B. M. LAL, J. By this second writ peti tion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner Natraj Chhabigrih seeks an order, direction or writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned notice dated 5-11- 1996 and 20-12-1996 (Annexure 4 and 7 to the writ petition) and also seeks a suitable order, direction or writ declaring the proviso to Section 3 (A) (1) of U. P Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. The actual controversy involved in this petition is concluded by the Full Bench decision of this Court passed on the writ petition filed by the same petitioner being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 805 of 1995, Natraj Chhabigrih v. State of U. P, decided on 22-3-1996 [since repected is 1996 (2) JCLR 968 (A11) (FB)], whereby considering the validity of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3-A of the Act in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Full Bench of this Court held that this provision is intra vires and is a valid piece of legislation and overruled the earlier decision rendered by the Division Bench in Kamla Palace v. State of U. P, dated 10-7-1995 : [ Since reported in 1995 (2) JCLR 710 (A11)]. 3. In this petition, the petitioner has raised the main question that the decision of Full Bench rendered in Natraj (supra) ear lier petition of present petitioner, is entirely incorrect and it requires to be reconsidered by the larger Bench of Five Judges. 4. We are afraid. Such arguments are not open to be advanced before the Division Bench in respect of the Full Bench decisions, as the Full Bench is the higher Court than the Division Bench. The expres sion higher Court has been used by their lordships of Apex Court in reference to the Full Bench. 4. We are afraid. Such arguments are not open to be advanced before the Division Bench in respect of the Full Bench decisions, as the Full Bench is the higher Court than the Division Bench. The expres sion higher Court has been used by their lordships of Apex Court in reference to the Full Bench. In U. P. Rashtriya Chini Millad-hikari Parishad Lucknow v. The State of U. P. JT 1995 (5) SC 475 : 1995 (2) LBESR 332 (SC) where the correctness of Division Bench decision of this Court was taken to have been doubted by the Full Bench and in this context their Lordships of Apex Court ruled that once the correctness of a judg ment is doubted by the higher Court, the judgment no longer remains the law of the land and is treated as non-est. We are refer ring Chini Mills case (supra) just to show that the Full Batch is higher Court than the Division Therefore, the expres sion higher Court should not be confused with the expression appellate Court. Thus, as a necessary corollary the Division Bench is higher Court than the Single Judge Court, and the Full Bench is higher Court than the Division Bench and therefore, correctness of Division Bench decision cannot be doubted by Single Judge Bench and that of the Full Bench decision cannot be doubted by the Division Bench and accordingly judi cial propriety demands that the Division Bench decision should not be referred to larger Bench by Single Judge Bench and the Full Bench decision should not be referred to still larger Bench by the Division Bench. It is only for the Benches of coordinate juris diction to refer the decisions of equal Benches to the larger Benches, in case they doubt its correctness. 5. Here it is necessary to make clear that it is not that this view is being taken by this Court for the first time in this case rather this view is settled since long by this Court as well as by the Apex Court in plotnera of decisions some of which are being referred hereto below. 6. 5. Here it is necessary to make clear that it is not that this view is being taken by this Court for the first time in this case rather this view is settled since long by this Court as well as by the Apex Court in plotnera of decisions some of which are being referred hereto below. 6. In T. P. Thakkar v. R. M. Patell ( AIR 1968 SC 372 ) their lordships of Apex Court had ruled as under: "it has been held time and again that a Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct the judgments of Courts of Co ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason for the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law. " Similarly in Assistant Collector of Central Precise v. Dunlop India Ltd. , AIR 1985 SC 330 , their lordships of Apex Court observed: ". . . . . . as was said in Cosset and Company Limited v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027 we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that in the hierarchical system of Courts which exists in our country, "it is necessary for each lower tier" including the High Court, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers. " 7. The Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Pritam Kaur v. Surjit Singh, ( AIR 1984 P&h 113 ) held as follows: "it is equally necessary to highlight that the binding nature of precedents generally and of Full Benches in particular, is the king-pin of our judi cial system. It is the bond that binds together what otherwise might well become a thicket of in dividualistic opinions resulting in a virtual judicial anarchy. . . . . . . It is a necessary discipline of the law that the judgments of the superior Courts and of larger Benches have to be followed unhesitatingly whatever doubts one may individually entertain about their correctness. . . . . . . It is only within the narrowest field that a judgment of a larger Bench can be questioned for reconsideration. . . It is a necessary discipline of the law that the judgments of the superior Courts and of larger Benches have to be followed unhesitatingly whatever doubts one may individually entertain about their correctness. . . . . . . It is only within the narrowest field that a judgment of a larger Bench can be questioned for reconsideration. One of the obvious reasons is, where it is unequivocally manifest that its ratio has been impliedly over ruled or whittled down by a subsequent judgment of the superior Court or a larger Bench of the same Court. Secondly, where it can be held with certainty that a co-equal Bench has laid down the law directly contrary to the same, and, thirdly, where it can be conclusively said that the judg ment of the larger Bench was rendered per in-cwiam by altogether failing to take notice of a clear- cut statutory provision or an earlier binding precedent. It is normally within these constricted parameters that a similar Bench may suggest a reconsideration of the earlier view and not other wise. " 8. Here it may be made clear that learned counsel for the petitioner failed to point out any of the reasons or circumstan ces given in Pritam Kaurs r se (supra) to doubt correctness of the Full Bench decision in the instant case. Moreover, this Bench is not a Full Bench and therefore, not a similar Bench so as to doubt the correct ness of the Full Bench. 9. Recently a Full Bench of this Court in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U. P. , (1995 ACJ 200: 1995 (2) JCLR 569 (A11) (FB) has also held as under:- "implicit, thus, in the disregard by a Single Judge or a Division Bench of a binding judicial precedent of a larger Bench or seeking to doubt its correctness for reasons and in circumstances other than those split out in Pritam Kaurs (supra) is what cannot but be treated as going counter to the discipline of law so essential to abide by, for any efficient system of law to function, if not it virtually smacking of judicial impropriety. In other words it is only within the narrow compass of the rule as stated by the Full Bench in Pritam Kaurs case (supra) that reconsideration of a judgment of a larger Bench can be sought and has been so expressly put there, such judgments are not to be blown away by every side wind. (See also Radhey Shyam v. State of U. P, 1984 AU 666) 10. Further, in this regard it will not be out of place to mention what Lord Diplock said in Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome (All E. R. 1972 (1) 801 at p. 874, (House of Lords) as under: "the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. " 11. It is also important to mention that the doctrine of binding precedents has the merit of promoting a certainty and consis tency in Judicial decisions and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transaction forming part of his daily affairs. (See Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc. and others, (1989) 2 SCC 754 ) 12. Thus, in view of the discussions made above thi5 legal proposition stands amply clarified that only a similar Bench or the Bench of Coordinate jurisdiction may suggest or refer the earlier view to a larger Bench for reconsideration and not other wise. 13. In this regard it may also be made clear that when this Court strikes down a statutory provision holding it to be uncon stitutional or ultra vires it derives its authority to do so under the Constitution and in view of the doctrine of binding prece dents the law declared by it is of a binding character and as command as the law made by a legislative body or an authorised delegated of such body, within the territory of State of U. P. provided the same is not inconsistent to any such law declared by the Apex Court. The Court is not merely the interpreter of the law as existing but much beyond that. The Court as a wing of the State is by itself a source of law. The Court is not merely the interpreter of the law as existing but much beyond that. The Court as a wing of the State is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is- [see Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab (1995) 6 SCC 614 para 17 : 1996 (2) JCLR 46 (SC)] 14. Therefore, the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Natrajs case (supra) has binding force of law for the State of U. P. . 15. Besides this, it is again necessary to mention that prior to the present petition, this very petitioner filed above referred Writ Petition No. 805 of 1995 which has ultimate ly been decided by the aforesaid Full Bench of this Court and in the same matter he has again filed present writ petition. This trend of filing petitions after petitions amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and there fore, must be deprecated. In this context the observations of the Apex Court in a recent pronouncement in S. P. Anand v. H. D. Deve Gowda JT 1996 (10) SC 274 are attracted which are as under:- "the Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filing a series of petitions refusing to accept the Courts earlier decisions as concluding the point. . . . . . Except for saying that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to the correct ness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court even by a per son well- versed in law would not be coun tenanced. " 16. Similarly in Dr. Budhi Kota Sub-barao v. Mr. K. Parasaran and others JT 1996 (7) SC 265 their lordships of Apex Court ruled as under: "finality must attach to some stage of judi cial proceedings, the course adopted by the ap plicant is impermissible and his application is based on misconception of law and facts. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. " 17. In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another v. N. Raju Reddiar and another (JT 1997 (1) SC 486) their lordships of Apex. Court imposed exemplary costs of Rs. 20, 000/- for the abuse of the process of the Court. . 18. In this back drop we are con strained to observe that one can understand the plight of the litigants who are not sup posed to be so conversant with the legal propositions and latest pronouncements of the Courts of Record but all the same learned members of noble profession who are participants in the process of develop ment of law itself in the Courts are not expected to be ignorant of law and even if that is so in any particular case, the ig norance of law is no excuse and therefore such persons have to be more cautious, vigilant and careful while accepting brief and filing the case. The dignity of the profes sion has to be maintained by its learned and respectable members and therefore, it is not that as and when any client approaches a counsel for filing any case, the counsel must accept each and every case without examin ing the pros and cons of the steps which he is going to take. If the matter in issue is fully covered by statutory law or binding prece dent of this Court or Apex Court and in that very matter there is decision of Full Bench or Constitution Bench, it is not supported that the learned counsel shall argue before the Division Bench that the correctness of the law laid down by the Full Bench or the Constitution Bench is doubtful and requires reconsideration. Such sort of practice is not in consonance of the settled norms of the profession and therefore, must be depre cated. 19. Such sort of practice is not in consonance of the settled norms of the profession and therefore, must be depre cated. 19. In our considered opinion present is a fit case for imposing exemplar costs so as to discourage filing of successive peti tions in the same matters which have been settled by the Full Bench but we refrain from doing so on this occasion in the hope that he will exercise restraint in future, failing which he may in a similar or like case be visited with an order of cost. With these observations we dismiss this writ petition. Petition dismissed. .