors.). (3). D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 23/96 is directed against the judgment dated 27.3.1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 289/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Babbar Kanwar & Ors.). (4). D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 24/96 is directed against the judgment dated 27th March, 1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 290/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Nemichand & Ors.). (5). D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 25/96 is directed against the judgment dated 27th March, 1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 291/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Smt. Mishra & Ors.). (6). D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 26/96 is directed against the judgment dated 27th March, 1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 292/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Aadam Khan & Ors.). (7). D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 27/96 is directed against the judgment dated March 27, 1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 295/95 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Ranmal & Ors.). (8). Originally there were eight appeals against the Award passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Barmer on 4.4.1995 in Claim Pe- titions Nos. 33/92, 35/92, 37/92, 38/92, 51/92, 52/92, 53/92 and 92/92. (9). The accident took place on 1st January, 1992 on Barmer- Jaisalmer National Highway No. 15, where there was a head on collusion of Truck No. RJC 5727 (hereinafter to be referred to for the sake of brevity as `the Nisan Truck) and Truck No 04/G-0177 (hereinafter to be referred to for the sake of brevity as `the L.P. Truck). (9). The accident took place on 1st January, 1992 on Barmer- Jaisalmer National Highway No. 15, where there was a head on collusion of Truck No. RJC 5727 (hereinafter to be referred to for the sake of brevity as `the Nisan Truck) and Truck No 04/G-0177 (hereinafter to be referred to for the sake of brevity as `the L.P. Truck). In the accident besides the drivers of both the Trucks, Nakhat Singh and Rane Khan, five more persons lost their lives and three persons sustained injuries. The Nisan Truck was badly damaged. Injured Usman, Nizam and Aadam Khan claimed compensation for the injuries, Kalyan Chand claimed compensation for the damage of the Truck, Babbar Kanwar and others legal representatives of Bhika Khan, Nemichand, husband of Smt. Dharmi, Khinv Raj and others legal representatives of Bhoor Chand filed separate claim petitions, wherein Dhule Khan, the owner of L.P. Truck and the New India Assurance Company, who was the Insurer were impleaded as non-petitioners. The matter initially proceeded ex-parte against the owner of L.P. Truck Dhule Khan. Aadam Khan, Mishra Bai and Usman pleaded the owner and the Insurer of Nisan Truck also as the non-petitioners. The reply of the New India Assurance Company Limited, the appellant was that it was a case of contributory negligence of the two Truck drivers. The Tribunal framed various issues in all the cases and examined witnesses separately in each case deciding all the claim petitions by one and the same judgment dated 4.4.1995. The eight appeals filed against the said judgment dated 4.4.1995 were also decided by the learned Single Judge of our Court by a common judgment. (10). The main contention of the appellant-New India Assurance Company Limited was that its liability for the property was limited to Rs. 6,000=00 only and, therefore, the Tribunal has erred in decreeing the entire amount against the Insurance Company in Claim Petitions Nos. 53/92, 37/92 and 38/92. Mr. Vyas, learned advocate appearing for the appellants contended inter- alia that Aadam Khan was Khalasi on the Truck and, as such, the Award in Case No. 92/92 could not exceed the compensation which could be awarded under the Workmens Compensation Act as per proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. (11). The next contention raised was an excessive amount was awarded in Claim Petitions Nos. 33/92, 35/92, 38/92, 51/92 and 52/92. (11). The next contention raised was an excessive amount was awarded in Claim Petitions Nos. 33/92, 35/92, 38/92, 51/92 and 52/92. It was further contended by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunal has held United India Insurance Company also liable in respect of the Claim Petition No. 52/92 and, therefore, it would be deemed that the accident had occurred on account of the mistake on the part of both the drivers and the liability should be apportioned. (12). On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the Insurance Company had no right to challenge the quantum of the award in view of the provisions of Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and as and when the claim is filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, the limit of Workmens Compensation Act does not come in the way of the Tribunal so as to grant just compensation. The learned advocate appearing for the respondents cited the decisions in Suresh Chand vs. State of UP (1), British India General Insurance Co. vs. Cap. Itbar Singh (2), United India Insurance Co. vs. Shiv Raj (3) and New India Assurance Co. vs. Lad Kanwar (4). (13). It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunal has held the Insurer of Nisan Truck liable and hence, by application of the principles of contributory negligence, the amount should be apportioned. The learned Single Judge of our Court, however, held that there appeared to be inherent incongruity. It was observed by the learned Single Judge that a reading of the last paragraph of the judgment of the Tribunal really goes to establish that the Tribunal came to a conclusion that since the vehicle was insured with the New India Assurance Company, it was liable to make the payment. However, in the last line instead of mentioning of the non-petitioner no. 2, by slip there is the name of non-petitioner no. 4. (14). It may be pointed out that the Tribunal no where held that the drivers of both the vehicles were responsible for the accident. While discussing the issue no. However, in the last line instead of mentioning of the non-petitioner no. 2, by slip there is the name of non-petitioner no. 4. (14). It may be pointed out that the Tribunal no where held that the drivers of both the vehicles were responsible for the accident. While discussing the issue no. 1, which was the common issue in all the claim Cases, it was clearly held that the accident had taken place because of the rash and negligent driving by Rane Khan, who was the driver of L.P. Truck No. 04/G- 0177 and there was no mistake on the part of Nakhat Singh, who was the driver of the Nisan Truck. On the other hand, the learned Single Judge thought on a perusal of the evidence that it was not at all established that there was any fault on the part of the driver of the Nishan Truck. It thus could not be found that it was a case of contributory negligence of the drivers of both the two vehicles. The other contention that both the Insurance Companies should be made liable to make payment was also rejected by the learned Single Judge as untenable in law. (15). It was contended by Mr. Vyas, learned advocate appearing for the appellants that it was alleged in the First Information Report that both the drivers were driving the vehicles rashly and negligently and hence, both the Insurance Companies ought to have been made liable. The learned Single Judge did not appreciate at all the evidence in the proper perspective and did not even sift the same. There was no discussion worth the name as to apportionment of the liabilities in between the two vehicles. On behalf of the New India Assurance Com- pany, there was no witness at all except the Khalasi, who was tendered as the witness for the claimants. On behalf of the United India Insurance Company, two witnesses were examined and one of them Kalyan Mal was not an eye witness. He was merely the owner of the vehicle, which was Nisan Truck. Khinv Raj, who lodged the FIR made it clear that both the drivers had the complicity in this matter, but only one driver was found responsible, who was the driver of the L.P. Truck. In particular reference to Special Appeals nos. He was merely the owner of the vehicle, which was Nisan Truck. Khinv Raj, who lodged the FIR made it clear that both the drivers had the complicity in this matter, but only one driver was found responsible, who was the driver of the L.P. Truck. In particular reference to Special Appeals nos. 21/92, 25/92 and 26/92 affecting Usman and others, Smt. Mishra and others and Aadam Khan and others, it was specifically urged by Mr. Vyas, learned advocate appearing for the appellants that both the drivers ought to have been made responsible and both the Insurance Companies would have been made liable to apportion the compensation. (16). With regard to Special Appeal no. 23/96, it was contended that Babbar Khan who is already aged 65 years has been awarded compensation of Rs. 3,72,000=00 and her son was earning about Rs. 700=00 p.m. and the amount as awarded was excessive. (17). With regard to D.B. Civil Special Appeal no. 27/96 where Ranmal is the respondent, it was contended that he was awarded Rs. 4,79,000=00 as compensation and his son was earning about Rs. 1,000=00 p.m. and the quantum of compensation is rather excessive. (18). With regard to D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 25/96, it was contended that Smt. Misra was awarded compensation of Rs. 3,06,000=00, but her dependency was for Rs. 6,00=00 p.m. and even if the multiplier of 18 would have been applied in her case, she was not entitled to the compensation more than 7200 x 18 = Rs. 1,29,600=00. (19). In British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Captain Itbar Singh & Ors. (supra), it was held that in a Claim Case under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the defences open to Insurer were only those mentioned in Section 96(2), which clearly provides that it was a right created by statute and its content necessarily depends on the provisions of the statute. It clearly provides that an insurer while made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in it. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. The only manner of avoiding liability provides for in Sub-section (2) is through the defences therein mentioned. Therefore, when Sub-section (6) talks of avoiding liability in the manner provided in Sub-section (2), it necessarily refers to these defences. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. The only manner of avoiding liability provides for in Sub-section (2) is through the defences therein mentioned. Therefore, when Sub-section (6) talks of avoiding liability in the manner provided in Sub-section (2), it necessarily refers to these defences. It cannot be said that in enacting Sub-section (2), the Legislature was contemplating only those defences which were based on the conditions of the Policy. It was held in this case that the Court cannot add words to a section unless its stand is meaningless or is of doubtful meaning. (20). In Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and others (5), it was held that the exclusion clause does not exonerate the Insurer. Ordinarily, it is not the concern of the Legislature whether the owner of a vehicle insures his vehicle or not. If the vehicle is not insured any legal liability arising on account of third party risk will have to be borne by the owner of the vehicle. Why then has the legislature insisted on a person using a motor vehicle in a public place to insure against third party risk by enacting Section 94. Surely the obligation has not been imposed in order to promote the business of the insurers engaged in the business of automobile insurance. The provision has been inserted in order to protect the members of the Community travelling in vehicles or using the roads from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicles on the roads. The law may provide for compensation to victims of the accidents who sustain injuries in the course of an automobile accident or compensation to the dependents of the victims in the case of a fatal accident. However, such protection would remain a protection on paper unless there is a guarantee that the compensation awarded by the Courts would be recoverable from the persons held liable for the consequences of the accident. A Court can only pass an award or a decree. It cannot ensure that such an award or decree results in the amount awarded being actually recovered, from the person held liable who may not have the resources. The exercise undertaken by the law Courts would then be an exercise in futility. A Court can only pass an award or a decree. It cannot ensure that such an award or decree results in the amount awarded being actually recovered, from the person held liable who may not have the resources. The exercise undertaken by the law Courts would then be an exercise in futility. And the outcome of the legal proceedings which by the very nature of things involve the time cost and money cost inves- ted from the scarce resources of the Community would make a mockery of the injured victims, or the dependents of the deceased victim of the accident, who themselves are obliged to incur not inconsiderable expenditure of time, money and energy in litigation. To overcome this ugly situation, the Legislature has made it obligatory that no motor vehicle shall be used unless a third party insurance is in force. To use the vehicle without the requisite third party insurance being in force is a penal offence. The legislature was also faced with another problem. The insurance policy might provide for liability walled in by conditions which may be specified in the contract of policy. In order to make the protection real, the legislature has also provided that the judgment obtained shall not be defeated by the incorporation of exclusion clauses other than those authorised by Section 96 and by providing that except and save to the extent permitted by Section 96 it will be the obligation of the Insurance Company to satisfy the judgment obtained against the persons insured against third party risk. In other words, the legislature has insisted and made it incumbent on the user of a motor vehicle to be armed with an insurance policy covering third party risks which is in conformity with the provisions enacted by the legislature. It is so provided in order to ensure that the injured victims of automobile accidents are really compensated in terms of money and not in terms of promise. Such a benign provision enacted by the legislature having regard to the fact that in the modern age the user of motor vehicle notwith- standing the attendant hazards, has become an inescapable fact of life, has to be interpreted in a meaningful manner which serves rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. The provision has therefore to be interpreted in the twilight of the aforesaid perspective. (21). In National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. The provision has therefore to be interpreted in the twilight of the aforesaid perspective. (21). In National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Kastoori Devi and others (6) where there was collision between a truck and motor cycle resulting in the death of motor-cyclist and two out of three persons riding on the pillion seat and there was a defence that there was no collision between the two vehicles and the motor cycle driven at fast speed fell into a ditch on account of its negligent driving, this Court found that there was evidence that the truck driver was negligent in causing the accident. The question arose whether the fact that there were four persons on the motor cycle tantamounts to contributory negligence on the part of the motor cyclist. It was ultimately held that there was no contributory negligence since carrying three persons on the pillion seat does not lead to the inference that motor-cyclist was guilty of contributory negligence. On the question of apportion- ment of liability where Insurers of two vehicles involved in an accident contended that the apportionment of liability of both the insurance companies should be done according to the proportion of negligence of the two vehicles, it was held that there was no method or indicia to bifurcate or apportion the liability and both were liable jointly or severally. As regards the quantum of compensation arising out of the fatal accident, it was found that the deceased was aged 21 years and deemed to be earning Rs. 395=00 p.m. and the parents, who were the claimants had monthly dependency assessed at Rs. 200=00 and applying the multiplier of 25, they were awarded Rs. 60,000=00 as compensation. Again, with regard to the deceased aged 22 years, earning Rs. 700=00 p.m. where the claimants were parents, they were awarded Rs. 60,000=00 as compensation. As regards another deceased, who was unemployed and unmarried and the mother was the claimant and the dependency was assessed at Rs. 2,00=00 p.m., multiplier of 10 was adopted and she was awarded Rs. 24,000=00. (22). In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sheela Rani and Others (7), it was observed that the attitude of the Nationalized Insurance Companies should be more prone to the social justice. 2,00=00 p.m., multiplier of 10 was adopted and she was awarded Rs. 24,000=00. (22). In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sheela Rani and Others (7), it was observed that the attitude of the Nationalized Insurance Companies should be more prone to the social justice. The provisions regarding compensation to the injured are piece of social legislation enacted to protect the interest of users of the road who are unfortunately involved in the accident. It was further observed that it would be appreciable if the Insurance Companies do not enter into unnecessary prolonged litigation and rather adopt broad outlook to compensate the helpless victims of the accident. It was further observed that the Insurance Company could take only such defence as were available to it under section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as it stood then and no more. (23). In United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Shivraj and others (supra), it was held that no defences are available to the Insurance Company beyond what are prescribed under section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was further observed that the Insurance Company cannot question the finding of the Tribunal as to the manner of accident or its estimate of compensation or the liability of the insured. It can only challenge the correctness of the award if it contravenes Section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. (24). In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs D. Kamalam and others (8), it was held that where the Insurance Company did not raise any defence available to it under section 96(2) before the Tribunal, but in appeal it confined itself to challen- ging the finding on negligence and quantum of compensation, the Insurance Company cannot be permitted to raise any objection to the findings of the Tribunal on negligence and quantum of compensation in appeal since that would nullify the effect of Section 96(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. (25). In United India Insurance Co. (25). In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pratibha Rathi and others (9), whe- re there was an appeal by the Insurance Company challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, but no contention was raised that the Insurance Company had reserved in the policy, right to raise defences on behalf of the insured and that it had invoked that right before the Tribunal and there was no attempt before the Tribunal to invoke the provisions of Section 110-C (2-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it was held by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that the appeal filed by the Insurance Company challenging the quantum of compensation is not maintainable. (26). In National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kamarjahan and others (10) where there was a collision between a car and truck coming from opposite directions re- sulting in the death of car driver and the driver, owner and insurance company of the truck and insured of the car remained ex-parte, Insurance Company had not reserved in the policy any right to defend the claim on all grounds and defences available to the insured and the Insurer of the car led evidence and cross-examined the witnesses of the claimants on all defences available to the insured and the clai- mants raised no objection, it was found by another Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that the appeal filed by Insurance Company on the question of negligence and on the question of quantum of compensation is not maintainable and no permission to lead evidence on all issues available to the insured was neither sought for nor granted by the Tribunal and there could be no deemed permission or direction of the Tribunal in favour of the insurer. It was further held that under section 110-C (2-A), which corresponds to Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the right to contest on all grounds with the direction or permission of the Tribunal is available where the insurer is already a party or where on being noticed, it is made a party during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal. As regards the quantum of compensation on the fatal accident and the deceased was a driver and the claimants were mother aged 72 years and son aged 8 years, the Tribunal assessed dependency at Rs. As regards the quantum of compensation on the fatal accident and the deceased was a driver and the claimants were mother aged 72 years and son aged 8 years, the Tribunal assessed dependency at Rs. 950=00 p.m. and adopted multiplier of 15 and awarded Rs. 1,68,000=00 as compensation and the Award was upheld in appeal. (27). In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lad Kanwar and others (supra), it was held that the Legislature has provided only one appeal against the judgment of the Claims Tribunal, general provisions will not abrogate special provisions and the legislature has to create an appeal if it intends to enact the same as an appeal cannot exist without a clear legislative provision. It was held in the facts of the case that where the Insurance Company filed a special appeal before the Division Bench against the judgment of a learned Single Judge and there was a preliminary objection that Section 110-D provides for only one appeal and a special or a second appeal is not maintainable, no special appeal was found to be maintainable. As regards the defences available to the Insurance Company and whether the Insurance Company can challenge the quantum of compensation, it was held that the Insurance Company cannot challenge the quantum of compensation since an insurer cannot take the pleas beyond Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Its right is confined to the matter enumerated therein. (28). As regards the defences available to the Insurance Company and whether the Insurance Company can challenge the quantum of compensation, it was held that the Insurance Company cannot challenge the quantum of compensation since an insurer cannot take the pleas beyond Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Its right is confined to the matter enumerated therein. (28). In New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Kamlaben and others (11) where a passenger was carried in a goods vehicle and the question arose as to the liability of the Insurance Company and it was established that the passenger was travelling in a truck by paying fare and the truck met with an accident resulting in the death of the passenger, it was decided by three learned Judges of the Gujarat High Court that the Insurance Company was liable since goods vehicle can also be used for carrying passengers for hire or reward on some occasions and in order to disclaim its liability on the grounds mentioned in Section 96(2), the Insurance Company has to establish : (i) that on the date of the contract of insurance, the insured vehicle was expressly or implicitly not covered by a permit to carry any passenger for hire or reward; (ii) that there was a specified condition in the policy which excluded the use of the insured vehicle for the carriage of any passenger for hire or reward; (iii) that the vehicle was, in fact, used in breach of such specified condition on the occasion giving rise to the claim by reason of the carriage of the passenger therein for hire or reward; and (iv) that the vehicle was used by the insured or at his instance in breach of specific conditions including a condition that in the goods vehicle passengers for hire or reward were not to be carried. If it is done without knowledge of the insured by the drivers acts or omission, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured. If it is done without knowledge of the insured by the drivers acts or omission, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured. If the passenger was travelling in truck by paying fare and the truck met with accident resulting in the death of the passenger, as regards the liability of the Insu- rance Company, it was held that the same would be covered by clause (a) of Sub-section (2) which provides limit for insurance coverage for goods vehicle and not by clause (c) which provides limit of insurance coverage for the vehicles other than `passenger vehicle and `goods vehicle and in this case, the liability of the Insurance Company was limited to Rs. 50,000=00. As regards compensation, it was found that it is the duty of the Claims Tribunal to ensure that major part of compensation amount reaches the victims or their dependents and is not frittered away so that they are not again left at the mercy of the society and the socio-economic object of the legislation is not defeated. Some guidelines which are to be followed by the Claims Tribunals while awarding compensation were enumerated in this case. (29). Taking into account the judgment in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivendrum vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas and others (12)) the proper method is multiplier method and it involves ascertainment of loss of depen- dency and capitalizing it by appropriate multiplier. According to Mr. Vyas even though the increase in the emoluments ought to have been taken into account while computing multiplicand, the multiplier ought not to have been more than 16 even if the computation of income would have been double the amount and still there should be some scope for interference. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpora- tion and others vs. Trilok Chandra and others (13) the multiplier of 18 was taken into consideration. (30). It was urged before us with particular reference to D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 23/96 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Babbar Kanwar and Ors. that a multiplier of 43 was taken in that case and the income of the deceased despite being Rs. 700=00 per month there was no proper fixation of the multiplier. Even if we take double the amount as multiplicand of Rs. 1400=00, according to Mr. Vyas the compensation as awarded was on high side. Ltd. vs. Babbar Kanwar and Ors. that a multiplier of 43 was taken in that case and the income of the deceased despite being Rs. 700=00 per month there was no proper fixation of the multiplier. Even if we take double the amount as multiplicand of Rs. 1400=00, according to Mr. Vyas the compensation as awarded was on high side. But where computation of income of a driver must be more than Rs. 1000=00 p.m. and would be roughly about Rs. 2,000=00 per month, the multiplicand also changes and the range of divergence is not that quantum which really calls for interference. In respect of D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 25/96 New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Misra and others also a multiplier of 35 was taken into consideration whereas the multiplicand was taken to be Rs. 600=00 when the income was Rs. 900=00 per month and the deceased was 30 years old involved in the trade of bullocks. We are of the considered view that the income which was taken to be the basis of the multiplicand was very much on the decreased side. We do to find any scope for interference in this appeal also. Similarly in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 27/96 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Ranmal and others, the multiplier was taken to be 37 and the multiplicand by way of income was taken to be Rs. 1000=00 when the deceased was of 28 years enga- ged in provision and readiments shop business fetching Rs. 2000=00 per month. The assessment of income has also been on the very low side and here also even if we take into consideration the multiplier as enunciated in Susamma Thomass case or Trilok Chandras case, we do not think if the income is to be taken as almost the double, there is any scope for interference. Furthermore when amounts have already been paid to the claimants by the Insurance Company we would not be justified in interfering in the special appeal as we have found little scope for the Insurance Company to agitate the question on quantum of compensation. (31). Regard being had to the facts and circumstances of these cases, we do not think that we would be justified in interfering with the award of compensation in any of the aforesaid appeals. (31). Regard being had to the facts and circumstances of these cases, we do not think that we would be justified in interfering with the award of compensation in any of the aforesaid appeals. As regards the question of splitting up the compensation money against the different claimants, we may direct the Claims Tribunal to make a proper apportionment inter-se in between the sisters on the one hand and the father as regards Special Appeal No. 22/1996.