JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J. :- The present revision petition has come up before us on a reference order made by a Single Judge ( Bhawani Singh. J.) dated 11.8.1992. This reference was necessitated because of the different interpretations put on the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. 1986 (herein after to be called as the Act) by various High Courts. The said Act was enacted as a result of the decision of the apex Court which is now the celebrated case of Shah Bano Begum, reported as Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. (AIR 1985 Supreme Court, 945). As noticed, in the reference order the High Courts of Patna. Andhra Pradesh. Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, Rajasthan and Kerala have .taken the view that after the commencement of the Act no claim for maintenance is admissible under Section 125. Code of Criminal Procedure except by mutual agreement irrespective of the act whether the order for maintenance has been passed priori to the commencement of the Act or subsequent thereto. 2. On the other hand, the High Courts of Gujarat, Calcutta, Kerala, Guwahati, Punjab & Haryana and Karnataka in another case have taken the view that the Muslim women are entitled to maintenance and provisions of Section 125 and 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable and enforceable even after the period of Iddat whether the order is passed before the commencement of the Act or thereafter. 3. However, the position has now been settled by the apex court in Secretary. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board & Anr: v. Syed Fatima Nachi (1996 CRL. .LJ. 3488). It has been laid down therein that in a proceeding under the Act. she (wife) is entitled to plead and prove the facts in one proceedings as to inability of her relations mentioned in sub-section (1) to maintain her by directing her claim against the State Wakf Board in first instance. She is not required to proceed against her relatives mentioned in sub- section (1) first in the order they are mentioned and then finally to initiate proceedings against Wakf Board. Provision of Section 4. sub- sections (1) and (2) has been held by the apex court to be one integrated whole. 4. The above interpretation of Section 4 of the Act by the apex Court is due to the provisions of Section 3 thereof. Provision of Section 4. sub- sections (1) and (2) has been held by the apex court to be one integrated whole. 4. The above interpretation of Section 4 of the Act by the apex Court is due to the provisions of Section 3 thereof. The said Section relating to "Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce: Provided under sub-section (1) that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to: (a) a reasonable and air provision and maintenance to be made and paid to ha within the iddat period by her former husband. The iddat period has been defined under Section 2 thereof, to mean in the case of a divorced woman: three menstrual courses after the date of divorce, if she is subject to menstruation: and.(ii) three lunar months after her divorce, if she is not subject menstruation. 5. This being the legal position, the impugned order passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate. Dehra on 18.6.1990 is liable to beset aside. By the said order the objection petition in the execution taken on record by the wife in the present case, which was filed by the husband before the lower court, was dismissed. Consequently, in view of the impugned order having been set-aside, the objection petition is allowed and the execution petition of the divorced wife, who was respondent therein, ii dismissed. 6. We have adopted the above course of finally deciding the revision petition in as much as the legal position having been now settled by the apes court, as indicated above, it would serve no purpose in sending the case back to the Single Judge for a decision on merits. 7. This revision petition stands disposed of accordingly. -