SATYABRATA SINHA, J, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals have been filed by Shri Tarak Nath Sha who is the landlord in respect of premises No. 3, Leonard Road, P. S. Hastings, Calcutta-700 022. ( 2 ) THE basic fact of the matter is not much in dispute. ( 3 ) ON 23rd March, 1963 one Ram Kewal Sha, the predecessor-in-interest of Tarak Nath Sha executed a deed of lease in favour of M/s. Bhutoria Brothers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the said company') for a period of 21 years. One Manmal Bhutoria was the Manager of the said Company who became a Director thereof later on. He, on behalf of the company used to reside in the said premises. The said company is a family concern of Manmal Bhutoria. He resigned from the post of the Director of the company whereafter, the company allegedly by a letter dated 18th April, 1974 terminated the said lease with effect from expiry of June, 1974. ( 4 ) CLAUSE III (iii) of the said deed of lease on the basis whereof the said notice was issued reads thus :-"notwithstanding the term hereby reserved the LESSEE MAY terminate the lease at any time after the expiry of one year from the commencement thereof by first giving two calendar months' notice in writing according to the English Calendar and the Lessor shall accept such notice or two months' rent in lieu of such notice for the determination of the lease provided always that the lessee shall have paid, fulfilled, observed and performed the covenants and conditions hereinbefore reserved and on the part of Lessee to be paid, fulfilled, observed and performed provided nevertheless the Lessee will not be entitled to exercise such option unless the lessee surrenders the demise in respect of the said demised premises. It is mutually agreed by and between the parties that the surrender of the demise to be operative must be in respect of the demised premises. " ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY the said company paid rent @ Rs. 700/- p. m. and performed all its obligations upto end of June, 1974. Allegedly the said premises were again let out to the aforementioned Manmal Bhutoria at an increased rent of Rs. 1,100/- p. m. which included a piece of vacant land adjoining the said premises. " ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY the said company paid rent @ Rs. 700/- p. m. and performed all its obligations upto end of June, 1974. Allegedly the said premises were again let out to the aforementioned Manmal Bhutoria at an increased rent of Rs. 1,100/- p. m. which included a piece of vacant land adjoining the said premises. According to the said Manmal Bhutoria no rent receipt used to be granted by the landlord. By a letter dated 27th January, 1984 the Appellant demanded possession of the said premises from the company. As the Appellant threatened to dispossess the aforementioned Manmal Bhutoria, he filed Title Suit No. 240/84 claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs :-"a. for declaration thereby declaring that the plaintiff is a monthly tenant under the defendant No. 1, as a trustee of the premises in suit described in the schedule given at the foot of this plaint at a monthly rental of Rs. 1100/- per month payable according to English Calendar month. b. A decree for permanent injunction, thereby permanently restraining the defendant No. 1 his agents and/or heirs and successors or assignees and/or agents and/or heirs servants from denying in any manner, the plaintiff's right to possess the premises in suit as per schedule given at the foot of this plaint on a monthly tenant under the defendant No. 1 on and from July 1, 1974 on payment ofmonthly rental at the rate of Rs. 1100/- payable according to English Calendar Month,c. for damages;d. for costs and incidentals to this suit against the defendant No. 1;e. such further or other relief or reliefs as to this learned Court may seem fit and proper in the matter in the interests of justice". ( 6 ) THE appellant also filed a suit being Title Suit No. 812 of 1984 against the said Company claiming, inter alia, for its eviction on the ground of expiry of lease. ( 7 ) BOTH the aforementioned suits were heard analogously. The learned trial Judge in view of the rival contentions framed the following issues in T. S. No. 812084 :1. Is the suit maintainable? 2. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for khas possession as prayed for?3. Is the plaintiff entitled to mesne profits? if so, for what amount?; and in T. S. No. 240/84:1. The learned trial Judge in view of the rival contentions framed the following issues in T. S. No. 812084 :1. Is the suit maintainable? 2. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for khas possession as prayed for?3. Is the plaintiff entitled to mesne profits? if so, for what amount?; and in T. S. No. 240/84:1. Did the defendant No. 1 agree to the plaintiff's continuing in possession of the suit premises or any portion thereof as a monthly tenant from 1st July, 1974 at a monthly rental of Rs. 1100/- per month as alleged in paragraph 8 of the plaint?2. Did the plaintiff pay any rent to the defendant No. 1 without receipt?3. Has the plaintiff any right to claim tenancy in respect of suit premises or any portion thereof?4. Does the plaint of this suit disclose any cause of action?5. Is the suit as framed maintainable?6. Is the suit property valued and stamped?7. Is the plaintiff entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in the suit? ( 8 ) THE learned trial Judge decreed the suit of Manmal Bhutoria and dismissed the appellant's suit. ( 9 ) IN this Court an application for additional evidence has been filed. ( 10 ) MR. S. P. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the purported notice dated 24-1-74 terminating the tenancy is a manufactured document as would appear from the fact that the postal seal on the Acknowledgment Due would show a Pin Code No. but from a perusal of the application for additional evidence it would appear that it did not have any pin code number at the relevant time. The learned counsel further submitted that admittedly no rent receipt had been granted to the said Manmal Bhutoria and as such no relationship of landlord and tenant came into being. The learned counsel further submitted that the onus to prove about creation of new tenancy was on the defendant which he has failed to discharge. It was submitted that in view of the fact that Manmal Bhutoria has admittedly been staying in the possession certain correspondences with him were made in usual course of business. ( 11 ) IT was also urged that admittedly rent receipts were granted upto 1974. Mr. It was submitted that in view of the fact that Manmal Bhutoria has admittedly been staying in the possession certain correspondences with him were made in usual course of business. ( 11 ) IT was also urged that admittedly rent receipts were granted upto 1974. Mr. Roychowdhury would urge that the Municipal Register showing payment of rent in favour of Manmal Bhutoria and consequent entry to the effect that he was a tenant is inadmissible in evidence. ( 12 ) IN support of his contention that the Court should allow the application of adduction of additional evidence, the learned counsel has relied on S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1356 and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lal Pancham, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1008 . ( 13 ) MR. Bachawat, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Company, on the other hand, submitted that the matter has to be considered keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances of this case. According to the learned counsel the company had surrendered tenancy under Registered cover with Acknowledgment Due and the Acknowledgment Due bears the signature of the appellant. According to the learned counsel the learned trial Judge had the occasion to consider the demeanour of the witnesses and, thus, if he had relied upon the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent and has not relied upon the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant, this court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction would not interfere therewith. It was submitted that a number of documents were brought on records to show creation of a new tenancy. It was further submitted that the Court itself compared the disputed signature with the admitted signature of the appellant but the appellant had not filed any application for appointment of any handwriting expert. It was submitted that a bare perusal of the carbon copies of the rent receipts filed by the appellants would show that they are all fabricated because of the following reasons :-1. No rent receipt has been granted in prescribed form. 2. All the papers appear to be of the same age. 3. The ink and the carbon copy used therein appear to be the same. 4. The receipt portion of the signature in most of the cases are across the paper. 5. Some of the documents bear overwriting. No rent receipt has been granted in prescribed form. 2. All the papers appear to be of the same age. 3. The ink and the carbon copy used therein appear to be the same. 4. The receipt portion of the signature in most of the cases are across the paper. 5. Some of the documents bear overwriting. ( 14 ) IN this connection the learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the deposition of witness Hub Narayan Tiwari, the Secretary of the Company. Our attention has also been drawn to the fact that the respondents have also proved the certified copy of the Register maintained under the Companies Act to show that Manmal Bhutoria had resigned. The certified copy of the register of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has also been brought on record to show that Manmal Bhutoria was the tenant. The learned counsel had also drawn our attention to the evidence of P. W. 2 examined on behalf of the appellant for the purpose that he was not a competent witness. It was urged that as the evidence which is sought to be brought on record by was of additional evidence was also put to the said witness, this Court should not allow the application for additional evidence for the purpose of filling up of the gap or lacuna. Reliance in this connection has been placed on State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, reported in AIR 1957 SC 912 and Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1416 . ( 15 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing for Manmal Bhutoria has drawn our attention to various documents to show that an independent relationship existed between the appellant and the respondent Manmal Bhutoria. ( 16 ) THE questions which, thus, arise for decision in these appeals are :-1. Whether in view of the admitted position that the company took a lease from the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, it surrendered the same?2. Whether a fresh tenancy was entered into by and between the appellant and the aforementioned Manmal Bhutoria? ( 17 ) AS both the aforementioned questions are inter-related and the decision in one Suit would have a direct impact on the other, both the questions may be considered together. Whether a fresh tenancy was entered into by and between the appellant and the aforementioned Manmal Bhutoria? ( 17 ) AS both the aforementioned questions are inter-related and the decision in one Suit would have a direct impact on the other, both the questions may be considered together. ( 18 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the matter any further, it may be noticed that the parties before the learned trial Judge agreed that the evidence in one case may be treated as evidence in other case. ( 19 ) IN a case of this nature apart from the direct evidence the circumstantial evidences have a great role to play. It is said that witnesses may lie but circumstances do not. While appreciating the evidence brought on records by the parties the Court in a case of this nature must also necessarily take into consideration the normal human behaviour as also its experience in such matter. ( 20 ) THE Court in a case of this nature cannot arrive at a finding on the basis of the consideration of abstract burden of proof but on consideration of the entire materials on record to arrive a findings on the basis as to in whose favour the preponderance of probability lies. It is also a trite law that the question of onus of proof loses its importance when both sides have adduced evidence. ( 21 ) IN Union of India v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. , reported in (1976) 3 SCC 32 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1414 ), the Apex Court observed that the question of onus is not important when the entire evidence is before the Court. Reference in this connection may also be made to M/s. Cox and Kings Ltd. v. Their Workmen, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1666 , para 34. ( 22 ) THE fact that Manmal Bhutoria resigned from the Directorship is not and cannot be disputed in view of the certified copy of the Register (marked Ext. A in T. S. 248/84) maintained under the Companies Act. It is also not disputed that Manmal Bhutoria after his resignation did not have any connection with the said company. By a letter dated 18th April, 1974 the Company terminated the lease in terms of Clause III (iii) of the deed of lease. They also tendered the arrears of Rs. A in T. S. 248/84) maintained under the Companies Act. It is also not disputed that Manmal Bhutoria after his resignation did not have any connection with the said company. By a letter dated 18th April, 1974 the Company terminated the lease in terms of Clause III (iii) of the deed of lease. They also tendered the arrears of Rs. 1,400/- for the months of May and June 1974 in lieu of notice. It was stated "we warn you that in case you fail to take possession of the said premises as stated hereinabove we shall not be liable and responsible towards payment of rent from expiry of June 1974 nor towards any of the terms or conditions under the deed of lease which please note". The aforementioned notice satisfies the requirements of Clause III (iii) of the deed of lease. No question has been raised about the validity of the notice by the Appellant but only receipt thereof has been questioned. A copy of the said notice was also sent to Manmal Bhutoria at 3 Leonard Road, Calcutta for information and for complying with the requisites contained in the above notice and negotiate with the landlord if required directly. ( 23 ) ADMITTEDLY the said notice was sent under Registered post. The resignation receipt has been proved by the Secretary of the Company. A presumption arises that a letter posted has reached the addressee. Such presumption becomes stronger in respect of a registered letter. In the Acknowledgment Due of course the postal seal (Ext. 3) appears to be wholly illegible. At this juncture we may consider the evidence of the postal peon. Sri Kedar Nath Chatterjee who on the date of his deposition, viz. 19-9-89 was only 35 years old. He brought the relevant record on the basis of the complaint which was lodged by the appellant on 9th August, 1989. He proved the letter which was marked as Ext. 6 with objection. He also proved the reply to the said letter which was marked as Ext. 7. According to him each delivery office under the postal rules have a pin code number. Princep Street Post Office allegedly became a delivery post office with effect from 11-6-75 and was allotted a pin code number under the rules. He, however, said that Ext. 3 bears postal stamp of Princep Street Office with pin code number. 7. According to him each delivery office under the postal rules have a pin code number. Princep Street Post Office allegedly became a delivery post office with effect from 11-6-75 and was allotted a pin code number under the rules. He, however, said that Ext. 3 bears postal stamp of Princep Street Office with pin code number. In his evidence, however, he admitted that he was not in employment in 1974 and he only joined his services in 1977. He could not state even by guess as to in which year he was transferred to Serampore Head Office. He joined the Princep Street Post Office only on 31st December, 1988 and at the relevant time he was attached to Yogayog Bhawan. He, however, admitted that he did not bring the office seal that was used by the Princep Street Post Office in the year 1974. He was not acquainted with handwriting of Tarak Nath Sha. He stated that he has no personal knowledge regarding the letter of complaint. He admitted that his knowledge was based on official records but no official records whatsoever had been produced in support of his statement. ( 24 ) THE learned trial Judge in his judgment under appeal did not rely on his evidence, inter alia, on the ground that Ext. 7 does not bear any date and reply was sought to be given on the next date. The learned trial Judge observed that the enquiry has allegedly been held in (sic) haste. He, however, is not correct in holding that the letter dated 9-8-1989 was received by the Postal Authorities on 4-8-1989. From the deposition of the appellant it appears that he had merely denied that the lease had been surrendered in the year 1974 and the new tenancy came into being in respect of the said premises in favour of Manmal Bhutoria. He further merely denied a suggestion that on the basis of a letter dated 18-4-1974 that the company surrendered the lease and the same was accepted. He also merely denied that Manmal Bhutoria was inducted as a tenant at a monthly rental of Rs. 1,100/ -. He stated that he had not received any notice from the company in 1974. Thus, he did not deny his signature on the Acknowledgment Due. ( 25 ) HE proved various office copies of the rent receipts which were marked Ext. 1,100/ -. He stated that he had not received any notice from the company in 1974. Thus, he did not deny his signature on the Acknowledgment Due. ( 25 ) HE proved various office copies of the rent receipts which were marked Ext. 3 series in his suit. The very look of the said receipts would show that the same are fabricated documents. It is interesting to note that from Exts. 3 to 3/216 the name of the company has been typed as 'bhutoria' whereas from Exts. 3/217 to 239 the same was typed as 'bhutoria' (sic ). There is absolutely no reason as to why in the said rent receipts the name of the company would be mis-spelt. Furthermore, the rent receipts do not show that the papers are old enough. There is no signature of any representative of the company showing receipt of any of the said rent receipts. Such rent receipts appear to have been prepared later on. Some of them bear overwriting. To top it all, language used in all the rent receipts are same. The appellant admitted that in some of the carbon copy receipts his signature did not appear and in some of them his son had put his signature. He alleged that rent from Bhutoria Brothers used to be sent to him each month. He admitted that he used to keep rent receipts prepared from before and as to when Bhutoria brothers used to tender rent receipts used to be granted to them. He proved two rent receipts Exts. A and A/1 which were dated 1st February 1974 and 1st March, 1974. He further stated that except 5 rent receipts (Exts. 3 to 3/4) no other rent receipt bear his signature under the heading Trustee but in the left hand corner of those other receipts his signature appears with an endorsement 'received in cash'. Some of the rent receipts do not bear his full signature but only initials. He denied his knowledge that Manmal Bhutoria was one of the Directors of defendant-Company. He, however, admitted that he knew Manmal Bhutoria. He admitted that his Advocate had duly been served notice of the documents including original letter from defendant to plaintiff dated 18-4-1974 and original letter from the defendant to N. P. Kshetry, Advocate dated 14-2-1984 and he had accepted the same by putting his signature in Acknowledgment Due slip. He, however, admitted that he knew Manmal Bhutoria. He admitted that his Advocate had duly been served notice of the documents including original letter from defendant to plaintiff dated 18-4-1974 and original letter from the defendant to N. P. Kshetry, Advocate dated 14-2-1984 and he had accepted the same by putting his signature in Acknowledgment Due slip. He admitted that security deposit amounting to two months' rent i. e. Rs. 1400/- was lying in deposit with him in favour of Bhutoria Brothers Pvt. Ltd. He denied a suggestion that the said amount had been adjusted with the rent for the months of May and June, 1974. ( 26 ) IN this context it may be necessary to consider the documents produced by Manmal Bhutoria. Exbts. A. and A/1, produced by him however, appear to be original receipts which bear the signature of the appellant showing receipts of the amount of Rs. 700/- in each. One of (sic) the said receipts which were received by one R. K. Gupta on 6-3-74 and 4-4-74 respectively. ( 27 ) AS far as back on 26-3-1979 a letter in Hindi was addressed by Manmal Bhutoria in his own letter-head and not in the letter-head of the company asking the appellant to make certain repairs which he had earlier promised. However, according to the appellant though he had received the said letter, the date of the said letter was 31-7-81 which on the face of it appears to be false as a new date had been put in. The date 31-7-1981 appear to have been put in at a latter date. ( 28 ) ON 2-7-1974 Manmal Bhutoria had written a letter to Sri Tarak Nath Sha wherein it was specifically stated that he had agreed to allow him to occupy premises at 3, Leonard Road, Calcutta along with the adjoining vacant land comprised in the said premises on a monthly rental of Rs. 1,100/- as a monthly tenant on and from 1st July, 1974. The appellant did not deny receipt of the said letter. The other letters were also sent under Registered cover with Acknowledgement Due bearing the respective dates. By another letter dated 28-4-1983 the appellant was requested to consider his complaint as regard leakage in the roof. Receipt of the said letter also stands proved. The appellant did not deny receipt of the said letter. The other letters were also sent under Registered cover with Acknowledgement Due bearing the respective dates. By another letter dated 28-4-1983 the appellant was requested to consider his complaint as regard leakage in the roof. Receipt of the said letter also stands proved. By another letter dated 7th June, 1983 Sri Manmal Bhutoria had thanked the appellant for bringing the mistry and showing the repairs of the roof and he was requested to ask him to complete the job before monsoon. It is also admitted that the appellant had handed over one rent receipt to him, for the purpose of assessment of rates by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. ( 29 ) BY another letter dated 20th October, 1983 Sri Bhutoria while sending his greetings for Vijaya requested him to accept rent by cheque in place of cash, if the same was not inconvenient to him. He had also asked him to come and see the bathroom which required repairs and at that point of time further discussions were to take place. By a letter dated 9th February, 1984 original whereof was sent by hand and the copy by Registered Post with A. D. also he categorically stated that he was inducted as a tenant after he ceased to be a Director of the Company. He stated that for almost past 10 years he had been a tenant. ( 30 ) IT is admitted that amongst other documents in the records of the Corporation of Calcutta Mr. Bhutoria's name appears as a tenant. In the said letter, a complaint was made that no rent receipt was granted and he understood that this was also the practice with M/s. Bhutoria Brothers (P) Ltd. All these letters were neither replied to nor receipt thereof have been denied. A similar letter was issued to the appellant's advocate by Sri Bhutoria by a letter dated 12th March, 1984. In all such letters which were sent under Registered cover and in respect of some of them as the A/d cards had not come back, Sri Bhutoria had sent letters to the Superintendent of Post Office and on each such occasion it was confirmed that such letters were delivered to the appellant. In all such letters which were sent under Registered cover and in respect of some of them as the A/d cards had not come back, Sri Bhutoria had sent letters to the Superintendent of Post Office and on each such occasion it was confirmed that such letters were delivered to the appellant. To crown it all the Annual Registers of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation clearly show that the Annual valuation of the land was calculated at 4,800/- i. e. at the rate of 400/- rupees per month and Sri Bhutoria was a tenant in the suit premises. It further appears that even during pendency of suit Sri Manmal Bhutoria had deposited the rent before the City Civil Court. ( 31 ) THE Court is required to consider the cumulative effect of all the materials and there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that keeping in view the fact that the plaintiffs had manufactured rent receipts and also sought to put a date in the Hindi letter addressed by Manmal Bhutoria to the appellant clearly go to show that Manmal Bhutoria became a tenant of the appellant in his personal capacity. The position might have been different if Sri Manmal Bhutoria continued to occupy the said premises as a director of the company. ( 32 ) THE appellant did not reply to any of the letters of Sri Manmal Bhutoria; one of which, as noticed hereinbefore, clearly stated that he had been inducted as a tenant on payment of a sum of Rs. 1100/- p. m. It has also been proved beyond all shadow of doubts that Manmal Bhutoria resigned from the Directorship of the Company in the year 1974, for whose benefit the company took the premises on rent. ( 33 ) IN Ramji Dayawala and Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Invest Import, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 80 : ( AIR 1981 SC 2085 ) the Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine of acceptance sub silentio. The said doctrine applies in all fours in the fact of this present case. ( 34 ) FURTHERMORE it is now a trite law that the appellate Court would be slow to interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Court. ( 35 ) IN Kalipada Saha v. Sm. The said doctrine applies in all fours in the fact of this present case. ( 34 ) FURTHERMORE it is now a trite law that the appellate Court would be slow to interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Court. ( 35 ) IN Kalipada Saha v. Sm. Lila Rani Saha, reported in (1995) 1 Cal HN 284, a Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member, held :"moreover the learned Court below upon appraisal of the evidences brought on records accepted the plea of marriage. Such a finding based or oral testimonies of the witnesses shall not be ordinarily interfered with by the Appellate Court. In Madholal v. Official Assignee of Bombay, reported in AIR 1950 FC 21, it has been observed :"it is true that a Judge of first instance can never be treated as infallible in determining on which side the truth lies and like other tribunals he may go wrong on question of fact but on such matters if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at, the Appeal Court should not lightly interfere with the judgment". ( 36 ) TO the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhusudan Das v. Narayani Rai, reported in AIR 1983 SC 114 . In this case, the learned trial Court had considered the testimonies of the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff relating to the fact at issue. I find that the findings arrived at by the trial court are reasonable and as such there is no reason as to why this court would differ with the said findings on the aforementioned point. ( 37 ) IN Rajbir Kaur v. M/s. S. Chokosiri and Co. , reported in AIR 1988 SC 1845 , the Apex Court upon consideration of a large number of decisions observed as follows :-18 Reference on the point could also usefully be made to A. L. Goodhard's Article (71 LQR 402 at 405) in which the learned author point out :'a Judge sitting without a jury must perform dual function. The first function consists in the establishment of particular facts. This may be described as the perceptive function. It is what you actually perceive by the five senses. it is a datum of experience as distinct from a conclusion. The first function consists in the establishment of particular facts. This may be described as the perceptive function. It is what you actually perceive by the five senses. it is a datum of experience as distinct from a conclusion. ''it is obvious that, in almost all cases tried by a Judge without a jury, an appellate Court, which has not had an opportunity of seeing the witnesses, must accept his conclusions of fact because it cannot tell on what ground he reached them and what impression the various witnesses made on him'. ( 38 ) THE following is the statement of the same principle in 'the Supreme Court Practice' (White Book 1988 Edn. Vol. 1 ). 'great weight is due to the decision of a Judge of first instance whenever, in a conflict of testimony, the demeanour and manner of witnesses who have been seen and heard by him are material elements in the consideration of the truthfulness of these statements. But the parties to the cause are nevertheless entitled as well on questions of fact as on questions of law to demand the decision of the court of Appeal, and that Court cannot excuse, itself from the task of weighing conflicting evidence, and drawing its own conclusions, through it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. ". . . . . . . . . . NOT to have seen witnesses puts appellate Judges in a permanent position of disadvantage against the trial Judge, and unless it can be shown that he has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage for - for example has failed to observe inconsistencies or indisputable fact or material probabilities (ibid. and Yuill (1945)/15; Watt v. Thomas (1947) AC 484 ).- the higher Court ought not to take the responsibilities of reversing conclusions so arrived at merely as the result of their own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses, and of their view of the probabilities of the case. . . . . . . . . . . "". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BUT while the Court of Appeal is always reluctant to reject a finding by a Judge of the specific or primary facts deposed to by the witnesses, especially when the finding is based on the credibility or bearing of a witness, it is willing to form an independent opinion upon the proper inference to be drawn from it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 39 ) A consideration of this aspect would be incomplete without a reference to the observations of B. K. Mukherjee, J. , in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, 1950 SCR 781 at p. 783 : AIR 1951 SC 120 at p. 121, which as a succinct statement of the rule cannot indeed be bettered :"the question for our consideration is undoubtely one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeals lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is -- and it is nothing more than a rule of practice--that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. ""the area in which the question lies in the present case is the area of the perceptive functions of the trial Judge where the possibility of errors of inference does not play a significant role. ""the area in which the question lies in the present case is the area of the perceptive functions of the trial Judge where the possibility of errors of inference does not play a significant role. The question whether the statement of the witnesses in regard to what was amenable to preception by sensual experience as to what they say and heard is acceptable or not is the area in which the well-known limitation on the powers of the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence falls. The appellate court, if it seeks to reverse those findings of fact, must give cogent reasons to demonstrate how the trial Court fell into an obvious error. With respect to the High Court, we think, that, what the High Court did was perhaps even an appellate Court, with full-fledged appellate Jurisdiction would, in the circumstances of the present case, have felt compelled to abstain from and reluctant to do. Contention (c) would also require to be upheld. " ( 40 ) ONCE it is held that Shri Manmal Bhutoria became a tenant under the appellant, surrender of the tenancy by the companyand acceptance thereof by the appellant would be deemed to have been proved. ( 41 ) A question also arose as to whether the learned trial Judge ought to have compared the disputed signature of the appellant with his admitted signature. ( 42 ) ALTHOUGH there appears to be divergent views on the subject, there cannot be any doubt that although court is said to be expert of all experts, in such matter it should be slow to undertake such a task upon itself. Ordinarily, the Court should examine a disputed signature with the aid and assistance of a handwriting expert. But the Court should also satisfy itself that the demand for sending the disputed signature is not frivolous and for that purpose it may also examine the same with his naked eye. In the instant case, even no such application has been filed. ( 43 ) SO far as the question of adduction of additional evidence is concerned, the same would depend on fact of each case. ( 44 ) IN Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh , reported in AIR 1951 SC 193 , the law has been stated to the effect that the appellate Court was not justified in admitting the additional evidence to fill up a lacuna. ( 44 ) IN Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh , reported in AIR 1951 SC 193 , the law has been stated to the effect that the appellate Court was not justified in admitting the additional evidence to fill up a lacuna. ( 45 ) YET again in Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, reported in AIR 1990 SC 325 , the Supreme Court refused to permit adduction of additional evidence as such a plea had not been taken before the courts below. In S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1356 , the Apex Court was considering a matter under Income-Tax Act. ( 46 ) IN the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1008 , it was held (at p. 1012 of AIR) :"no doubt, under R. 27, the High Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the High Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the High Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. The High Court does not say that there is any such lacuna in this case. On the other hand, what it says is that certain documentary evidence on record supports in a large measure the plaintiffs contention about fraud and mala fides. " ( 47 ) THIS decision, therefore, goes against the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury inasmuch as keeping in view the documentary evidences apart from the oral evidences we are satisfied that learned trial Judge had arrived at a correct finding. ( 48 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Judge are affirmed but in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. 49. I agree. Appeals dismissed.