Killa Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. C. M. C. — 1997 DIGILAW 329 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. All these batch of 10 writ petitions raised common questions of law and facts and, therefore, they were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The writ petitioners who are owners of their respective premises and admittedly are liable to pay taxes to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) have challenged the orders passed by the Hearing Officer, determining the annual valuation of their respective premises and also prayed for setting aside the special notices issued by the Authorities under section 184(4) of the Act for revision of the annual valuation of their respective premises. The ground of revision indicated in such special notices issued under section 184(4) of the Act reads as follows:- "New valuation of the portion in the premises on estimated yearly rental value less statutory allowances for repairs on apportionment of taxes with effect from 2/94-95 under section 178(3) read with section 180(1)(i) of C.M.C. Act, 1980." 2. In the said notices the writ petitioners were intimated that they were entitled to submit written objection against the determination of annual valuation under section 186 of the Act. From the said notice, it would also appear that in case the writ petitioners filed such written objection to the same, the same shall be considered and heard by the Hearing Officer on the dates mentioned in the said notices. It is not disputed that the petitioners have become owner of their respective premises by purchase. There is no dispute that the writ petitioners submitted their written objections against issuance of such special notices under section 184(4) of the Act. The Hearing Officer after considering the written objections filed by the writ petitioners passed orders fixing the annual valuation of the respective premises. Against the above orders of the Hearing Officer, determining the annual valuation of the flats in question, admittedly the petitioners have filed appeals before the Municipal Assessment Tribunal, Calcutta Municipal Corporation under section 189 of the Act which are still pending decision. The orders passed by the Hearing Officer after considering the written objections as well as the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer to revise, the annual valuation of the respective premises of the writ petitioners under section 184(4) of the Act are now under challenge in these batch of writ petitions. 3. Mr. The orders passed by the Hearing Officer after considering the written objections as well as the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer to revise, the annual valuation of the respective premises of the writ petitioners under section 184(4) of the Act are now under challenge in these batch of writ petitions. 3. Mr. Das Adhikari, appearing on behalf of the Calcutta Municipal Authorities raised a preliminary objection as to the entertainability of the writ applications against the orders determining the annual valuation of the respective premises of the writ petitioners in view of the availability of an alternative remedy by way of an appeal under section 189 of the Act. He also submitted that in view of the admitted fact that in these cases the writ petitioners have already availed of such alternative remedy by filing appeals against the orders of the Hearing Officer which are still pending, the writ jurisdiction of this Court which is discretionary in nature cannot be invoked at this stage. 4. The learned counsel for the writ petitioners, however, contested the submissions of the learned counsel for the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. According to the learned counsel for the writ petitioners, even if there is a provision for filing an appeal against the order of annual valuation there is no absolute bar for the writ court to entertain the writ application when the writ court is of the view that the orders determining the annual valuation were on the face of it wrong or no reason had been given as to how the annual valuation of the respective premises was arrived at by the Hearing Officer. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record and considering the scheme of the Act, I am of the view that these writ applications should not be entertained at this stage for the following two reasons:- The first reason is that when an appeal is provided under section 189(6) of the Act which is an alternative efficacious remedy for the owners of the premises, no writ petition should be entertained by this Court in view of such alternative efficacious remedy available to the owners of the premises. Secondly, in these batch of writ petitions, since the writ petitioners have already availed of such efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal before the Municipal Tribunal, the writ petitions should not be entertained. Secondly, in these batch of writ petitions, since the writ petitioners have already availed of such efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal before the Municipal Tribunal, the writ petitions should not be entertained. In order to appreciate the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, on the question of entertainability of the writ petitions at this stage, it would be necessary to deal with the relevant provisions of the Act before we consider the decisions cited at the bar. Chapter XII of the Act deals with powers of taxation and consolidated rates. Section 174 of the Act deals with the proceedings for determination of annual valuation of any premises. Section 179 of the Act provides that the annual valuation of any or building situated in any ward of the Corporation which has been determined before and is in force on the date of commencement of this Act, shall remain in force, and shall be deemed to be the annual value for the purpose of assessment of consolidated rate on such land or building under the Act, until a fresh annual valuation is enforced under the Act. Section 180 of the Act speaks of different modes of determining the annual valuation of the lands and building in the Schedule relating to the imposition of taxes and rates, the Corporation has been vested with the power of levy tax of lands and buildings on the basis of annual valuation and the various methods of arriving at such annual valuation has also been prescribed. Section 186 of the Act provides for filing objection against the annual valuation of assessment. Section 188 provides for fixation of valuation after determination of objection. In view of section 188 of the Act, it is, therefore, necessary for the Corporation Authorities to determine the question of annual valuation after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and also after indicating reasons for the order that would be made by the Assessing Officer after hearing the objection of the assessee. Section 189 of the Act provides for an appeal against the order of the Assessing Officer making annual valuation and or assessment in respect of any premises in question. In particular section 189(1) of the Act says that there shall be a Municipal Assessment Tribunal for hearing and disposed of an appeal against an order passed under section 188 of the Act. In particular section 189(1) of the Act says that there shall be a Municipal Assessment Tribunal for hearing and disposed of an appeal against an order passed under section 188 of the Act. Section 189(5) of the Act clearly says that any owner or person liable to payment of consolidated rate may, if dissatisfied, with the determination of objection under section 188 appeal to the Tribunal. Section 189(6) of the Act however, provides that no appeal under this section shall be entertained unless the consolidated rates in respect of any land or building for the period ending on the date of presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined under section 188 has been deposited and the appeal shall abate unless consolidated rate is continued to be deposited till the appeal is finally disposed of. 6. From a comparative analysis of the relevant provisions as indicated hereinabove, it cannot be doubted that an appeal has been provided against the final determination of annual valuation of a premises. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in view of section 189(6) of the Act the appeals filed by the writ petitioners can not be entertained by the Municipal Tribunal until and unless taxes are paid on the basis of the annual valuation arrived at by the Calcutta Municipal Authorities. Therefore, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners argued that the alternative remedy by way of an appeal cannot be considered to be an alternative efficacious remedy to the writ petitioners and, therefore, this Court can invoke its jurisdiction against the orders determining the annual valuation of the premises in question. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Customs Collector, Bombay vs. Shantilal, AIR 1966 SC 197 , Smt. Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahabidyalaya, 1987(4) SCC 525 and also on another decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Filterco vs. Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 626 . Strong reliance was also placed on a single Bench decision of Ajit Sengupta, J. (As His Lordship then was) reported in Surendra Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. CMC & other, 99 CWN 324 and on such reliance the learned counsel for the writ petitioners contended that this writ Court can still invoke its jurisdiction even if appeals have been filed by the writ petitioners before the Municipal Tribunal as in these cases the Hearing Officer had not passed the orders after applying his mind nor reasoned orders were passed by him. Lastly, reliance was also placed in the case on N.N.C.S. and W. Mills vs. Ahmedabad Municipality, AIR 1967 SC 1801 in order to show that in spite of providing an appeal against the order of valuation, the writ Court can invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. I have given my anxious considerations to the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel of the respective parties, In my view, Mr. Das Adhikari was justified in arguing that in view of the availability of an alternative remedy by way of an appeal which the writ petitioners have already availed of these writ petitions at this stage are not entertainable by the writ court. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the appeal provided under section 189 of the Act is an alternative remedy for the writ petitioners or not. If it is held that the appeals is an alternative efficacious remedy for the writ petitioners, then there cannot be any reason for the writ court to entertain the writ applications as it is well settled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the writ court is discretionary and the same should be invoked only in an extraordinary circumstance. In Jail Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 898 , the Supreme Court at Paragraph 4 has observed as follows:- "The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it involved determination of disputed questions of fact. It was also observed that the High Court should not in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction grant relief to the appellant when he had an alternative remedy. After hearing Mr. Sobhagmal Jain on behalf of the appellant, we see no cogent ground to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. It was also observed that the High Court should not in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction grant relief to the appellant when he had an alternative remedy. After hearing Mr. Sobhagmal Jain on behalf of the appellant, we see no cogent ground to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. There cannot, in our opinion, be any doubt on the point that the extent of purity of the gypsum won by the appellant is a question of fact. It has also been brought to our notice that after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court the appellant has filed a suit, in which he has equitated the same question which is the subject-matter of the writ petition. In our opinion, the appellant cannot pursue two parellel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time." (Emphasis added) In the case of Assistant Collector C.E., Chandan Nagar vs. Dunlop India Limited, AIR 1985 SC 330 , the Supreme Court has deprecated the invocation of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when there is an alternative remedy for the writ petitioner in an appropriate forum. In Paragraph 3 of the said Supreme Court Section, the Apex Court of our country has observed as follows:- "In Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 , A.P. Sen, E.S. Vemkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ, held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private of public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take juridical notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." (Emphasis added) 8. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court made in the aforesaid decision it is clear there is an alternative remedy available to the writ petitioner to meet their grievances. But, at the same time, the Supreme Court has observed that matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not matters to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by the statute. There is no dispute that the taxes payable to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation shall be paid on the basis of the annual valuation which are under challenge in these writ petitions. In a similar situation under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 , has held that section 170(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act is intra vires and appeal can be admitted or entertained, but only cannot be heard or disposed of without pre-deposit of the disputed property tax. In this decision of the Supreme Court, in view of the availability of an alternative remedy by way of an appeal, it was held that the writ court should not invoke its writ jurisdiction and in Paragraph 42 of the said decision, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "If the provision is interpreted in the manner above suggested, one can steer clear of all problems of constitutional validity. The contention on behalf of the Corporation to read the provision rigidly and seek to soften the rigour by reference to the availability of a recourse to the High Courts by way of a petition under Articles 226 and 227 in certain situation and the departmental instructions referred to earlier does not appear to be a satisfactory solution. The departmental instructions may not always be followed and the resort to Articles 226 and 227 should be discouraged when there is an alternative remedy. A more satisfactory solution is available on the terms of the statute itself. The construction of the section approved by us above vesta in the appellate authority a power to deal with the appeal otherwise than by way of final disposal even if the disputed tax is not paid. It enables the authority to exercise a judicial discretion to allow the payment of the disputed tax even after the appeal is filed but, no doubt, before the appeal is taken up for actual hearing. The interpretation will greatly ameliorate the genuine grievances of, and hardships faced by, the assessee in the payment of the tax as determined. Though an assessee may not be able to acquire an, absolute stay of the tax until the dispute is resolved, he will certainly be able to get breathing time to pay up the same where his case deserves it. If this interpretation is placed on the provision, no question of unconstitutionality can at all arise." (Emphasis added) 9. From a comparative analysis of the aforesaid decisions and particularly in view of the decision in the case of Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 , I am of the view that the appeal provided under section 189 of the Act is an alternative effective remedy for the writ petitioners to challenge the order of annual valuation and, therefore, the writ jurisdiction of this Court which is discretionary in nature should not be invoked at this stage. 10. 10. Before parting with this part of the order, let me now consider the decisions cited at the Bar on behalf of the writ petitioners. The first decision is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Customs Collector, Bombay vs. Shantilal, AIR 1966 SC 197 . In my view, this decision is clearly distinguishable. In, that decision, the Supreme Court was considering the question of alternative remedy available to an assessee by way of an appeal under the Sea Customs Act. From a comparative analysis of the said decision, I am confident that the said decision cannot have any application to the facts and circumstances of this case as it appears that under the Sea Customs Act, no appeal could be filed unless a large penalty imposed upon the writ petitioner had first been deposited that is to say no appeal could be filed or entertained by the Tribunal if large penalty imposed upon an assessee was not deposited. In view of the decision in the case of Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 , which dealt with the payment of taxes under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act in which the Supreme Court has clearly held as noted herein earlier that the appeal can be filed and entertained by the Municipal Tribunal, only appeal cannot be heard or disposed of without pre deposit of the disputed property tax, in my view, the decision in the case of Customs Collector, Bombay vs. Shantilal, AIR 1966 SC 197 , is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Similar is the position in respect of the other decision of the Supreme Court cited on behalf of the writ petitioner in the case of M/s. Filterco vs. Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 626 . From a perusal of Paragraph 11 of the said decision it is evident that the provision for filing an appeal under section 38 sub-section (3) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act (2) of 1959 requires that a substantial portion of the tax had to be deposited before an appeal or revision can be filed. From a perusal of Paragraph 11 of the said decision it is evident that the provision for filing an appeal under section 38 sub-section (3) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act (2) of 1959 requires that a substantial portion of the tax had to be deposited before an appeal or revision can be filed. Therefore, in this decision the Supreme Court also held that the filing of an appeal can not arise until and unless a substantial portion of the tax was deposited by the assessee or, in other words, no appeal under the Sea Customs Act should be filed until and unless a substantial portion of the tax was deposited. Since under the Act, appeal can be filed and entertained but, cannot be disposed of before the tax is deposited in view section 189(6) of the Act, the decisions of the Supreme Court in which the Supreme Court dealt with statutes which prohibit filing of appeals without pre-deposit, cannot be made applicable in relation to the statute which confers power on the appellate authority to entertain such appeal. Therefore, in my view, the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be applicable to cases under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act. In view of my discussions made hereinabove and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 , the aforesaid decisions as cited on behalf of the writ petitioners cannot be of any help to the writ petitioners. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N.N.C.S. and W. Mills vs. Ahmedabad Municipality, AIR 1967 SC 1801 , is concerned, I am of the view that this decision is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that decision, the Supreme Court observed that the right of an appeal in a case where the rateable value is challenged on the ground of Article 14 was hardly of any use to the assessee. In that decision, the Supreme Court observed that the right of an appeal in a case where the rateable value is challenged on the ground of Article 14 was hardly of any use to the assessee. Since in that decision, Article 14 of the Constitution was invoked and in that context the Supreme Court held that in spite of the existence of an alternative remedy, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked and as I do not find from the writ petition that any case was made out by the writ petitioners alleging the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, in these cases, therefore, this decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The next decision on which the learned counsel for the writ petitioners relied by is a decision in the case of Surendra Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. CMC & other, 99 CWN 324. It is true that to some extent this decision helps the writ petitioner. In that writ application, the order fixing the annual valuation of premises was set aside and the writ application was allowed, although the order was appealable under section 189 of the Act. From a look of the single bench decision of this Court, it appears that in that decision the writ petition was entertained in spite of the availability of an alternative remedy by way of an appeal, as, according to the learned Judge, the appeals abate until and unless consolidated rates are deposited with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and, therefore, in view of the abatement of the appeal for non deposit of taxes, the question of availability of an alternative remedy does not exist. This single bench decision of this Court cannot be relied in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Kishore vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 . I have already discussed the said decision of the Supreme Court and have already held that appeal does not abate for non deposit of the taxes, but the appeal shall not be heard or disposed of before the deposits are made. In that view of the matter, this decision of the Single Bench of this Court reported in Surendra Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. CMC & other, 99 CWN 324, cannot be relied. In that view of the matter, this decision of the Single Bench of this Court reported in Surendra Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. CMC & other, 99 CWN 324, cannot be relied. The last decision on which the learned counsel for the writ petitioners relied on is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahabidyalaya, 1987(4) SCC 525 . This decision is, in my view, also cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of these cases. In that decision, the Supreme Court held notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy under the statute, the writ petition was maintainable as the order challenged in the writ application was a null and void order. In Paragraph 12 of the said decision of the Supreme Court, the apex Court of our country observed as follows:- "The next question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Chancellor under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity such an order could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act." (Emphasis added) 11. From the aforesaid observation, it is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court held that existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the invocation of writ jurisdiction in view of the fact that the order challenged in the writ application was totally without jurisdiction. From the aforesaid observation, it is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court held that existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the invocation of writ jurisdiction in view of the fact that the order challenged in the writ application was totally without jurisdiction. So far as the present case is concerned, it appears that the objections were filed by the writ petitioners before the Hearing Officer which were heard and thereafter after considering the said objections the same were disposed of by the impugned orders. It may be that the orders were passed without giving any reason and for that in cannot be said that the said orders were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice nor it can be said that the orders impugned in these writ petitions were without jurisdiction. It is always open to the Appellate Authority to set aside the order of the Hearing Officer, if it is found by the Appellate Authority that the order was passed without giving any reason 12. Accordingly, I am of the view that the preliminary objection as to the entertainability of the writ application at this stage raised on behalf of the CMC should be sustained and accordingly, these writ petitions cannot be entertained at this stage and, therefore, they are dismissed. There is another aspect of the matter. There is no dispute that the appeals have also been filed against the orders determining the annual valuation of the respective premises. There is no dispute that these appeals are still pending, before the Municipal Tribunal for decision. In view of my discussions made hereinabove that the appeals filed by the writ petitioners are effective alternative remedies available to the writ petitioners against the orders fixing annual valuation of the respective premises. I am of the view that the writ petitioners would not be permitted to proceed with a parallel remedy by moving the writ applications in this Court when appeals are pending before the Tribunal. In this connection a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of A.V. Georgekutty vs. State, AIR 1994 Kerala 19, may be referred to. In this connection a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of A.V. Georgekutty vs. State, AIR 1994 Kerala 19, may be referred to. Accordingly, I hold that the writ petitions should be dismissed also on the ground that these are not entertainable at this stage in view of the availability of alternative remedy by way of an appeal under section 189 of the Act, which remedy has already been availed of by the writ petitioners. 13. Before parting with this part of this order, I may be permitted to consider another contention of the learned advocate for the writ petitioner. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner contended that in view of the fact that section 189(1)(i) of the Act has been declared ultra vires the Constitution of India in the case of Shree Mahamaya Mining vs. CMC, 1995(2) CHN 125 and also in the case of A.K. Das Adhikari vs. CMC, 1996(1) CHN 425, the special notices issued under section 184(4) of the Act must be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. For giving an appropriate answer to this submission of the learned advocate for the writ petitioner, I have perused the contents of the special notices issued under section 184(4) of the Act. It appears from the same that the said special notices were issued by saying the following:- "New valuation of the portion in the premises on estimated yearly rental value less statutory allowances for repairs on apportionment of taxes with effect from 2/94-95 under section 178(3) read with section 180(1)(i) of CMC Act, 1980." From a plain reading of the contents of the special notices, it is clear that the said notices were not issued only on the basis of section 180(1)(i) of the Act. The said special notices were issued also on the basis of yearly rental value less statutory allowances for repairs on apportionment of taxes with effect from 2/94-95 under section 180(3) read with section 180(1)(i) of CMC Act, 1980. Therefore, in my view, this contention of the learned advocate for the writ petitioner cannot be accepted and hence it is rejected. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that these writ petitions should not be entertained at this stage when the writ petitioners have filed appeals against the said orders of annual valuation in respect of their respective premises." 14. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that these writ petitions should not be entertained at this stage when the writ petitioners have filed appeals against the said orders of annual valuation in respect of their respective premises." 14. There is another aspect of the matter too. In my view, the writ petitioners have come to this Court to invoke the discretionary power of the writ court in order to avoid payment of taxes in terms of section 189(6) of the Act. Since the power of the writ court is discretionary and when the writ petitioners, knowing fully well that the appeal cannot be disposed of without depositing the taxes, filed the appeals which have not yet been disposed of, there is no reason to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court in the facts and circumstances of this case. However, I make it clear, that I have not gone into the merits of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties in respect of the orders passed by the Hearing Officer on the question of determination of annual valuation of the respective premises of the writ petitioners which shall be decided by the Municipal Tribunal in appeals filed under section 189(6) of the Act. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Interim orders, if there be any, shall stand vacated. Writ petitions dismissed.