JUDGMENT M. SRINIVASAN, C.J.—These three writ petitions have been remanded by the Supreme Court for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made by them and in accordance with the principles of law. Before setting out the directions, given by the Supreme Court, it will be necessary briefly to indicate the circumstances under which these petitioners have approached this Court. The facts are all similar though the dates in each case may differ. These three petitioners intended to open Small Scale Industries within the State of Himachal Pradesh taking advantage of certain incentives being announced by the State Government as would be granted to such Small Scale Industries. One such incentive was exemption from sales tax and later reduction of rates in payment of sales tax. 2. The petitioners entered into agreements with the Forest Department. The petitioner in C.W.P. No. 86 of 1981 entered into an agreement on 7-1-1977. The other two petitioners entered into agreements on 27-9-1977. The contents of the three agreements were all the same. The agreements were between the Governor of Himachal Pradesh through the Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Department of Forest, Farming and Environmental Conservation, referred to as the seller on the one part and the petitioners herein referred to as the Buyer on the other part. After setting out the relevant facts in the preambles, the agreement provided in Clause 7 as follows : "7. The Buyer shall have to produce Registration Certificate under Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1968 (Act No. 24 of 1967). In case the Buyer fails to produce proof of his registration, he shall have to pay sales tax as applicable from time to time in Himachal Pradesh along with the instalments of the sale price. The buyer shall have to pay the sales tax on the due date of instalments as provided above irrespective of the fact whether the period of payment of any instalment is extended by the competent authority, viz. Chief Conservator of Forests or not. in case of his failure to do so, he will have to pay penalty as assessed by the Sales Tax Department. Further, the buyer shall be liable to pay such levies/taxes as may become legally payable hereinafter under any Act, Rules or Regulations." 3. Thereafter, the petitioners established their factories and commenced production. The petitioners in C.W.P. No. 86 of 1981 commenced production on 1-5-1977. Further, the buyer shall be liable to pay such levies/taxes as may become legally payable hereinafter under any Act, Rules or Regulations." 3. Thereafter, the petitioners established their factories and commenced production. The petitioners in C.W.P. No. 86 of 1981 commenced production on 1-5-1977. The petitioners in C.W.P. No. 79 of 1981 commenced production on 1-5-1978. The other petitioners commenced production on 10-3-1979. 4. The Forest Department was claiming that the petitioners were liable to pay t Sales Tax on the sales of the goods made to them as per the agreements, referred to above. They had also been deducting the sales tax payable by the petitioners on that footing. There was a lot of correspondence between the petitioners on one hand and the Forest Department on the other, besides correspondence between the petitioners on one hand and the Excise and Taxation Commissioner of the State on the other. The contention of the petitioners was that on basis of the representation contained in Clause 7 of the agreements, they had invested huge amounts of money and started the factories within the State of Himachal Pradesh and they had also produced large quantities of the goods, which they intended to manufacture. Hence, it was contended by them that they were not liable to pay sales tax as per Clause 7 of the agreements, even if the Forest Department might be liable to make such payments. Besides the aforesaid contention, the petitioners also drew the attention of the departments to the Notification issued by the State Government on 27-5-1974 granting exemption for payment of sales/purchase tax In the case of Small Scale Industries which came into being and are registered with the Industries Department as such after 12-4-1971, for a period of 5 years from the date of coming into their existence. The said contentions were not accepted by the Departments and the petitioners were obliged to file the writ petitions. 5. Apart from raising a contention that the petitioners were not liable to pay sale tax by virtue of Clause 7 of the agreements as well as the Notification of the Government dated 27-5-74, the petitioners also contended that the Principle of Promissory Estoppel would apply in these cases and the respondents were prevented from making a demand for sales tax from the petitioners. This Court by judgment dated 28-11-1990 accepted the first contention of the petitioners and allowed the writ petitions. This Court found it unnecessary to go into the second contention in the view they have taken on the first contention 6. Aggrieved thereby, the State Government preferred appeals in the Supreme Court of India. By judgment dated 10-4-1997, the Supreme Court accepted the appeals of the State Government and remanded the matters for fresh disposal. The relevant passages in the judgment of the Supreme Court are as follows : "A reading of Section 6(3) (a) (ii) of Act would show that in order to claim exemption under this limb of the sub-section the assessees have to substantiate the following amongst others : (i) The goods for which deduction is claimed should be one which is specified in the Certificate of Registration of the assessees for use by them in the manufacture in the State of any goods. (ii) The goods so manufactured should be goods other than those declared tax free under Section 7. (iii) The goods manufactured should be for sale in the State. With regard to the above factors there is material available in the case (as disclosed the paper book filed), Even the High Court not relied upon any proper or reliable material to find the existence of the above factors. The adjudication of the controversy raised in these cases based on Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, must necessarily disclose the evidence of the above three factors. That is totally absent. The judgment of the High Court has not referred to these aspects, it appears that the primary documents in that regard were not produced before the High Court. The judgments of the High court, which are appealed against are, therefore, in the circumstances, unsustainable in law. We set aside all the three judgments appealed against, and remit the matters to the High Court for a proper investigation and disposal in accordance with Law. The parties are allowed to file additional documents or affidavits before the High Court. The respondents-assessees had a plea that in view of certain factors, the State is precluded by the Principle of Estoppel from raising the demand. The High court did not go into this aspect since it found that it is unnecessary to do so in the way Section 6(3) (a) (ii) of the Act was interpreted. The respondents-assessees had a plea that in view of certain factors, the State is precluded by the Principle of Estoppel from raising the demand. The High court did not go into this aspect since it found that it is unnecessary to do so in the way Section 6(3) (a) (ii) of the Act was interpreted. It is open to the assessees to urge this plea again and also produce relevant documents in support thereof," 7. After remand, when the matters came up before us, we granted sufficient time to enable the parties to file affidavits, as directed by the Supreme court. Such affidavits were filed in C.W.Ps. No. 86/81 and 7/82, The petitioner in C.W.P. No. 79/81 has not filed any affidavit, but learned Counsel has stated that the materials already on record are sufficient to comply with the directions contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Counter-affidavits have been filed by the State Govt. in C.W.Ps. No. 86/81 and 7/82. 8. When, these matters were taken up for disposal, today, learned Senior Counsel appearing in C.W.P. No. 86/81 made a representation that certain new facts have been stated by the State Government in their counter-affidavit, which was served on the petitioner only today and the petitioner would require some more time to file a reply or rejoinder, We replied to the Counsel that the case may be opened and if necessity arises, we would consider the request of the Counsel. In the course of arguments, we did not find any necessity whatever to refer to new facts, which are said to have been urged in the counter-affidavit filed by the State Government today. We find that the facts and materials, which are already on record, are sufficient to dispose of these writ petitions in the light of the directions in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Hence, we proceed to dispose of these matters. 9. The first contention urged by learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the Certificate of Registration produced by the petitioners would show that they mention the goods, in which the petitioners are dealing and doing business. According to learned Counsel what all is required for the purpose of Section 6(3) (a) (ii) of the Sales Tax Act is only a Certificate of Registration under the Act, which would mention the goods in which such dealers are doing business. According to learned Counsel what all is required for the purpose of Section 6(3) (a) (ii) of the Sales Tax Act is only a Certificate of Registration under the Act, which would mention the goods in which such dealers are doing business. It is also submitted by him that the petitioners are only buying certain goods from the Forest Department under the contract and if any liability of sales-tax arises, such liability would be only on the vendor, namely, Forest Department, and it cannot be fastened on the petitioners, which are only buyers. 10. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the specific pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the language of Section 6(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. That section has been extracted in the judgment of the Supreme Court itself. The relevant part of the Section reads as follows : "(3) In this Act, the expression "taxable turnover" means that part of dealers gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom. (a) his turnover during the period on...... (ii) sales to a registered dealer of goods of goods specified in his Certificate of Registration for use by him in the manufacture in Himachal Pradesh of any goods......" 11. It is the expression "goods specified in his Certificate of Registration for use by him in the manufacture", which has been taken note of by the Supreme court and a direction has been given that the assessee has to substantiate that the goods for which deduction is claimed should be one, which is specified in the Certificate of Registration of the assessees for use by them in the manufacture in the State of any goods. There can be no doubt whatever in understanding the directions contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is only if the Certificate of Registration specifies the goods, for which deduction is claimed and registration is for use of those goods in manufacture in the State of any goods. The Certificates produced by the petitioners in these cases mention only the goods which are to be manufactured by the petitioners. In paragraph 2 of the Certificate of Registration, it is stated that the business is for sale of match splints & wooden boxes & allied. The Certificates produced by the petitioners in these cases mention only the goods which are to be manufactured by the petitioners. In paragraph 2 of the Certificate of Registration, it is stated that the business is for sale of match splints & wooden boxes & allied. There is no mention whatever of the goods, which are to be used by the petitioners for the purpose of manufacturing the goods specified in paragraph 2 of the certificate. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that normally it will not be mentioned in the Certificate of Registration. We are unable to accept this contention. There is a provision in the certificate for mentioning such goods. For an application for registration under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act a form is prescribed, namely, Form S.T.I under the rules. Clause 11 of the form provides for setting out the classes of goods, which are ordinarily purchased by the business for manufacture of goods for sale or containers or other packing materials. Thus the person, who applies for registration is bound to mention under clause 11, the classes of goods, which are ordinarily purchased by such person for the business of manufacture. In the form prescribed for Certificate of Registration, namely, ST. Ill, paragraph 4 reads thus : "The sale of the following goods other than goods liable to tax at the first stage of sale and declared goods made to this dealer for use by him in the manufacture in the Himachal Pradesh of any goods, other than goods declared tax free under Section 7, for sale will be free of tax." 13. That also shows that there is a provision for the Certificate of Registration mentioning the goods which are to be purchased by the dealer for the business of manufacturing other goods. Therefore, it follows that in the absence of such mentioning in the Certificate of Registration itself, it is not open to the petitioners to claim the benefit of Section 6(3) (a) (ii). That is what has been pointed out by they Supreme Court. 14. It is thus clear that on the facts of these cases, the petitioners have failed to fulfil the first test prescribed in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Hence, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the second and the third tests prescribed in the judgment are satisfied. 14. It is thus clear that on the facts of these cases, the petitioners have failed to fulfil the first test prescribed in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Hence, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the second and the third tests prescribed in the judgment are satisfied. But it may be pointed out that as regards the second test the goods manufactured by the petitioners are goods other than goods declared tax free. That is a matter, which is available in the Act and the Schedule itself. As regards the third test, it depends upon the facts of each case. In the view, we have mentioned above, it is not necessary to consider the applicability of the third test in this case. 15. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the respondents are barred by Principle of Estoppel from claiming that the petitioners are liable to pay sales tax under the provisions of the Act. For this purpose, reliance is placed upon Clause 7 of the agreements, which had already been extracted in this judgment. If we read Clause 7 in the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme court, referred to above, it is clear that what is required to be produced under Clause 7 by the buyer is such a Certificate of Registration, which is contemplated by Section 6(3)(a)(ii), as understood by the Supreme Court. It is well known proposition that there is no presumption of illegality. When a Government Department enters into a contract with another party, it cannot be expected to provide for any illegality; nor it is expected to make a provision, which will run counter to7 the provisions of the State Legislation. If the interpretation given by learned Counsel for the petitioners is accepted, it would mean that the contract contains a clause, which runs counters to the provisions of Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. Hence, we are unable to accept this contention. The registration certificate mentioned in Clause 7 of the agreements does not mean any Registration Certificate, which is obtained by the buyer under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. In our opinion, such a Registration Certificate must specify the goods for which deduction is claimed and which is used by them f in manufacture of other goods. 16. In our opinion, such a Registration Certificate must specify the goods for which deduction is claimed and which is used by them f in manufacture of other goods. 16. If the interpretation given by us above is correct, it follows that the Principle of Estoppel has no applicability in this case as there is no representation whatever in Clause 7 when admittedly the certificates contemplated by the judgment of the Supreme Court have not been obtained by the petitioners herein. 17. Even assuming that the interpretation given by learned Counsel for the petitioners is correct, the question whether the Principle of Estoppel will apply in this case has to be considered. As regards the Principle of Estoppel. The facts which are relied upon by learned Counsel are as follows : 18. In Annexure P-12 dated 12-9-1980, the petitioners in C.W.P. No. 86 of 1981 have written to the Secretary (Forests) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, stating that on the strength of the agreement between them and the Forest Department dated 7-1-1977, they had established a factory at Nihal Sector, Industrial Area, Bilaspur at the cost of Rs. 43 lacs and that the same went into production in June, 1977 and they had achieved targeted production of 30,000 million splints. In the writ petition, the averments have been made in paragraphs 9 and 10 to the following effect: "9. Acting on the representations made by the State Government, in the matter of exemption from payment of sales tax during the operation period of the agreement and supply of Chil trees at Rs. 59.65 per cubic metre for the first five years and thereafter at the revised rates in accordance with the formula as incorporated in Clause( 6) of the agreement, the company, after investings own funds and taking loans from Institutions like Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, Banks and others set up a factory at Bilaspur. The investments of the company have touched nearly forty five laks of rupees. 10. The factory set up by the Company at Bilaspur in Himachal Pradesh territory, pursuant to the representations of the State Government and the terms of the Agreement formally and legally executed between the State Government and the company, went into production in May, 1977." Similar averments have been made by other petitioners. It is not necessary for us to refer them in detail in this case. 19. It is not necessary for us to refer them in detail in this case. 19. These averments are countered in the reply by the respondents in the following terms in the counter-affidavit filed by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, in paragraphs 9 and 10. "9. The contents of this para regarding acting on the representation are not admitted, because the factory owner considers other facts also such as availability of labour, subsidy, land, electricity etc. etc. before establishing a factory at a particular place in a certain state. 10. The contents of this para are admitted to the extent that the petitioner company has set up a factory at Bilaspur in Himachal Pradesh territory and went into production in May, 1977. It is denied that any assurance of exemption from sales tax was held out to the petitioner company." The same contention is raised in the counter-affidavit filed by the Forest Department. 20. Apart from such averments, there is nothing on record to show whether the petitioners suffered any detriment on account of the representations made by the respondents in Clause 7 of the contract. Thus, the petitioners are only contending in their petitions that they had altered their position pursuant to the agreements, even if they had not suffered any deteriment. It is only on the basis of such alteration of the situation, the petitioners are now invoking the Principle of Estoppel. The question of estoppel has been considered by the Supreme Court in several cases. Learned Counsel for the petitioners have drawn our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2414. The relevant passage is in paragraph 18, which reads as follows : "Here the Railway Rates Tribunal apparently appears to have gone off the track. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has not been correctly understood by the Tribunal. It is true, that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered detriment or prejudice it was often said simply, that the party- asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But his has now been explained in so many decisions all over. But his has now been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means, the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estopel. The Court, however, would compel the Opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the premise that it is reliance-based and nothing more." 21. After referring to the case Law on the subject, the Court observed, as follows, in paragraphs 24 and 25 : "24. The concept of detriment as we now understand is whether it appears unjust, unreasonable or inequitable that the promissor should be allowed to resile from his assurance or representation, having regard to what the promisee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation. 25. It is, however, quite fundamental that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power Secondly, the estoppel stems from equitable doctrine. It, therefore, requires that he who seeks equity must do equity. The doctrine, therefore, cannot also be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement." 22. The question came to be considered in detail by another Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Ganesh Wood Products and others, AIR 1996 SC 149. After discussing the case law starting from Mis. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621 upto Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 274, the Court settled the law, thus : "What does altering the position ? After discussing the case law starting from Mis. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621 upto Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 274, the Court settled the law, thus : "What does altering the position ? Does it mean such a change in the position of the promisse (as a result of acting on the faith of representation of the promissor that compensating him in money would not be just and equitable to him, I.e., a situation where the ends of justice and requirements of equity demand that the promissor should not be allowed to go back on his representation and must be held to it or does altering his position mean doing of some act, big or small, which the promisee does acting on the faith of the representation which he would not have done but for the representation? In other words, is it enough that the promisee has spent some money or has taken some step acting on the basis of representation, which can be recompensed in money or otherwise ? Is it not ultimately a matter of doing equity and justice between the parties a case of holding the scales even between the parties and deciding whether in the interests of justice and equity the promissor can be allowed to resile from his promise and compensate the promisee appropriately or the promissory ought to be held to his promise and not allowed to go back since such a course is necessary in view of the change in position of promisee ? Our view of the matter is probably evident from the way we have posed the above questions. To wit, the rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, has to be mouled to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend and equitable treatment to them. To wit, the rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, has to be mouled to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend and equitable treatment to them. If it is more just from the point of view of both promissor and promisee that the latter is compensated appropriately and allow the promissor to go back on his promise, that should be done; but if the court is of the opinion that the interests of justice and equity demand that the promissor should not be allowed to resile from his representation in the facts and circumstances of that case, it will do so. This, in our respectful opinion, is the proper way of understanding the words "promisee altering his position". Altering his position should mean such alteration in the position of the promisee as it makes it appear to the Court that holding the promissor to his representation is necessary to do justice between the parties. The doctrine should not be reduced to a rule of thumb. Being an equitable doctrine it should be kept elastic enough in the hands of the Court to do complete justice between the parties. . . .All that we wish to emphasise is that anything and everything done by the promisee on the faith of the representation does not necessarily amount to altering his position so as to preclude the promissor from resiling from his representation. If the quiry demands that the promissor is allowed to resile and the promisee is compensate appropriately, that ought to be done, if, however, equity demands, in the light of the things done by the promisee on the faith of the representation, that the promissory should be precluded from resiling and that he should be held fast to his representation, that should be done. To repeat, it is a matter of holding the scales even between the parties to do justice between them. This is the equity implict in the doctrine. 57. It may perhaps be appropriate to point out that what we have said above is consistent with the doctrine as stated in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills and the subsequent decision. To repeat, it is a matter of holding the scales even between the parties to do justice between them. This is the equity implict in the doctrine. 57. It may perhaps be appropriate to point out that what we have said above is consistent with the doctrine as stated in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills and the subsequent decision. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills, AIR 1979 SC 621 at p. 644), it has been held firstly that: "But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the quity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the government were required to carry out the promise, the court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies." and then it is observed : "But when where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore the status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise could become final and irrevocable. Vide Ajayi v. Briscoe, (1964) 3 All ER 556." It is this aspect which has been elaborated by us keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of this case." 23. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise could become final and irrevocable. Vide Ajayi v. Briscoe, (1964) 3 All ER 556." It is this aspect which has been elaborated by us keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of this case." 23. Thus the law on the equitable estoppel has been settled by the Supreme court in unmistakable terms. Even if the promisee has altered his position, the altering of the position should be such that it would make appear to the Court that holding the promissor to his representation is necessary to do justice between the parties. It is also pointed out that if the equity demands in the light of the things done by the promisee on the faith of the representation, that the promissor should be precluded from resiling and that he should be held fast ot his representation, that should be done. Thirdly, it is pointed out that the Court must have regard to \ the public interest and find out whether the public interest is likely to suffer if the promise given to the promisee is enforced and the Government is made to fulfil that promise. 24. In the present cases, if we apply these three tests, we do not find anything in the pleadings or in the records produced before us to warrant the application of the Principle of Equitable Estoppel or Promissory estoppel. The only alteration in the position of the petitioners, as set out in the pleadings and found in the records, is that of establishment of factories within the state and starting production. In fact the petitioners have produced huge quantities of goods, it is no where stated by the petitioners that they were not in a position to sell their goods or make a profit on account of the Government now insisting upon the payment of sales tax by the petitioners. It is no where alleged or averred that the petitioners were not in a position to pass on their liabilities of sales tax to their purchasers in turn. It is not stated that when they sold their manufactured goods to their purchasers, they were not in a position to include these taxes liabilities as a part of their manufacturing cost and claim the same as the price of the goods from their purchasers. It is not stated that when they sold their manufactured goods to their purchasers, they were not in a position to include these taxes liabilities as a part of their manufacturing cost and claim the same as the price of the goods from their purchasers. In such an event, it cannot be said that the justice of the case requires the enforcement of the promise as against the Government or can it be said that the equity warrants in this case the enforcement of such promise. At one stage of the arguments, it was pointed out that the petitioners were in a position to collect the sales tax from their purchasers for the manufactured goods but it is not stated anywhere that the costs of manufactured goods excluded the tax liability, which was imposed upon them by the Forest Department. Hence, it cannot be said that the equity is in favour of the petitioners herein. Thirdly, the public interest will certainly suffer if the contention of the petitioners is accepted and they are exempted from payment of tax. It is seen from the agreements between the petitioners and the Forest Department that the liability for payment of tax will not be there throughout the period of contract, namely, 20 years. If their interpretation is accepted that will certainly be against the public interest and the Government cannot afford to lose the income which will be available by way of tax for a period of 20 years when the interest of the entire State and the public at large are involved. Hence, we are of the opinion that none of the tests set out above is satisfied in this case and there is no warrant for granting the prayer of the petitioners to apply the principle of equitable estoppel in the present case. 25. The next limb of the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioners is to rely upon a notification dated 27-5-1974. That Notification exempted the small scales Industries from payment of tax for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of the factory. That Notification was later withdrawn by another notification dated 5-7-1978. By the second Notification certain concession in the rates was given and it was not a case of complete exemption. That Notification exempted the small scales Industries from payment of tax for a period of 5 years from the date of commencement of the factory. That Notification was later withdrawn by another notification dated 5-7-1978. By the second Notification certain concession in the rates was given and it was not a case of complete exemption. As we have already pointed out, the question again depends upon whether the petitioners have altered their situation to such an extent that the justice of the case would demand the application of the Principle of Equitable estoppel. If, according to the petitioners, they relied upon the representation contained in the earlier notification dated 27-5-1974 and established their factories within the State of Himachal Pradesh, and, therefore, the State Government is not entitled to withdraw the benefit granted by earlier notification, they have to satisfy the three tests, referred to above. We have already found that they have no satisfied those tests. It must also be pointed out here that the State Government has given reasons for withdrawing the Notification dated 27-5-1974 and introducing the later Notification dated 5-7-1978. In the reply filed by them, it is stated by the State Government, as follows : "14. The contents of this para are not admitted. The Notification dated 27-5-1974 granting complete holiday from sale/purchase tax have been issued under section 42 of the H.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1968 in order to benefit the Small Scale Industries. The said notification was superseded by Notification dated 5-7-1978 in order to curb the misuse of concessions given by Notification dated 27-5-1974. The government was constrained to take such a measure, because many of the Industries wound up their business or gave a new name ot their Industries after availing the benefit of exemption. The result was that no only the state was deprived of the legitimate revenue, but there was also no satisfactory establishment of Industries. So, the exemption was given through Notification and was curtailed by a proper and legal subsequent Notification in the interest of both i.e., the traders and public revenue. Thus, the Principle of Promissory Estoppel is not applicable in the case of the petitioners. So, the exemption was given through Notification and was curtailed by a proper and legal subsequent Notification in the interest of both i.e., the traders and public revenue. Thus, the Principle of Promissory Estoppel is not applicable in the case of the petitioners. Not admitting, but for the sake of arguments even if it is considered that the case of the petitioners is governed by Notification dated 27-5-1974, they are not entitled to effect tax free purchases of trees, because the tax on timber is at the stage of sale and not at the stage of purchase, the sales tax is leviable on the sale of goods and deposited by the person charging the tax into Government Treasurey, whereas the purchase at is levied on the purchase of goods and deposited by the purchaser into the Government Treasury, In the case of timber, the tax is levied on the sale of timber which is leviable at the first stage with effect from 1-8-1975. Since the purchase tax is not leviable on trees, the petitioner are not entitled to effect tax free purchases even under the Notification dated 27-5-1974.” 26. This only fortifies our conclusion that the public interest will not allow the Principle of Estoppel to be applied in the present cases. 27. Learned Counsel for the petitioners draws our attention to the judgment of this Court in Kundan Lal Ahuja and another v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and others, ILR 1980 MP 400. On the facts of that case, the Court held that the petitioners therein could not be denied the sales tax holiday referred to in the notification dated 27-5-1S74. The Court also placed reliance on the earlier judgments of the Supreme court including M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Ltd.s case. We have already discussed that question and pointed out that the Supreme Court has clearly set out the relevant tests applicable in such matters in the latest judgment In State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Ganesh Wood Products and others, AIR 1996 S.C. 149. Hence, the ruling of this court, referred to above, will not help the petitioners. 28. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also referred to another judgment of this Court in Mis. Mahesh Udyog and another v State of H.P. and others, 1990(2) Shim. L.C. 153. The report of the judgment does not show what was the prayer made in that case. Hence, the ruling of this court, referred to above, will not help the petitioners. 28. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also referred to another judgment of this Court in Mis. Mahesh Udyog and another v State of H.P. and others, 1990(2) Shim. L.C. 153. The report of the judgment does not show what was the prayer made in that case. Ultimately, its Court had issued a mandamus to the respondents preventing them from levying or collecting sales/purchase tax from the petitioners therein in excess of the rates mentioned in Annexure p4 Notification, which was obviously the second Notification dated 5-7-1978. It is, therefore, contended by learned Counsel for the petitioners that the respondents should not be allowed to collect anything more than the rates prescribed in the second Notification. That question has not been raised in any of these cases. The relevant facts have not been mentioned in the writ petitions. Hence, it is not open to the petitioners to raise that contention for the first time at this stage. As far as this question is concerned, we leave it open and the petitioners may approach the concerned authorities and make their representations for fixing the correct rates on the basis of which sales tax should be charged, it is for the concerned authorities to consider such representations and decide the proper rates at which the petitioners should be charged for payment of sales-tax. 29. The learned Advocate-General draws our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v Godfrey Philips India Ltd,, AIR 1986 S.C. 806. The relevant passage is found in paragraph 14, which reads as follows : "Of course we must make it clear, and that is also Said down in Motilal Sugar Mills case (AIR 1978 SC 62i3Jsuprai that there can be no Promissory Estoppel against the Legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Government or public authority be debarred by Promissory Estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is equally true that Promissory Estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. It is equally true that Promissory Estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. This aspect has been dealt with fully in Mitilal Sugar Mills case (supra) and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with what has been said in that decision on this point." 30. This principle has been considered in State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Ganesh Wood Products and others, AIR 1996 SC 149 and set out therein the more explicitly. 31. The learned Advocate-General has also drawn our attention to Annexure RB filed along with the additional counter filed today. The said Annexure-Notification dated 14-7-1975 was issued by the State Government directing that with effect from 1st August, 1975 the tax notified under sub-section (1) of Section 6, shall be levied at the first stage of the sale of timber at which such dealer sells such goods for the first time in Himachal Pradesh. The said Annexure-Notification dated 14-7-1975 was issued by the State Government directing that with effect from 1st August, 1975 the tax notified under sub-section (1) of Section 6, shall be levied at the first stage of the sale of timber at which such dealer sells such goods for the first time in Himachal Pradesh. It is submitted by him that under Clause 12 of Rule 31 of the Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1970, it is provided that in calculating his taxable turnover, a registered dealer may deduct from his gross turnover the purchase value of goods which has already been subjected to tax under Section 6(2) used by them in manufacture in Himachal Pradesh of goods, other than goods declared tax-free under Section 7 for sale, (i) in Himachal Pradesh; (ii) in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; or (iii) in the course of exports out of the territory of India. The learned Advocate-General points out that this benefit is certainly available to the petitioners and the first sale is by the Forest Department in favour of the petitioners. According to him, it is only the first sale of timber by the Forest Department to the petitioners, which is taxable under Section 6(1) of the Act. It is open to the petitioners to claim the benefit under Rule 31 Clause 12 before the appropriate Authorities by making appropriate representations. 32. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that the Principle of Estoppel is not applicable in this case and the petitioners cannot invoke the same. 33. It follows that the writ petitions have to fail and they are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. However, as observed already, it is open to the petitioners to make appropriate representations to the concerned Authorities with regard to the rates at which the tax should be made payable by them. Petition dismissed.