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1997 DIGILAW 331 (KER)

Mariamma & Ann v. State of Kerala & Ors.

1997-08-29

J.B.KOSHY

body1997
Judgment :- J.B. Koshy, J. In all these petitions, petitioners are challenging the Circulars issued by the Board of Revenue dated 3.9.96 and 10.9.96 wherein it is stated that when it is detected that liquor in possession or in the course of sale is found to be diluted, crime should be charged under S.55 of the Abkari Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Officers are acting on the basis of above Circulars and it is also alleged that in certain cases they are reopening the matters already closed. In all these, cases, samples of Indian Made Foreign Liquor were taken from the licenced premises and it was allegedly found that the above did not contain required strength of alcohol and offences were said to have been committed before 3.6.97. The Act was amended with effect from 3.6.97 by Abkari Amendment Ordinance, 1997 (Ordinance 7/97) which was replaced by Ordinance No. 13/97. The samples were taken from the petitioners licensed premises before the amendment of the Act by Ordinance. In other words, these are pre-ordinance cases. The petitioners include licensees and their employees.. It was found that above samples were below the required strength. R.2 of the Foreign Liquor Rules provides required strength for Indian Made Foreign Liquor. It reads as follows: "2. The minimum strength at which imported and Indian made foreign spirits can be sold are 35 UP of gin and 25U.P. for all other kinds of spirits. However, the actual proof spirit content of such liquor may be 1 proof under or over the above proof strength". Similar conditions are engrafted in the licence also (Condition No. 4). Since on analysis of samples it was further alleged that the liquor taken was not having the required strength, actions were initiated against the petitioners under different sections of the Abkari Act. In certain cases matter was already agreed to be compounded under S.67 of the Act. Even such cases are sought to be reopened on the basis of Circular issued by the Excise Commissioner on 3.9.96 after a date of passing of the Ordinance. In paragraph 8 of the Circular it is stated that such offences should be charged out under S.55 of the Act and it shall not be under S.58 of the Act as is being done by certain officers. This is the reason for taking criminal prosecution. In paragraph 8 of the Circular it is stated that such offences should be charged out under S.55 of the Act and it shall not be under S.58 of the Act as is being done by certain officers. This is the reason for taking criminal prosecution. In view of the Circular officers have no option but to charge the case under S.55. Therefore, intervention of this Court is necessary and petitioners pray for a declaration that such offences will come only under S.56(1) of the Act and are compoundable under S.67(a) of the Act as existed before the introduction of Ordinance. 2. It is the contention of the petitioners that they have not committed any offences. They are purchasing liquor from Kerala Beverages Corporation as it is compulsory. There is no case for the Department that they have adulterated the liquor or liquor is purchased from any other place. It is also submitted that when bottle is opened in the bar, because of the easy evaporation of the ethyl alcohol, reduction of strength is a natural consequence. Ethyl alcohol is the primary alcohol with following composition, CH3 - CH, OH with high evaporation rate. This results in easy dilution and reduction in strength. It is also pointed out that Clause 25 of the Excise Manual allows 4 degree 'variation and it is provided to avoid malicious prosecution of shopkeepers. 3. It was also submitted that in the Beverages Corporation itself there is no facility to check the strength of the liquor. They also submit that under S.67 of the Act, if the offences are held to be compoundable instead of contesting their cases, to close the worry and difficulties in going to the Magistrate Court etc. they are prepared to compound the cases. 4. The first question to be considered is under which clause these offences will come. There is no alleged adulteration or possession of illicit liquor coming so as to attract 57 or S.58 in this case. What is alleged is they have violated the licence conditions and rules, which would be an offence under S.56(b). It is conceded by the learned Advocate General that on the basis of earlier judgments of this Court that the offences will come only under S.56(b). On merit also, I am in agreement with the above view. Then the question is whether these offences are compoundable. S.67(a) provides as follows: "67. It is conceded by the learned Advocate General that on the basis of earlier judgments of this Court that the offences will come only under S.56(b). On merit also, I am in agreement with the above view. Then the question is whether these offences are compoundable. S.67(a) provides as follows: "67. Power to compound offences:- Any Abkari Officer specially empowered in that behalf may accept from any person - (a) whose licence or permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended under clauses (a) and (b) of S.26 or who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under cl. (2) of S.55, Ss.56,57 or 63, a sum of money not less than ten thousand rupees;" So, at the time of alleged commission of these offences these offences were compoundable under S.67(a). It is a settled law that criminal offences has to be considered on the basis of the law existing at the time of the offences. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that in view of the deletion of S.67 by the new ordinance, at present there is no power to compound and the petitioners have to face prosecution according to the law existing in force at the time of occurrence of the offence. 5. The decision of this Court reported in Catholic Syrian Bank v. Appellate Authority (1986 KLT 1394) was relied for the proposition that the authorised officers has no power to compound the offence after the deletion of S.67 by ordinance and therefore, no compounding is possible even though offence was committed earlier. It was held in the above case that when scheduled banks were exempted by Government notification from the purview of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act even pending appeal also ceases to be maintainable. The decision reported in Meenakshi Amma v. Madhavan Nair (1968 KLT 744), Mano Mani v. Labour Court and Ann (1969 KLR 742), Collector v. Habib-Ullah-Din (AIR 1967 Jammu & Kashmir 44), Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Padmavathy Amma (1970 KLT 888) and Hotel Maharani Pvt. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calicut (1986 KLT 992) were differentiated on the ground that in all those cases the authority to dispose of the matter continued to have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. But in view of the issuance notification exempting the Scheduled Banks from the Shop Act it was held that no jurisdiction of the appellate authority also' ceased. But in view of the issuance notification exempting the Scheduled Banks from the Shop Act it was held that no jurisdiction of the appellate authority also' ceased. This view was upheld by the Division Bench in this Court in Poulose v. Catholic Syrian Bank (1988 (2) KLT 599). The SLP was also dismissed. Based upon the above decisions, it was argued that since the authorised officers power to compound the offences is taken away now, it is no more possible to compound the offences. In these petitions, there were requests for compounding the offences earlier. Further criminal cases stand on a different footing. 6. In Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India (1988 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 30), it was held that unless the acts are amended retrospectively it will only be prospective. When a section is amended or existing provision is deleted, such a deletion has repeal of the existing provision. But such substitution or repeal has only future application. It was catgorically held that an amendment including substitution of a provision is not retrospective unless it is expressly made in that Act. The provisions in that amendment ordinance is not retrospective at all. In Gokul Chit Funds v. Kochu Ouseph Vareed (1976 Chitties Act and it was held that S.70 of the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975 does not have the effect of rendering the provisions of the said enactment applicable in the matter of determination of the rights and liabilities of parties in respect of chit fund transactions in the Malabar area which were not in existence on the date of commencement of the Act. Because the word 'existing chitties' is used and unless expression on provisions are made, the provisions of the Kerala Act will have no retrospective operation. In Sainuddin v. Pokkunhi (1977 KLT 516) a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether a second appeal will continue to lie, which was filed before the amendment of CPC even after amendment. It was held that right to file appeal is vested right and such right already vested will continue inspite of the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code, by Amendment Act, 1976. A vested right of the parties cannot be taken away retrospectively unless specifically mentioned in the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners also heavily relied on the General Clauses Act and General Principles on Interpretation of Statutes. 7. A vested right of the parties cannot be taken away retrospectively unless specifically mentioned in the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners also heavily relied on the General Clauses Act and General Principles on Interpretation of Statutes. 7. Before the amendment of the Abkari Act by Ordinance No. 7/97 the offences charged against the petitioners for dilution were compoundable as per R.67(a) of the then existing Act. It is not disputed that in all these cases, dates of alleged occurrences of crime were before the amendment of the Act by Ordinance 7/97. Criminal case has to be dealt with on the basis of law in force at the time of occurrence of offence unless otherwise provided for validily in the statutes. When S.67 was deleted by Ordinance, deletion was not made retrospectively. Therefore, as offences detected are compound-able under S.67 at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, petitioners are well within their rights to make use of the same. It was a right vested in the licensees during that time. Without going to the merits of the case, petitioners are willing to compound the cases. Ext. P1 and P2 circulars created more difficulties as circulars directed the Excise Officer to charge in a different section than that is permissible under law. The above directions in this regard is illegal. In all these cases, where reduction of strength in the IMFL was noticed without any other allegation, offences can be charged only under S.56(b) of the Act. If charges are levelled against the petitioners in any other sections it shall stand deleted. Since criminal cases are to be tried according to the law in force at the time of commission of offences, I am of the view that these offences charged against the petitioners for dilution of liquor can be compounded on the basis of the provisions then existed i.e. S.67(a). Now it has been held that the offences will come under S.56(b) the maximum amount chargeable under S.67(a) for compounding is Rs. 10,000/4 also note that if the offences were tried, maximum fine is only Rs. 2,000/-. In the circumstances, if the petitioners herein pay the maximum amount of fine ie, Rs. 10.000/- to the authorised abkari Officers ie. Now it has been held that the offences will come under S.56(b) the maximum amount chargeable under S.67(a) for compounding is Rs. 10,000/4 also note that if the offences were tried, maximum fine is only Rs. 2,000/-. In the circumstances, if the petitioners herein pay the maximum amount of fine ie, Rs. 10.000/- to the authorised abkari Officers ie. concerned Assistant Excise Commissioners within one month from today the offence shall be compounded and report has to be filed before the respective criminal courts, whenever cases were already charged, Criminal cases shall be closed on getting report of compounding. Criminal cases now pending against the petitioners shall be kept in abeyance by the respective criminal courts awaiting the report of compounding for period of two months. The Original Petitions are disposed of as above.