JUDGMENT R. Dayal, J. We have heard Mr. S.N. Mukherjee for appellant and Mr. Sunil Mitra for respondent No. 1 as regards the maintainability of the appeal. 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 3rd December 1996 of a learned Single Judge of this Court passed in Civil Suit No. 93(A) of 1996 whereby an application made by the appellant, who is defendant No. 1 in the Civil Suit, under s. 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was rejected on the ground that reliefs have been claimed in the Civil Suit against respondent No. 2 as well who is not a party to the arbitration agreement even when reliefs can only be granted in the presence of the appellant. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 has submitted that the appeal is not maintainable for the reason that s. 37(1) of the Act does not specify an order passed under s. 8 as an order from which an appeal is permissible. According to the learned Counsel, since subs. (1) of said s. 37(1) provides for appeals only against those orders which are specified thereunder and further stipulates that an appeal does not lie from any other order an appeal does not lie from an order of a class not specified thereunder either under s. 37 of the Act or under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, particularly, in view of cl. 44 of the Letters Patent which makes all the provisions of the Letters Patent subject to the law of the appropriate legislature. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that an order rejecting an application under s. 8 amounts to judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and as such appeal against such an order under the Letters Patent. He has sought to derive support from certain observations in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another AIR 1981 SC 1786 . Section 37 of the Act reads as follows :- "37. Appeal-able orders.-(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely :- (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. Appeal-able orders.-(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely :- (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. (2) Appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order of the arbitral tribunal- (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or taken away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court." Clause 44 of the Letters Patent says :- "Powers of Indian Legislature preserved. And we do further ordain and declare, that all the provisions of these Our Letters Patent are subject to the legislature powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council and also of the Governor-General in Council under section 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and also of the Governor-General in cases of Emergency under section 72 of that Act, and may be in all respects amended and altered thereby." 3. Section 37(1) of the Act specifies those orders of the Court from which an appeal lies to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. It further stipulates that an appeal shall not lie from any order not specified therein. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with cl. 44 being subject to the law of an appropriate legislature, interdiction of an appeal from an order not specified under s. 37(1) would exclude the operation of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent with regard to such appeal. In State of West Bengal vs. Gourangalal Chatterjee 1993(3) SCC 1 similar controversy came to be considered by the Apex Court. There the question was whether an appeal is maintainable either under s. 39(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 or under the Letters Patent from an order not covered in either of the six clauses mentioned in s. 39. In State of West Bengal vs. Gourangalal Chatterjee 1993(3) SCC 1 similar controversy came to be considered by the Apex Court. There the question was whether an appeal is maintainable either under s. 39(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 or under the Letters Patent from an order not covered in either of the six clauses mentioned in s. 39. Material portion of s. 39(1) is in the same terms in which s. 37(1) of the 1996 Act is couched, in as much as s. 39(1) also specifies the orders from which an appeal lies with further stipulation that an appeal would not lie from any order not specified thereunder. It was held that an appeal could lie only from the orders mentioned in sub-s. (1) itself and since the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge was not covered in any of the six clauses mentioned therein it is obvious that no appeal could be filed against the order of the learned Single Judge. This decision is an authority for the proposition that an appeal does not lie under the Letters Patent from an order of a learned Single Judge, which is not mentioned in sub-s. (1) of S. 39 of the Act of 1940. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Union of India vs. K. Satyanarayan & Co. 1995(1) CLJ 458 and Santosh Kumar Agarwal vs. Phalguni Banerjee, 1994 (1) CHN 113 . All these authorities are fully applicable to the present controversy. In our view Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben (supra) is of no assistance to the appellant. There the plaintiff appellant had filed a suit on the original side of the Bombay High Court for specific performance of a contract and prayed for an in term relief by appointing a receiver of the suit-property and injuncting the defendant from disposing of the suit-property during the pendency of the suit. The learned Single Judge after hearing the notice of motion dismissed the application for appointment of receiver as also for interim injunction. Thereafter, the plaintiff-appellant filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court which dismissed the appeal as being non-maintainable on the ground that the order impugned (order of the Single Judge) was not a judgment as contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. Since Orders under Rr. 1 and 2 of the Or. Thereafter, the plaintiff-appellant filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court which dismissed the appeal as being non-maintainable on the ground that the order impugned (order of the Single Judge) was not a judgment as contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. Since Orders under Rr. 1 and 2 of the Or. 39 and r. 1 and r. 4 of Or. 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure are appellable under Or. 43 r. 1 CPC, one of the questions for consideration was whether the provisions of Or. 43 r. 1 are inconsistent with cl. 15 of the Letters Patent or whether s. 104 read with Or. 43 r. 1 CPC could not apply to the original trial by the trial Judge which is governed by the Letters Patent clause, and as such whether an order refusing to appoint receiver and to grant injunction by a Learned Single Judge is not appellable before the Division Bench. It was held that a combined reading of the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure leads to the irresistible conclusion that S. 104 read with Or. 43 r. 1 clearly applies to the proceedings before the Trial Judge of the High Court and does not in any way abridge, interfere with or curb the powers conferred on the Trial Judge by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. Further, it was pointed out that what s. 104 read with Or. 43, r. 1 does is merely to give an additional remedy by way of an appeal from the orders of the Trial Judge to a larger Bench. There is nothing to show that the Letters Patent in any way excludes or overrides the application of s. 104 read with Or. 43 or to show that these provisions would not apply to internal appeals. While considering Pandey Dagadu vs. Jamnadas Chotumal Marwadi, AIR 1923 Bom 28, the Court pointed out in paragraph 60 that the decision in that case appears to have overlooked "that far from excluding the Code there could be other special Acts which could and did confer additional jurisdiction even in internal appeals to the High Court, viz., from an order passed by a Trial Judge to a larger Bench, for instance S. 39 of the Arbitration Act or S. 202 of the Indian Companies Act and other similar local or special Acts. If these special Acts could without affecting the jurisdiction of the Letters Patent or overriding the same provided a supplementary or additional jurisdiction, there was no reason why the Code of Civil Procedure also could not do the same particularly when the Trial Judge had to adopt the procedure contained in the Code, starting from the presentation of the plaint to the delivery of judgment." On the basis of these observations Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that since the impugned order affects the valuable right of the appellant, it amounts to judgment and an appeal lies under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent even though no appeal is contemplated under s. 37 of the Act. This argument overlooks the fact that the impugned order is not an order passed under the Code of Civil Procedure which in s. 4(1) provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. The impugned order is one which has been passed under the Arbitration Act which is a self contained Code as regards Arbitration and s. 37 of which clearly excludes an appeal from an order of a Court not specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 37 of the Act. In Khimji's case the Court was not concerned with the effect of any statutory provision similar to S. 37 of the Act on Letters Patent. On the other hand, State of W.B. vs. Gourangalal Chatterjee (supra) is a direct authority on the issue before us. 4. We therefore, hold that an appeal does not lie under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent from an order which is not covered by cl. (1) of S. 37 of the Act, so, this appeal is not maintainable. 5. In the result, the appeal as also the application is dismissed, but without any orders as to costs upon treating the appeal as on the day's list. All undertakings stand discharged. 6. Xerox certified copy of this judgment be made available to the parties expeditiously. U.C. Banerjee, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.