Judgment :- In this Writ Petition, the petitioners are the brothers, who have sought for issue of Writ of certiorari calling for records in File No. VIII/10-11/Cus./Div. 95 from the 2nd respondent, quash the Order-in-Original No. 2/AC/1996, dated 31-1-1996 passed by him and directing the 2nd respondent to restore the Sony Television set 29 "made in Japan intact with the other goods seized by the Customs Officers from the shop of the petitioner's father at Ahmedabad on 15-11-1995 as per Ex. "C" to the 1st petitioner at Madras or the 2nd petitioner at Ahmedabad or in the alternative to pay a sum of Rs. 68, 200/-. 2.The necessary facts for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition are these : The 1st petitioner has come down to Madras upon an invitation by his father-in-law late Sri Jugraj P. Jain to commence his own business and he is staying here since past more than one year. His father-in-law had promised to gift a colour T.V. set to his daughter, the wife of the 1st petitioner and accordingly, he had purchased one Sony Colour T.V. 29 made in Japan in the name of the 1st petitioner from an Air Passenger Sellaiyan Karunanidhi on 10-11-1995 for Rs. 65, 000/-. The 1st petitioner wanted to install that T.V. Set at his native place at Rajasthan and booked the same to Ahmedabad in the name of his wife Neelam through a courier service in the name and style of "Tirupati Air Cargo" between Madras and Ahmedabad having his office at N.S.C. Bose Road Cross, Madras-3. The 2nd petitioner is staying with his father and doing business in General Marchandise at Ahmedabad. The 1st petitioner asked the 2nd petitioner to get released the T.V. set from the Courier and keep it in his house so as to enable the 1st petitioner to carry the same to his native village during the next month. The baggage receipt No. 016809, dated 1-11-1995 and an affidavit executed by the said Air Passenger S. Karunanidhi on 10-11-1995 before Notary Public have been collected by the petitioner. 3.The said air parcel was intercepted by some customs officers from the courier's office at Ahmedabad on 15-11-1995. They recorded the statement of the owner of the courier service and seized the T.V. set under a panchanama on the same day. 3.The said air parcel was intercepted by some customs officers from the courier's office at Ahmedabad on 15-11-1995. They recorded the statement of the owner of the courier service and seized the T.V. set under a panchanama on the same day. The Customs Officers also raided the shop of the petitioner's father at Ahmedabad and recovered some non-notified imported goods from the shop worth about Rs. 3, 200/-. They also recorded the statement of the brother of the petitioner in vernacular. 4.The 2nd respondent issued a show cause notice dated 27-11-1995 to the 2nd petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why the Sony Colour T.V. set and other seized goods on 15-11-1995 under two different Panchanams should not be confiscated and why penalty under Sections 112(a) & (b) of the Customs Act be not imposed on him. The 2nd petitioner submitted his reply on 12-12-1995 stating that the television set was despatched from Madras by his brother and it is meant for household use. He has also produced the original baggage receipt and the affidavit executed by the air passenger and explained to the 2nd respondent that the seizure of the T.V. and other non-notified goods was illegal and requested him to release the goods and drop further proceedings against him. However, the Additional Collector, Customs (Preventive) Ahmedabad passed the impugned order directing confiscation of the T.V. Set and other miscellaneous goods and imposing a personal penalty of Rs. 7, 500/- against the 2nd petitioner by his Order-in-Original No. 2/AC/1996, dated 31-1-1996. The said order is the subject matter in this writ petition. 5.On behalf of the respondents, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs who is the 2nd respondent has filed a counter-affidavit. He has denied all the allegations and averments made in the affidavit filed by the 1st petitioner in support of the writ petition except those that are specifically admitted by him. He has raised preliminary issue of maintainability on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction and on the ground of availability of effective expeditious and alternative remedy. After narrating the facts which made them to seize the said T.V. set, he has stated that a show cause notice was issued to the 2nd petitioner on 27-11-1995 asking him to show cause as to why the goods of foreign origin valued at Rs. After narrating the facts which made them to seize the said T.V. set, he has stated that a show cause notice was issued to the 2nd petitioner on 27-11-1995 asking him to show cause as to why the goods of foreign origin valued at Rs. 47, 500/- should not be confiscated under Section 111(d) of the Act and why penalty should not be imposed on him under Section 112(a) and (b) of the Act. To the said show cause notice, the 2nd petitioner submitted his reply and after giving personal hearing and considering the arguments in his written reply, the order has been passed. He has further submitted that as the cause of action has arisen at Ahmedabad, the question of jurisdiction at Madras does not arise. He has also stated that the 1st petitioner was nowhere in picture till the order was passed. Since there were every reason to believe that the subject goods are smuggled, the said goods were confiscated in the adjudication proceeding. He has pointed out that since the petitioners have got alternative remedy, the present writ petition which has been filed without exhausting the said remedy is liable to be dismissed. 6.Heard Mr. M. Ranka, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. K. Ilias Ali, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents. 7.Mr. Ranka, learned Counsel raised number of contentions in this writ petition. He has contended that the impugned order dated 31-1-1996 passed by the 2nd respondent is absolutely void and without jurisdiction. Since the 2nd respondent has usurped jurisdiction upon wrong assumption of facts and conducted the proceedings in a manner contrary to law and offending the sense of justice and fair play. The impugned decision of the 2nd respondent is based on patent misconstruction of the provisions of the Customs Act and the amended Baggage Rules as per various notifications of the Central Government. According to the learned Counsel, he submitted that in respect of Sony Colour T.V. set, the 2nd petitioner had properly produced the baggage receipt dated 1-11-1995, Ex. A.1 which goes to show that the said T.V. was properly purchased from the Air Passenger and that too under his affidavit duly authenticated by a Notary Public of Madras. According to the learned Counsel, he submitted that in respect of Sony Colour T.V. set, the 2nd petitioner had properly produced the baggage receipt dated 1-11-1995, Ex. A.1 which goes to show that the said T.V. was properly purchased from the Air Passenger and that too under his affidavit duly authenticated by a Notary Public of Madras. The opinion expressed by the second respondent that the baggage receipt was issued for an old T.V. whereas the subject T.V. is totally new and unused is absolutely unwarranted and uncalled for. It was for the Customs Officers at the Airport who should have raised such objections before clearing the goods under the baggage receipt. 8.He has pointed out that the subject goods is neither prohibited nor notified nor specified under Section 11B or 123 of the Customs Act. Since the goods seized by the Customs Officers have neither notified under Section 123 nor covered by Chapter IVA of the Customs Act, it would not justify a presumption as to their smuggled character. The second respondent was not at all justified in placing the burden on the petitioners to prove the lawful origin of the goods in India. Confiscation of goods under Section 111(d) of the Act in permissible only when there is a proved importation of goods in contravention of any statutory provision. Since the subject matter of goods were not seized from the possession of any of the petitioners during the course of importation from any foreign country, nor during any attempt of the petitioners to bring the subject goods within Indian Customs Water, the order of confiscation is illegal. 9.Learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents tried to justify the order passed by the 2nd respondent. He submitted that the confiscation of 29 "Sony Colour T.V. has been done since it has been proved beyond doubt that it is a case of illegal importation without paying any customs duty. Hence, there was every reason to believe that the subject goods are smuggled one. He has further submitted that it is the responsibility of the air passengers to give their correct address in the baggage receipt and it is practically impossible for the Customs Officers present at Airport to ascertain the authenticity of the address mentioned by each and every air passenger in their respective baggage receipt. He has further submitted that it is the responsibility of the air passengers to give their correct address in the baggage receipt and it is practically impossible for the Customs Officers present at Airport to ascertain the authenticity of the address mentioned by each and every air passenger in their respective baggage receipt. Since the baggage receipt produced before the 2nd respondent pertains to an old and used T.V. under T.R. Concession, while the 29" * Sony Colour T.V. seized by the Customs Officers is a brand new piece in original packed condition, the said baggage receipt did not pertain to the T.V. in question. 10.Further, as regards the claim of the petitioner that the goods seized by the Customs Officer are not covered under Section 123 of the Act, learned Counsel for the respondents has relied on the decision in Jain Enterprises v. Collector of Customs and submitted that the provisions of Section 123 of the Act is rightly applicable. He has submitted that it is beyond doubt that the goods under seizure i.e. 29 "colour T.V. and other miscellaneous goods have been acquired/possessed in total disregard to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, Import Control Order, 1955 and Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 and as such, they are liable for confiscation. 11.Since the respondents have raised the preliminary objection of maintainability of the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction and also on the question of alternative remedy being available to the petitioners, let me consider those preliminary objections first. 12.Consequent upon insertion of Clause (1A) re-numbered as 01.(2) In Article 226 of the Constitution of India by 42nd Amendment, the Writ of every High Court runs beyond its territory. Now, the jurisdiction of a High Court can be invoked if the cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India reads as follows :" * The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writ to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. "13.In this connection, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions : in Veeri Chettiar v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay learned Counsel placed reliance on the following passage at page 670 : In reply the petitioners contending contra state that under Art. 226 (1A) of the Constitution of India a part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu and the notice initiating the impugned proceedings were all received by the respondent in the State of Tamil Nadu and therefore this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and pass necessary orders thereon. They deny that no writ can lie against the person of the respondent and that the action proposed by the respondent is wholly without jurisdiction and therefore a writ of prohibition is the only effective remedy, though other alternative remedies are available under the Act after an illegal order of assessment is passed. "At page 672 of the same decision, this is what this Court has observed :" * One other incidental contention is that this court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ because no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court. We do not agree. Under Art. 226(1A) of the Constitution of India, the High Court has the power to issue directions order or writs to any Government, authority or person provided the cause of action for the issuance of such a rule under Art. 226 (1A) wholly or in part, arises, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. What then is the cause of action that is referred to in this sub-clause of Art. 226 of the Constitution? "Cause of Action" has always been understood as referrable to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and if a limb of that bundle of facts is available, seen or discernible in one particular place which is a seat of the High Court, then such High Court has the power to exercise all the powers conferred on it under Art. 226 (1A) notwithstanding the fact that the authority against whom the ultimate rule has to be issued and whose act has created a cause of action as a whole or in part, is situate outside its territorial limits. "14.The next decision on which the learned Counsel placed reliance is in M/s. The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd., Coimbatore v. Ramachandra C. Oza and Others 1974 AIR(Mad) 209 ) and he invited my attention to paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 which read as follows : The" * 9. meaning of the expression 'cause of action' has been the subject of judicial discussion in several cases. In Read 10. V. Brown 1888 (22) QBD 128, Lord Esher M.R. Defined 'cause of action' to mean - "Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved." * Fry L.J. 11. in the same ruling observed - Every thing which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment must be part of the cause of action. "15.Reliance was also placed on the decision in Atlas Exporters and Another v. K.V. Irnirava, ACCIE in which the Bombay High Court in paragraphs 7 and 8 has observed as follows : In my" * 7. judgment, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Raval that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. In the first case of Motipur Sugar Factory, supra, it is apparent that no cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The impugned order taking over the affairs of the Sugar Factory had been passed in Bihar. The registered office of the sugar factory was situated in Bihar. The impugned order had been passed by the Central Government in Delhi and was published in the Gazette of India which was also published at Delhi. By the Impugned order, the sugar factory situated in Bihar was closed down. On these facts, it was held that merely because the copy of the impugned order was forwarded to the Directors in Calcutta, or that the Company had Sales Office at Calcutta, could not confer jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the second case relied upon by Mr. Raval viz. In the second case relied upon by Mr. Raval viz. M/s. Swaika Properties, supra, the land situated at Rajasthan had been acquired, merely because the notice of acquisition was served upon the owner in West Bengal, the same was held to be insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court to exercise its powers under Article 226. The Notification for acquisition had become effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified lands became vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. In these circumstances, it was held that the entire cause of action arose in Rajasthan and the Calcutta High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 merely on the ground that the notices of acquisition had been served on the owners in West Bengal. In regard to the third case viz., East India Commercial Company supra, it is enough to observe that the same related to a point of time prior to the 15th and 42nd constitutional amendments whereby Clauses (1A) and (2) respectively were introduced. The observations contained in this case will, therefore, have no application to the facts of the present case.In the 8. present case, it will have to be noticed that the petitioners are carrying on business in Bombay. Under the relevant Export Policy, the Petitioners were engaged in the Business of Exporting readymade garments to U.S.A. This business of export was being carried on in Bombay. In view of the provisions of Article 226(2), the short question that will have to be decided is whether the cause of action to file the present petition either wholly or in part arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. It is true that the impugned order has been passed by the respondent No. 1 in Delhi. However, all the consequences that flow from that order are visited upon the petitioners in Bombay. By that impugned order, the petitioners' business of export being carried on in Bombay are vitally affected. It must therefore, be held that a part of the cause of action has arisen in Bombay. In my view, therefore, this court will have the jurisdiction to entertain and try this petition. In the case of Damomal v. Union of India reported in 1967 AIR(Bom) 355 , a Division Bench of this court on similar facts held that this court has jurisdiction. In my view, therefore, this court will have the jurisdiction to entertain and try this petition. In the case of Damomal v. Union of India reported in 1967 AIR(Bom) 355 , a Division Bench of this court on similar facts held that this court has jurisdiction. The impugned order in that case had been passed outside the jurisdiction of this court. The authority passing that order was also located outside its jurisdiction. Placing reliance on the 15th constitutional amendment which is identical to Clause (2) of Article 226 brought about by the 42nd Constitutional amendment, it was held : Even assuming that this order was made by the third respondent in New Delhi there can hardly be any doubt that the effect of this order fell on the petitioner at Ulhasnagar where he resides. It is also not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territories in relating to which this Court exercises jurisdiction ".In this view of the matter, it will have to be held that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try this petition." * 16.In the decision of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others the Supreme Court in paragraphs 5 and 6 has observed as follows : "5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, "within those territories" directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which its exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which its exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that atleast a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh 1889 16 ILR(Col) 98 , 102 : 15 1A 156] Lord Watson said :" * ...the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." " Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. "17.The learned counsel has also relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Indo Asahi Glass Co. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others wherein his Lordships' held thus : When the registered company of the petitioner is at Calcutta and carries on manufacturing activity in the State of Bihar and the show cause notice is issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Ranchi and the statutory appeal as provided for under the Act is now pending before the Court at Delhi, the writ petition ought to have been filed in the High Court at Patna, Ranchi Bench. Since neither the cause of action wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the High Court at Calcutta, the Writ Petition filed in the Calcutta High Court was not entertainable. "18.Placing reliance on the above decisions, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that consequent upon insertion of Cl. (1A) re-numbered as Cl. (2) in Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the jurisdiction of a High Court can be invoked if the cause of action arises wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. In the instant case, the television set was purchased by the 1st petitioner at Madras and despatched to Ahmedabad from Madras. The television set was meant for personal use of the 1st petitioner who is permanently staying at Madras and hence, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In the instant case, the television set was purchased by the 1st petitioner at Madras and despatched to Ahmedabad from Madras. The television set was meant for personal use of the 1st petitioner who is permanently staying at Madras and hence, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. He has also submitted that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is much wider because the High Courts are required to exercise the jurisdiction not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal rights. 19.On the other hand, the Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents submitted that the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction and has placed reliance on the following decisions : In Union of India and Others v. M/s. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. and Others the Supreme Court in paragraph 2 has observed thus : Ms. Oswal Woollen Mills Limited, having its registered office at Ludhiana in the State of Punjab and a branch office at Calcutta and Narayan Das Jain, Secretary of the Company have filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking various reliefs against the Union of India (through the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi), the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi, the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Amritsar, the Collector of Customs, Calcutta and the State Trading Corporation of India, New Delhi. The primary prayer in the writ petition is to prevent or to quash an apprehended or purported action under Cl. 8B of the Import Control Order. All the other reliefs sought in the writ petition involve round the principal relief regarding Cl. 8B of the Import Control Order. The other prayers are either ancillary or incidental to the principal prayer or are of an interlocutory character. Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents......against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi one would have expected the Writ Petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents......against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi one would have expected the Writ Petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The Writ Petitioners however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port. An inevitable result of the filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the Office of the Company is in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi. But we do feel disturbed that such writ petitions are often deliberately filed in distant High Courts, as part of a manoeuvre in a legal battle, so as to render it difficult for the officials at Delhi to more applications to vacate stay where it become necessary to file such applications. More about this later. "20.The next decision on which reliance was placed is a decision in State of Rajasthan and Others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and Another wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- The expression 'Cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure : "The cause of action" means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. "In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 5(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta, i.e., within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan, i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act became effective the moment It was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice of them by the special officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate Writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52 (1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose. "21.The next decision on which reliance was placed is a decision in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others (supra). In Paragraph 8, it is stated thus :" * From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the "Times of India" at Calcutta. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the "Times of India" at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta Office and revised the rates subsequently, when it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly speaking; NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta, and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi, that these would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi, of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the more fact that it sent fax message from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. "22.Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 23.After hearing the rival submissions and going through the various decisions cited by the learned Advocate which have been referred to above, I am of the opinion that the Writ Petition filed in this Court is maintainable. "22.Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 23.After hearing the rival submissions and going through the various decisions cited by the learned Advocate which have been referred to above, I am of the opinion that the Writ Petition filed in this Court is maintainable. The part of cause of action arose within the State of Tamil Nadu, as the television was purchased at Madras. The last petitioner is a resident of Madras. In view of Articles 226(2) of the Constitution of India, the High Court will have power of exercise jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 24.Now, let me consider the next preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) against the said adjudication order and hence, this writ petition should be dismissed on that ground. In fact, in the impugned order passed by the second respondents, it has been specifically mentioned that a person deeming himself aggrieved by the said order may appeal against that order to the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), Ahmedabad, within three months from the date of receipt of the order. The said order further says that any person desirous of appealing against this order, shall pending the appeal, deposit the duty demanded or the penalty levied therein and produce proof of such payment along with the provisions of section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962. 25.The argument of Mr. Ranka, learned Counsel for the petitioners was that as far as the first petitioner is concerned there was no show cause notice and no enquiry and hence, the impugned order is ab initio void. Further, the seizure of goods was ab initio void since the said goods does not fall within Section 123 (2) of the Act and it was not liable for confiscation since it is not covered by Section 11B or Section 123 of the Act. He further submitted that by virtue of Notification No. 4/93, all items mentioned under Section 11B of the Act have been rescinded. He further submitted that by virtue of Notification No. 4/93, all items mentioned under Section 11B of the Act have been rescinded. Since the order is ab initio void, according to learned counsel, the question of alternative remedy does not arise. Another submission was that, since the petitioners were not in a position to pay the penalty to file an appeal, they have approached this court by filing this writ petition. His last submission was that this writ petition was entertained by this Court and Rule Nisi has been issue and now it may not be proper to reject this writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy being available to the petitioners. 26.In this connection, he has placed reliance on the following decisions : 1. Shew Bhagwan Goanka v. The Collector of Customs and Another 1971 AIR(Cal) 112 ); 2. M.G. Abrol, Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay and Another v. M/s. Shantilal Chhotelal and Co. & Ors.; 3. Shri Madhav Mills Private Limited v. Union of India and Others; 4. Durlabhkumar v. The District Judge, Indore and Another 1973 AIR(Map) 175 ); and 5. M.R.F. Limited v. Union of India and Others. 27.In Shew Bhagwan Goenka's case (supra) learned Counsel placed reliance on paragraph 30 which read as follows : The next question to be considered is whether the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the petitioners right to relief in a writ petition. Section 128 of the Act provides for appeal from decisions or orders of customs authorities. In this case, the impugned decision is that of a Collector of Customs and therefore, an appeal lies from that decision to the Central Board of Revenue. Section 129(1) of the Act requires that pending the appeal the appellant should deposit with the proper officer the duty demanded or the penalty levied. From the order of the Central Board of Revenue an application in revision lies to the Central Government under section 131(1) of the Act. The statute therefore clearly provides for an alternative remedy to a party who is aggrieved by an order of the Customs authorities; and the question therefore is if the existence of such an alternative remedy bars a petitioner's right to relief in this application. The law on this question is now well-settled. The statute therefore clearly provides for an alternative remedy to a party who is aggrieved by an order of the Customs authorities; and the question therefore is if the existence of such an alternative remedy bars a petitioner's right to relief in this application. The law on this question is now well-settled. The existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to the jurisdiction of this court to issue appropriate writs and orders, but, is a matter which the court should take into consideration in exercising its jurisdiction in issuing appropriate writs and orders. This position has been affirmed in several decisions by the Supreme Court; Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairna; Union of India v. T.R. Varma; British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasgit Singh; Thansingh Natmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhupri; A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani; Faburam Prakash Chandra Maheswari v. Antarim Zilla Parishad; Additional Collector of Customs v. Shohanlal Bahl 1965 (69) Cal 439; Sova Chand Mulchand v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, 1968 AIR(Cal) 74". 28.In Dhurlabhkumar's case (supra) in paragraph 9 at page 175, the Madhya Pradesh Court has held thus : It was contended that as the alternative remedy of appeal, which was available to the petitioner, was not availed; of by him, relief under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be granted. In this question was considered by the Supreme Court and it was observed that...... "An order under Section 35 of the Income Tax Act is not applicable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-Tax. But, Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33A of the Act had not be expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income Tax Officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income Tax Officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits. In this view of the matter, it would not be right to reject this petition at this stage. 29.In M.G. Abrol, Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay and Another v. M/s. Shanthilal Chhotelal and Co. (supra) in paragraph 15, the Supreme Court has held as follows : Lastly it was argued that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the respondents had an effective remedy by way of appeal to higher Customs authorities. But the High Court rightly pointed out that the respondents had to effective remedy, and they could not file an appeal without depositing as a condition precedent the amount of penalty imposed on them. That apart, the existence of an effective remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court, but it is only one of the circumstance that the Court should take into consideration in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this case, the High Court thought fit to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not see any exceptional circumstances to interfere with its discretion. In the result, Civil Appeal Nos. 376 and 377 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. "30.In Shyam Sunder U. Nichani's case (supra) the Karnataka High Court in paragraph of the judgment has held thus :- The learned Standing Counsel, Central Government, raised a preliminary objection that as the petitioner has not availed of the remedy of appeal, the writ application should be dismissed. Without considering the points urged by the petitioner. In reply, Mr. Mahto argued that the writ application having been admitted in 1979 cannot now be defeated on the ground of alternative remedy being available. He appears to be right. Without considering the points urged by the petitioner. In reply, Mr. Mahto argued that the writ application having been admitted in 1979 cannot now be defeated on the ground of alternative remedy being available. He appears to be right. The case was admitted within the period of limitation available to the petitioner for appeal and therefore, in view of the decisions in Govind Saraj & Sons v. State of Bihar - 1983 PLJR 26 , Lowa Tanti v. State of Bihar - 1976 BBCJ 1 and Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly - the writ application cannot be rejected on the ground that the alternative remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner. "31.In M.R.F. Limited v. Union of India and Others (Supra), the Bombay High Court has held as follows : When an alternative remedy exists and the High Court entertains a petition and hears it on merits in spite of such alternative remedy having not been availed of, the High Court cannot loathe to decline to exercise the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. "32.On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that when the party has got an alternative and effective remedy by way of an appeal, normally High Courts will not entertain the matter by way of Writ Petition. He invited my attention to the decision in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandra Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others and placed reliance on paragraph 3 of the judgment which reads thus :- In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (A.I.R. SC. 603) A.P. Sen Exs. Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an officacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us, Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedure. That it has become necessary, even now for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us, Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedure. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require if that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But, then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the procedure by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. "33.The next decision on which reliance is placed is in The Collector of Customs, Customs House, Madras v. Madras Electric Castings P. Ltd., Madras of that judgment reads as follows : We may also point here that even otherwise also, it would not be just and appropriate for this Court to entertain the Writ Petition, because the order is appealable to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, which can go into questions of fact and law and can set aside or affirm or annul the order of remand it for fresh consideration. The order passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal can also be challenged before the Supreme Court. When there is efficacious alternative remedy provided it would not be just and appropriate for this Court even to adjudicate upon the validity of the Order of Collector, directing confiscation of the goods. It may be pointed out that directing or relating of the goods would arise only, if it is found that the confiscation ordered is not sustainable. The redemption of the goods can be allowed only if the goods are to be confiscated. Therefore, without going into the validity of the confiscation order, the direction of the nature issued in the writ petition is not permissible. The redemption of the goods can be allowed only if the goods are to be confiscated. Therefore, without going into the validity of the confiscation order, the direction of the nature issued in the writ petition is not permissible. "34.In Purvi Electronic Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India this Court was held as follows: - The High Court is not expected to enter into factual investigation in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is a tendency in recent times for people to by pass such special Tribunals for reasons best known to them. If in every case of disputed assessment, petitions are entertained by this Court it would lead to a situation where the very purpose of constitution of such Special Tribunals would be defeated. Therefore it is unnecessary for this Court to decide the contention raised by the petitioner in the Writ Petition and it is open for him to raise the same before the Appellate Tribunal. "35.Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this Writ Petition should be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have got an alternative remedy of appeal and without exhausting the said remedy, they have approached this Court by filing this Writ Petition. 36.It is true that the petitioners have got an alternative remedy of appeal and normally this Court will not entertain a Writ Petition when an alternative remedy is available to the parties. But the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order passed by the second respondent as far as the 1st petitioner is concerned is ab initio void. He has not issued with show cause notice and no enquiry was held against him. Hence he cannot file an appeal against the said order. Further, if at all the appeal has to be filed the petitioners have to file the said appeal at Ahmedabad. When I have held that this Court has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain this Writ Petition it may not be proper at this stage to dismiss the Writ Petition on this ground. Petitioner submitted that it is too enormous as it casts a heavy burden on the petitioners to depost the penalty levied on the 2nd petitioner as a condition precedent for entertainment of the appeal. Petitioner submitted that it is too enormous as it casts a heavy burden on the petitioners to depost the penalty levied on the 2nd petitioner as a condition precedent for entertainment of the appeal. Further as far as the 1st Petitioner is concerned, there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice and the order is a nullity. Further, the petitioners have alleged that the Collector had no jurisdiction to confiscate the goods which are not covered by Section 11B or Section 123 of the Customs Act. Hence, the above preliminary objection is also over-ruled. Accordingly, I reject the said contention of the learned counsel for the respondents and proceed to deal with the matter on merits. 37.Now let me consider the case on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the instant case, in respect of the Sony Colour T.V. set, the 2nd petitioner had properly produced the baggage receipt dated 1-11-1995 which goes to show that the subject T.V. was properly purchased from the Air passenger and that the under his affidavit duly authenticated by a Notary Public of Madras. Further, the opinion expressed by the second respondent that the baggage receipt was issued for an old T.V., whereas the subject T.V. is totally new and unused, is absolutely unwarranted and uncalled for. It was for the Customs Officers at the Airport who should have raised such objections, if any, before clearing the goods under the baggage receipt. He has further submitted that the second respondent has wrongly placed the burden of proof to show that the television was not a smuggled one on the petitioners which was illegal. In this connection, he has placed reliance on the following decisions. In Kanungo and Co., v. Collector of Customs and Others 1965 AIR(Cal) 248 ) paragraphs 8 and 9 read thus : The charge was one of importation of wrist watches without import licence. The petitioner admittedly had no licence. He, however, claimed to have legally purchased the watches or received some of them from customers for repair (vide his case as set out in the show cause notice - annexure `A' to the Petition). Even if this case be found to be unsubstantial, even then the case of unlawful importation of wrist watches by the petitioner, is not established. He, however, claimed to have legally purchased the watches or received some of them from customers for repair (vide his case as set out in the show cause notice - annexure `A' to the Petition). Even if this case be found to be unsubstantial, even then the case of unlawful importation of wrist watches by the petitioner, is not established. The petitioner may not have come to possess the wrist watches by lawful means, as alleged, but that does not lead to the further conclusion that the petitioner must have unlawfully imported the watches from across the customs barrier and thus come to possess the same. The burden of proving unlawful importation (excepting in cases under S. 178A of the Sea Customs Act and this case is not one such) is upon the Customs authorities. This is the view which was expressed by the Supreme Court in Ambalal v. Union of India and followed by Division Bench of this Court in Mangala Prasad v. V.J. Manerikar (68 Cal. WN 383). The question, therefore, is whether the Customs authorities failed to discharge this onus. Mr. G.P. 9. Kar, learned Advocate for the respondents, contended that the Customs authorities had disclosed to the petitioner materials on which they disbelieved the explanation given by the petitioner, namely, that the petitioner had locally purchased some of the watches and received others for repairs from different persons and thereafter the onus shifted with the petitioner to prove that the wrist watches had been lawfully imported. I am unable to upheld this argument. If the Customs authorities had led any prima facie evidence of illicit importation of the watches, I might have considered the question of shifting of the onus. Here the Customs authorities did nothing of the sort. Apart from showing that the petitioner had no valid importation licence and could not successfully explain how it came to possess the watches, the Customs authorities proved nothing more. What the Customs authorities proved do not lead to the inevitable inference that the petitioner must have illicitly imported the watches. The explanations given by the petitioner may be disbelieved but there may be other explanation for it. One such explanation of his possession of the wrist watches may be that he was in unlawful possession of the lawfully imported watches-say, for example, in possession of stolen watches, which had been lawfully imported. The explanations given by the petitioner may be disbelieved but there may be other explanation for it. One such explanation of his possession of the wrist watches may be that he was in unlawful possession of the lawfully imported watches-say, for example, in possession of stolen watches, which had been lawfully imported. That may make the petitioner liable under the law of crimes but that would not enable the Customs authorities to confiscate the watches. I, therefore, held that the mere possession of the watches by the petitioner company will not lead to the inevitable inference that he must have imported or been concerned in the importation of the watches seized from it. A contention similar to that made by Mr. Kar was made and overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of 1981 AIR(SC) 264 (supra). "38.The next decision on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Manicklal Sen and Another v. Additional Collector of Customs and Another and invited my attention to the following passage :- This case, although not strictly relevent, has an important bearing on the question of onus. The position seems to be as follows : The Sea Customs Act deals with offences which carry punishment, of confiscation or fine. The offence and the adjudication thereof, including conviction and punishment, are all of a penal nature. Such proceedings are therefore, in the nature of criminal proceedings. The general rule relating to all criminal proceedings is that a criminal charge has to be established by the prosecution to the hilt and the burden of proof is never on the accused. This fundamental principle of the burden of proof in criminal proceedings can only be carried by a statutory enactment. Under the Sea Customs Act, it has now been varied by the introduction of Section 178A, which has been quoted above. In this case, however, like to cite a Madras case as the facts are very similar to the present case. In Public Prosecutor, Madras v. M.L. Modi 1961 AIR(Mad) 368 , what happened was as follows : The petitioner H.L. Modi disembarked at Meenambakkam Aerodrome from an aeroplane which flew from Bombay to Madras. He was interrogated by Customs Officials and his trunk was searched. In Public Prosecutor, Madras v. M.L. Modi 1961 AIR(Mad) 368 , what happened was as follows : The petitioner H.L. Modi disembarked at Meenambakkam Aerodrome from an aeroplane which flew from Bombay to Madras. He was interrogated by Customs Officials and his trunk was searched. With the result that underneath certain articles of clothing a tin box was found containing 247 wrist watches of Record manufacture, most of them being new. He was charge-sheeted under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and was convicted. It was stated on behalf of the Customs authorities that the petitioner had made a statement admitting the broad facts, which was Ex. P.2 in that case. This was a revision to the Madras High Court which was allowed, Anantanarayanan, J. said as follows : "It is claimed by the learned Public Prosecutor that in his statement, Ex. P 2 the revision petitioner admitted that he was aware that there were watches upon which duty had not been paid. First of all, I am not all certain how far Ex. P 2 could be safely accepted and acted upon. Secondly, even if it is to be acted upon such an admission clearly cannot form the basis for any conviction of the revision petitioner. The prosecution must prove, by some other dependable evidence that these watches had been imported into India, without duty, and were, in fact, smuggled goods. Actually, the Legislature has been very well aware of the difficulty of proving this, and has enacted, Section 178-A(1) of the Act". 39.On the other hand, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel submitted that the second Respondent has correctly placed the burden of proof on the petitioners and the said order of confiscation does not suffer from legal infirmity. He pointed out that in proceedings for confiscation of goods under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, the function of weighing the evidence of its sufficiency is the business of the Collector or the appellate Authority which is the final Tribunal of fact. He has submitted that in the present case of confiscation of 29 "Sony Colour T.V. it has been proved beyond doubt that it is a case of illegal importation without paying any customs duty. He has submitted that in the present case of confiscation of 29 "Sony Colour T.V. it has been proved beyond doubt that it is a case of illegal importation without paying any customs duty. There was every reason to believe that the subject goods are smuggled and as far as baggage receipt is concerned, he has submitted that the air passengers had cleared an old and used T.V. under T.R. concession, while the 29" * Sony Colour T.V. seized by Customs Officers is a brand new piece in original packed condition having the literature, manual, etc. Further, as regards the claim of the petitioner that the goods seized by, the Customs Officer are not covered under Section 123 of the Act, the said submissions, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, is contrary to the decision in Jain Enterprises v. Collector of Customs 1986 (25) ELT 911 ]. He has submitted that the petitioners have acquired the said T.V. set in total disregard to the provisions of Section 11 of the Customs Act, Import Control Order, 1955 and Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 and hence, the act of the respondents in confiscating the said goods does not call for any interference. 40.He has placed reliance on the decision in Collector of Customs, Madras and Others v. D. Bhoormul in which it is observed as follows :- "(i) The propriety and legality of the Collector's order is to be judged in the light of the principles regarding the burden of proof. Legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. Since it is exceedingly difficult for the prosecution to prove the facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as a part of its primary burden. Legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. Since it is exceedingly difficult for the prosecution to prove the facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as a part of its primary burden. On the principle underlyings, 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden to establish the facts within special knowledge of a person lies on him and if he fails to establish the facts within special knowledge of a person lies on him and if he fails to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of facts may arise against him, which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in the result would prove him guilty. The first part of the entry in the third column of clause of S.167 of the Sea Customs Act regarding the penalty of confiscation of the goods casts less rigorous burden on the prosecution as the order operate intrem and is enforced against the goods only. (841 D: 841 D: E.F.). (ii) Although no direct evidence of the illicit importation of goods was adduced by the Department the fact that the goods were of foreign origin coupled with the inference arising from the dubious conduct of Babhoothmull and Bhoormul could reasonably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Collector that the goods were smuggled goods." * 41.On the above contentions, learned counsel submitted that there is no merit in this writ petition and it is liable to be dismissed. 42.The subject matter Sony Colour T.V. was purchased for household use from Mr. Sellaiyan Karunanidhi residing at No. 2-16, Mari Amman Oil Street, Tanjore District who had imported the same as baggage. He has also produced xerox copy of baggage receipt No. 16809 dated 1-11-1995 of Trivandrum Airport and the sale deed for the purchase of the said T.V. The television was not a specified goods and hence, the burden of proof that the goods under seizure was smuggled goods lies on the Department and not on the petitioners and the Department has not brought any direct evidence on record to prove that the television set is a smuggled goods. 43.When the second respondent was not prepared to accept the baggage receipt on its face value, then it was incumbent upon him to have adduced independent evidence to prove that the subject matter T.V. was indeed a smuggled one. In the absence of any tangible evidence to the contrary the second respondent was not justified in discarding the concrete evidence produced by the petitioners in support of their positive case. Further, the respondents have failed to prove that the subject goods is neither prohibited nor notified nor specified under Section 11B or 123 of the Act. Since the television set seized by the Customs Officers on 15-11-1995 was neither notified under Section 123 of the Act not covered by Chapter IV-A of the Act, it would not justify to draw a presumption that the said goods was a smuggled one. Further, the second Respondent was not at all justified in placing the burden on the petitioners to prove the lawful origin of the goods in India. When the petitioners have produced the baggage receipt and an authenticated affidavit from the concerned Air Passenger at Madras. Further confiscation of goods under Section 111(d) of the Act is permissible only when and where there is a proved importation of goods in contravention of any statutory provision. In the instant case, the subject matter of goods were not seized from the possession of any of the petitioners during the course of importation from any foreign country, nor during any attempt of the petitioners to bring the subject goods within Indian Customs Water. The said goods could not have been confiscated since it is not covered by either Section 11B or 123 of the Customs Act. Further, the 1st petitioner has paid the price and purchased the goods. The address on the baggage receipt is not written by any of the petitioners, but, the same has been written by the Air Passenger and counter-signed by the Baggage Inspector as well as the Superintendent at the Trivandrum Airport. The second Respondent ought to have made enquiries with the concerned Officers at the Trivandrum Airport and not with the Assistant Commissioner, Customs, Trichy. According to me, the materials collected by the Second respondent were not sufficient to connect the contravention alleged. The second Respondent ought to have made enquiries with the concerned Officers at the Trivandrum Airport and not with the Assistant Commissioner, Customs, Trichy. According to me, the materials collected by the Second respondent were not sufficient to connect the contravention alleged. The goods are seized long after they have been actually imported or brought as personal baggage by bona fide passengers and there being no direct evidence to identify such goods either having been imported without proper licence or of illicit origin, the seizure cannot be justified and the penalty imposed is beyond the jurisdiction of the Customs Authority. 44.Hence, for the reasons stated above, allow the Writ Petition. However, there will be no order as to costs.