JUDGMENT C.S. Rajan, J. 1. A common question regarding the constitutional validity of Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') arises in these two Original Petitions. O.P. No. 16199/1994 is by the Kerala Magistrates Judicial Association and the other by the Kerala Judicial Officers' Association, which were originally filed before the Supreme Court of India and transferred to this Court for disposal as writ petitions filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Since important legal questions are involved these have come before us on a reference by a Division Bench. 2. The "fight" between the two wings of the subordinate judiciary in the State for supremacy and for better promotional avenues has a chequered history spreading over more than two decades. The members of the State Judicial Service were governed by three sets of special rules. The State Higher Judicial Service consisted of Selection Grade District and Sessions Judges and District and Sessions Judges including Additional District and Sessions Judges. They are governed by the State Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1961. The Kerala Subordinate Magisterial Service consisted of Additional First Class Magistrates and Sub Magistrates. They were governed by the Kerala Subordinate Magisterial Service Rules, 1964. The State Judicial Service consisted of Subordinate Judges which term included Sub Judges posted as District Magistrates (Judicial) and Munsiffs which term included Munsiffs posted as Sub divisional Magistrates. They were governed by the State Judicial Service Rules, 1966. 3. The Government by order dated 12th February 1973 constituted two separate wing of civil and criminal judiciary consisting of Sub Judges and Munsiffs on the civil side, and District Magistrates (Judicial), Sub divisional Magistrates, Additional First Class Magistrates and Sub Magistrates on the criminal side. The two new services were designated as Kerala Civil Judicial Service and Kerala Criminal Judicial Service. But the bifurcation of the judicial service into two branches was challenged before this Court and it was held in M. K. Krishnan Nair v. State of Kerala and others 1974 KLT 313 that the Government orders "by which the two separate wings were constituted in the judiciary of this State as Civil and Criminal, are invalid, as (1) the G. Os. restrict the exercise of option to get into criminal judiciary only to Officers borne on the Magistracy; and (2) as the separation into two wings and the carving out of separate promotional avenues for the Magisterial section of the Judiciary, which had been integrated with, or absorbed into, the Civil Judicial posts, is discriminatory and irrational". But this ecision was reversed in appeal by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. (See AIR 1978 SC 747 ), which upheld the bifurcation, but sustained the finding of the High Court that the restriction of the option to officers originally borne on the magistracy is invalid. Thereafter the High Court considered the question of integrating the two wings of the State Subordinate Judiciary and of issuing unified rules. It was discussed in the various committees of the Judges of the High Court at various levels. There were protracted correspondence between the High Court and the Government, which finally made specialties for the Kerala Judicial Service under Art.234 and 235 of the Constitution of India, and under sections (1) of the Kerala Public Services Act as per G.O. (P) 190/91 Home, dated 31st December 1991. According to the above rules, there shall be a common service called the Kerala Judicial Service in the place of existing Kerala Civil Judicial Service and Kerala Criminal Judicial Service, which shall consist of the following categories of officers. 1. Subordinate Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates. 2. Munsiff Magistrates. The service was formed by integrating the members of the Kerala Civil Judicial Service consisting of Subordinate Judges and Munsiffs and the members of the Kerala Criminal Judicial Service consisting of Selection Grade Chief Judicial Magistrates, Chief Judicial Magistrates, Senior Grade Judicial Magistrates of the First Class Judicial Magistrates of First Class and Judicial Magistrates of Second Class. Subordinate Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates shall be formed by integrating those in the category of Subordinate Judges and those in the category of Selection Grade Chief Judicial Magistrates and Chief Judicial Magistrates in the ratio of 3:1. The Munsiff Magistrates and Senior Grade Judicial Magistrates of the First Class and Judicial Magistrates of the First Class are integrated in the ratio of 5:2. The working of the ratio of 3:1 between the Subordinate Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates is as follows. The first three places shall be given to the Subordinate Judges and the 4th place to the Chief Judicial Magistrates and so on. The working of the ratio of 3:1 between the Subordinate Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates is as follows. The first three places shall be given to the Subordinate Judges and the 4th place to the Chief Judicial Magistrates and so on. The working of the ratio of 5:2 between the Munsiffs and the Magistrates is as follows. The first three places shall he given to the Munsiffs, the fourth, place to the Magistrates, 5th and 6th to the Munsiffs, 7th place to the Magistrates and so on. 4. Shri T. P. Kelu Nambiar, learned Senior Counsel, who appeared for the Criminal Judicial Officers submitted that the basic requirement of integration of two services are equation of the post and determination of seniority in the equated post. R.3 (4) no doubt purports to equate the posts, but actually determines the seniority. He said that R.3 in all its ramifications does not really integrate the two services by equation of posts and fixing seniority. By introducing a ratio, which is irrational and arbitrary, the seniority acquired by the Magistrates had been destroyed. He has therefore prayed to quash the rule in its entirety or in the alternative for a direction to place all the Magistrates over Munsiffs arid Chief Judicial Magistrates over Sub Judges on the basis of the date of continuous service reckoning from the date of first appointment in the equated category. 5. The learned Senior Counsel relied on an unreported decision of a learned Judge of this Court in O. P. No. 1.0572 of 1985 wherein the principle of integration has been explained as follows: "One of the cardinal Rules of Integration is equation of posts. After equation of posts is made seniority in the equated category has to be determined..... .The date of initial recruitment cannot be the criterion for equation of posts on the date of integration because the length, of service with reference to the initial recruitment cannot be the basis for integration of persons belonging to different service. The length of service will have no nexus to the post held by the personnel on the date of integration. The length of service will have no nexus to the post held by the personnel on the date of integration. The total length of service under the Board cannot be the criterion for the purpose of fixation of seniority in any cadre when personnel belonging to two services are sought to be integrated." The above Judgment of the learned Single judge was upheld by this Court in the ruling reported in Saratchandran v. Malathy 1989 (2) K.L.T. 914 . But the Supreme Court reversed the above Judgment in the ruling reported in Kerala State Electricity Board v. N. Sukesen 1996 (9) S.C.C. 397 . 6. The learned Senior Counsel also cited the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Om Praksh Sharma v. Union of Indian A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1276. In the above ruling the facts were as follows: There were three independent departments under the control of Divisional Electrical Engineer. They had a common seniority list. The appellants there in were seniors to the contesting respondents. After the repatriation and re-amalgamation of the department, the contesting respondents obtained accelerated promotion because of easy availability of vacancies. When re-amalgamation was introduced, the contesting respondents who were reverted to the common seniority list with the appellants scored a march over the appellants. It was contended that their position ante must be reflected in the seniority list. Dealing with the above aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court held as follows: "Obviously when the amalgamation took place, respondents Nos. 3 to 6 could not score a march over erstwhile seniors on any valid principle of seniority. This would unquestionably be denial of equality under Art.16 of the Constitution. It may be that they might have enjoyed some accelerated promotion when workshop staff was amalgamated with the Bombay Office. But when they were repatriated and re-amalgamated with original two offices and brought back on the common seniority list, they must find their original place qua the appellants. This is not a case where appellants were passed over at the time of selection or denied promotion on the ground of unsuitability In such a situation status quo ante has to be restored. Obviously respondents Nos. 3 to 6 will be below the appellants and any other view to the contrary would be violative of Art.16 as it would constitute denial of equality in the matter of promotion. Obviously respondents Nos. 3 to 6 will be below the appellants and any other view to the contrary would be violative of Art.16 as it would constitute denial of equality in the matter of promotion. Therefore, the seniority list drawn up on a principle contrary to what is discussed herein would be bad in law and deserves to be Quashed." The learned Senior Counsel also relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in R. M. Ramual v. State of H. P. A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 357. "8. One of the two steps which was to be taken for the purpose of integration was determination of equivalent posts. For determining the equivalent posts, the factors which would have to be taken into consideration were also suggested in the said letter. One of the factors, which is by far the most important one, was as contained in clause (a) of Para.2, namely, the salary of the post. It is apparent from the instructions given by the Central Government, as contained in the said letter of the Joint Secretary, that for the purpose of integration the first thing which should be done was determination of equivalent post and after such determination, the determination of relative seniority of persons holding equivalent posts would be made. 9. It is surprising that although the instructions as given by the Central Government were very clear and specific in the matter of integration of services, the Government of Himachal Pradesh instead of following the two steps as mentioned in the said letter of the Joint Secretary, prepared a provisional seniority list of the Tourism Department without first determining the equivalent posts. There can be no doubt that integration of services postulates equation, of posts. Without such equation, preparation of inter se seniority lists between different groups of officers holding different posts cannot be conceived. The Himachal Pradesh Government, however, appears to have ignored the specific, clear and categorical directions of the Central Government to first of all determine the equivalent posts and adopted an arbitrary procedure in preparing the provisional inter se seniority list without such equation of posts." 16............There was no attempt to determine the equivalent posts, that is to say, no endeavour was made by the Government to equate one post with another for the purpose of integration and determination of relative seniority. Instead, the posts as they were, were placed in the seniority list." The learned Senior Counsel also quoted the often Repeated passage from the ruling reported in State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (1983) 2 S.C.C. 33 . Today's equals cannot be made unequal by saying that they were unequal 20 years ago and we will restore that position by making a law today and making it retrospective. Constitutional rights, constitutional obligations and constitutional consequences cannot be tampered with that way. A law which if made today would be plainly invalid as offending constitutional provisions in the context of the existing situation cannot become valid by being made retrospective. Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to wipe out present vice (constitutional) by making retrospective law." 7. The inequity and injustice meted out to the members of the Magisterial service was attempted to be demonstrated by Mr. Nambiar by pointing out that large number of Judicial First Class Magistrates who started their service as Judicial Second Class Magistrates in 1974, 1,979 etc. are now given seniority in the integrated cadre only with effect from 1980, 1981 etc. This was due to the introduction of the ratio as per R.3 (4) of the Rules. The above deprival of seniority by several year was vehemently attacked by the learned Senior Counsel by relying on the observation of the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 55 which reads as follows: "Seniority is an incident of service which cannot be eroded or curtailed by a rule which operates discriminately........". 8. Sri T. R. Govinda Warrier, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court with the strong support of Senior Counsel Sri. S. Vekitasubramanya Iyer appearing for the members of the civil judiciary and with the able assistance of the learned Government Pleader Sri K. Jayakumar took us to the history of the promulgation of the rules including the details of deliberations in the various committees consisting of eminent Judges well versed in service jurisprudence. The committee of senior Judges considered the memorandum submitted by the Kerala Magistrates (Judicial) Association. The representative of the Associations were also given a personal hearing. The committee of senior Judges considered the memorandum submitted by the Kerala Magistrates (Judicial) Association. The representative of the Associations were also given a personal hearing. The main requests of the Magistrates was these: (1) The scheme of integration may be implemented with retrospective effect from 6th February 1987, the date on which the Government took the policy decision to integrate the two services. (2) Inter se seniority of the officers on the civil and criminal side shall be determined with reference to the date of appointment to the equated categories. (3) Munsiffs and Judicial Magistrates of the First Glass recruited after 6th February 1987 may be adopted to the new Rules and the inter se seniority among them may be fixed on the basis of the length of service on the equated categories of Munsiffs and Magistrates remaining to be absorbed at the bottom. The committee rejected the request to make the rules retrospective since it is against the accepted principles regarding subordinate legislation. The principles regarding the determination of seniority with reference to the date of appointment in the equated category was examined in depth by the committee. After a detailed examination, the committee found that the ratio of 3:1 suggested by the High Court for the preparation of the combined seniority list of Sub Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates was very much beneficial to the Chief Judicial Magistrates except in the case of the senior most three Chief Judicial Magistrates who were in service at that time. If the date of appointment to the equated category is taken as relevant criterion for determination of inter se seniority, all the other Chief Judicial Magistrates other than three senior most Chief Judicial Magistrates would be pushed down in the combined seniority list very considerably. With regard to the determination of seniority of the Munsiffs and Judicial Magistrates, the committee had the following views: The number of Munsiffs in service at present is 90. They can now aspire for promotion to 111 posts of Sub Judges and District Judges together (49 posts of Sub Judges and 62 posts of District Judges). With regard to the determination of seniority of the Munsiffs and Judicial Magistrates, the committee had the following views: The number of Munsiffs in service at present is 90. They can now aspire for promotion to 111 posts of Sub Judges and District Judges together (49 posts of Sub Judges and 62 posts of District Judges). By the induction of the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class numbering 64 into the integrated service, their chances of promotion also get augmented as the number of posts to which the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class could aspire for promotion now is only 18 posts of Chief Judicial Magistrates. In other words, while the promotion chances of Munsiffs at present is at the rate of 1.25 for every post of Munsiff (111:90), the said chance in the case of Judicial Magistrates of the First Class is only about 0.30 (18:64) for every post of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. By integration, the combined ratio becomes 0 84 (129:154). It may, therefore, be noted that while the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class gain, the Munsiffs lose, to some extent. Such loses or gains, in the matter of chances of promotion, are ordinary concomitants of any integration process. 9. In this connection it is pertinent to point out that the 3:1 ratio between the Munsiffs and the Magistrates proposed by the High Court was altered by the Government as 5:2, thus extending more favour to the Magistrates. 10. In this factual background Sri Warrier, learned Senior Counsel referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court to impress upon us that what the High Court and the Government did was perfectly legal and justifiable. In the ruling reported in Menyn Continho v. Collector of Customs, Bombay A.I.R. 1967 S. C. 52, the Supreme Court upheld the determination of seniority on the basis of a rotational system between the two sources of recruitment as follows: "7. This brings us back to the circular of 1959, and the main question in that connection is the meaning to be assigned to the words 'seniority determined accordingly', in the explanation to principle 6 relating to relative seniority of direct recruits and promotees. This brings us back to the circular of 1959, and the main question in that connection is the meaning to be assigned to the words 'seniority determined accordingly', in the explanation to principle 6 relating to relative seniority of direct recruits and promotees. As we read these words, their plain meaning is that seniority as between direct recruits and promotees should be determined in accordance with the rosier, which has also been specified, namely, one promotee followed by one direct recruit and so on. Where, therefore recruitment to a cadre is from two sources namely, direct recruits and promotees and rotational system is In force, seniority has to be fixed as provided in the explanation by alternately fixing a promotee and a direct recruit in the seniority list. We do not see any violation of the principle of equality of opportunity enshrined in Art.16 (1) by following rotational system of fixing seniority in a cadre half of which consists of direct recruits and the other half of promotees, and the rotational system by itself working in this way cannot be said to deny equality of opportunity in Government service." 11. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the following observation of the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in Joginder Nath v. Union of India (1975) 3 S.C.C. 459 "It was not possible or practical to measure their respective merits for the purpose of seniority with mathematical precision by a barometer. Some formula doing largest good to the largest number had to be evolved. The only reasonable and workable formula which could be evolved was the one engrafted in R.11 of the Delhi Judicial Service Rules." In the ruling reported in Education Department Association v. Tamil Nadu A.I.R. 1980 S. C. 379 the Supreme Court was considering the principles of the integration of services in the Tamil Nadu Education Department and fixation of ratio for promotion and principle of computation of service in determining the common seniority. While upholding the introduction of 'quota' rule in the integration of services, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in his inimical style declared as follows: "2. In service jurisprudence integration is a complicated administrative problem, where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruise to a few cannot be ruled out. While upholding the introduction of 'quota' rule in the integration of services, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in his inimical style declared as follows: "2. In service jurisprudence integration is a complicated administrative problem, where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruise to a few cannot be ruled out. Some play in the joints, even some wobbling, must be left to Government without fussy forensic monitoring, since the administration has been entrusted by the Constitution to the Executive, not to the Court. All life, including administrative life, involves experiment, trial and error, but within the leading strings of fundamental rights, and absent unconstitutional 'excessess', judicial correction is not right. Under Art.32, this Court is the Constitutional sentinel, not the national ombudsman. In the instant case even if the quota rule is an administrative device to inject justice into the integrating process, the ratio cannot be arbitrary nor based on extraneous factors. 3. The ratio of 5:3 and 3:2 respectively were prescribed for the ministerial staff and teaching staff, taking a realistic note of the total numbers of the two equivalent groups viz., quondom District Board servants and relative Government School staff. This is not an irrational criterion when coalescence of two streams springing from two sources occurs. 4. Having regard to the strength of the District Board staff to be inducted, the ratio is rational. A better formula could be evolved, but the court cannot substitute its wisdom for Government's, save to see that unreasonable perversity, mala fide manipulation, indefensible arbitrariness and like infirmities do not defile the equation for integration." 12. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the determination of seniority applying rotational principle when recruitment to a service is from two different sources. In Jaisinghani v. Union of India A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427 the Supreme Court pointed out that in the case of recruitment to a service from two different sources and adjustment of seniority between them, the preferential treatment of one source in relation to the other can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification, if the difference between the two sources has a reasonable relation to the nature of the posts to which the recruitment is made. In the above case the Supreme Court upheld the provisions contained in the Service Recruitment Rules of Income Tax Officers, whereby weightage was given to the promotees by providing that three years of outstanding work in Class II would be treated as equivalent to two years of probation in Glass I (Grade II service). 13. The above question again came up before the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in Bishan Sarup v. Union of India A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1618 the following observations of Palekar, J. speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench are extracted with advantage: "There is no question in this case of any discrimination being made in a service after officers from two sources have been brought in one cadre. It is true that seniority is a vital element in the matter of promotion but that does not mean that allotment of seniority by rule relative to recruitment, involves any classification for the purposes of promotion. The argument that the promotees and direct recruits became one class immediately on entry and, thereafter there could be no classification between them does not disclose the correct approach to the problem of fixing inter se seniority between them. When recruits from two sources have come into a service it is essential to fix inter se seniority for a proper integration of the cadre. Therefore, it is really a case of adjustment of seniority between the recruits and does not amount to making a classification after their absorption in one service." 14. The above view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in R. S. Makashi v. I. M. Menon (1982) 1 S.C.C. 379 in the following words: "The reasons stated by the learned Single Judge of the High Court for declaring the aforesaid rule to be arbitrary and violative of Art.16 of the Constitution do not appeal to us as correct or sound. Almost the entire reasoning of the learned Single Judge is based on an assumption that there is an invariable 'normal rule that seniority' should be determined only on the basis of the respective dates of appointment to the post and that any departure from the said rule will be prima facie unreasonable and illegal. The said assumption is devoid of any legal sanction. We are unable to recognise the existence of any such rigid or inflexible rule. The said assumption is devoid of any legal sanction. We are unable to recognise the existence of any such rigid or inflexible rule. It is open to the rule-making authority to take a note of the relevant circumstances obtaining in relation to each department and determine with objectivity and fair ness what rules should govern the inter se seniority and ranking of the personnel working in the concerned departments and the courts will only insist that the rules so formulated should be reasonable, just and equitable. Judged by the safe test of reasonableness and fairness the action taken by the Government in equating the clerical personnel which had rendered two years' regular service in other departments with the temporary Supply Inspectors of the C.F.D. and in directing as per impugned R.4(a) that their inter se seniority shall be determined with reference to the length of service calculated on the basis of the said equation cannot be said to be in any way discriminatory or Illegal. We are unable to accept as correct the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court that "while fixing the seniority in the higher post, it is not open to take into consideration any service rendered in the lower post and that by itself spells out discrimination." 15. The earlier rulings of the Supreme Court were discussed and approved in the ruling reported in O. P. Singla v. Union of India A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1595 in the following words: "24. The earlier rulings of the Supreme Court were discussed and approved in the ruling reported in O. P. Singla v. Union of India A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1595 in the following words: "24. This court has taken the view in many cases that whenever the rules provide for recruitment to a service from different sources, there is no inherent infirmity in prescribing a quota for appointment of persons drawn from those sources and in working out the rule of quota by rotating the vacancies as between them in a stated proportion [See, for example, Mervyn continho v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1966) 3 S.C.R. 600 : (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 52), S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (1967) 2 S.C.R 703 : (A.I.R. 1967 S.G. 1427), Bishan Sarup Gupta v. Union of India f 1975) 1 S.C.R. 104: (A.I.R. 1974 S.G. 1618), A. K. Subramaft v. Union of India (1975) 2 S.G.R. 979: (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 483) V. B. Badami v. State of Mysore (1976) 2 S.C.C. 901 : (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1561) and Paramjit Singh Sandhu v. Ram Rakha (1979) 3 S.C.R. 584 : (A.I.R. 1979) S.C. 1073]. Therefore R.8 (2) cannot be held to be unconstitutional merely because, it reserves one third of the vacancies in the service for direct recruits and provides that the first available vacancy in the service will be filled in by a direct recruit, the next two by promotees and so on." 16. In one of the latest rulings the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the above aspect (New Bank of India Employees Union v. Union of India (1996) 8 S.C.C. 407 . The Supreme Court was considering the procedure of computing the seniority for fitment or for promotion to the higher grade, after the amalgamation of the two Banks. The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the aggrieved parties that the ratio fixed for placement of the employees is illegal, in the following words: "33. Mr. Sharma, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, the Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation urged that the ratio of 2:1 fixed under the Placement Scheme in fact works out gross injustice. The interest of the employees of the Punjab National Bank should not be jeopardised by bringing the employees of the New Bank of India and no credit should be given to the employees of the New Bank of India for their past services rendered. The interest of the employees of the Punjab National Bank should not be jeopardised by bringing the employees of the New Bank of India and no credit should be given to the employees of the New Bank of India for their past services rendered. We do not find any force in the aforesaid contention and, as discussed earlier, the ratio of 2:1 was fixed in the Placement Scheme in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and after a comparative study of the business of the two banks, the rate of promotion, the higher productivity and larger measure of responsibility and higher average business per branch of the Punjab National Bank as compared to the New Bank of India and all other germane considerations. The submission of Mr. Sharma, therefore, is rejected." 17. The last word spoken by the Supreme Court on this question is in the ruling reported in Kailash Chand v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1997) 3 S.C.C. 27 . The offending rule in the above case was as follows: "26(3)(b) The integration shall be made by rotating the names of the officers appointed under R.5 or R.6 or R.19 in the Executive cadre with that of officers appointed in the Ministerial cadre under R.5 or R.6 or R.19. In the event of officers appointed under R.5 or R.6 or R.19 in a particular cadre not being equal the names of officers in excess shall be placed below the officers appointed under R.5 or R.6 or R.19, as the case may be." The principle of 'rota' incorporated in the above rule was held to be permissible by the Supreme Court in, the following words: "5. It cannot be doubted that if this further amendment made in R.26 does not depart from the principle of reckoning seniority computed on the basis of total length of service in the cadre, then the challenge has to be rejected. That principle has already been upheld at the earlier stages of litigation between the two branches and, therefore, that issue no longer survives. The clear stand on behalf of the Delhi Administration is that the same principle of determining seniority on. the basis of total length of service in the cadre continues even under the latest amendment made in R.26. Nothing has been shown on behalf of the petitioners/appellants who belong to the Executive Wing to indicate that this is not so. The clear stand on behalf of the Delhi Administration is that the same principle of determining seniority on. the basis of total length of service in the cadre continues even under the latest amendment made in R.26. Nothing has been shown on behalf of the petitioners/appellants who belong to the Executive Wing to indicate that this is not so. The principle of 'rota' incorporated in sub-clause (b) of Clause.3 of R.26 is also permissible in such a situation and is a matter within the domain of executive decision. There is thus no vice in R.26 as amended on 19th May 1989." "6. Shri M. S. Ganesh, learned counsel for the petitioners, strenuously urged that on account of certain fortuitous circumstances, those who belong to the Ministerial branch have got an unfair advantage over persons belonging to the Executive branch and the chances of promotion to those in Executive branch are remote because of shorter length of service in this cadre. Suffice it to say that this by itself is not a ground to strike down R.26 which incorporates a settled principle of service jurisprudence for determining seniority. The legality of the merger having been upheld earlier the logical consequence thereof in application of the well recognised rule for determination of seniority on the basis of total length of service in the cadre has to be accepted. At any rate this cannot be a ground to hold that R.26 as amended on 19th May 1989 is invalid for any reason." 18. What seems to emerge from the decisions above referred to could be summarised as follows: There cannot be any inherent infirmity in prescribing a quota for appointment of persons drawn from two sources and in working out the rule of quota by rotating the vacancies between them in a proportion. A ratio can be fixed not in the abstract, but with reference to the total number of persons in service in the two groups, who are to be integrated. The strength of each service is a reasonable basis for formulating the ratio. Unless the above wisdom of the Government is unreasonable or arbitrary, the Court cannot strike it down. A ratio can be fixed not in the abstract, but with reference to the total number of persons in service in the two groups, who are to be integrated. The strength of each service is a reasonable basis for formulating the ratio. Unless the above wisdom of the Government is unreasonable or arbitrary, the Court cannot strike it down. It is always open to the rule making authority to take note of the relevant realities of the situation prevalent in each sendee and to determine with objectivity and fairness the principles governing the interse seniority and ranking of the personnel borne in the respective services. The principle of 'rota' is permissible in determining the seniority of persons after integration of the two services. 19. In this case the files reveal that all the pros and cons of the complex problem were discussed threadbare. The Magistrates who could aspire to become only up to the level of Chief Judicial Magistrates are now given further avenues of promotion to the post of District and Sessions Judges. Earlier, the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class numbering 64 could aspire to become Chief Judicial Magistrate numbering only 18. Now they are entitled to be considered for promotion to the 62 posts of District Judges and more as the posts tend to increase. Thus the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class are gaining by getting more avenues of promotion. Thus taking an over all view of the integration, a large number of Magistrates will be gaining considerably in the matter of seniority and avenues of promotion as against the minor disadvantage for a few. It cannot therefore be said that as a result of integration and fixation of ratio for the purpose of forming the integrated service, the Magistrates are adversely affected. As indicated earlier, the Magistrates whose career would have come to an end by reaching the post of Chief Judicial Magistrates are now getting the door open to go up the ladder and reach the top position in the judiciary. 20. Thus we are of opinion that no injustice has been meted out to the Magistrates by adoption of the ratio while integrating the two services and fixing the seniority. 20. Thus we are of opinion that no injustice has been meted out to the Magistrates by adoption of the ratio while integrating the two services and fixing the seniority. We do not see any constitutional infirmity or violation of any fundamental rights, since the constitutional Benches of the Supreme Court have upheld the prescription of ratio in the matter of fixation of seniority for the purpose of integration of the services. Therefore we are of opinion that the rules are quite valid and constitutional and we uphold the validity of the same. The Original Petitions are therefore dismissed.