SUDHENDU NATH MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) THE matter arises out of an application filed on behalf of the plaintiff/petitioner for substitution of the heirs of the deceased OP Nos. 1 and 2 after setting aside abatement on condonation of delay. Though not specifically mentioned in the cause title the instant application is to be treated as an application under Order 22, Rule 9 C. P. C. read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is alleged that during the pendency of this revisional application the OP/defendant No. 1 died intestate on 8/07/1994 leaving behind her daughters OP No. 1 (a) and 1 (b) as her heirs and legal representatives and that the OP/defendant No. 2 also died intestate on 7-11-1995 leaving the OPs 2 (a) to 2 (c) as his legal heirs and representatives. All the proposed heirs are stated to be major, sui juris and suffering from no legal disability. The petitioner's case is that although prayer for substitution of the heirs of the aforesaid deceased defendant/op Nos. 1 and 2 was made in the Trial Court in connection with the Title Suit No. 15 of 1991, he had no idea or legal knowledge that he had to take steps for substitution in the instant revisional application also. It is the further case of the petitioner that as his youngest brother was suffering from paralysis from 19/08/199 4/11/1995 he could not take appropriate steps for substitution in connection with the present matter till he contacted his lawyer in High Court on 24-1-1996. On being advised by his lawyer he filed the instant application on 29-1-1996 and filed the same in the Court of N. K. Bhattacharjee, J. on 1-2-1996. The application has been seriously contested on behalf of the heirs of the deceased OP Nos. 1 and 2 who have filed affidavit-in-opposition separately. The petitioner has filed supplimentary affidavit and affidavit-in-reply. At the time of hearing it has been, however, contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Order 22 and Rules thereunder regarding substitution are not applicable to a civil revisional application under Section 115, C. P. C. by virtue of Section 141, C. P. C. Mr. At the time of hearing it has been, however, contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Order 22 and Rules thereunder regarding substitution are not applicable to a civil revisional application under Section 115, C. P. C. by virtue of Section 141, C. P. C. Mr. Bhattacharjee has further contended that even if it is held that the provisions of Order 22 and the Rules thereunder are applicable to a revisional application the period of limitation for substitution or for setting aside abatement will not be governed by Articles 120 and 121 of the Indian Limitation Act but, will be governed by the provisions of residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act. ( 2 ) MR. Bhattacharjee in support of his contention that provision of Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to a revisional application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as referred to a Single Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1976 (1) CLJ 492 Md. Israil, petitioner v. S. M. Amirul Islam, Opposite Parties. The relevant part of the above reported case may be quoted below :-"from the plain reading of the provisions it appears that there is provisions for substitution in case of suits and appeals and some other matters but not in case of revisional application filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Revisional applications are not original proceedings. This is clearly a discretionary matter with the Court. If for the disposal of the revisional applications, the High Court thinks that for ends of justice any party has got to be added or if at the instance of any of the parties any substitution is necessary though belated, for ends of justice certainly and for proper decision, the High Court should allow substitution or addition of the parties. There can be no question of limitation in this respect. "in all fairness he has also referred to an earlier Single Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1975 (2) CLJ 191, Md. Eusuf Mondal, v. Md. Omar Ali. There can be no question of limitation in this respect. "in all fairness he has also referred to an earlier Single Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1975 (2) CLJ 191, Md. Eusuf Mondal, v. Md. Omar Ali. The learned Judge there while relying upon a decision of the Lahore High Court reported in AIR 1949 Lahore 186 and upon many other decisions of the Supreme Court noted in the Judgment has held that Rules, as to abatement apply as much to proceedings in revision as to appeals and that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction and there is no reason why the provisions of Order 22 will not apply to revision cases in the High Court. In a Division Bench case of this High Court reported in AIR 1977 Cal 241 , State Bank of India v. S. Wazir Singh, both the above two Single Bench Judgments were considered and the decision reported in 1976 (1) CLJ 492 was overruled and the earlier Single Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1975 (2) CLJ 191 was approved. Relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 the Bench has held that' the provisions of Order 22, C. P. C. apply in the case of revisional applications as well and that being so, we hold that the application for substitution of legal heirs that as the application for substitution was filed beyond 90 days the learned Additional Registrar was right in recording a note of abatement of the rule as against the opposite party No. 1. " In the above Supreme Court Judgment reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 , Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, it has been held as follows at Page 4 :-"when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the C. P. C. circumscribed the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. Section 115 of the C. P. C. circumscribed the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the statute basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. "in coming to the conclusion that provisions of Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to revisional applications, this High Court in the above reported case in AIR 1977 Cal 241 (supra) relied upon the Bench decision of this High Court reported in (1913) 18 CLJ 141 (Anandmoyi Dasi v. Rudra Mahanti ). Mr. Bhattacharjee has submitted with reference to the above decisions of this High Court that the observations made by the Bench is obiter dictum making a reference to an earlier decision of this High Court reported in (1912) 16 CLJ 571, Deo Saran Lal v. Syedunnessa Begum. But this aspect of the matter, in my opinion, should not be pursued because in view of the settled position of law it would be a merely too technical and academic exercise. Mr. Bhattacharjee cannot get any support in his contention that provisions of Order 22, C. P. C. have no application to an application under Section 115, C. P. C. on the basis of the Judgment reported in 1976 (1) CLJ 492 because that Judgment has been overruled by Division Bench and has ceased to be a good proposition of law. ( 3 ) MR. Banerjee the learned Counsel appearing for the OP 1 (a) and 1 (b) has argued a lot to bring home his point that provisions of Order 22, C. P. C. are applicable to a revisional application in terms of Section 141 read with Section 117 of the Civil Procedure Code and in support of his contention he has referred to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1973 Raj 219 , Mahendra Singh v. Sohan Baj and also to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 : (1963 All LJ 1068), Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dillon but in my opinion, this aspect of the matter does not require further elaboration in view of the position of law as settled in the Bench case reported in AIR 1977 Cal 241 which I have already discussed. Under the circumstances I must hold that the provisions of Order 22 are applicable to a revisional application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 4 ) NOW the question is what would be the period of limitation for filing a substitution application in respect of a deceased OP in such revisional application. Mr. Bhattacharjee has submitted that Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act would have no application to a revisional petition. Article 120 provides for substitution of the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or of deceased defendant or respondent. In a revisional application under Section 115 parties are not described as plaintiff or defendant or appellant or respondent. They are described as petitioners or as opposite parties. In the aforesaid Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1977 Cal 241 (supra) it has been held that the period of limitation for such an application would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act on the premises that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction. As I have already noted this decision is based on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 (supra) where it has been held that the revisional jurisdiction is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. Mr. Bhattacharjee has rightly contended that in the aforesaid two cases what has been decided is the nature and character of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It is the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee that even if the revisional jurisdiction is taken as a part of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, such exercise of jurisdiction does not decide the nature or type of the application. A revisional application does not become an appeal by analogy and as such the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal cannot be made applicable to a revisional application. The Supreme Court is silent on this point in Shankar Ramchandra's case (supra ). Mr. A revisional application does not become an appeal by analogy and as such the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal cannot be made applicable to a revisional application. The Supreme Court is silent on this point in Shankar Ramchandra's case (supra ). Mr. Bhattacharjee has referred to a Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1980 MP 12 , Smt. Sayeeda Begam v. Ashraf Hussain wherein it has been held that as follows :-"order 22 contains penal provisions which affect substantive rights of the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, when an application for substitution is not filed within time. The penal provisions have to be construed strictly. Unless they expressly declared the provisions to be applicable to a proceeding other than a suit or appeal, those provisions cannot be applied by analogy to such a proceeding. Further, Article 120 of the Limitation Act governs the application for substitution in suit or appeal. This Article cannot be extended in its operation by analogy or otherwise to an application for substitution when an applicant or non-applicant dies in a proceeding for restoration under Order 9. It cannot be read into the Article "an applicant" for the plaintiff or "a non-applicant"for the defendant. Moreover, Section 141 of Civil Procedure Code may permit the procedure for a suit to be followed in a proceeding initiated under Order 9 but the provisions of the Limitation Act could not be amended by any process of reasoning so as to read "applicant' for 'plaintiff' and "non-applicant" for "defendant", and unless that could be done, the application for substitution in such a case would be governed by the residuary Article, there being no special provision. " (quoted from head notes)". Mr. Bhattacharjee has further relied upon a Bench decision of this High Court reported in AIR (38) 1951 Cal 518, Mahindra Kumar Bose v. Santi Rani Biswas wherein it has been held that in construing the law of limitation the Court must confine itself strictly within the terms of the Limitation Act and not enlarge the scope of the Act by introducing 'notional' defendant in the place of the word 'defendant'. Mr. Bhattacharjee is also supported in his contention by a Judgment of the High Court of Jammu Kashmir in a case reported in AIR 1989 J and K 35, Islamia College of Science and Commerce v. Gh. Mr. Bhattacharjee is also supported in his contention by a Judgment of the High Court of Jammu Kashmir in a case reported in AIR 1989 J and K 35, Islamia College of Science and Commerce v. Gh. Hassan Balkhi while referring to the similar provisions contained in Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act it has been held there as follows at Page 36 :-"from reading the aforesaid authorities it would appear that application for bringing legal representatives on record in a revision petition can be made under Article 181 of the J. and K. Limitation Act also. Period for making such an application is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. Under Article 176 of the Limitation Act, six months' period is provided for bringing legal representatives of deceased plaintiff or deceased appellant on record. Six months would run from the date of death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant. However, this Article seems to be applicable only to suits and appeals. Therefore, in revision petitions a revision-petitioner can fall back upon residuary Article which is Article 181 of the Limitation Act, as to how it is to be applied is discussed by the Allahabad Authority of 1972 (supra ). I am in respectful agreement with the said authority and am of the opinion that residuary Article of 191 of the Limitation Act would apply and not the general Article of 176 in the present case. The revision petition is not the original proceedings. It is a proceedings of civil nature but cannot be termed as original civil proceedings. It has to be distinguished from appeal and suit. In the appeal and suits, Article 176 of the Limitation Act will be applicable. But the petition of this nature which emanates from the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, residuary Article of 181 Limitation Act would be applicable. " ( 5 ) THE last case and the most important case relied upon by Shri Bhattacharjee is a Special Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1988 (1) CHN 461 : ( AIR 1988 Cal 358 ), Mst. Nurnahar Bewa v. Rabindra Nath. The aforesaid case however, relates to a question of limitation concerning an application for restoration of a Mis. Case under Order 9 filed for a restoration of a suit dismissed for default. But the principles laid down there, as has been rightly submitted by Mr. Nurnahar Bewa v. Rabindra Nath. The aforesaid case however, relates to a question of limitation concerning an application for restoration of a Mis. Case under Order 9 filed for a restoration of a suit dismissed for default. But the principles laid down there, as has been rightly submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee, are applicable to the present case. It has been held there that the Limitation Act is a disabling statute and in construing the law of limitation, the Court should confine strictly within the provisions of the Limitation Act and should not enlarge the scope of the Act by introducing any notional meaning by implication. It has been held in the aforesaid case that when an application made under Order 9, Rules 4, 9 or 13 of the Code for setting aside a suit dismissed for default is itself dismissed for default and an application under Rule 4 or Rule 9 of Order 9 is made for restorartion of the said application, the period of limitation for making such application for restoration is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the period of limitation is therefore, three years. Article 120 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that it relates to the period of limitation for substitution of the heirs of the deceased plaintiff or appellant or of deceased defendant or respondent. This Article under no stretch of imagination can have application to a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is a residuary Article and it governs the period of limitation in respect of the matters which are not specifically provided for in any other Article. In the Bench decision of this High Court reported in AIR 1977 Cal 241 it is not the ratio that Article 120 applies to a revisional application. ( 6 ) UNDER the circumstances I must accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee while following the case laws cited by him that in the matter of substitution under Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code the period of limitation would be three years as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and not by Article 120. Mr. ( 6 ) UNDER the circumstances I must accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee while following the case laws cited by him that in the matter of substitution under Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code the period of limitation would be three years as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and not by Article 120. Mr. Banerjee has taken great pains to impress upon this Court by refering to many Judgments that the revisional jurisdiction is a party of the appellate jurisidiction of the High Court and as such a revisional application should be treated as an appeal and that in such a position Article 120 would be applicable. I have already held that even though the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, a revisional application does not become an appeal for the purpose of application of Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The instant application for substitution being governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act has been filed quite within the prescribed period of limitation. The question of setting aside of abatement and condonation of delay as prayed for in the instant application does not arise. As such there is no point to see whether the petitioner was prevented by any sufficient cause from making an application under Order 22, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bring the heirs of the deceased OPs a record after setting aside abatement. The application must be treated as a simple application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased defendant/op Nos. 1 and 2. The application is allowed. The proposed heirs of the deceased defendant/op Nos. 1 and 2 be substituted and brought on record. The cause title of the revisional application be amended along with the entries with the appropriate register. The application stands disposed of. No order as to costs. Application allowed.