JUDGMENT S.K. Dubey, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act') against the award dated 4.4.1995 passed in Claim Case No. 92 of 1990 by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Rewa. 2. The appellants filed an application for compensation of Rs. 5,73,424/- for the death of their breadwinner Ravendra Prasad caused in motor accident on 23.5.90 by the passenger bus No. MBS 1935 driven by respondent No. 2, owned by respondent No. 1 and insured with respondent No. 3. The appellants averred that when the deceased was going on a motor cycle with a pillion rider Rajendra Prasad, AW 2, on the uphill side of Rewa-Dabhora Marg, near blind turn the bus driver reversed the bus, as a result of which the motor cycle was dashed and entangled in the bumper of the bus. On account of this Ravendra Prasad came under the wheels and was crushed to death. 3. In the written statement filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in para 4 a specific plea was raised that the accident was caused due to the sole negligence of the motor-cyclist. When the bus was going on uphill side the motor-cyclist from the wrong side, overtook and came in front of the bus which suddenly dashed the motorcyclist from the left front side. The driver could not see the motor-cyclist as a result of which he was dashed and came under the wheels of the bus because at the spot there was a khai (ditch). On pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed the issues. Issue No. 1 related to negligence whether the non-applicant No. 2 was driving the bus in speed and negligently caused the injuries to Ravendra Prasad resulting in his death. 4. To prove the issue of negligence on the part of the bus driver, the appellants have examined the injured pillion rider Rajendra Prasad Tiwari, AW 2, who has categorically stated that the motor-cyclist was going ahead of the bus towards Rewa. He was sitting on the motor cycle as a pillion rider. After the turn the motor cycle was ahead about 10-15 yards. The bus was behind the motor cycle. Both the vehicles were going towards uphill side of the road. Bus dashed with its front side and hit the motor cycle from behind, as a result of which both fell down. After the turn the motor cycle was ahead about 10-15 yards. The bus was behind the motor cycle. Both the vehicles were going towards uphill side of the road. Bus dashed with its front side and hit the motor cycle from behind, as a result of which both fell down. He came in between the two wheels of the bus and was dragged. The motor-cyclist came under the front wheel of the bus who then died in the hospital. To establish the plea raised in defence the bus driver examined himself as NAW 1, who stated that the bus was going on the ascending side of the road. On the right side there is a khai (ditch). Near the turning the motor cycle came which struck with the left side of the bus and then got entangled with the bumper. When the passengers of the bus shouted, then he came to know and stopped the bus. He came down from the bus and saw the motor-cyclist and the pillion rider lying under the bus with the motor cycle. The Tribunal, after appreciating the evidence, believed the story set up by the bus driver and dismissed the claim. 5. Having heard Mr. Harish Agnihotri for the appellants, Mr. J.L. Mishra for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. R.P. Agrawal for the respondent No. 3 and on close scrutiny of evidence, we are of the opinion that this appeal deserves to be allowed. 6. In this case it is not denied by the respondents that the front portion of the bus dashed the motor-cyclist. However the defence is that the motor-cyclist came with speed and attempted to overtake the bus from the wrong side, resulting in the accident. NAW 1 has admitted that the motor-cyclist was hit from behind, by the front side of the bus. He also admitted in his statement that motor cycle as well as the motor-cyclist and the pillion rider came under the front wheels of the bus. He further admitted that when the passengers cried, he stopped the bus. He stated that the accident occurred because he could not see the motor-cyclist. To corroborate his statement none of the passengers who saw the accident and cried to stop the bus was examined who could have stated as to the manner and the circumstances in which the accident occurred. He stated that the accident occurred because he could not see the motor-cyclist. To corroborate his statement none of the passengers who saw the accident and cried to stop the bus was examined who could have stated as to the manner and the circumstances in which the accident occurred. Non-examination raises an adverse inference against the driver and owner falsifying the defence. From the evidence of AW 2 and the admission of the driver of the bus that motor-cyclist was hit from the front portion of the bus and from the circumstances, it is apparent that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the bus driver, who did not have a proper look out of the traffic on the road. His responsibility was greater being the driver of heavy vehicle. Heavier the vehicle, greater is the responsibility. In the circumstances reliance on a decision of Delhi High Court in Halima Khatoon v. N.D.M.C. 1994 ACJ 95 (Delhi), by the learned Counsel for the appellants is quite appropriate wherein a truck struck a scooter from behind killing the scooterist at the spot. Truck driver deposed that the scooter came at a fast speed and attempted to overtake the truck from the wrong side resulting in the accident, but, failed to support his testimony by any independent witness. The Court held that from the circumstances it is apparent that the truck had struck the scooter from the back and had not stopped for 15 to 20 ft. making it selfevident that the truck was being driven by the driver in a rash and negligent manner and the same resulted in the said accident causing fatal injuries to the scooterist. 7. Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence of appellant cannot be looked into as it was at variance with the pleadings, wherein a different type of negligence was pleaded. Counsel cited a Division Bench decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashadevi 1988 ACJ 846 (MP) and the decisions in Shakuntla v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 1989 ACJ 1063 (Rajasthan) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dakhi 1990 ACJ 827 (Rajasthan). 8. True, it is rule of practice that no amount of evidence can be looked into without the pleading and issues. Ltd. 1989 ACJ 1063 (Rajasthan) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dakhi 1990 ACJ 827 (Rajasthan). 8. True, it is rule of practice that no amount of evidence can be looked into without the pleading and issues. It would not be open to a party to attempt to sustain the claim on a ground which is entirely new. But in considering the application of this doctrine to the facts of a particular case Court must bear in mind the other principle that considerations of form cannot override the legitimate considerations of substance and the Court would not throw out the claim on mere technicality. If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial and did they lead evidence about it? If the Court or Tribunal finds that the parties have gone with the trial conscious of the issue of which no specific plea or issue was raised and adduce evidence relating thereto, the absence of specific pleading on the question will be a mere irregularity. See Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao AIR 1956 SC 593 , Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul AIR 1966 SC 735 and a decision of this Court in a motor accident's case in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha 1968 ACJ 1 (MP). 9. In this case on the pleadings of the parties issue No. 1 was raised. The parties led evidence. The driver led evidence conscious of the issue specially of the plea raised by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that the accident was not caused due to the negligence or any fault on the part of the respondent No. 1 the driver of the bus, but it was the deceased himself who was responsible for the accident who while overtaking the bus from the wrong side was dashed with the front side of the bus resulting in an accident. The plea raised by the respondent Nos. The plea raised by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 having not been found established in the circumstances of the case and we have answered the issue No. 1 in affirmative, therefore, the claim of the appellants cannot be thrown out for want of specific pleadings which in the circumstances will be merely an irregularity. 10. The decisions relied by learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 are distinguishable on facts. On the other hand the decision in Ashadevi's case 1988 ACJ 846 (MP), while reiterating the rule of practice observed that the Tribunal while deciding case of motor accidents is as much bound by the pleadings of the parties as 'civil Court', though pleadings in cases of claimants are liberally construed. 11. Coming to compensation: the deceased was aged about 32 years and was in regular employment working as samiti sewak in a cooperative society. He was getting Rs. 1,311/- per month. It is well settled that while applying the multiplier method future prospects on advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. [See: General Manager, Kerala State Road Trans. Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC)]. Therefore, to estimate the loss of dependency having regard to the prospects on advancement of future career it would be appropriate to estimate the monthly gross income of the deceased at Rs. 1,500/-, from this 1/3rd of the gross income towards personal living expenses of the deceased is deducted the balance amount would come to Rs. 1,000 per month, yearly Rs. 12,000/- as likely to have been spent on the members of the family. This loss of dependency should be capitalized with an appropriate multiplier of 16 looking to the age of the deceased, the widow and minor children, the compensation would work out to Rs. 1,92,000 to which is added the usual award of loss of consortium and loss to the estate a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses, the total would come to Rs. 2,09,000/- which would be a fair, just and reasonable compensation to which the appellants are entitled with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application, i.e., 30.8.1990 till realization. 12. 15,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses, the total would come to Rs. 2,09,000/- which would be a fair, just and reasonable compensation to which the appellants are entitled with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application, i.e., 30.8.1990 till realization. 12. As the respondent No. 3, the insurer of the vehicle has not disputed its liability on any of the grounds enumerated under Section 149(2) of the Act, therefore, we direct the respondent No. 3 to deposit the amount of compensation of Rs. 2,09,000/- with interest within a period of two months from the date of supply of certified copy. On deposit the amount shall be disbursed keeping in mind the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in Susamma Thomas's case 1994 ACJ 1 (SC) and Lilaben Udesing Gohel v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 1996 ACJ 673 (SC). 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The award of the Tribunal is set aside and is substituted as indicated hereinabove. The appellants will get the costs throughout which are quantified at Rs. 5,000/-.