JUDGMENT A.L. Vaidya, J.: The present petitioner Smt. Jallo Devi appeared as a witnees in a Sessions Trial No.46-N/7 of 1990 decided on 04-5-1992. Raju and others were prosecuted in the said trial under Sections 302/314/34 IPC. The prosecution case in that trial briefly was that on 13.5.1988 one Savitra was brought to the Civil Hospital, Paonta Sahib by accused Raju and Wahid alongwith the present petitioner Smt. Jallo Devi and had left her in the examination room of the lady Doctor alleging that Savitra had been bleeding from her private part 2. The Staff nurse on examination found that lady had no pulse at which she informed Dr. Divya Sharma who finding her dead informed the Doctor Narang who sent the information to the local police. It was found by the police that Savitra had been pregnant for six months and was having illicit relations with accused Raju and Wahid and these two accused had taken her away from her house for getting illicit child aborted, and had gone to one Dr. Sukhdev Mittal, who refused to carry out the abortion. They had then gone to accused Kikkar Singh a registered medical practitioner in Puruwala, where they tried to carry out abortion with various instruments but failed. Lady started bleeding and according to the prosecution the accused persons apprehended the death of the lady, she was administered aluminium phosphide and there-after with the help of one trained mid-wife Jallu Devi and taken her in a three wheeler of one Pawan Kumar to the hospital. 3. The present petitioner Smt. Jallo Devi was examined as PW-15 in the trial. During the investigation her statement under Section 164 Cr. P.C. was recorded before the Magistrate and she was also examined under under Section 161 Cr. P.C. In the statement made under Section 164 Cr. P.C. which was exhibited as Ex.PW-15/B she had stated that she alongwith wife of Dr. Kikkar Singh, Raju and Wahid went to the hospital on the asking of Dr. Kikkar Singh and where in the hospital accused Wahid disclosed that Savitra was to be admitted in the hospital and she was his sister. Raju the other boy disclosed that Savitra was his wife. She also stated before the Magistrate that she has asked the Sister to examine Savitra. Similar was the statement given by her under Section 161 Cr. Kikkar Singh and where in the hospital accused Wahid disclosed that Savitra was to be admitted in the hospital and she was his sister. Raju the other boy disclosed that Savitra was his wife. She also stated before the Magistrate that she has asked the Sister to examine Savitra. Similar was the statement given by her under Section 161 Cr. P.C. During the trial of the case, she resiled from her statement made under Section 164 Cr. P.C. She stated that she had disclosed to the police that Kikkar Singh accused came to her and asked her to take his wife for vaccination to the hospital and that she had met her and other accused Wahid and Raju in Puruwala Chowk where Savitra was paled in a Tempu for being taken to the hospital for abortion. She further stated that she had been kept in the Police Station by the Thanedar who had threatened her to make a statement as recorded in Ex.P-15/A (statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C). She also stated that her statement was recorded by the Magistrate but that was not voluntary one. According to her, Thanedar had threatened her to make that statement otherwise she was to be put behind the bar. 4. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused persons and regarding this Julio Devi, who appeared as PW-15, made a reference that her statement was found completely false which she made before the court. The learned Session Judge, thereafter observed that a separate notice was being issued to her under Section 344 Cr. P.C. for action against her. 5. The present petitioner was given following notice on 3.6.1992: "Whereas you appeared as a witness for prosecution in a Sessions trial State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar & Ors., under Sections 302, 314 read with Section 34 IPC. and it has been found by me while delivering the judgment that you have knowingly and wilfully given false evidence in the said case with the intention that such evidence be used in that case and I am satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that you be tried summarily for giving false evidence intentionally as abovesaid, you are called upon to show cause why you should not be summarily tried and punished for the said offence under Section 344 Cr. P.C." 6. P.C." 6. On that very day, in reply to the aforesaid accusation, the present petitioner stated that she had made a true and correct statement before the court and whatever statement was recorded befor the Chief Judicial Magistrate that was incorrect and she had made that statement on the asking of the police which had threatened her and forced her to make that statement. She also stated that whatever statement was made by her on the asking of the police was not true and in order to prove this fact she would prove by examining the evidence. She also stated that she be given time to lead evidence. 7. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge on that very day without examining any evidence or affording any opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in support of her statement, convicted the present petitoner for making false statement on oath and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and a fine of Rs.300/- and in default of payment of fine she was to further undergo simple imprisonment for another 15 days. 8. The aforesaid order dated 3.6.1992 has been assailed in the present revision petition by the petitioner on various grounds. 9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the entire record has been scrutinised. 10. Section 344 Cr. P.C. deals with the summary procedure for trial for giving false evidence. In order to proceed with under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a witness, forgiving false evidence, the following ingredients are essential to be legally established for exercising the powers under the Section: (i) the court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must express an opinion to the effect that the witness appearing had knowingly or wilfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence; (ii) that the court must come to the conclusion that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offences which appears to have been committed by the witness ; (iii) that before commencing the summary trial the court must give reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished. 11. All the aforesaid conditions under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are mandatory in nature. 12. 11. All the aforesaid conditions under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are mandatory in nature. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly contended that so far as the circumstances of the present case are concerned, the aforesaid conditions/required to be established for proceeding under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not present in the present case and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on that account suffers from illegaliites. It has also been contended that summary procedure whcih has been followed for trying the present petitoner is very much against the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this behalf. 13. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the witness had given a false statement as she has resiled from her statement made to the police under Section 161 Cr. P.C. and to the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr. P.C. According to the trial judge, the statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr. P.C. was correct and true. It may not be out of place to mention here that as per record of the case all the accused have been acquitted in the trial as there was no direct evidence connecting them with the alleged occurrence and the circumstantial evidence examined was also not legally competent to warrant their conviction. 14. At this stage, even if for arguments sake the version given by the petitioner before the police and that too before the Magistrate is accepted as a truthful version, it has to be inferred whether such a version if accepted is legally competent evidence, - - sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused persons. The obvious reply would be in the negative. Moreover in the present case, the present petitioner while making statement on oath during the trial and while giving reply to the accusations in the present proceedings in very clear terms stated that she was threatened by the police to make statement before the Judicial Magistrate and before the police also. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr. P.C. alleged to have been voluntarily made was correct version. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr. P.C. alleged to have been voluntarily made was correct version. It may not be out of place to mention here that admittedly the present petitoner was afforded no opportunity to substantiate her allegations that she was threatened by the police to make such like statements. The summary proceedings conducted by the trial Judge without examining any evidence and without affording any opportunity to the accused to examine defence cannot be said to be legal and in accordance with Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the summary trial. Under Section 264 of the Code it has been provided that in every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a Judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding. In the present proceedings, neither any evidence was recorded nor the accused was afforded any opportunity to lead evidence, especially when it was only on 3.6.1992 that the petitioner was summoned to appear in the court and on that very day the entire proceedings were completed. The order of conviction passed by the trial judge, trying the petitioner summarily, by itself is very much clear that the learned Judge did not comply with the various provisions of Code for proceeding with a case in a summary manner. 15. It has been rightly contended on behalf of the petitioner that it would not be expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute a witness, resiling from his previous statement under Section 164 of the Code, for perjury if the previous statement appears to be false due to police pressure and the subsequent statement appears to be true. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel has to be considered favourably especially when it has been specific case of the present petitioner that because of police pressure she made statement before the Police and before the Magistrate also and the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to prove her defence. In the background of the present circumstances, it could not be said that the alleged statement made by the petitioner was a voluntary one and was not under the police pressure. 16. In the background of the present circumstances, it could not be said that the alleged statement made by the petitioner was a voluntary one and was not under the police pressure. 16. Otherwise also, as pointed out above, even if for arguments sake it is assumed that the witness made a false statement before the court and where the alleged perjury by a witness would not very much effect the result of the trial in which it was committed, it cannot be said that it was expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute the perjurer. In order to support this Jai Bir Singh v. Malkhan Singh & anr., (A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad, 364) can safely be cited wherein it has been held that where the alleged perjury by a witness would not very much affect the result of the trial in which it was committed, it is not expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute the perjurer. 17. Otherwise also, as pointed out above the trial itself was also not held in accordance with law and on that very store, the same has been rendered illegal, causing serious prejudice not only to the trial but to the defence also. 18. Thus, taking into consideration the over all facts present in this case, it was not a case legally competent to proceed under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the present petitioner. That being so, the present petition is accepted and the order under reference convicting the present petitioner for perjury and sentencing her as referred to above is quashed and as a consequences thereof, the petitioner is acquitted. The bail bonds furnished by the petitioner stand discharged and the fine if paid by her be returned without any undue delay. Accordingly, petition stands disposed of.